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JMA,
Unfortunately you have it wrong. We did not trial Papon for what he did in Algeria but for what he did during WWII. Therefore asking for the otherside to be clean is irrelevant.
We, actually, are starting to look at it.:o
But this being said, as I said previously, several issues could be interresting to look at.
Yes I regret that error. I do not wish to get into the specifics but rather stick with the principle.Quote:
Originally Posted by M-A Lagrange
I have absolutely no problem with the likes of Papon being tried, jailed and ostracised by society. His conviction indicates what kind of man he was.
Having been to the scene where a civilian bus hit a landmine I can't for the life of me see the difference between the likes of Papon and the glorious 'freedom fighters' who seem to get away with murder every time.
So 9 people were killed in the 8 February 1962 Charonne 'massacre'. Yes that needs legal investigation but so do the crimes of the so-called "freedom fighters". I can't stand hypocrisy and need to say that.
First off, I reject "relative filth" as a legal defense; but, at the same time, have to acknowledge its practical uses in some areas (e.g., divorce cases).
Once upon a time, though, reciprocity (in fact, the necessity for recipocity) was a recognized component of the Laws of War. I was reminded of that when I was reading through the grandfather of our present FM 27-10 from 1914, then titled "The Rules of Land Warfare"; and found this clear recognition of the necessity of reciprocity (p.11 of .pdf):
Now, perhaps, we could simply say that our grandfathers of WWI were barbaric Neanderthals; but it might better be the case that they had something in requiring at least a certain amount of reciprocity from opposing combatants - and in inflicting retribution upon them if that reciprocity was not given.Quote:
7. Nature and binding force. These declarations and conventions, freely signed and ratified by a very great number of the civilized powers of the world, constitute true rules of international law that are binding upon those who are parties thereto in a war in which all belligerents engaged are parties. In case one power, who is a party to the war, has not agreed to these conventions, or having been a party has denounced the same, or has made reservations as to one or more articles, then and in that case the other parties belligerent will not be bound by the convention or by the reserved articles. [1]
[1] The observance by the French Army of the Rules announced is implicitly subordinated to the condition of reciprocity on the part of the opposing belligerent, for if France imposes certain limitations upon her means of action against future enemies, it is naturally upon the condition that they impose upon themselves the same restrictions. (Les Lois de La Guerre Continentale, by Lieut. Jacomet, p. 26.)
Regards
Mike
Quote:
Originally Posted by jmm99
I guess by today's requirements I too would be considered barbaric (and I was one of the good guys). (I say requirements rather than standards for obvious reasons)
Quite often the insurgents make it easy for us to think of them as animals and less than human. The rape and murder of Missionaries and their young children and the bayoneting to death of 6 month old infants in my opinion prejudices their right to be treated according to the Geneva Convention.
We lost the "hearts and minds" competition in Rhodesia because we were no match for either set of gooks in terms of sheer brutality. While the US and the world only took Charles Colson (I believe it was) half seriously when he said "If you grab them by the b*lls, the hearts and minds will follow" he was correct in terms of most African contexts if not also elsewhere.
(If there are any doubters out there they should read up on the Gukurahundi genocide as carried out by Mugabe's North Korean trained 5th Brigade in the years after independence. If a soldier wearing a red beret is seen in Matabeleland today the whole Ndebele nation has a collective bowl movement. The Ndebele nation has been crushed, shattered and never to rise again. Thats how you win wars in Africa and neither the Rhodesians nor later the South Africans could bring themselves to stoop to that level.)
Now how does this all apply to Algeria? I think jmm99's point is valid that for that era the French were probably too soft to crush the FLN and break the resolve of the people. Yesterdays SOPs may well be todays war crimes I don't know but surely it must be obvious that you can't fight a war by the Queensbury Rules when the insurgent binds himself to no rules of conduct and indeed relies on horrific barbarity as a means to his ends.
I don't have any argument against studying what happened during the Algerian War and find the conduct unacceptable or if not acceptable then at least explainable. I certainly can't accept a witch hunt aimed solely at the actions of the French and their agents while ignoring the FLN altogether.
This is totally a personal thought - and not an argument vs anyone who thinks differently. Anyway, as to this:
I've always liked animals. They act from instinct; and, though nature is very red in tooth and claw, those acts (brutal and unconscionable if done by humans) are part of animal nature. Humans with free will and conscience do not have that excuse.Quote:
from JMA
Quite often the insurgents make it easy for us to think of them as animals and less than human.
So, the folks that did what you say (or what Mike Hoare talked about in his book on the Congo; or what Tom Odom has written of Rwanda; and what has occured in any number of other genocides throughout the World during my lifetime) - those folks are not animals, but very evil humans who should be killed one way or the other. Those very evil humans are far below the level of animals by orders of magnitude.
If those very evil humans are roaming the range, the military option to find, fix and kill seems to me the better solution for them. That solution includes the problem of defining and distinguishing the enemy (always difficult in irregular warfare even under sensible rules where a combatant remains a combatant - as opposed to rules allowing "transitory guerrillas" to flip their status on and off).
The question of "Queensbury Rules" would seem to me to come in more when those very evil humans surrender or are captured. Some might say summarily execute them - and that summary executions of irregular combatants were legal prior to the Geneva Conventions. Not so.
From the 1914 US Rules of Land Warfare (linked in prior post):
Land Warfare is a reference to Prof. L. F. L. Oppenheim, Handbook on the Rules of Land Warfare (1912), prepared for the British Army.Quote:
40. Duty of oflcers as to status of troops. The determination of the status of captured troops is to be left to courts organized for the purpose. Summary executions are no longer contemplated under the laws of war. The officers' duty is to hold the persons of those captured, and leave the question of their being regulars, irregulars, deserters, etc., to the determination of competent authority. Land Warfare, Opp , par. 37.
Of course, at that time, military commissions and tribunals were recognized as regularly constituted courts.
So, a trial then took place much more quickly than now - and could take place in the field, subject only to limited review.Quote:
17. In cases of individual offenders. Whenever feasible, martial law is carried out in cases of individual offenders by military courts; but sentences of death shall be executed only with the approval of the Chief Executive, provided the urgency of the case does not require a speedier execution, and then only with the approval of the commander of the occupying forces. G. 0. 100, 1863, art. 12.
I can't really see (can't visualize the military actions) where matching the brutality of evil irregulars would gain much for the good guys. If that was being suggested in Rhodesia or South Africa, what tactics were being suggested ?
Occasionally, you see something along the lines of these conflicting thoughts in these quotes (emphasis by me; source in this post)
RegardsQuote:
Upon seeing the American commandos, the muhj became nervous, clearly not wanting the boys near their prisoners. A rumor had spread after the laughable surrender deal a few days earlier that the Americans would kill all prisoners in cold blood. In a war zone, that wasn't necessarily a bad reputation to have.
One AQ responded to a question about UBL by saying: "I could tell any Muslim brother where Sheik Usama is; and they wouldn't tell you."
Every nervous muhj guard present during this exchange thought the next action would be an American commando putting a .45-caliber hard ball into the prisoner's smart-ass mouth. But we are more civilized than our terrorist adversaries, a characteristic seen as a sign of weakness by al Qaeda's ilk, and let them live. In a war zone with these people, such compassion isn't such a good reputation to have.
Mike
I have an old hard back copy of The Centurions by Jean Larteguy which explains why the soldiers used torture and is a very good book on counter-insurgency, as is the movie, The Battle for Algiers which were both training aids by the Australian Army in counter-insurgency training during the Vietnam War. For how not to do things, for example torture, as well how cells were formed and used.
An old friend of mine, a hopeless Francophile with a somewhat shady background, explained how the cells worked and why after 24 hours or less, any information was useless tactically for any operation like the one to break up the FLN in the Casbah. Torture was the only means by which the French saw as getting the time sensitive information they required to get rid of the FLN in the Casbah. He explained to me that the French officer in charge of the torture complained to his superiors he needed more men, as the torture was physically exhausting his men due to the time constraints required for the information. This is an example of a time constarint.
A man innocently past a house on his way to and from work carrying a newspaper under his left arm. Everyday at a safehouse, which may not be known to the man with the newspaper, another man checks for this person to walk past between a certain time frame to and from work. The newspaper could be missing one day or under his right arm, or if captured the man does not appear at all. The people in the safe house immediately respond to whatever message the newspaper meant or the dissapearance of the person involved. If the authorities cannot break the person with the newspaper prior to his next walk past the house (which they need the address of as well) the organisation knows it has been breached and takes measure to protect itself. It breaks the cell up, but the individuals just move on. The Army then had to find another messenger or link in the chain.
Interesting posts. The "Torture Issue" always gets a lot of attention. I think one of the important lessons to be learned from the French experience in Algeria is how the French people became appalled at the actions of their army and their military leadership when they learned what was going on in la sale guerre. It was pretty clear by the fall of the 4th Republic that Jean and Jeanne Doe in France would not condone the army's behavior in "protecting them" from "terrorists."
Do you make a difference between a landmine and a drone strike that kills civilians?Quote:
Originally Posted by JMA
Best
Chris
With respect, I think folks are missing the point in the emotional issues that surround torture.
There are two critical, yet entirely separate issues.
a.) Does it produce actionable and useful intelligence?
b.) Does its use undermine the policy?
Fact is, skilfully done, torture works more often than it fails. Anyone saying "information extracted via torture is unreliable" has not thought it through. Torture is a skill, and a team game. It requires training, resources and careful selection of personnel - if you want it done well.
Handing Corporal Doomweeby a pair of pliers and letting loose on some suspect, is not a plan or even sensible.
BUT - Policy. Torture is generally held to be immoral by Western Democracies. It is therefore difficult to set forth a policy based on Western liberal values, if that policy is set forth using torture.
Well, I think that John Grenier point is very relevant. The damage done by torture was more on the army and the support to its operations than the torture it self. You also have to put in perspective that it happened just 10 years after WWII and discovering that the French army was having the same method than Nazi was a in depth shock. But I also see it as a learning process from the army. Painful but for the better.
Saying this, what I found interesting in Algeria war is the incapacity of the French administration to timely understand the problematic.
France did not realise that she could not ask for the colonies to fight 2 world wars for her and give nothing in return. She did not want to see in FNL a liberation movement with populace support before it was too late.
And that is may be one common point of many insurgencies. The longer you wait to identify the political problematic that is supporting the insurgency, the harder it is to fight against it.
IMO, in COIN what is important is the sequencing. COIN as a response is most probably the too late response. COIN operations as a basic principle at the very first moment you take control of an area is most probably the best practice.
Otherwise, taking out the rationalisation of torture based on the fact that an anti communist army is an army of freedom fighter, Trinquier modern warfare is setting the bases of what is actually done. After all, they won the battle of insurgency in a lost war since the very first day.
That is a very debatable statement. Between 1954 and 1962, the French Army lost 28,000 dead (avg: 300 a month). The cost of holding onto Algeria was simply too high, in terms of the strategy. The French left because they could not sustain the military engagement. Most French people wanted out because of the human cost of the war.Quote:
Originally Posted by M-A Lagrange
Wilf,
I have read a little about the French war in Algeria, including the memoirs of an English-speaking conscript and an English-speaker in the Foreign Legion.
Was the impact of the death toll minimised by the professionals and colonial formations were the operational "hard edge"? I recall at the time of the 'General's Revolt' the conscripts made it clear they were not involved or supportive.
Are there parallels with the US role in South Vietnam? More troops deployed meant conscription.
Wilf,
I do not disagree with you. The death toll during Algeria War was unacceptable for the population in France. I am not familliar enought with the details of the impact of conscription but it was clear that going to war in Algeria was not popular and the death toll made it even less popular. Official media could say what they want, people find out when too many sons are not coming home...
David,
You are perfectly right saying that the conscript did not support the general revolte. But neither did the President (De Gaule if I am not mistaking).
My point was rather on the fact that in Malaysia case, the British did promise independance since the early stages while in the case of Algeria it was promised at the end and without the support of the colon population in Algeria (and without the support of some military). And extremely badly explained.
Still, I do think that not evaluating rightfuly the situation at its early stage was the biggest mistake. And is the one which is repeated.
Yes, in terms of the cost of the strategy. Destroying the enemy has to be matched to the cost of doing so.Quote:
Originally Posted by davidbfpo
When I was younger, my idea was that Pdt. De Gaulle did a real mistake when he choose to leave, regarding agricultural & petrol resources of Algeria. My analyze, today is (as one of the greatest Pdt we had) that he made the good choice, and the main reason, can't be told to people of France at that time is : demographic.Quote:
Originally Posted by M-A Lagrange
To apply that question to current deployement : Why did the opponents of ISAF fights ? Freedom ? politics ? money (opium) ? religion ? ethnics ?Quote:
Originally Posted by M-A Lagrange
No doubt "war weariness" contributed to DG's decision (Wilf's point); BUT probably more important was the cost of lost opportunities elsewhere if Algeria continued to be a drain financially, and on France's overall posture in Europe and the World.
This:
- that DG made a good choice - seems to be correct (from my armchair view then and now :)). DG had bigger fish that he wanted to fry (sometimes the USA :D); so, Algeria was relatively expendible.Quote:
from jps2
When I was younger, my idea was that Pdt. De Gaulle did a real mistake when he choose to leave, regarding agricultural & petrol resources of Algeria. My analyze, today is (as one of the greatest Pdt we had) that he made the good choice, and the main reason, can't be told to people of France at that time is : demographic.
Nixon and Kissinger made a similar choice re: Vietnam where the lost opportunity costs were too great once Southeast Asia (except for "Indochina") appeared to be secure from a Commie takeover.
Regards
Mike
Yes I do, and I'll tell you why.Quote:
Originally Posted by Seabee
If the insurgent lays a mine/IED on a road used by forces and civilians and knows that the military vehicles are to some degree protected from mine blast he does not care who detonates the mine, who gets killed (in other words an act of indiscriminate terrorism)
If a drone is used to fire a missile at the residence of the number two Taliban leader which he occupies with his wife and children then that is IMHO acceptable "collateral damage".
A drone firing a missile into a wedding party and killing women and children is sheer incompetence and should probably be legally actionable.
A note here is that I seldom trust the media in reporting such civilian deaths as I was on the receiving end in Rhodesia of deliberate disinformation where virtually every military camp we attacked in Zambia and Mozambique was supposedly a 'refugee camp' full of women and children. Our PR and media relations were bad and I am willing to assume (unless proved otherwise) that the US has the same problem.
Those casualty rates are appalling! I had no idea the war was of that intensity.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
actually, I also heard that US very pretty much happy that France lost such oil capacity... ;)Quote:
From JMM
- that DG made a good choice - seems to be correct (from my armchair view then and now ). DG had bigger fish that he wanted to fry (sometimes the USA ); so, Algeria was relatively expendible.
Not saying they were happy to see it fall in the hands of the Russias... :wry:
The Algerian War - Wiki has Wilf's 28K KIA + 60K WIA for the French. On the FLN side of the ledger, this:
with a longer story in the Wiki's Death Toll section:Quote:
Mostly civilians, 153,000 dead, 160,000 wounded
1,500,000 dead according to the Algerian government
960,000 dead according to historians
Unscrambling all those eggs would be difficult to say the least - so, there's a lot of hot air for propaganda wiggleroom.Quote:
While it is admitted that any attempt to estimate casualties in this war is nearly impossible, the FLN (National Liberation Front) estimated in 1964 that nearly eight years of revolution had cost 1.5 million dead from war-related causes. Some other French and Algerian sources later put the figure at approximately 960,000 dead, while French officials estimated it at 350,000. French military authorities listed their losses at nearly 28,600 dead (6,000 from non-combat-related causes) and 65,000 wounded.
European-descended civilian casualties exceeded 10,000 (including 3,000 dead) in 42,000 recorded terrorist incidents. According to French official figures during the war, the Army, security forces and militias killed 141,000 presumed rebel combatants. But it is still unclear whether all the victims were actual fighters or merely civilians, mostly due to the Algerian press and second bureau (intelligence) which regarded every Moslem civilian as a rebel.
More than 12,000 Algerians died in internal FLN purges during the war. An additional 5,000 died in the "café wars" in France between the FLN and rival Algerian groups. French sources also estimated that 70,000 Muslim civilians were killed, or abducted and presumed killed, by the FLN.
Historians, like Alistair Horne and Raymond Aron, consider the actual figure of war dead to be far higher than the original FLN and official French estimates, but below the 1 million adopted by the Algerian government. Horne has estimated Algerian casualties during the span of eight years to be around 700,000. Uncounted thousands of Muslim civilians lost their lives in French army ratissages, bombing raids, and vigilante reprisals. The war uprooted more than 2 million Algerians, who were forced to relocate in French camps or to flee to Morocco, Tunisia, and into the Algerian hinterland, where many thousands died of starvation, disease, and exposure. In addition large numbers of pro-French Muslims were murdered when the FLN settled accounts after independence.
That (propaganda wiggleroom) ties in with JMA's last paragraph in his post on the prior page.
--------------------------
As to this, from that:
More correct than less correct, but each of those examples would have to be expanded to cover the nuances - both military and legal - ranging from OK to "war crime".Quote:
from JMA
If the insurgent lays a mine/IED on a road used by forces and civilians and knows that the military vehicles are to some degree protected from mine blast he does not care who detonates the mine, who gets killed (in other words an act of indiscriminate terrorism)
If a drone is used to fire a missile at the residence of the number two Taliban leader which he occupies with his wife and children then that is IMHO acceptable "collateral damage".
A drone firing a missile into a wedding party and killing women and children is sheer incompetence and should probably be legally actionable.
Regards
Mike
Evil things are done by people in any conflict, and not just in genocides. Some of these acts are carried out deliberately to 'terrorise' the target population and others merely because the perpetrators are depraved subhumans. (like the RUF in Sierra Leone)Quote:
Originally Posted by jmm99
Yes they should be dealt with one way or the other but what do you do when one (or more) of them puts his hands in the air?
Again I mention the scenario of surrender. What then?Quote:
If those very evil humans are roaming the range, the military option to find, fix and kill seems to me the better solution for them. That solution includes the problem of defining and distinguishing the enemy (always difficult in irregular warfare even under sensible rules where a combatant remains a combatant - as opposed to rules allowing "transitory guerrillas" to flip their status on and off).
What do you do with Joseph Kony and his LRA subhumans? Why have only a few leaders of the Bosnian Serbs been prosecuted and not also the trigger-men?
I guess it all comes down in that context to what constituted the "competent authority."Quote:
The question of "Queensbury Rules" would seem to me to come in more when those very evil humans surrender or are captured. Some might say summarily execute them - and that summary executions of irregular combatants were legal prior to the Geneva Conventions. Not so.
From the 1914 US Rules of Land Warfare (linked in prior post):
My comment there was to 'win the hearts and minds' of a given population through violence driven intimidation resulting in sheer terror. Certainly the Rhodesian forces never got close to out-terrorising the population. Don't cooperate with the security forces and get a slap around the ear, but don't cooperate with the gooks and get killed (often in horrific fashion) - make your choice. There is no choice and we better all start to understand that.Quote:
I can't really see (can't visualize the military actions) where matching the brutality of evil irregulars would gain much for the good guys. If that was being suggested in Rhodesia or South Africa, what tactics were being suggested ?
Armies with conscience can never win the 'hearts and minds' war against a enemy who executes civilians who don't cooperate with them. This is why the focus must be on killing the enemy.
Yes Mike that is the problem facing soldiers today. One man's legitimate act is another's war crime. How the hell does a soldier wade through that minefield today?Quote:
Originally Posted by jmm99
A rather odd definition. By this definition anyone who lays a mine where a civilian crosses commits an act of indiscriminate terrorism. One could argue that dropping a bomb into a city neighborhood aiming for a military bunker but knowing that the bunker is fortified while civilian buildings around are not is also committing an act of indiscriminate terrorism. Then we also have cluster bombs.Quote:
If the insurgent lays a mine/IED on a road used by forces and civilians and knows that the military vehicles are to some degree protected from mine blast he does not care who detonates the mine, who gets killed (in other words an act of indiscriminate terrorism)
I think 'hearts and minds' is a fallacy - as has been argued ad nauseum on this board the proper method should not be 'support' registered by the population but rather 'control' over the population. 'Control' can be won by any number of means, including through the discriminating use of terror, but also through the provision of security against enemy terrorizers.Quote:
Armies with conscience can never win the 'hearts and minds' war against a enemy who executes civilians who don't cooperate with them. This is why the focus must be on killing the enemy.
Historically there has been a sliding scale. Both methods of control, however, require constant intelligence and interaction with the population. Ignoring the population or treating it as something static, like terrain, is not an option.
First off, the soldier's Powers That Be should adopt a clear set of non-conflicting military operational considerations, diplomatic-political policies and legal constraints. As to legal, one must allocate the Laws of War (military) and Rule of Law (civilian) to their proper spheres.Quote:
from JMA
Yes Mike that is the problem facing soldiers today. One man's legitimate act is another's war crime. How the hell does a soldier wade through that minefield today?
From that definitive juncture of military, diplomatic-political and legal, the Powers That Be then come up with a set of non-legalistic, blackletter doctrines and rules that will be trained in, not imposed on, the soldier.
The idea is that rules of engagement and rules for use of force are worked into the combat drills - practice makes perfect. If the Powers That Be are smart, they will fall in love with the doctrine "from the masses, back to the masses" and accept feedback from the soldier as to doctrine and rules.
No cookbook exists for this process. Each nation (each tribe) has its own military culture, its own diplomatic-political culture and its own legal framework - just as this board has some differences of opinion concerning the better practices in "counter-insurgency".
It is beyond my kenning as to how that could be done for a coalition of nations trying to handle someone else's counter-insurgency (as in Astan).
I suppose we could talk about surrenders and captures (two slightly different things); but what one should do in those cases would depend on the country and timeframe selected. The rules applied by a djaghoun commander under Subotai would definitely differ from those applied by today's US company commander.
The soldier could also say to hell with it and follow the path outlined by James Molony Spaight, War Rights on Land (1911), p.18:
;)Quote:
..... for an ambitious subaltern who wishes to be known vaguely as an author and, at the same time, not to be troubled with undue inquiry into the claim upon which his title rests, there can be no better subject than the International Law of War. For it is a quasi-military subject in which no one in the army or out of it, is very deeply interested, which everyone very contentedly takes on trust, and which may be written about without one person in ten thousand being able to tell whether the writing is adequate or not.
Along those lines I suppose we could work up a set of rules that would fit each person's morals and ethics as to what the rules should be. International law profs seem to be good at that - and in trying to impose their rules on others.
Regards
Mike
Here is a thought from the peanut gallery....
Did France "loose" or just come to the conclusion that in the modern world there is no place for Colonies. especially ones you have to fight for.
At what point do leaders sitting around the table say "we CAN keep going for another 50 years... but is it worth it?"
Best
Chris
That is what the Policy had to decide. It is that condition that alters the strategy, because of the cost - for France, 28,000 KIA.Quote:
Originally Posted by Seabee
If you lay a mine on a road where you have as much if not more chance of killing civilians in a passing bus than the enemy in mine protected vehicles then yes that is "an act of indiscriminate terrorism" and a war crime. If a command detonated mine or IED was used then it would be a different matter.Quote:
Originally Posted by tequila
Yes, using bombing and missiles in a civilian residential area is problematic from the legal point of view (in 2010) and before than from a moral point of view.
Cluster bombs should be illegal and the use of them should be a war crime. We have steadily been getting smarter with the increasing accuracy of bombs and missiles and there is no longer place for the likes of cluster bombs.
Convention on Cluster Munitions
I don't think 'hearts and minds' is a fallacy, it is just that given the local situations (in most insurgencies) and the actions of the insurgents it is largely a futile process.Quote:
I think 'hearts and minds' is a fallacy - as has been argued ad nauseum on this board the proper method should not be 'support' registered by the population but rather 'control' over the population. 'Control' can be won by any number of means, including through the discriminating use of terror, but also through the provision of security against enemy terrorizers.
Historically there has been a sliding scale. Both methods of control, however, require constant intelligence and interaction with the population. Ignoring the population or treating it as something static, like terrain, is not an option.
You build a school in Afghanistan today and there is a guarantee that within 4-5 years it will probably become a training centre for IEDs or worse.
It all comes back to the selection and maintenance of the aim. That has been lost over time and now the ISAF force is seen to be propping up an illegitimate and corrupt Afghan government. There is no possibility that any 'hearts and minds' campaign in Afghanistan can be won under those circumstances.
My belief is that both Algeria and Vietnam were decided that way.Quote:
from Seabee
At what point do leaders sitting around the table say "we CAN keep going for another 50 years... but is it worth it?"
Regards
Mike
So who has ever ignored the population? You do not ignore terrain.Quote:
Originally Posted by tequila
My effort is to take the population out the competition as a whole. They will support who ever wins. Why ask them to be part of the fight?
Gaining intelligence from a population does not require the vast majority of troops to interact with them - in fact, it has best been done by very small numbers of specialists. - this is especially true in very "hard" or non-permissive environments. You don't need to work in the area where everyone like you.
I am still under the impression that the population was the key in the Algerian Independence War.
The general population was quite unimportant, but the Europeans in Algeria (about 70% of them not really Frenchmen, but of Spanish or other descent) were the key.
Their aggressive (at times almost genocidal) behaviour looks to me like the spark that ignited the whole mess after the fuel of war had previously only been warmed up by the indigenous population.
The French Army could imho probably have won the war very quickly by choosing the European Algerians as their opponent and quelling their unrest instead of going after an ever-growing share of the general population.
Going after the "obvious" enemy as quite self-defeating (on the strategic & political level), while going after the counter-intuitive enemy might have enabled a quick and brilliant strategic victory (that would have to be defended by politicians, of course).
The "let's kill as many enemies as quickly as possible till the others give up" path only knew one destination in Algeria; failure.
1. Isolating the population may work if the facts allow it (as in Malaya, where a minority of a minority were isolated from the bush-based guerrillas). If the insurgents permeate the entire population (as in the case of Vietnam), your proposal is not practical.Quote:
from Wilf
[1] My effort is to take the population out the competition as a whole. [2] They will support who ever wins. [3] Why ask them to be part of the fight?
2. Not necessarily so. They may submit; but if the factors that drove the insurgency to begin with continue to subsist, they will probably lead to future outbreaks.
3. Counter-insurgency is manpower intensive (if done right - e.g., Malaya). If the masses are mobilized, they can provide their own security (as well as their own political and economic development) - thereby allowing the pros to go on to neutralize other insurgents and to mobilize other masses.
Regards
Mike
Only because for whatever reason they did not get that right.Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
Aha!! - at last! :wry: Concur. Doing stupid stuff is stupid.Quote:
Originally Posted by JMA
I beg to differ. Criminals and drug dealers "permeate" populations. You still go after them without forcing the population to take a side. - and Context, context and context.Quote:
Originally Posted by jmm99
Armed force can only be used against armed force. Politics is for the politicians. Military force sets a condition that politics exploits. It's not the solution and never can be.Quote:
2. Not necessarily so. They may submit; but if the factors that drove the insurgency to begin with continue to subsist, they will probably lead to future outbreaks.
Sure. Raise some "local defence militia." - then they are on your team. You are not "winning their support" or doing "armed social work."Quote:
3. Counter-insurgency is manpower intensive (if done right - e.g., Malaya). If the masses are mobilized, they can provide their own security (as well as their own political and economic development) - thereby allowing the pros to go on to neutralize other insurgents and to mobilize other masses.
Fine with me.
1. Criminals are not in the same context as insurgents. However, taking criminals as an example, you (if you happen to be in criminal justice) want a great deal of co-operation from the people - as informants, witnesses and jurors who will convict.
Your initial assertion was "My effort is to take the population out [of ?] the competition as a whole"; which has now morphed to "You still go after them without forcing the population to take a side". Treating the population like a bunch of department store dummies is not a formula for success.
2. Is armed force really the only tool in your personal tool kit ? Maybe so; which is no personal sin if you (like Brig. "Trotsky" Davies) insist on being a pure soldier. But, it does end the conversation with those who believe that military affairs and political affairs have to be co-ordinated - and that insurgency is often a mixed military and political problem - as exemplified by Davies' end of conversation with Enver Hoxha: "...I am a soldier and not a politician.".
3. If you can mobilize the people for a local defense militia, you can also mobilize them in other areas where they also become part of the team.
Frankly, I can't understand why you insist on building such a strict firewall between military action and political action.
Regards
Mike
Well the use of the criminal justice system will flow from policy. In Irregular warfare, I just want to get to the kill and/or capture part, with capture always being preferable, but the choice is theirs.Quote:
Originally Posted by jmm99
With respect, there isn't any morphing here. There are degrees of application within the context. The population is a constraint on the use of force, and that is driven by the policy. The population is also a sources of information. I don't have to do anything "POP-centric" to exploit those two conditions.Quote:
Your initial assertion was "My effort is to take the population out [of ?] the competition as a whole"; which has now morphed to "You still go after them without forcing the population to take a side". Treating the population like a bunch of department store dummies is not a formula for success.
Soldiers set forth policy, using violence (or threat of). They do not make policy, but yes, they have to support it, so they have to understand it.Quote:
2. But, it does end the conversation with those who believe that military affairs and political affairs have to be co-ordinated - and that insurgency is often a mixed military and political problem - as exemplified by Davies' end of conversation with Enver Hoxha: "...I am a soldier and not a politician.".
You do not go to a therapist and ask for financial advice - but the therapist has to understand you have money problems. Make sense?
I do not. I just wish people would realise that military force is a specific tool for a specific problem.Quote:
Frankly, I can't understand why you insist on building such a strict firewall between military action and political action.
To use a medical analogy, Military force is surgery. Politics is therapeutics. Both are needed. Both need to understand the other, but both are done by separate folks.
I do contend this.Quote:
Originally Posted by JMA
The French won militarily, and lost politically/strategically.
Their basic assumption/assertion was that Northern Algeria was a province of France itself, not a colony. It was France.
The military actions against the non-European insurgents proved that the government was a government of Europeans, and not at the same time a government of the people of Northern Algeria.
The heavy-handed military actions proved the opponent's point and led quite inevitably to political defeat.
It would have required a counter-intuitive behaviour that did fit into the political assertion in order to win the conflict (possibly even with great elegance and at low cost).
The "kill! kill! kill!" approach was the dumb and wrong path.
Keep in mind that CvC did not cover the conflict in Spain yet before he died and left an unfinished work. The Napoleonic conflict in Spain was more relevant for the Algerian Independence War than his "break their will and/or disarm them" theory about forcing another government to make concessions.
The "kill! kill! kill!" approach would in my opinion even have been the wrong (way too slow & expensive) path if it could have worked. It was at best suitable to break armed opposition, while a smart approach (cracking down on violent European-descent settlers and behave as a government for all Northern Algerians) could have solved the conflict for decades.
That is a grossly simplistic misrepresentation of Clausewitian teaching and observation.Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
Clausewitz's thinking was informed by every armed rebellion in history, that he was aware of. The Spanish insurrection was no different from the native South American insurrections against the Spanish in Peru. Armed Rebellions and insurrections have always been as prevalent as wars between societies and nations.
The issue is the use of arms to prevent the opposing use of arms to present policy. It really is very simple. It is nothing to do with "kill, kill kill." That is childish.
It is to do with the destruction of will, via the instrument of killing. Mao understood this, and so did Thucydides.
The French lost because of 28,000 KIA. That is what broke their will to endure, so the FLN succeeded militarily and strategically solely by killing as a means to set forth their policy.
If the US had only suffered 15,000 casualties by 1973, while inflicting 750,000 on the NVA, the chances are, the US would still be there, - just like Korea.
at the end:
with triple emphasis on "I do not" (B, I and U ;)); and also this:Quote:
from Wilf
I do not. [1] I just wish people would realise that military force is a specific tool for a specific problem.
[2] To use a medical analogy, Military force is surgery. Politics is therapeutics. Both are needed. Both need to understand the other, but both are done by separate folks.
do clarify to me your position re: the military effort and the political effort.Quote:
[3] Soldiers set forth policy, using violence (or threat of). They do not make policy, but yes, they have to support it, so they have to understand it.
[4] You do not go to a therapist and ask for financial advice - but the therapist has to understand you have money problems. Make sense?
So now we have a military effort (you) and a political effort (me). How does command and control work in our little party ?
Regards
Mike
OK, no real context, but...Quote:
Originally Posted by jmm99
a.) You are in charge. I work for you.
b.) I provide a service. With good enough preparation, I can find and kill/capture those who are using armed force. Given time, and resources, I can destroy their organisation and/or force them to negotiate, in terms of wishing to abandon the armed struggle. That is why you have an army. If we cannot do it, you need a new army.
c.) I need the necessary legal instruments to do that and I also need the legal support for various forms of long term detention (with and without trial) and intelligence activity.
d.) AND - I need you to have a coherent policy (elections - party political reform? Housing?) that addresses the political dimension/causes of the conflict, so that I can restrict my use of force in line with the policy you wish to set forth. You need to make clear, that the political action will only take place in safe areas, and once the violence has stopped.
e.) and I need lots of money!
So, do I get the job? :cool:
I'm not a novelist, but I'll try to flesh out our imaginary journey into small war land. I am putting some parameters on this: we're both indigenous to Country X and no foreign elements are involved to any material extent. So, this is not an FID, SFA, etc. tale.
The insurgency in our country is widespread and cannot be resolved quickly via political, police or military action on a limited scale. We start with a clean slate - new government, successful coup, whatever. The insurgency, from our viewpoint, is an existential threat.
Addressing your points:
OK, Civil Authority takes the lead and, if it prevails, proves its legitimacy. First off, we have to determine how much civil authority and military forces actually exist; as well as what areas are Ours, Theirs and Contested. Our organization is a triangle: Civil Authority (top level), Military Officer (2nd level - you) and Political Officer (2nd level - actually that was me in my original concept before you promoted me :)).Quote:
a.) You are in charge. I work for you.
Generally, Rule of Law governs Ours areas; Theirs and Contested areas are under martial law (i.e., the Laws of War). An essential part of this is that the Ours areas must really be that and fully secured. The Military Officer and Political Officer have no authority in the Ours areas, except in cases of invasion of or rebellion in the Ours areas - and then only with respect to the immediate area of the invasion or rebellion.
Since this is an indigenous, internal armed conflict which is an existential threat to us, we have all the time in the rest of our lives to carry on whatever struggle is required. ;)Quote:
b.) I provide a service. With good enough preparation, I can find and kill/capture those who are using armed force. Given time, and resources, I can destroy their organisation and/or force them to negotiate, in terms of wishing to abandon the armed struggle. That is why you have an army. If we cannot do it, you need a new army.
The Military Officer and Political Officer can fill in the military and political blanks; but my basic concept as Civil Authority is a co-ordinated military and political strategy which would, if carried to its conclusion, result in the insurgency's neutralization (not a euphemism - it encompasses kill & capture by the military; surrender and conversion to the political).
That strategy would also be flexible enough to negotiate with the insurgents if that has more plusses for us. Obviously, we have to know the military and political sides of the insurgency. Generally, we confront military with military and political with political.
As stated, Theirs and Contested areas are under martial law and are considered theatres of war, where the Laws of War ("FM 27-10") control. ROEs and RUFs are wartime, which does not mean that troops have a hunting license to kill everything in the forest. The Ours areas are Rule of Law ordered, except in cases of invasion or rebellion where the Laws of War trump. The basic rule on insurgents is: if you (Military Officer) don't bag 'em, tag 'em and toss 'em into the Poltical Officer's lap for status determination and detention.Quote:
c.) I need the necessary legal instruments to do that and I also need the legal support for various forms of long term detention (with and without trial) and intelligence activity.
My suggestion as to long-term detention, psyops and intelligence activities in general is that they are under the Political Officer's control. Whichever of these functions you feel you need as organic assets are yours to duplicate (tactical intelligence, I'd suppose).
Yes, we will have a narrative - in fact, two basic narratives. One is our vision for our country's future which should be what we really want; and that, that vision cannot be realized because of the insurgents.Quote:
d.) AND - I need you to have a coherent policy (elections - party political reform? Housing?) that addresses the political dimension/causes of the conflict, so that I can restrict my use of force in line with the policy you wish to set forth. You need to make clear, that the political action will only take place in safe areas, and once the violence has stopped.
Reduced to a short slogan (expressed in four sets of contradictions):
we = legitimacy + construction + progess = security and opportunity for you.
they = illegitimacy + destruction + regression = insecurity and privation for you.
The second narrative is developed by examining the claims made by the insurgents to decide whether any of those claims can be co-opted by us. If so, political-side would implement those improvements.
In the Ours areas, those narratives have to come to life - another reason to be careful in deciding that an area is fully secured and thus Ours.
As to this, "You need to make clear, that the political action will only take place in safe areas, and once the violence has stopped," - yes and no.
Yes, in the Ours areas where Rule of Law prevails and the Civil Authority (with its normal civilian administrators) carry on.
A qualified "no" In the Theirs and Contested areas, your troops (once they've sliced the salami into smaller pieces) would be immediately followed by Gendarmerie-Intelligence-Civil Affairs units under the Political Officer. They would set up local governance, intelligence nets, and justice systems (detainees, for example, would pass through those courts).
Those units would have status as a separate branch of the armed forces - simply to provide them with combatant immunity when they have to kill insurgents. Once a Theirs or Contested area is secured as an Ours area, martial law ends and the Civil Authority (with its normal civilian administrators) replaces the Gendarmerie-Intelligence-Civil Affairs unit.
No doubt. Your generousity is well known and indeed your need for money is based on that virtue which is one of your pleasures. To seal the deal, I give my IOU secured by all of the gold in the chest at Akiba. :DQuote:
e.) and I need lots of money!
Regards
Mike
Well I was once....Quote:
Originally Posted by jmm99
Be careful here. If you are going to dump an administration into this area, you are giving me a lot more work in terms of folks to protect and you are forcing more agencies into my span of command.Quote:
A qualified "no" In the Theirs and Contested areas, your troops (once they've sliced the salami into smaller pieces) would be immediately followed by Gendarmerie-Intelligence-Civil Affairs units under the Political Officer. They would set up local governance, intelligence nets, and justice systems (detainees, for example, would pass through those courts).
Now, I would hope to have Special Branch and my MI guys out collecting HUMINT and "all sources" to support the killing and capture of the Rebels, which will forces them to leave the area.
If we can have relatively good security, then the control of that area can be handed over to the Gendarmerie-Intelligence-Civil Affairs units under the Political Officer - IF they can do the job...
OK, but I'm not ever going to be that comfortable with handing over all my networks to some one else - because I may need them back in a hurry.Quote:
Those units would have status as a separate branch of the armed forces - simply to provide them with combatant immunity when they have to kill insurgents. Once a Theirs or Contested area is secured as an Ours area, martial law ends and the Civil Authority (with its normal civilian administrators) replaces the Gendarmerie-Intelligence-Civil Affairs unit.
I would suggest the formation of a "Combined Operations Unit" that would be a one-time Intelligence agency comprising Military/Police/Parks Service/Civ Admin, - that would be the one stop shop in the hard areas, and remain so until the end of the emergency. It operate on the "Committee System" - everyone at the table has to share ALL they have - and they would conduct operations against the rebels. They would cease to exist once their reasons for being ceased.
IIRC he admitted in a letter that he hadn't covered people's wars such as the Spanish insurgency properly yet. That was one of the things he had no time for left.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
There's a huge difference between breaking the will of a top-down enemy and a bottom-up enemy.
Besides; I meant you with "kill! kill! kill!" approach, not CvC. CvC wasn't so specific about how to disarm the enemy leadership.
True, but we have no reason to believe that his specific addressing of that issue would have changed his insight. I admit CvC was left incomplete, but what he did commit to paper has never been proven wrong in its general terms. - and especially in the relationship between Strategy and policy, where armed force is used.Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
There's a difference. I am not sure it is "huge."Quote:
There's a huge difference between breaking the will of a top-down enemy and a bottom-up enemy.
BUT I do not say that. To recap.Quote:
Besides; I meant you with "kill! kill! kill!" approach, not CvC. CvC wasn't so specific about how to disarm the enemy leadership.
a.) Use armed force against armed force.
b.) Armed force must be used in line with policy
c.) Armed forces can only kill/capture/destroy or thus deter, based on those things.
d.) Yes! The primary instrument which armed forces use to serve policy is killing.
Chris, that is the fundamental question our leaders need to ask. Let's not forget that just a Algeria was heating up, France was reading the ledger on Indochina. 90,000 DEAD between 1946 and 1954. After dorking around in Algeria, CdG finally had the guts to say "enough!" That's what we need today -- a leader who has the guts to stand up and say "enough!" That individual will not be from the the military. It is going to have to come from the political left, because the right makes too much hay by kissing the military's butt. Obama is not the man for the task ... he had the chance, and acted liked a politician.Quote:
Originally Posted by Seabee
BTW, check out this link
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/19/wo...19bigeard.html
to get us back to the torture piece. I'm just so happy that we Americans have taken the fundamental values that we hold most dear and sacred and taken a great big old sh!t on them so we can have a stalemate (at best -- mark my words, we will "lose" in both AFG and Iraq) in our neo-colonies from which we don't even extract the resources (like there is anything to get from AFG -- at least they have or had oil in Iraq).
What a sad and pathetic state of affairs.
1) You liked metrics. Measurable stuff.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
Show a metric to attempt to prove your point.
2) Common practice does not necessarily equal best practice.
The German states did not win against France in 1870/71 by killing more or better or the most. They did so by taking prisoners.
Similar in 1940 France, 1940 Belgium, 1940 Denmark, 1940 Norway, Barbarossa '41 saw much more POW than KIA as well.
I do also bet that Britain took more Italians prisoner than it did kill in WW2.
The Middle Ages and Renaissance had dozens if not hundreds of wars that were not primarily about killing either.
Even some Mongol wars were often not so much about killing as about dissolving opposition.
Your emphasis on killing is *unhealthy*. It does not even come close to lead towards best practice or best innovations.
I observed your morphing into a CvC extremist, hardcore Israel partisan and "kill! kill! kill!" advocate of the last two years and I have to say you were a more impressive theorist before that morphing.
Even CvC emphasized disarming the enemy leaders - this includes KIA, WIA, POW and rendering forces irrelevant by other means (cutting off, fixing them through diplomacy at another threatened border, bribing them, keep them busy guarding a coast, letting them fall ill on sieges, and others).
See how awfully short fell your list at (c)?
An emphasis on killing is an emphasis on the most obvious, the least "art" of war and the most "brute strength" approach.
There's not much insight and not many clever options to find in the realm of "kill! kill! kill!", not even on the tactical and much less on the operational level. It's a braindead concept on the strategic level where much more finesse is required.
(Superior) finesse on all levels can improve the current Western forces, a "kill! kill! kill!" doctrine isn't helpful.
The Algerian War of Independence was probably completely unnecessary during the 60's. Clever political decisions could have avoided the costs and risks of that war by sending the military on a completely different mission.
The French followed the "kill! kill! kill!" approach, won militarily - and were still total and unlimited losers of the conflict.
From the UK perspective:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obit...l-Bigeard.html
A reminder what torture means:Quote:
Le Monde published an interview with Louisette Ighilahriz, an Algerian grandmother who told how, as a 20-year old FLN fighter, she had been taken prisoner by French paratroopers who had subjected her to three months of interrogation, during which she had been repeatedly raped and tortured and eventually left to die in a pool of excrement and blood. What made her interview persuasive was that she seemed to be moved less by hatred of her torturers than by gratitude to the French military doctor who had rescued her and whom she now wished to thank in person. At the same time, she had no qualms about naming the officers who presided over her ordeal, notably Generals Jacques Massu and Marcel Bigeard.
Her charges provoked an uproar and stimulated vigorous debate. But while General Massu admitted the credibility of Louisette Ighilahriz's testimony and regretted the behaviour of French forces during the conflict, Bigeard dismissed her claims as a "tissue of lies" and accused those who had stirred up the issue of being communists or intellectuals of the sort whose "treason" had given comfort to the FLN during the war.
I will play the devil advocate here. :cool:
at the end of Algeria war, almost all the FNL leaders were in prison. And some since quite a while. I believe some may think that if they would have been dead, it would have been easier to win the political battle as there would be noone to negociate the Accords d'Evian...
Now let come back to reason :rolleyes:
But the point is also foolish because what really made France loose that war is that colonial empire were no more acceptable (for many reasons, cost, politic, ideology...). And also, the army would have not tried to win the war she lost in Indochina, the situation could have been different.
But we cannot rewritte the past.
I would like also to signal the threat started on the death of General Bigear in general news.
As it was written in the french blog Secret Defense: he was the perfect image of the French army and the French want of it. (In the light as in the dark). From private to 4 start general... A kind of a career!
With his departure (and the one of some others) at least in France, we will be able to look at this war with some objectivity...
Algeria was different. Its coastal region was officially no colony - it was considered to be part (department) of France itself.
The waging of a colonial anti-insurgency war was the cardinal error.
The military didn't behave as was necessary to fit into the narrative of the government.
Can't agree more than that with you. As I said, I play the devil advocate for free for Wilf's "kill, kill, kill".Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
;)