Been that way since a year or two after World War II.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
gute
Many who view America in the way you suggest should take a second and reflect on their countries deeds. Quite blaming us for their failures and take responsibility.
Not likely to change. As a columnist in the London times said about a year ago:
""What makes America the indispensable power (and even more indispensable in the era of the new China), is precisely what makes anti-Americanism inevitable."" LINK.
Get used to it. I did, long time ago. A number of guys from various countries who were also on R&R from fighting in Korea alongside the US all telling me how evil America was. Recall, they were 'Allies.' I've heard and read it ever since and we keep plugging along, doing our thing. some bad stuff, mostly good stuff. The carping can be mildly annoying, no sense letting it be more than that -- like the man said, it isn't going away soon...
The Taliban's Winning Strategy
CEIP: The Taliban's Winning Strategy by Gilles Dorronsoro. H/T to the invaluable Registan.
Quote:
The Taliban’s clear strategy and increasingly coherent organization have put the International Coalition on the defensive, marginalized the local Afghan government, and given the Taliban control of southern and eastern Afghanistan. Rather than concentrating limited troops in the South and East where the Taliban are firmly entrenched, the International Coalition should prioritize regions where the Taliban are still weak but making alarming progress: in the North and around Kabul.
Far from a loose assortment of local groups, the Taliban are nationally organized, with coherent leadership and a sophisticated propaganda operation. The Coalition, on the other hand, lacks clear direction, largely due to its underestimation of the Taliban. Following a month-long trip through Afghanistan, Gilles Dorronsoro assesses the insurgency and proposes a strategy for the coalition based on a comprehensive understanding of the Taliban’s capabilities and goals.
Key points:
The Taliban have built a parallel government in areas they control to fulfill two basic needs: justice and security. An almost nonexistent local government and the population’s distrust of the international coalition allowed the Taliban to expand their influence.
Focusing resources in the South and East, where the insurgency is strongest, is risky, especially since the Afghan army is not ready to replace U.S. forces there.
The Taliban have opened a front in the northern provinces, having consolidated their grip on the South and East. If the International Coalition does not counter this thrust, the insurgency will spread throughout Afghanistan within two to three years and the coalition will not be able to bear the financial and human costs of fighting.
The insurgency cannot be defeated while the Taliban retain a safe haven in Pakistan. The Taliban can conduct hit-and-run attacks from their refuge in Pakistan, and the North remains open to infiltration.
The United States must pressure Pakistan to take action against the Taliban’s central command in Quetta. The current offensive in Pakistan is aimed at Pakistani Taliban and does not indicate a major shift in Pakistani policy toward Afghanistan.
Dorronsoro's book is required reading for Afghanistan. An excellent primer.
urban and rural populations
Conventional Wisdom Won't Work in Afghanistan
JOSHUA FOUST | 17 JUL 2009
WORLD POLITICS REVIEW
Quote:
The cliché that you must "protect the population" in order to win a counterinsurgency has now become entrenched in conventional wisdom. This is especially so of the war in Afghanistan, where civilian casualties have become a deeply polarizing issue. It has become so important that, during a recent trip to Helmand Province, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the new commander of U.S. and NATO-led troops in Afghanistan, declared that Coalition forces must make a "cultural shift" in Afghanistan, away from their normal combat orientation and toward protecting civilians.
But protecting the population requires knowing where it lives. Here, the Army's conventional wisdom fails.
In Iraq, the population was heavily urbanized, so spreading out into the cities made sense. The Surge, for example, was almost entirely focused on Baghdad. Now the consensus seems to be that the Army should focus on securing Afghanistan's major cities as well.
Pretending that Afghanistan is an urban culture clashes with reality. According to the Central Statistics Office, around 10 percent of Afghanistan's population is still nomadic. Afghanistan's 10 largest cities hold less than 20 percent of its people, and the rest of Afghanistan lives in small rural communities.
Interesting. Could mean he agrees with those of us here who
tried to point out that Afghanistan was not Iraq; that the far more rural Afghans were not Arabs; that the terrain in Afghanistan made it a totally different game; that MRAPS were not a good buy and a few other things. We may have been on to something.
Still, not necessarily a doomed operation. All those items are easily addressed. We'll see how smart and adaptable the the new Command crowd is...
The Poppy and The Greenback
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009...est=latestnews
"U.S. Debating Payoffs to Afghan Poppy Growers
Obama administration is considering whether to pay off Afghan farmers to stop them from growing heroin poppies on contract for the Taliban, senior officials told the Associated Press. "
The article goes on to express concern that farmers will take the cash and still grow their poppies. It would be stupid to grease their palms with cash and ask them not to grow, rather let them plant and before the crops near maturity, pay them high market value then destroy the crop(s). The taliban then has to extort money from the farmers and that makes them like us.
Civilian deaths in A'Stan
Can't have metrics without strategic goals
I think the metrics argument puts the cart before the horse. Yes, we need better metrics to assess the situation on the ground. But the problem is that in the absence of a solid strategic framework the metrics become the strategy -- maximizing the "good" stuff you choose to count becomes progress, minimizing the "bad" becomes a cause for concern.
Now, in truth, an a priori determined set of metrics would be better than what we were doing in the early days of Iraq, which was essentially letting ideology determine whether we were winning regardless of facts on the ground.
But nevertheless, until we can get the administration to do better than define success in Afghanistan as "we'll know it when we see it." Any exercise at developing metrics is premature.
--BF
Afghanistan's imperfect democracy
National Post
8/20/09
We wish Afghanistan's society were more like our own. We wish that there weren't so much corruption, that the domestic military and police were more competent and professional, that death sentences were no longer issued for Muslims who convert to other faiths and that laws permitting wife-beating weren't passed.
Then again, if Afghanistan already were a stable, humane and modern democracy, there would have been no need for our troops to deploy there in the first place.
(snip)
Steve Coll's short column
Steve Coll's taut piece on the arguing over Afghanistan: http://www.newyorker.com/online/blog...tml#entry-more
Note the links to General McChrystal's guidance -v- Rory Stewart's critique.
davidbfpo
Well, if the CFR consensus is that it is a war of choice, it almost certainly is not.
If the foreign policy establishment is looking in one direction, it behooves someone to look in several others. Their track record isn't too good...
Actually, the war in Afghanistan is of course a war of choice. That, however, does not preclude it also being a war of necessity. It need not have been but it became and it is now necessary. Contrary to what Haas says, it was not necessary in the first place -- Foreign Policy errors led to the attack that led to Afghanistan -- but it is now necessary. So he has it exactly backwards.
Haas says that the Korean War and the Persian Gulf war were wars of necessity. Went to the first, stepped back and allowed a son to go to the second -- neither was a war of necessity in any sense until we committed to them. Then they also became necessary. Same Son has also been to the current two and seems to think they were wars of choice that became necessary. As he said to me once "We either finish it now or we'll be back in ten years." I made much the same comment about the 1991 war -- pillars of the foreign policy establishment didn't agree...
Haas misses the point that the secret is to not commit to such wars unless they are truly necessary lest such commitment become a matter of displaying national integrity and responsibility in finishing what one started. Prating about the national interest should consider that it is in our interest to avoid unnecessary conflicts but if engaged we must do our very best.
I am reminded of one pillow (sic) of our Foreign Policy Establishment and her asinine quote leading to the foolishness that was Kosovo. “What is the point of having this superb military you're always talking about if you can't use it?”
Haas also says this:
Quote:
"...no one should forget that doing more in Afghanistan lessens our ability to act elsewhere, including North Korea, Iran and Iraq. There needs to be a limit to what the United States does in Afghanistan and how long it is prepared to do it, lest we find ourselves unable to contend with other wars, of choice or of necessity, if and when they arise."
While certainly a case of stating the obvious -- to an extent that is both inane and patronizing, a difficult feat -- it also shows the banal and short sighted outlook of that foreign policy establishment.
And to make things even more difficult...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bernard Finel
I think the metrics argument puts the cart before the horse. Yes, we need better metrics to assess the situation on the ground. But the problem is that in the absence of a solid strategic framework the metrics become the strategy -- maximizing the "good" stuff you choose to count becomes progress, minimizing the "bad" becomes a cause for concern.
Now, in truth, an a priori determined set of metrics would be better than what we were doing in the early days of Iraq, which was essentially letting ideology determine whether we were winning regardless of facts on the ground.
But nevertheless, until we can get the administration to do better than define success in Afghanistan as "we'll know it when we see it." Any exercise at developing metrics is premature.
--BF
...any metric you can measure change in within a 4-year period IS NOT STRATEGIC.
Perhaps this is why we muck around in strategy-less tactics; they may not be taking you anyplace you want to be, but at least you can measure how fast you are getting there!
Strategic, Operational, Tactical, ......
Quote:
Posted by BW, any metric you can measure change in within a 4-year period IS NOT STRATEGIC.
I would like to see some examples of strategic metrics that don't change within 4 years. I think you are referring to the metric, not the content.
For example, the cost of oil is a strategic metric, but it changes daily (the price of oil impacts almost everything else such as food prices, ability to sustain economic growth, political stability, etc., and of course all these factors impact international relationships).
If the argument is to develop the strategy first (and associated metrics), and then determine how you're going to actualize it (operational and tactical approaches and associaed metrics), then I agree.
Metrics. Metrical or the other metrical...
I'll go a step further than Bob's World. Strategy does not lend itself to metrics.
Metrics of many types -- oil prices, tonnages, number of personnel or opposing organizations, availability of food, miles or efforts passed and hundreds more -- affect strategies but the strategy itself is rarely amenable to measurement other than subjectively. Metrics can be applied to Operational and Tactical efforts and they may or may not indicate anything of value pertaining to the mission.
I have watched attempts to apply metrics to strategy and to warfare for a number of years. If anyone can provide me with truly useful metrics in an all encompassing sense of indicating results at the strategic, operational or tactical levels, I'll be most appreciative.
Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3) and metrics….
Like many, 98% of my experience has been at the tactical level and as far as I know the rest was at an operational level...my armchair is also far, far away from Afghanistan...but I'll take a crack at this one nonetheless.
In our SWJ thread entitled Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police we covered a lot of ground and perhaps we can pick out some tactical, operational, and strategic metrics.
Tactical Metrics:
Quote:
Originally Posted by
tequila
Mr. Mohammad had no rank, no money for food and not enough clothing or gear to operate in cold weather. Two of his six trucks were broken. The ammunition the Pentagon provided him came in cardboard boxes that immediately crumbled, exposing cartridges to the elements on his storeroom’s dirty floor.
Operational Metrics:
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
As an aside, I'd suggest that given what I know of Afghanistan, they'd be better off with one National Gendarmerie and having the normal police functions at Province and city level -- but that's in the too hard box at this time.
Strategic Metrics
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Entropy
The strategy of the major U.S. and British military offensive in Afghanistan's Helmand province aimed at wresting it from the Taliban is based on bringing back Afghan army and police to maintain permanent control of the population, so the foreign forces can move on to another insurgent stronghold.
Robert Kaplan covered this in the Atlantic: Saving Afghanistan
Quote:
While the coalition builds an army from the top down, they hope to improve security in the countryside from the bottom up through the Afghan Public Protection Program or AP3. As described by American Brig. Gen. Mark Milley, the AP3 recruits, trains, and arms locals across tribal and ethnic lines, making them answerable to provincial governors who are, in turn, appointed by the democratically elected president.
And I linked to a cost estimate of the security strategy from Foreign Affairs
Quote:
Afghanistan needs larger and more effective security forces, but it also needs to be able to sustain those security forces. A decree signed by President Karzai in December 2002 would have capped the Afghan National Army at 70,000 troops (it had reached 66,000 by mid-2008). U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has since announced a plan to increase that number to 122,000, as well as add 82,000 police, for a total of 204,000 in the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Such increases, however, would require additional international trainers and mentors -- which are, quite simply, not available in the foreseeable future -- and maintaining such a force would far exceed the means of such a destitute country. Current estimates of the annual cost are around $2.5 billion for the army and $1 billion for the police. Last year, the Afghan government collected about 7 percent of a licit GDP estimated at $9.6 billion in revenue -- about $670 million. Thus, even if Afghanistan's economy experienced uninterrupted real growth of 9 percent per year, and if revenue extraction nearly doubled, to 12 percent (both unrealistic forecasts), in ten years the total domestic revenue of the Afghan government would be about $2.5 billion a year. Projected pipelines and mines might add $500 million toward the end of this period. In short, the army and the police alone would cost significantly more than Afghanistan's total revenue.
This is an excellent question.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
I would like to see some examples of strategic metrics that don't change within 4 years. I think you are referring to the metric, not the content.
For example, the cost of oil is a strategic metric, but it changes daily (the price of oil impacts almost everything else such as food prices, ability to sustain economic growth, political stability, etc., and of course all these factors impact international relationships).
If the argument is to develop the strategy first (and associated metrics), and then determine how you're going to actualize it (operational and tactical approaches and associated metrics), then I agree.
So, if the number one US Strategic objective is, say, "Secure the homeland,"
and you are designing operations to deal with AQ. This means that any operational metric you have for AQ must be subordinate to any strategic metric you have for defending the homeland.
What I see is a fixation on the operational metrics for defeating AQ, and because we have not adequately designated and prioritized strategic priorities for "securing the homeland" we end up pressing too hard for an intermediate objective and totally missing the fact that excessive pursuit of an operational objective may in fact be creating a strategic vulnerability.
I will not say that one should never risk strategic defeat in pursuit of an operational or tactical victory; but I will say unequivocally that to do so must not only be knowingly, but also a CCIR that is laid on some 4-stars, or even the President's desk for decision first.
All neat, surferbeetle. However,
Tactical Metrics:
I said in that post that I was aware that many metrics can affect a sistuation at the strategic level (or any level for that matter). I fully acknowledge the quote you provide is a metric that affects the tactical situation however my request was for truly useful metrics in an all encompassing sense of indicating results at the strategic, operational or tactical levels.
Operational Metrics:
My comment above applies with respect to the Operational level as well.
Strategic Metrics
As it does to the Strategic level.
Kaplan adds nothing. Regrettably, in my view your quote adds yet more data on the effects or on items that affect the war in Afghanistan -- but not an ounce of metrics indicating a result of tactical, operational or strategic action.
Questions. Serious ones, not idle...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bob's World
So, if the number one US Strategic objective is, say, "Secure the homeland,"... any operational metric you have for AQ must be subordinate to any strategic metric you have for defending the homeland.
Desirable, yes. 'Must' possibly, in some cases even probably -- but not always. Not least because one can pursue multiple lines of operation in the process of attaining a strategic goal. Why must that be so?
Quote:
...totally missing the fact that excessive pursuit of an operational objective may in fact be creating a strategic vulnerability.
I don't really think anyone has 'missed' that issue and I'd also say that both Afghanistan and Iraq were strategic issues as well as operational issues. You may not agree with the strategy but that doesn't mean it was or is nonexistent. In any event, if not initially strategic, is either now a strategic issue?
Second question on the topic; are we missing it or taking a calculated risk?
Quote:
I will not say that one should never risk strategic defeat in pursuit of an operational or tactical victory; but I will say unequivocally that to do so must not only be knowingly, but also a CCIR that is laid on some 4-stars, or even the President's desk for decision first.
I would tend to go with the President's desk since we're talking national stuff here and I have no reason to believe nor an indication in any way that was not done. I also suggest that the document required in such a case is not only a CCIR, which is simply information on which to base a decision (but a fair CYA tool if the right people initial it...) but a NSPD (or a PPD, depending on which administration you're addressing), an action directive. Would that not be necessary?
Marketing theory may have some answers…
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
Tactical Metrics:
I said in that post that I was aware that many metrics can affect a sistuation at the strategic level (or any level for that matter). I fully acknowledge the quote you provide is a metric that affects the tactical situation however my request was for truly useful metrics in an all encompassing sense of indicating results at the strategic, operational or tactical levels.
There are always questions concerning the validity and or applicability of marketing/metrics methodologies…and that’s a good thing, because it leads to interesting conversations and highlights that there are always more than one way to skin a cat.
Lets keep in mind the services we are targeting in our COIN/GWOT/OIF/OEF fight can be grouped in three main areas: security, economics, and governance. A way to analyze our effectiveness in these areas might include a marketing-style analysis of ‘three key environments’ (internal, customer, and external) at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
An analysis of the internal environment of our organization could include:
- Availability and deployment of human capital (demographic breakout)
- Availability and capacity of equipment and technology
- Availability of financial resources
- Power struggles within the organization
- Current marketing objectives and performance
An analysis of the environment of our customer could include:
- Customer demographic breakout?
- Service/Product segment breakout?
- What do our customers do with our products?
- Where do our customers receive our products?
- When do our customers receive our products?
- How & why do our customers receive our products?
- Why do potential customers not select our products?
An analysis of the external environment in which our organization works:
- Competitor’s demographic breakout?
- Competitor’s product segment breakout?
- Economic growth and stability?
- Legal and regulatory issues?
- Technological advancements?
We could also hop in a HMMWV and go for a look-see to check the staffwork...;)
Seems to me I've heard that song before...
From Surferbeetle's quote of Kaplan in the full post just prior to this from me:
Quote:
While the American-led NATO coalition is holed-up in a network of heavily fortified bases, surrounded by HESCO barriers and living off food supplied by Kellogg Brown and Root, the Taliban are masters of isolation, quick as they are to make deals with local tribes and to threaten villagers with hideous retribution through “night letters.”
"Doing the same thing over and over and hoping for a different result..."
For the record, I know some are getting out and about -- still, when they are out they're in large bodies and a lot of protective gear; when they aren't out, they're too comfortable and too expensively 'secure.' Won't work.
Before the Army got overly impressed with itself, back when one could try things
without causing ulcers for worrywarts and CSMs, I used to have a "Fall Out One" day about once a quarter. The NCOs would be peons for the day and the Troops would take charge. I managed to convince most of my Platoon Leaders to go along with this, only had one who wouldn't go for it (OCS type who'd 'risen above' that :rolleyes:). Had two Co Cdrs and several 1SGs that were willing to play over the six years or so I was a PSG. You wouldn't believe how a CPT 18 years in the Army commanding his third company can screw with minds...
Everyone learned a lot -- the troops who got to be 'in charge' learned it wasn't as easy as they thought and shared that knowledge with their fellow troopies. The Officers and NCOs got a reminder that life as Joe wasn't quite like their life. Did it in garrison occasionally but mostly in the field; it worked really well on exercises; that steepens the learning curve. Also provided some good entertainment on occasion. :wry: :eek:
When LTG Walter Ulmer was the III Corps Cdr in '82-83, he caught both Divisions headed back in to garrison after a big exercise, told them to halt in place, bring all the Officers in to the Post theater for an Officers Call and that the NCOs were to bring in the units and commence accountability and cleanup routines. He did that ti make the point that those guys could be trusted. A Colonel who had participated in that as a Major told the tale to several people in 1993 stating that it had worked out well -- and a LTC and two CPTs who heard all said that no LTG would do that and that if one did, they'd refuse the order. Fascinating.
Back to my PSG days, in almost seven years I had only five PLs, nine(?) (or none) for longer than six months. Ran a platoon as the APL in Viet Nam for seven months and at that time, there were seven other NCOs including two SSGs serving as acting PLs in the Bn; eight out of 19 Platoons and the S2 was an SFC -- did a good job but the MI guys hated him cause he'd consistently embarrass 'em. This stuff isn't rocket science...
Long way of getting to the point that I think American Pride is on to something. :D
And I can REALLY sympathize with ODB's rant...
People back the winning horse..
Some things I have trouble understanding:
1. What the hell is the Quetta shura? If the US knows that taliban HQ is operating in Quetta, what is stopping them from doing something about it? If they dont think the shura is in quetta, then why keep up this charade?
2. Many of my (leftwing) friends from Pakistan suspect that the US is actually trying to get the ISI to help them get out of Afghanistan without it being a PR disaster and is basically waiting for the ISI to make some sort of livable deal with the Taliban. And my Indian friends suspect that in return ISI gets to keep the kashmir jihad going. Is this conspiracy mongering or could it be true? If its not true, I suggest that the widespread existence of these theories is a sign that the US is not able to communicate effectively. If its true, then a lot of people are being killed for PR purposes, which seems immoral.
3. Whats the plan?
I think that the US is not winning in Afghanistan, not because the war is so "complex". Its because at one level its really simple. As Bin Laden said: people will bet on the stronger horse. In this case, far too many people are betting that the taliban will win. Unless there is a decisive change in that assessment, its a self-fulfilling prophecy. It may be that in war nobody will tell you their whole plan, but its also true that in this case not seeing a plan keeps a lot of fence-sitters on the fence. I look forward to being enlightened.