A point of view to ponder
I had this comment via a PM and have the author's consent to use this. It reflects their long-time membership and long absences from posting.
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In my opinion, the vast majority of posts could be grouped into 3 bins: 1. submission of ideas and articles rejected by other publications, 2. retired mil folks with an axe to grind, 3. trigger pullers arguing over low tactical issues. While those discussions are interesting, I would rather see a discussion of more operational/strategic level items and issues. I have always appreciated the ability of members of the SWC to answer RFIs that no one else seem to be able to answer. I see SWC as a forum to try out ideas on an educated audience, thus tolerate responses that are predictable in order to get the one or two that are true gems. I would love to see discussions on what our options are regarding NATO, Israel, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, etc. I would like to see more historical analysis of past small wars and what the true lessons are/were, and of what utility they are to us today. Just a few thoughts.
One of the more popular posts...
One of the more popular posts on the Small War Council asks, "What can we do to keep the SWJ relevant?" Maybe the answer for the SWJ council is, "Quit insulting each other."
I stopped posting on here because people like Bill Moore and "Of the Troops" immediately descend to calling me an idiot or the author of "highly naive articles and this is just another one to add to the compost pile." As a result, I only check the council side when someone links to my article. As usual, most of the "discussion" chooses to personally attack me and avoid the argument.
You gentlemen stay classy.
On the quality of participation
This is my opinion. As such it is clearly open to challenge. But it is based on a fair historical perspective and so might be worth something. At the height of the COIN revival I was fearful that we would fall back into the default mode of trying to forget about small wars as we did after Vietnam. We also did the same after every single major war we have fought. After the Revolution we fought Indians in the Northwest Territories and Florida but then along came the War of 1812 with a major conventional enemy (and we darn near lost the war). After New Orleans we fought Indians again all over the West. Then along came the Mexican War against a major conventional enemy and Scott, Taylor, and Doniphan led us to victory. After that we had to learn to fight Indians all over again. In 1861 along came the civil war with West Pointers fighting West Pointers. Big armies on the move. Lots of technical innovation. After it was all over and Sheridan had scared the French out of Mexico massing 50,000 troops on the border, we had to learn to fight Indians again. Then we fought Spain in 1898 - it is amazing how many former Confederate generals marched again to the sound of the guns in the blue and khaki uniforms of the US, Fitzhugh Lee and William Oates come to mind. In the aftermath, the dirty little wars in the Philippines and Caribbean raised up and Pershing chased Pancho Villa all over Northern Mexico but we had to learn that these weren't the kinds of wars we were prepared to fight because people were not only not learning the lessons, they weren't even recording them. WWI was followed by the Banana Wars which only the Marines were interested enough to record but they were also preparing for the next big one. They published their Small Wars Manual at almost the same time as their Tentative Landing Operations Manual which was a major influence on conventional operations in WWII.
The point of all this is that neither our political nor our military leaders like the small, nasty, dirty wars. We all want to fight the "big one" (why are we pivoting toward Asia? - not merely for the obvious and real threat of China). As the small wars wind down, interest fall off among both military and civilian national security analysts. This leaves the door open for smart, intelligent challenges to the prevailing wisdom of small wars - challenges like those of Gian Gentile both on these pages and his new book. As for our junior officers, they are looking at being assigned to units planning against conventional conflicts with China (perhaps) and certainly not toward Iraq now seen in the media as a totally foolish effort without any redeeming social virtue or Afghanistan which our president says we are leaving in 2014 regardless of conditions on the ground. The Administration has floated the idea of no residual force of any kind - the zero option. and who wants to be the last casualty of a war we have deemed is not worth fighting anyway? As a result, interest in our broad topic has died down.
This fact - loss of broader interest - makes our forum (Journal and Council alike) all the more important. Here we can not only record the lessons we needed to learn but debate them and, perhaps, allow the next generation to actually learn them and not make the same mistakes that we and previous generations made.
On that note
Cheers
JohnT
So What Happened? Random Thinking And Stuff
I go all the way back to the Urban Operations Journal (precursor to the Small Wars Journal) I can still remember when we couldn't even break 100 as far as members go. So what happened? It is pretty typical as far systems thinking goes. We went from the formative phase to the normative phase (which lead to the revamped Journal section) to where we are now.........the adaptive or integrative phase. We have to change(adapt) or we will get all extinct and stuff:eek: Not a good option. More is less...we need to focus. The Journal is competing with the Council....not good IMO.... we may need to kill it! Or we need to kill the Council:( but we have to choose IMO. I always felt all naked and stuff when I posted at the Journal.... it is nice and cozy over here.....that might be good but could also be bad.
Some of us are facing age and health issues that were not present at the Big Bang. Nobody knows where Ken White is! We are in deep sh@@ just like the country. Only one thing left to or figure out. We need a great Strategic Reawakening(is that a word?) anyway just my random thoughts from the cultural center of the Universe.
I don't see any fresh thinking on Small Wars....
An an outsider to the military, I don't see much difference between some of supposed "retreat into conventional mode" and the "small wars are important" types.
I see a comfortable retreat into familiar arguments about familiar topics using overly represented and familiar examples by some proponents of the study of small wars--with no real reflection on what might have happened in the past decade or so and no opening up of the discussion on a theoretical or practical level.
Why the constant retreat to a few examples that seem to keep cropping up, the British in Malaya, Algeria, the Indian Wars, the Phillipines?
For the study of the Afghan campaign, a very careful full-rounded study of various South Asian insurgencies (outside the comfortable frameworks often presented on SA insurgencies here, same old same old, even the Indian General that wrote an article on COIN basically just repeated "hearts and minds") might be interesting.
I feel I spend too much time commenting already and would prefer to read academic papers or books on "small wars areas of interest" to me that don't seem to be covered much here. If I find interesting things, I will post--time permitting.
The moderators are awesome. The commenters and contributors are awesome.
David is absolutely terrific as a moderator.
But if the study of small wars is so important why are those interested always circling around the same few topics in the same way? I see nothing new, just the same old half-conceived notions of American history and practice regarding small wars.
It's a fascinating topic so where is the robust study and argumentation outside a little social science and some tactical discussion?
Best to all.
Not everything can be that clear with an opinion
Hey Madhu,
Would almost tend to agree with you. However, seems all the lessons learned from the past and our members' vast knowledge of the same has fallen on deaf ears.
We are not always meandering in the past, but sharing what we may feel has indeed been overlooked and deserves a relook or, we feel a need to share what our past revealed.
As duly noted, most of us come from military backgrounds and are in one form or another, still serving.
Not everything herein is Small Wars, but most everything has something to do with what may eventually occur and has often been overlooked by far more intelligent beings.
Regards, Stan
Reading, thinking and some posts
Bill M. asks a good question:
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What lessons do you feel are critical that we allegedly learned since 9/11 that we are at risk of losing?
So I think a thread entitled 'Lost Lessons' may emerge, but then Madhu's post entitled 'I don't see any fresh thinking on Small Wars....' gives a contrary viewpoint. So the thread maybe called 'Lost Lessons & Fresh Thinking: a challenge for SWC'.
My reopening of this thread was four days ago and we have just hit a 1k views, with thirty one posts. That indicates to me an ample readership, but only a fraction comment.
We Lost The Lesson That The Air Force Can Fight Small Wars
In the late 40's and early 50's the Air Force came up with the concept of using an American Air Force and a small force of advosrs(CIA) but let the supporting country supply the needed Army. So I say the biggest lesson lost is that the Air Force cannot fight a Small War.....They can.
Thanks for the correction and point of agreement
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Originally Posted by
Steve Blair
Actually, both the Indian War and the Philippines are poorly-studied here. Brian Linn is one of the few scholars who actually has devoted a great deal of time and attention to the Philippines (at least the period from 1898 through 1910 or so), and his work is outstanding. The Indian Wars tend to be rather spotty, and often the focus is on a specific individual or battle rather than a longer-term view of the conflicts. There are a few outstanding scholars to be sure, but some areas remain very neglected and would certainly repay study. That doesn't mean that they are the "be all and end all" of small wars, but to assume that they've been mined out would be a mistake.
I agree that there is a lot of (misplaced) focus on areas like Malaya and Algeria. There's also little attention paid to things that have happened in both Central and South America.
Thanks for the comment too, Stan.
I tend to paint with too broad a brush in order to make a point. It's not a good habit. That's one reason I want to read more academic works. I need to break this habit. If I read more, I would have already known your point....
At least we all agree on one thing, we need more study and to keep the study alive, current and vibrant. I think one area that I have a kind of cultural disconnect from the military (or maybe the blogs I read?) is that I'm not really looking for quick "lessons learned" in the sense of "oh, look at what those guys did."
I have certain curiosities or questions about conflicts and want to read up on the questions because I think that current COIN doctrine oversimplifies the history of some campaigns used as a model. Gian Gentile in his book says that the models are too rigid and prevent a kind of grand improvisation (not minor tactical improvisations) or tailoring of a counterinsurgency campaign toward a specific conflict in all its peculiarities.
I have such a different narrative of colonial small wars in my head because of my ethnic background that sometimes it's like I'm from Venus and you all are from Mars.
Well, naturally that, given that I'm posting on a site about small wars....