McCreary's Blast (from Ricks/FP)
Tom called out Mr. McCreary's blast on Nightwatch>
Seems to hit everything...
http://nightwatch.afcea.org/NightWatch_20100106.htm
Counterinsurgency vs. Anti-insurgency
Gen. Flynn's article brings to the forefront a core discussion that has been moving under the radar screen since 2007. It highlights the core difference between anti-insurgency which is focused on kill/capture and the elimination of IED cells/networks or true counterinsurgency which focuses to a high degree on population control and security.
It is interesting that FID and unconventional warfare which were the bread and butter of Special Forces from their inception to the early 1970s was forced into extinction by the big Army as they drove to disband Special Forces who had to rebrand themselves as the "Strategic Recon types" in the 80s/90s in order to survive. This rebranding cause internal problems for SF when they discovered the need to shift back to FID/UW.
Now we are back to FID and unconventional warfare and big Army went left in Iraq and that is now not working in Afghanistan which went right and is a true insurgency with characteristics of a full blown phase three guerilla war. It is refreshing to see a Spad called a Spad.
Now just maybe big Army can focus in learning just what is insurgency, what drives an insurgency, and how does that insurgency evolve--and not learning it out of the COIN FM or from CTC scenario rotations. It is amazing that many in the old guard (Vietnam vets) have pointed to key lessons learned about FID, but were brushed off and now there is the sudden interest in books written about FID in Vietnam--lessons learned though from the Special Forces CIDG program seem on the other hand to still be ignored. One of the most important books written in the early 80s "Silence As A Weapon" written by retired COL. Herrington goes along way in describing the use of silence by an insurgency in the control of populations.
Since Gen. Flynn has gotten some attention on the MI side maybe attention should be paid to a concept developed by John Robb called "open source warfare" (2004/2005) and just recently scientifically verified by the Nature magazine article "Ecology of Human Warfare". For the first time via computer research one can make specific outside changes/impacts to the insurgency environment and see the results on the insurgency movement without having boots on the ground. And it goes a long way in explaining the media impact of their operations which can be verified by the impressive increase in video releases on the part of the Taliban in Afghanistan since 2008.
A Cross post from the HTT Thread . . .
Here
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Steve the Planner
Something about intelligence theory is basic. The more you know and learn, the more you can know and apply.
Professionally, I would rather use data (scrounged and verified by any sources) to cross-check against field verification and systemic consistency (smell test)) in sets, and update those sets with field changes on as real-time a basis as possible. Then, use that knowledge base to fill in gaps for people while they fill mine. If it isn't engaged and actionable, its just another contract..
Question is: What is needed?
You are correct with the last question--what is needed. We answer that question by knowing what the mission is IMHO and that brings us around to the discussion of the MG Flynn CNAS report.
The breakdown occurs in my opinion when one moves from position "the more one knows, the more one can know" (which is fine) to the position "the more one can know, the more one must know."
I'm not at all convinced that simply because we can know, for example, that the soil 10 feet below the surface at UTM grid LC 1234554321 consists of a specific form of clay that we usually need to know that. If I am planning to build another Burj Kahlifa I might need that knowledge, but I doubt it is important if I'm trying to decide where to erect my TACSAT antenna.
Those last few posts sort of summarize the problems...
Though I'd suggest that while Bob is correct on the tactical versus the strategic focus, he and the problem seem to forget that our political system is not conducive to long term strategies. That said, he is correct that our threat-centric intel focus is just really dumbb -- with two 'b's. :mad:
Ergo, a policy reform is required...
Entropy is correct in that many 'intel' errors are a result of lazy thinking and counterporductive (i.e. excessive classification, parochialism and turf battles, political expediency among other facets) actions by some analysts and many Bosses.
Seems like a policy reform might help...
Steve's quote from Night Watch has this gem:
Quote:
"Its weak point is that implementation relies on the same people who failed, twice."
Yet another case of a policy error IMO. Fire a few "pour l'encouragement d'les autres..."
Lastly, WM hits a nail squarely:
Quote:
"The breakdown occurs in my opinion when one moves from position 'the more one knows, the more one can know' (which is fine) to the position 'the more one can know, the more one must know.' "
There is no policy that explicitly says do that, rather, our policies -- and our Congress -- lead us to do that because the system has developed numerous rules and even laws to protect itself from accountability. Our deeply flawed budgetary process leads to a winner takes all approach and a 'go along - get along' attitude and set of turf allocations all too often that create a series of very discrete stovepipes that foster the idea that more is better when we should instead establish and encourage competition between agencies and units to produce meaningful intel. Reward those who get it right to spur the competitors to better efforts.
There's little doubt in my mind that sharp analysts in many agencies are delivering good product to their Bosses. The problem is they are being constrained by politically (in all senses of that word) oriented supervisors and / or units or agencies who do not want their Honcho to get upset by hearing things he or she would prefer not to hear.
That too would seem to indicate a needed policy change -- fire about half the senior people in order to get the rest to do what they should be doing instead of what they think the Boss might want.
And foster competition. While centralization will always be more efficient it will also always be less effective. In my view, effective intel trumps the 'efficient' production of something that is not really intel but is instead all too often platitudinous garb -- er, information -- of marginal value...
The Major Is On To Something
Pete:
In civilian life, I do court testimony as an expert.
I'm currently preparing muy reports and testimony for a very complex government case that has been going on for ten years, so I am sitting here going through mountains of records, evidence, underlying court rulings, and trying to develop a deep and richly-supported analysis against the realization that whatever I write or testify to will be grilled to death by two economics professors on the other side armed by the largest law firm in the world.
All kidding aside, the case is about money and government authority---no lives on the line whatsoever, and, ten years from now, no one will ever remember it.
It really is incredible that, where lives are on the line in such a complex circumstance, the so-called warfighter support is so poor.
I have written (or should I say: overwritten factual inaccuracies) in Wiki too often to know the limits of some of the electronic sources.
What's really funny to me in expert testimony matters, too, is that increasingly I see opposing counsel working from electronic research in regulatory cases. The applicable regulation comes up one section at a time despite that a regulation must be read across its entirety. So often, the next section alters the intent and meaning of the last, and they miss that.
E-lawyers versus the old guys that review a printed copy of the entire regulation, which they read cover to cover before developing any positions.
Oh, Brave New World!
Two "boots on the ground" comment
'Babatim' has commented on MG Flynn's report, as an "on the ground" commentator and outside officialdom worth reading IMHO: http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=2479
Quote:
(My added emphasis)This white paper is full of good things but all good things must come to an end and at the end of this paper there are no good things which I can detect.
He then adds a comment by a regular poster on the blog, by an in-country US intelligence analyst:
Quote:
I read MG Flynn’s paper as well, and while he makes some excellent points, he failed to mention that part of the reason our intelligence sucks is that all our collectors are mostly stuck on the FOB. That’s why we’ve become so hooked on technical intelligence. The kind of relevant intelligence that Flynn yearns for comes from meaningful interaction with the populace, period. In my experience with Afghans, especially Pashtuns, if you suddenly roll up into their village with your MRAPs, Star Ship Trooper suits, and “foreign” interpreters (even if your terp is from Afghanistan, if he’s not from the neighborhood, he’s “foreign”), they will tell you two things: jack and sh*t. We are reminded constantly that Afghanistan is a country broken by decades of war; no one trusts one another. But trust is only obtained by building meaningful relationships with people, and our current force protection policies make the process of building rapport impossible. As I sit here at my desk, on an unnamed FOB in Regional Command East, I would dearly love to grab a few of my soldiers and head out to the local market to see what’s going on in town today. Perhaps I could report back to my leadership that local farmers are concerned about a drought next year because of the light snowfall this winter, or that the mullah down the street is preaching anti-coalition/government propaganda. I’d get this information from shop keepers and kids that I’ve built a relationship with over the past few months. But I cannot just walk off the FOB because that would be the end of my career. Instead, I’m going to check out BBC.com, call a couple guys I know like Tim, and continue to be disgruntled that I have NO idea what’s going on outside my FOB.
I think relationship building has featured before on many Afghan threads.
As have excessive Force Protection measures,
The one precludes the other. You'd think someone would tumble to that simple little fact...
Excellent catch, David.
More from the Tom Ricks Blog
The following comments on the Flynn report are by Adam L. Silverman, Ph.D., a civilian analyst who was imbedded with the 1st Armored Division in Iraq:
Quote:
I have sat in meetings dealing with this issue where the question was repeatedly brought up: "how come we don't have any information from this area?" Looking at the part of the map being referred to the simple response is that there is no military presence in the area, which means no PRT, no CA, and no HTT there either. Provincial Reconstruction, Civil Affairs, and Human Terrain members work very hard, but even they can't bring back primary source data from places that no one is operating in.
Quote:
My second concern is that the military in general, seemingly derived from military intelligence, has two negative reinforcing dynamics: if you needed to know it you already would and if I know it and you don't, then I'm more powerful than you. Operationally relevant knowledge management will never be effective, regardless of the system that is put in place, until or unless this dynamic is broken! My third concern is that aggregation and collection of data into a centralized location, is still not going to solve the problem. The operational side of the House, whether hungry for information for non-lethal operations or intelligence for lethal ones must be fed!
The entire piece can be read using the link below.
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts...feed_the_beast
MG Flynn on the State of the Insurgency
Hat tip to KOW for picking this up, a ppt by Major General Flynn, entitled 'State of the InsurgencyTrends, Intentions and Objectives' (Unclassified) and the link is:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/01/fly...+(Kings+of+War)
KOW has a summary and I cannot improve on it.
Quote:
Then he drops what might be the biggest bomb in the entire deck: 'The Afghan insurgency can sustain itself indefinitely' at least in terms of arms and ammunition, funding, and recruits. Now, that is a pretty grim portrait. Of course, the Taliban are not supermen, they have weaknesses and, according to Flynn, they are not yet a popular movement throughout the country. (moving on)
But he does make it clear what he is thinking: 'Taliban strength is the perception that its victory is inevitable; reversing momentum requires protecting the population and changing perceptions'.
Seems sound to me. The rub, of course, is trying to turn that good advice into action and then reality.
I am surprised SWC did not pick this up earlier, although the ppt is dated late December 2009. One of the four comments raises issues that have appeared in many threads: end state sought, objectives etc.
A matter of perspective...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Rex Brynen
It seems to me that it is entirely possible that neither side can win: that the international community cannot defeat the insurgency or build a stable, functional, Afghan government that can assure security and exercise effective control over large parts of the country, while the Taliban cannot (given both their ethnic and sectarian opponents, as well as rivals within the Pashtun community) capture Kabul as they did in September 1996.
I think I've made this point before, the real risk—from an Afghan perspective---is that this become the prolonged reality. The international community slowly disengages from a COIN fight is can't win, but throws enough money and guns at the ANA/ANP, the ex-Northern Alliance, southern warlords, and others (including Iranian support to Hazara militias) to stalemate the Taliban. The Taliban, on the other hand, consolidate practical control over parts of the country, while fighting a continued civil war.
The depressing model here is Lebanon, 1975-90. Everyone (Israel, Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the PLO, Iran, etc.) simply threw resources at local clients in such a way to prevent their opponents from 'winning."
And perspectives drive priorities, which in turn shape the nature of engagement.
When one defines 'victory' what perspective, exactly, are they assessing that from? Even in politics we describe these things in terms of one particular candidate or party "winning" and the other "losing." What of the populace? How did the populace fare? Did the people win or lose or really have no change in their lives from the perceived victory or loss?
This goes to what I have described as "Government-Centric engagement" (where one commits themselves or their country to the preservation of a particular government or even form of government over some other); or "Threat-Centric engagement" (where one commits themselves or their country to the defeat of some particular threat) with little regard to the impact on the very populace that is either governed by that government you seek to sustain (or take down, for that matter); or from which the threat one is hard-set to defeat emanates from.
I believe we see a bit of both of this in Afghanistan. We can say we are conducting "Population-Centric COIN", but that is really describing TACTICs, not the strategic/operational focus. At the strategic/operational level we simply cannot seem to wean ourselves from making our priority the preservation of some form or particular man in government; or from the defeat of some particular threat.
This is the phenomenon that I attempted to address in the two papers that I published regarding what I termed "Populace-centric engagement." (Thread and links on SWJ). Suggesting that in the emerging information age with vastly empowered populaces and corresponding evolving perspectives on "sovereignty" that now, more than ever, it might be far more effective to worry less about preserving or defeating governments; or defeating "threats" in the pursuit of national interests; but to instead focus on designing engagement that builds relationships with the very populaces of the world as well.
In reality this in simplest terms is a shift of priority. We state that the Defeat of the Taliban is NOT our priority in Afghanistan. We state that the preservation of the Karzai Government is NOT our priority in Afghanistan. We state instead, that enabling stability, good governance, and a positive relationship with the PEOPLE of Afghanistan is our priority.
This puts Mr. Karzai on notice that we are not here to protect, preserve or even support HIM. He is expendable. He must lead, follow, or get out of the way.
This prevents us from painting ourselves into an "exit strategy-less" corner that makes "defeat" of some particular threat the measure of success, when in fact, that threat may well hold a portion of the answer.
This prevents us from designing a scheme of engagement that may appear to make headway in preserving governmental stability in a country, or in quelling threats to that government, but does so on the backs of the very populace that government is supposed to support. I believe far too much of our Cold War and post-Cold War engagement in the Middle East in particular falls into this category. And I believe it is this very form of engagement that forms the existential threat to the U.S.; not the governments or threats that draw so much of our attention currently.
I never said change was easy.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Entropy
Just a few questions.
How do you operationalize such a shift in priority? How do you get the people to trust you, the foreign occupier, over Karzai, the Taliban or the local warlord? Karzai cannot be easily separated from his constituents and base of support. Once he is kicked to the curb, how do you prevent him and his allies from throwing a wrench into your efforts to bring governance and stability to the Afghan people (which is something that's happened at the provincial level on at least a couple of occasions)? Similarly, If defeat of the Taliban is not a priority, then what will prevent them from promoting instability? What do you plan to do about local leadership & powerbrokers, who are the gatekeepers to the loyalty local populations, to say nothing of the major players? Does the US and NATO have the resources and resilience build governance over the long haul provided Karzai doesn't play ball? In short, good governance is your goal, so how do you get there in the mess that is Afghanistan?
Good questions. I once worked for a general who would announce to us staff nugs after we had slaved way at some problem for weeks and had achieved a major success "good job! We are now at step 2 of a 100 step process!" (We were all quite pleased when we were assessed at reaching "step 3")
So, what is step one? Well, much like the steps developed for defeating the destructive behavior associated with addictions, the first step is to admit that you have a problem and need to change. Most addicts don't get to that point until they are face down in the gutter with their lives and every relationship that they once valued in total shambles, and their financial and physical health squandered in the pursuit of their addictions.
I would offer that the US is a bit addicted to power and control, and that I would like to see us have that "come to Jesus" moment far prior to waking up face down as a nation in that proverbial gutter.
Step two is to simply recognize that governments come and go, threats rise and fall, but that populaces, while ever dynamic, are what endure. That by linking our efforts to approaches that prioritize our enduring relationship with the populace in the lands where our national interests may fall is in the long run far healthier than linking them to the current government there or some current threat emerging from there. Deal with those government and threats in the context of one’s prioritized relationship with the populace.
Step three would be a major shift of focus from the "State" Department. We are too designed in name and approach to dealing with "States", yet everyone recognizes the rise of non-states; the growing number of "failed" states, and the growing empowerment of people in general due to the access to greater and faster information. A "Foreign Office" construct is probably more inclusive and descriptive. Once the name is fixed they can then set about looking at how does the US approach to foreign policy need to be tuned up to operate with less friction in the emerging global environment. Certainly they'll still primarily work by through and with states. We hopefully just won't get so tied to the manifestations of government, and grow a better focus on the populace which that governance represents.
(I've never gotten past step three with that one particular general, so I'll stop there. Just getting to step three would be a tremendous shift in the right direction.)
He's neither our problem nor our responsibility.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Dayuhan
What if he can't lead and won't follow, which on the basis of form to date seems likely? How do you propose to get him out of the way?
Easy. Pack it up and go home. If's he's legit, he'll prevail against both official and unofficial challengers. If not, he'll soon be replaced and we can make that government the same offer we made him; to be a supportive ally that will not allow them to harbor organizations bent on doing us harm. That in exchange for working with us on that concern of ours we will help them with concerns of their own.
My wife teaches third grade. She sets standards for rewards and punishments with her students and holds herself and them to those social contracts ruthlessly. As a result she has order in her classroom as everyone knows what the standards are and that they will be held to those standards. Our foreign policy is more like the classroom management of those teachers who agonize over hurt feelings if someone gets what's coming to them, or the burden to themselves if they actually perform as promised to either punish or reward certain behavior, teaching the class that the standards don't really mean anything. Those classrooms are chaos, and everyone suffers from it. Our foreign policy could use a good dose of 3rd grade classroom management.
Decisions like this are why a President gets up in the morning.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Dayuhan
I think we all know he won't prevail. He'll probably be replaced by the Taliban (with possibly a few equally dysfunctional governments in between), who won't be interested in our help and will not care at all about what we will or will not allow. In short, this brings us back where we were before, which is why Karzai is pretty sure we won't do it.
Seems we're right back to something we've done before: harnessing ourselves to a Government that cannot stand, but which we cannot allow to fall. Hasn't worked so well in the past, and I can't say I'm terribly optimistic about the outcome this time out.
My concern are the guys and gals who brief him up on his options prior to making those decisions. With an overly threat-focused intel community; and an overly state-foucsed policy team; we are ill equipped to provide him the type of analysis that is most relevant for the world we live in today. Between the "Good Cold Warriors" on one side, and the neo-socialists on the other the voices of reason are either too few or simply not allowed access to the debate.