is what I'd like to read. From Vandenbroucke, p.204 snip:
Attachment 1521
Regards
Mike
Printable View
is what I'd like to read. From Vandenbroucke, p.204 snip:
Attachment 1521
Regards
Mike
No Mike, the onus is not on me for this.
To me it is self evident what the duties of staff officers are having served with a wartime Brigade HQ 30 odd years ago. It appears that you do not understand the function of 'staff'. You then need to read up on it (enough in the public domain) to realise that Adm Train (or whatever his rank was at the time he served on Moorer's staff) could well have been in the loop with the unfolding Son Tay developments. The bottom line is that there is no reason to question the integrity of Train's quoted response in the Vandenbroucke interview.
To support this last sentence of mine I refer to Amidon:
In the context of this SWC discussion you (and others) are treating Adm Train in this manner. I note with interest the difference in your handling of the choice items you cherry picked from the various texts you quoted and Train's comments. Would you be happy to just ignore Train's input (for fear of where it will lead) as Moorer/Blackburn/Bennett did with the HUMIT for Son Tay and Browning did with the evidence of two Panzer Divisions around Arnhem?Quote:
Out-group Stereotypes: The inputs of individuals outside the group are not valued if they do not conform to the group’s view. Although mission planners had repeatedly lamented the lack of HUMINT and the overreliance on technical means, when the HUMINT contradicted their desire to “go,” the HUMINT was ignored. Twenty-six years later, in a 1996 interview, former Secretary of Defense Laird said that when presented with the information from the Hanoi HUMINT source, he did not judge it to be accurate or believable.
A case study in group think is developing nicely around this thread and the spirted defense of Moorer. Fascinating.
Methinks you edited and lengthened this post after my first response, no matter...
Can you hear the one hand clapping?
I was merely assuming that you had the smarts to know that but... go on prove me wrong then.Quote:
Your presumption that I would conclude the intelligence to be too thin is pretty sweeping.
Me, risk averse? Got the wrong guy in mind. I can think of a couple of hundred people who would find that pretty funny. Been called a lot of things in my time (both good and bad) but never risk averse.Quote:
I think you are overly risk-averse, ...
You need help again. This time read your own manual FM 6.0 about the difference between taking a calculated risk and a gamble:Quote:
... so I understand how that could frame your views and your opinion of what a responsible commander looks like, but you really shouldn't let your values, opinions, and judgment speak for what posters should or shouldn't be inclined to think.
Got the picture now?Quote:
2-94. A calculated risk is not the same as a military gamble. A calculated risk is an exposure to chance of injury or loss when the commander can visualize the outcome in terms of mission accomplishment or damage to the force, and judges the outcome as worth the cost. Taking a calculated risk is acceptable. A military gamble is a decision in which a commander risks the force without a reasonable level of information about the outcome. In the case of a military gamble, the commander decides based on hope rather than reason. The situations that justify a military gamble occur when defeat or destruction of the friendly force is only a matter of time and the only chance for mission accomplishment or preservation of the force lies in the gamble.
Incredulous that you and others seem to be so imperceptive so as to fail to pick up on the key aspects of this issue and continue to blindly argue in favour of a man who when his moment came failed to make the most simple decision. (This is why I referred to the book; The Stress Effect: Why Smart Leaders Make Dumb Decisions)Quote:
It would be better to simply say, "I wouldn't have done that," and call it a day. Instead you are just incredulous that others might disagree with you. It's okay, really. it happens often here.
Officers are (or should be) judged on their ability to apply good judgement and display a keen ability to quickly and accurately grasp the critical elements of a given situation. Not too much of that around here sadly.
If you have been reading this thread you will know what actions I have commented on.Quote:
Which actions? Again, you've been all over the map, so clarify what you are talking about.
Silly.Quote:
What is your definition of confirmation? A POW waving into the night as an SR-71 flew overhead?
Here you surmise in favour of three people (Moorer/Blackburn/Bennett) who got it badly wrong. What was the standard they applied in May 1970 when the reached the decision that 61 POWs were in Son Tay?Quote:
I for sure am not talking about that level of intel, and I surmise that the planners did not believe they needed that standard to be able to advocate a go for the mission.
You seem unable to grasp that after the operational planning got under way and picked up momentum (like with Market Garden) the boot moved to the wrong foot in that the INTEL people had to prove the camp was empty rather than merely cast reasonable doubt as to a POW presence (which given the location of Son Tay and all the related risks) which would have led to an abort.
And the bad news is that Adm Train (the man whose testimony you all want to just go away) indicates what they knew and when they knew it.Quote:
You may be prescribing that standard here, and that's okay, but the whole point to this discussion is what the planners knew, when they knew it, and what other information impacted in the decision-making process (there was a lot).
I'm sure you think that but I'm not sure you could support that with any concrete facts, could you?Quote:
I think it's fair to say that there were a significant number of details, decisions and factors impacting on the process at the time, and there is a wide range of potentially contradictory information that exist.
I seldom enter the fray if I don't have the ammunition to support my case. I stated that Moorer made an imbecilic decision (along the lines of The Stress Effect: Why Smart Leaders Make Dumb Decisions) which could be explained by his being newly appointed, the Peter Principle kicking in or a range of other reasons.Quote:
I still believe that the planners tried to make conscientious decisions in the process. You don't seem to think so, and again, that's fine, but don't be surprised that you're expected to bring your A-game when making weighty posts like you have, and to defend your point of view with information.
You don't believe or you don't want to believe? Now your problem would come if you were asked to substantiate that.Quote:
At the end of the day, I don't believe Moorer to be a moral coward, imbecile, or unintelligent, and the contrasting viewpoints in this thread simply demonstrate the beauty of how people can come to different conclusions over the same bit of information.
Quote:
What is your definition of confirmation? A POW waving into the night as an SR-71 flew overhead?
I was being flippant to make a point, but are you going to answer the question? It was still directed at you and was not rhetorical.Quote:
Silly.
What standard do you believe they should have used to achieve confirmation or denial? A single source HUMINT report? A knock at the front gate?
And don't reply with, "well, the intel should have been better than what they had," because that's just moving the goal posts in circles. We know they should have had better intel, and there hasn't been anyone in this thread who has said otherwise.
Quote:
Quote:
At the end of the day, I don't believe Moorer to be a moral coward, imbecile, or unintelligent, and the contrasting viewpoints in this thread simply demonstrate the beauty of how people can come to different conclusions over the same bit of information.
You really don't have any idea how this discourse is supposed to work right now, do you? You are just talking in circles at this point.Quote:
You don't believe or you don't want to believe?
I...don't...believe...Moorer...to...be...a...moral...coward...imbecil e...or..unintelligent.
I don't need to. I have substantiated it already, at least the reason why I come to that conclusion.Quote:
Now your problem would come if you were asked to substantiate that.
I put the Vandenbroucke material on the end of spoon for you. Did you even read it and find the reference to the point made about the 3-13 November activity?
I called; you didn't show the cards - end game.
Regards
Mike
You are being silly again.
My standard is unimportant... and your demand for such is an attempt to draw that into the discussion is just a red herring.
The simple fact is that after 14 July 1970 for the four months and one week until the raid went ahead on 21 November 1970 no INTEL was produced to prove the camp was still occupied by US POWs. In other words no confirmatory INTEL.
In fact the evidence of a POW presence had deteriorated to so tenuous a level that Pres Nixon was deliberately deceived by not being informed of either the lack of activity in the camp nor the HUMINT report that the POWs had been moved.
To help you obtain a simple grasp of the Son Tay issue I suggest you read Amidon's document. You really need to attempt to approach this in an investigative and enquiring manner rather than mere resort to high school debating tactics driven by a desire to be blindly loyal to a man who screwed up big time.
Look I don't understand your inability to understand the most simple truth... and that being the camp was empty. There were no POW's there... the evidence points to that this was known by Moorer/Blackburn/Bennett before the raid was launched. Yet it went ahead placing the soldiers and airmen involved at an unacceptable risk on a fruitless exercise.
The charade of Son Tay resulted in the consolidation of US POWs to location beyond the reach of rescue.
If you want to do it you need to do it right but with the best will in the world and the best troops it is the string of intelligence failures and severe limitations in the top levels of US military command (at the time) that made these kind of operations a near impossibility to conduct effectively.
p.65 (p.64 is unavailable from Google)
Attachment 1522
Best I can do given attachment limits (enlarge your view to 150% or so).
and p.66
Attachment 1525
and p.67
Attachment 1526
Regards
Mike
JMA: based on the ad hominems you've been tossing at me for the last couple of days, I don't think I owe you the time of day or a link.
For the benefit of the others here, go to Google Books, Perilous options: special operations as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy By Lucien S. Vandenbroucke (url on my computer - it goes to Page 200 - use "Previous Page" on the right of Page 200 to get to pages 65-67).
Vandenbroucke was a State Dept. guy who generally took a negative view of special ops because of what he believed to be their negative impact on US foreign policy.
Regards
Mike
Mike,
It probably won't surprise you when I tell you most State P**ks still have a negative view and they are constantly telling us "other than State personnel" about our negative impact on foreign policy. It would be the chargé d’affaires who told us the Rwandan refugee crisis will last "two weeks tops" in July of 94 :D
Regards, Stan
Mike, with respect to you and given your approach to this thread being rather as one would expect from Moorer's legal team rather than someone attempting to find the truth you have hitherto got off lightly IMHO.
FWIW I have attempted to read the preview link and using three browsers (IE. Safari, Firefox) I continue to get 'No Preview Available' so must make do with the three pages you posted.
Yep, I get no preview available.Quote:
For the benefit of the others here, go to Google Books, Perilous options: special operations as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy By Lucien S. Vandenbroucke (url on my computer - it goes to Page 200 - use "Previous Page" on the right of Page 200 to get to pages 65-67).
So... from the attached pages we learn...
and Moorer:Quote:
According to Secretary Laird's military assistant, Brigadier General Robert Pursely, DIA told Laird and him before the operation that, "the chance that prisoners were still in he camp was, at best, 10 or 15 percent.
In post #4 to this thread I said the following:Quote:
"I argued more strongly than all the others that we should go in and conduct the rescue mission ... We had some doubts the POWs were there, but the forces were poised to go and there was some possibility the POWs were still there."
Laird/Pursely were told there was a 10-15 percent chance the POWs were still there while according to Train, he and Moorer knew the camp was empty. Yet despite this the raid went ahead.Quote:
Having been involved in some raid activity myself it is the waiting that gets to you. You want to get it done and over with. Son Tay had a specific weather/moon phase window of opportunity which limited possible action to a few days in each month. They wanted to go in October but were scheduled for November. The prospect of another delay was not what the commanders (and probably the troops) wanted.
Moorer was in a position to pull the emergency brake on a train that gathering a momentum of its own and he failed to do so and allowed himself to be swept all in the 'group-think'. As the top man in the military he failed. He failed to say:
"STOP... we are planning to do what on an empty camp 23 miles from Hanoi?"
This comment on Vanderbroucke? Because he doesn't produce what you wanted you got to put the boot into him too? Very Sad.Quote:
Vandenbroucke was a State Dept. guy who generally took a negative view of special ops because of what he believed to be their negative impact on US foreign policy.
Regards
Mike
It saddens me more than I can say that it is the behaviour of men at the top of the military (as in the example of the Son Tay Raid) that opens the door for the demand for civilian oversight and micromanagement of military operations.
While you have the luxury to discount reasons other than the PWs if you wish, the decision makers at the time did not.He did not "put the boot into him..." He disclosed a salient fact about his bias which any prudent person would consider in arriving at a judgement.Quote:
This comment on Vanderbroucke? Because he doesn't produce what you wanted you got to put the boot into him too? Very Sad.
There's a lot of that bias stuff going around, though it is exposed rather than disclosed... :D
Your sweeping lack of knowledge of how US foreign and military policy are crafted -- bad choice of words there, perhaps 'clumsily assembled' is better -- is yet again noted. You are of course entitled to that lack of knowledge and even to flaunt it as you do on these little forays through fantasy land in which there are no political interferences with military operations. :rolleyes:
Though I again suggest if you wish to comment on US polices and actions intelligently or with the slightest degree of credibility you might work at becoming a bit more aware. That lack of knowledge is shown by this statement of yours:The only sad thing in this thread is your intransigence and attempt to couch things of which you know little in terms of your own experience and denigrating the experience of others with condescension.Quote:
It saddens me more than I can say that it is the behaviour of men at the top of the military (as in the example of the Son Tay Raid) that opens the door for the demand for civilian oversight and micromanagement of military operations.
I suggested to you many months ago that was a mistake. It still is.
A little education is offered with faint hope it will be understood or accepted. That micromanagement of which you write began in this country during WW I. Wilson and his alter ego 'Colonel' Edward House who with no military or foreign policy experience served as Wilson's de facto national security adviser and diplomatic troubleshooter. Both of them intruded in American military affairs to an extraordinary degree during the war. They set the Stage for Franklin Roosevelt in WW II who was even more intrusive and for Lyndon Johnson who was yet again worse. So the Civilian oversight ALWAYS present in the US from 1775 forward became stifling by 1970, Nixon merely continued the interference of his predecessors . It caught up not only Son Tay, but the later Mayaguez and still later Eagle Claw -- in fact, in every US action since to include Iraq and Afghanistan, thus it still is stifling...
Having been in the US Army at the time and having known and talked to several participants as opposed to basing comments on unclassified history and articles, I'm quite certain you are wrong on Moorer's ability to halt the operation. Just that simple. While your simplistic tactical approach to the issue may seem to have some merit in your eyes, in the eyes of anyone who has the slightest idea of how the US Government works it will be seen as just that, simplistic and tactical. No matter, you can of course believe what you wish for whatever reason you wish to do so. Still, I again suggest that if you wish to comment on US policy and methods, you ought to know a bit more about the monster and the bureaucracy that feeds it.
Where is blueblood? No matter, I'll quote him:
"So what's with the holier than thou nature?"
I'm not an expert on this subject, but if the boss came to me and said...
"Hey guys, it looks like there is only a slight chance that our guys are still at the camp. Do we go or shall we cancel"?
My reaction would be, "Let's go get our guys."
I noticed you had taken up position waiting for your moment to pounce so I through the bait in the other thread to lure the vulture down... and it worked. You are so predictable Ken
Once again you take it upon yourself to set me right on an issue.
All this does display is how US-centric your view point is to the exclusion of reality and common sense. You demean yourself in the process (even if you can't see that).
It seems everything (and I mean everything) can be excused with the simple retort you just don't understand the US system etc etc.
But you fail to note that the majority of the world's population is not trapped in and by the US system so are able to see through the crappy excuses to where the real problems lie.
Every time there is a mark 1 cock-up mentioned it is met with the usual "but you don't understand our complex systems". A cock-up is a cock-up (whatever the reason) and that is the hard truth.
Son Tay was an audacious concept which degenerated into a case study of planning failure due to Group-think and weak leadership. The world knows this but only the Americans in mental lock step with the officially applied spin are in denial. Sad, very sad.
I'm seeing little of actual value in this thread aside from the usual sniping. Cease and desist. Otherwise this gets the same lock Dave applied so judiciously to the Revolution in America thread.
Maybe your reaction should then be to put in for a transfer because a smart boss would have said:
"We are aborting the Son Tay raid as we no longer are sure there are POWs there. We have identified Dong Hoi as live and are going there in a month or so."
No expertise needed... just a lick of sense.
Actually it did not -- I posted in the order I read the threads -- so yet again and as so often occurs due to your penchant for charging blindly and self righteously, you're wrong... :DNasty, fruitless job but some has to do it. Actually, I'm not alone in that quest. A number of folks here have tried to do that. You pay little attention to them either.Quote:
Once again you take it upon yourself to set me right on an issue.
Not really. I'm simply attempting -- quite unsuccessfully I note -- trying to keep you from continually doing just that to yourself.Quote:
All this does display is how US-centric your view point is to the exclusion of reality and common sense. You demean yourself in the process (even if you can't see that).
That's another untruth or shading of the truth. Not everything but indeed a number of things on which you choose to comment about the US. Ignorance shows...Quote:
It seems everything (and I mean everything) can be excused with the simple retort you just don't understand the US system etc etc.
You and that rest of the world also fail to note that those aren't excuses, they are reasons and that we are well aware of and tolerate, even welcome, that dysfunction because it is offset by a number of to us, advantages. That's where much misunderstanding originates.Quote:
But you fail to note that the majority of the world's population is not trapped in and by the US system so are able to see through the crappy excuses to where the real problems lie.
Nah, that's also untrue -- I only mention that when you miss the boat on an issue to which it applies. You get more right than a you do wrong but when you err, you tend to do it spectacularly. Cock-ups are often in the eye of beholders. In this issue, you see a cock-up, full stop. As the full story is not yet unclassified, others are suggesting you should not rush to judgement and doing so in several different ways for several different reasons. I strongly doubt this is a case of 'Everyone's wrong but JMA...'Quote:
Every time there is a mark 1 cock-up mentioned it is met with the usual "but you don't understand our complex systems". A cock-up is a cock-up (whatever the reason) and that is the hard truth.
Officially applied spin? Seems to me that your application of a cock-up label is predicated on cherry picking US sources. :wry:Quote:
Son Tay was an audacious concept which degenerated into a case study of planning failure due to Group-think and weak leadership. The world knows this but only the Americans in mental lock step with the officially applied spin are in denial. Sad, very sad.
If it's sad, why do you relish it so? :D
Crocodile tears are unbecoming...;)
I have not read it, but I recently noticed this in bookstore:
The Quiet Professional: Major Richard J. Meadows of the U.S. Army Special Forces, by Alan Hoe. The University Press of Kentucky, 2011.
The author is a veteran of Special Air Service and first met Meadows in 1960 during Meadows’ exchange with SAS. Saw there was a chapter on the Son Tay raid.
Ok...time for a cooldown. This thread's locked.