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Yemen: gestures
The succession struggle in the Yemen has not gone away, although it certainly has faded from the news reporting here, probably the impact of events in Libya and Syria.
So hat tip to FP Blog for this article, which opens with:
Quote:
After being tricked into believing that Saleh would sign a Gulf Cooperation Council brokered power transfer deal three times, the international community has finally realized that Saleh has no intention of leaving power until at least 2013, the end of his official presidential term of office.
Leaving aside the machinations in the Yemen, which are covered, I was struck by this paragraph:
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Short of asking for foreign military intervention, which most protesters reject outright, Yemenis have done all they can to make their struggle known to those abroad. Fully aware of their own lack of coverage in the international media, Yemenis have sought to increase their visibility in the international community from the outset of the protest movement last February by providing English language resources to Western journalists, establishing committees made up of English language speakers to issue press releases and hold press conferences, and making sure every protest sign was in both English and Arabic.
I am sadly not convinced the outside world, let alone English language speakers, are listening and or watching.
As for the freezing of President Saleh's assets abroad, nice diplomatic gesture and of little value beyond a headline.
Link:http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/pos...saleh_s_assets
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Two self-serving families compete for control of Yemen. Neither represent the will of the populace or show any indication of doing anything other than continuing the very unsustainable status quo. Meanwhile a wide range of nationalist insurgent movements rise from and draw support from the populace as a whole. Both families are willing to work with the West and to profit from the control of this bit of geo-strategically key terrain. This seduces us.
Into this F'd up mix comes AQ, smelling opportunity to get after their top two interests:
1. Take down the Saudi royal family;
2. Hurt the West enough to get us to break our support to the regimes of the region that we have helped sustain for so long.
Meanwhile Saudi insurgents flee to Yemen as the first "covered and concealed position" from Saudi Arabia. One can reasonably assume that those who stay close, rather than travel to Pakistan to work with AQ there, are most focused on nationalist issues at home in Saudi Arabia. Their issues are reasonable, even if their approaches are extreme. Sadly no reasonable approaches are available to them at home, so to Yemen they go (or simply disappear at home).
AQ conducts UW in support of members of both these groups primarily, but I suspect to a number of similarly motivated men from other nations in the region as well.
US "intelligence" lumps all of this under a single banner of "AQAP." They recommend CT against the lot, with little differentiation for purpose for action. I'd give a month's retirement pay as a Special Forces Colonel for a single intel officer above the grade of O5 who could carry on a 3 minute conversation with me about insurgency without reverting to tired cliché's and saying the words "ideology" or "AQ."
This isn't rocket science, it's people science and common sense. That is far too rare a commodity it seems. (Please excuse me a little Veteran's day venting, good men are being employed far less effectively than they could be, and we owe them better.)
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Book Review: Yemen and the Politics of Permanent Crisis
Book Review: Yemen and the Politics of Permanent Crisis
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Safer in Somalia!
During a university-level discussion on US strategy post-9/11 Yemen was cited as an example of where the USA had intervened of late, a point that I would and did contest.
Today FP Blog has a short update on the delicate mix in the Yemen, which illustrates the USA has few options currently and the locals, sorry a local, President / non-President Saleh remains in power - note, not control:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...again?page=0,1
Short of time? This sums up the situation brilliantly:
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Somali refugees in Yemen are now returning to Somalia in larger numbers. Perhaps they know something that the international community doesn't.
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BBC Inside Al Qaeda's Yemen
Yemen appears to have disappeared from the limelight of late, even though President Saleh is bound for the USA, for medical treatment. So it was a surprise to hear a BBC reporter actually in southern Yemen reporting on the growth of jihadist control.
A podcast:http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today...00/9685172.stm
A written article:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programme...lk/9682753.stm
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Yemen after Saleh: between uncertainties and divisions
A different, detailed commentary. The agreement to remove President Saleh:
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..do(es) not appear to herald a break with the past and the beginning of a process of appeasement and democratization.
Indeed, although the caretaker government also contains elements belonging to the opposition, some weak points of the agreement drawn up in Saudi Arabia regarding the deep divisions within Yemeni society indicate not only the attempt by the Republican faction to maintain strong control over the country, but also that the initial protests of Yemeni citizens against their autocratic leadership have been gradually transmuted into a military conflict between the state and the tribal confederations, plunging Yemen into a more acute domestic crisis, with obvious repercussions at regional level.
Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/maria-s...-and-divisions
So the Yemen has a new government, which faces the same problems and decides on "more of the same" with "a few chairs changed on a sinking ship". Great result for diplomacy.
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What Next For Yemen?
What Next For Yemen?
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U.S. Teaming With New Yemen Government on Strategy to Combat AQ
A grand sounding title from the NYT and:
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The plan’s two-pronged strategy calls for the United States and Yemen to work together to kill or capture about two dozen of Al Qaeda’s most dangerous operatives, who are focused on attacking America and its interests.
At the same time, the administration will work with Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf allies to train and equip Yemeni security forces to counter the organization’s wider threat to destabilize the country and the government of its newly installed president, Abed Rabu Mansour Hadi.
I wish this idea well, but cannot think of a more hostile place to try it (OK Afghanistan, oh it works there):
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One main proposal, he said, is to pay Yemeni troops directly rather than through their commanders.....(Citing Mr O'Brennan) We’re trying to ensure that the aid is very tailored, so it goes to those units that are professional, that fall within a command and control structure that reports to Hadi, that are addressing Al Qaeda and domestic threats to Yemen, and are not engaged in any political shenanigans.
In response Gregory Johnsen, a Princeton scholar who closely tracks militants in Yemen.:
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Some independent analysts aso warned that the administration’s approach amounted to picking and choosing favorite Yemeni generals, which could backfire over time. “Any time the U.S. gets into where it’s favoring certain generals or trying to play generals off each other, it is a very dangerous game,” said
Link:http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/27/wo..._r=1&ref=world
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Narratives and Strategies of AQAP
Somehow I missed the release of this RUSI report in December 2011, 'The Language of Jihad Narratives and Strategies of Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula and UK Responses' and have just skimmed through it, looks like a very good read. It is 55 pgs and has chapters on
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Terrorism, Communication and Strategy; The History of AQAP; The Language of Jihad; Conclusions and Recommendations; Postscript
The authors aim to:
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...look to understand the situation in Yemen and the possibilities for AQAP gaining further traction in the region, through garnering a greater understanding of the underlying issues that allow such groups to operate.....What is certain is that AQAP will be watching closely to capitalise on any mistakes that are made and will bide their time ready to fill any vacuum that appears.
Link:http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets..._Jihad_web.pdf
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Yemen: A U.S. Strategic Partner?
Yemen: A U.S. Strategic Partner?
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Profile: Ansar al-Sharia in Yemen
A BBC Arabic analyst in a short article, that starts with:
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An offshoot of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has issued a statement threatening the lives of 73 Yemeni soldiers it says it captured last week.
Then adds:
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Ansar al-Sharia, whose name means "Partisans of Islamic law" in Arabic, was formed by AQAP in response to the growing youth movement in Yemen..
Ends with:
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Many of those involved in Ansar al-Sharia are jihadists who have experienced living in an "Islamic state", either in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s, or among jihadists in Iraq after the US-led invasion in 2003.
Ansar al-Sharia's ability to launch attacks, as well as build local support, indicates that the Yemeni authorities' struggle with Islamist militants may soon become bloodier and more protracted.
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17402856
Where is this Abyan? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Yemen-Abyan.png
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Possible spilt between hard-liners and even more hardliners...
...Islah to be sidelined? Doubtful but developments are interesting...
First Yemeni Salafi Party announced
via the ever informative Yemen Times. Hat tip there to the wonderful Nadia As-Saqqaf, one of the few journalists in Yemen of integrity [her staff included].
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The President: a safe lightweight?
An on the ground report:
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Swept into office by a controversial one-candidate vote last month, President Abd Rabu Monsour Hadi faces the difficult task of steering the country toward multi-party elections in 2014. It's a job that would require huge political skill and authority even under the best of conditions. Yet Hadi is a political lightweight, an unlikely leader chosen primarily for his inoffensiveness. In Yemen, which endured decades of civil war in the twentieth century, Hadi is the safe pair of hands, the one political leader around whom warring factions were willing to rally.
Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...shoes?page=0,0
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The President: a safe lightweight balances changes
In a surprising move the President has shuffled senior civil and military posts:
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Yemen's president removed a half brother of former leader Ali Abdullah Saleh on Friday as head of the air force, replacing nearly 20 top officers but leaving Mr Saleh's son, nephew and other allies in place as heads of important military units.
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...-commands.html
A small hiccup:
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Yemen's main airport has re-opened after a protest by air force troops against the sacking of their commander.
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17649525
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Yemen: Always on the Brink?
Yemen: Always on the Brink?
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Al-Qaida's wretched utopia and the battle for hearts and minds
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Ghaith Abdul-Ahad reports from south Yemen on the jihadis offering free water and electricity alongside sharia law
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012...dis-sharia-law
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Short-term gains -v- long term gains?
A FP Blog article I missed the other day, which concludes:
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It is time for the U.S. to stop undermining democratic values and long-term stability in Yemen in exchange for short term counter-terrorism gains and a half-hearted continuation of the status quo. If Washington continues on this path, it will end up at best with another Somalia; at worse, another Afghanistan.
Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...oice?page=full
Interesting take on the views of Yemen's richer neighbour.
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1 Attachment(s)
ICSR Insight - Al Qaeda's Most Dangerous Franchise?
A sombre assessment by Kings College London-based ICSR is on the attachment; these 'Insights' are emailed out and take a few days to appear on the ICSR website. It did appear on WSJ, but only a summary is provided without registration etc.
I was particularly taken by:
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At its core are 100 veteran jihadists, who escaped local prisons in 2006 and 2011. The group also counts on 11 former Guantanamo detainees, who returned to terrorism after undergoing "rehabilitation" programs in Saudi Arabia. Their combined experience is greater than that of all other al Qaeda affiliates taken together.
Then:
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Unlike al Qaeda in Iraq, which alienated entire tribes with barbaric and indiscriminate violence, AQAP's policies have allowed it to cultivate local sympathies.... Immersed in the population and protected by the tribes, AQAP is free to raise money and train fighters. CIA drone strikes against its operatives, in turn, are more likely to kill civilians.
My query is if AQAP gains more within the Yemen, extending it's control not cultivating or immersion, there would be an advantage to portray its actions as a local struggle and so curtail attacks on the 'far enemy'. Now whether the USA would curtail it's drone attacks is clearly unlikely. IMO doing more than drones becomes more problematic and with declining local acceptance.
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Sanaa, Yemen (CNN) -- A suicide bomber dressed in a military uniform killed at least 101 soldiers Monday at the central security headquarters in Yemen, Interior Ministry officials said.
More than 70 were injured, with some in critical condition, authorities said.
The blast targeted a military parade rehearsal in Sabeen Square in the capital Sanaa, said Mohammed Albasha, a spokesman the Yemeni Embassy in Washington.
He said that it was too early to know who was responsible but that suicide attacks are "the hallmark of al Qaeda."
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/05/21/wo...html?hpt=hp_t3
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Talks about Talks – Does Yemen Need More Time?
Talks about Talks – Does Yemen Need More Time?
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Some light cast on the puzzle that is the Yemen
Yemen seems to have receded from the foreground, although the suicide bomber attack on a Central Security Forces (CSF) parade, which killed one hundred did get a mention - missing that the commander of the CSF is a Saleh family member.
The Lowy Institute draws attention to a week-old Frontline report, which has several key sections and ends in a town which has rejected AQ - after they killed a tribal chief - and only the locals fight off AQ's attacks, the army isn't interested. One wonders if this replicates the rejection of AQ in Irag?
Link:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sJtbhFimI8c
Hat tip to Leah Farrell's reactivated blogsite:http://allthingscounterterrorism.com/
The film is highly commended by a US academic expert, Gregory Johnsen, of Waq al-Waq, on the Yemen and I have linked the Q&A after the film was broadcast and this passage struck me:
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Over the past two-and-a-half years the US has managed to kill several mid-level commanders within AQAP, but at the same time it has also killed several civilians. In December 2009, AQAP had roughly 200-300 members and controlled no territory. Today it has over 1,000 members and controls significant amounts of territory in Abyan and Shabwa. This begs a very simple question: Why has AQAP grown so strong in such a short time? Now, I don’t think US drone and airstrikes are the only reason for the rapid growth of AQAP – one also has to consider the collapse of the Yemeni state in 2011 – but in my view it is certainly one of the key factors.
Link:http://bigthink.com/ideas/frontline-...yemen?page=all
The Australian analyst, Sarah Phillips, provides some context and touches upon the very murky aspects:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/...y-to-fail.aspx
There's also a short interview with her:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/...wo-videos.aspx
Want more to read, there's a pointer to this US journalist's blogsite:http://armiesofliberation.com/
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Jeremy Scahill, best known for his book about the LLC formerly known as Blackwater, did a prescient interview on Fresh Air four days before the 21 May attack in Sana'a. I know a lot of people write him off because of his politics (he’s quite the lefty), but as someone who has a real respect for investigative journalism he seems to me to know a lot more about how and why the sausage is made than most contemporary members of the Fourth Estate.
When the Fresh Air host puts the “Well, what would you have us do about AQAP?” question to Scahill his reply amounts to 1) stop acting as if al-Qaeda is an existential threat to the United States 2) stop outsourcing our HUMINT to the Saudis and 3) stop pretending more and better technology can obviate HUMINT. However his politics may shade what is presented in the interview, I found the discussion beginning at 41:49 of the role which attending khat chews played in his reporting to be indicative of a real respect for the sort of work that absolutely has to be done in investigative journalism, ethnographic fieldwork, or intelligence gathering worth calling such. And in the excerpt below he throws out an observation which in my experience is quite indicative of the lack of respect American foreign policy types have for that sort of work.
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And I would not have gotten access to the places I went, I wouldn’t have been able to talk to the people that I did, I wouldn’t have been able to travel as freely as I did in Yemen if I wasn’t going to those khat chews and negotiating permissions or talking to people and listening to them. And the reason that I’m so struck by that experience is because the United States bans its employees in Yemen from chewing khat.
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Khat - the way to learn?
I am unconvinced that chewing khat is the way to learn in the Yemen (or Somalia) and several of the authors who appear in this thread I have m' doubts would need to chew khat. Sipping tea, talking and have empathy before making gains is an art that takes time to gain.
Perhaps the US Embassy has banned sipping tea?
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Quote:
Originally Posted by
davidbfpo
[T]alking and have empathy before making gains is an art that takes time to gain.
From a tiny bit of first-hand knowledge and several second-hand accounts I’m lead to believe that there are quite a few FSOs with a real aptitude for what you are describing but that the structure of and priorities at State are such that it is hard for that aptitude to count for as much as it could.* They’re as a rule on a rotation schedule, for example. I’m sure there are good reasons for that but to keep to it as a rule for that line of work seems absolutely boneheaded to me…
Scahill’s mention of khat chews being off-limits to the embassy staff immediately brought to my mind an interview I had seen with Pik Botha in which he was discussing the negotiations leading to the Tripartite Accords. In his narrative the breakthrough came at the hotel pub when he and Jorge Risquet happened to be taking their board at the same hour. In passing Botha mentioned that the Americans had made the hotel pub off-limits to their contingent from day one of the talks.
*My impression based upon the little that I know is that the good listeners and empaths amongst the FSO corps tend to gravitate towards the positions that deal with aiding Americans in distress abroad.
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Quote:
Originally Posted by
ganulv
Scahill’s mention of khat chews being off-limits to the embassy staff immediately brought to my mind an interview I had seen with Pik Botha in which he was discussing the negotiations leading to the
Tripartite Accords. In his narrative the breakthrough came at the hotel pub when he and Jorge Risquet happened to be taking their board at the same hour. In passing Botha mentioned that the Americans had made the hotel pub off-limits to their contingent from day one of the talks.
I can see the point in the khat-chewing. Back when I was wearing the journalist hat I got way better information on the local military (as one example) by wallowing in rotgut booze and assorted other vices with a bunch of NCOs than I ever did by interviewing generals. Had more fun, too. Of course the pastimes of the freelance journalist are not always seen as appropriate for embassy staff, no matter how effective they may be.
Is there any place in the world where embassy staff actually go out in the streets and interact with ordinary people... even in the cities, let alone out in the countryside? It would be unthinkable here; their morass of security regulations wouldn't begin to allow it.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
ganulv
*My impression based upon the little that I know is that the good listeners and empaths amongst the FSO corps tend to gravitate towards the positions that deal with aiding Americans in distress abroad.
In the places I'm familiar with American Citizen Services is typically staffed by the youngest of the young. It seems like it's a post nobody else wants, thus pushed off on the least senior as a necessary rite of passage on the way to bigger and better things.
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Quote:
Originally Posted by
Dayuhan
In the places I'm familiar with American Citizen Services is typically staffed by the youngest of the young. It seems like it's a post nobody else wants, thus pushed off on the least senior as a necessary rite of passage on the way to bigger and better things.
Is American Citizen Services the same as Consular Affairs? I should try and learn about the workings of the State Department but their employees make me uneasy in the way that dentists do most other people. It’s a legacy of having lived in Central America in the early ’90s, where public opinion of the U.S. Department of State was neck–in–neck with that of the CIA.
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Some light cast on the puzzle that is the Yemen Part 2
In Part 1 in The Frontline video report there was a short clip of Yemeni town that was defending itself from AQAP, IIRC it was Lawdar.
Al-Jazeera has a good summary piece 'Making sense of Yemen's feuding factions' and refers to such self-defence activity:
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Local Popular Resistance Committees, made up of tribal militia fighters from various southern regions, are also fighting al-Qaeda in the current offensive. They have been attributed with successes against the group, using their local knowledge and warfare tactics. Not much is known about these groups, as most announcements on the war are made by Yemeni authorites. Some of the groups may be made up of southern seccessionist fighters, who, although seeking independence from the northern government, are also opposed to al-Qaeda.
In such a complicated environment I am not surprised that such groups are not supported by the divided Yemeni state. Should others engage with them? Yemen is not Afghanistan nor Iraq, if these groups multiply, we would be mistaken not to have links with them - a "bottom up", people-based approach COIN advocates wish for.
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A positive view
An optimistic commentary by a "boots on the ground" observer; which starts with:
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Although the GCC supported transitional regime has not turned Yemen into a revolutionary state, by comparison with what is happening elsewhere, the situation at the moment shows more positive signs than could have been expected: the forces of the uprisings are working to participate in the national dialogue, the transitional regime is working to weaken and remove most of the remnants of the previous era and is preparing for a new and hopefully more democratic future.
I liked this - hence emphasis, even if without details:
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Secondly, thanks to the new military leadership which is seriously committed to putting an end to the fundamentalist insurrection, the rebels have been dislodged from their stronghold in Abyan Governorate, pushing them back into Shabwa which was their main base for a number of years. Immediately after this achievement last week, moves have started in Shabwa and already some of their strongholds are falling, thanks to the establishment of local ‘popular committees’ who are ‘encouraging’ them to leave.
Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/helen-l...to-be-followed
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A year later - time for a review
CWOT and his colleague have returned to this issue, which is within the wider, global debate over the use of drones and the US strategy to pursue terrorism.
SWC has a long running thread on drones 'Using drones: principles, tactics and results': http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=7385
Quote:
Building on their past work on Yemen and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Watts and Cilluffo revisit the use of drones in Yemen, offering context to ongoing debates about U.S. counterterrorism strategy as well as recommendations regarding the way forward. The authors review what drones and Special Operations Forces (SOF) have accomplished over the past year, explore why AQAP has continued to thrive, and explain what critics of drones misunderstand about operations in Yemen. Watts and Cilluffo go on to urge continued improvement of intelligence to better the accuracy of drone strikes, and argue in favor of greater transparency and accountability in drone operations. The authors recognize that "drones alone cannot entirely defeat AQAP," and call for the development of "a larger, long-run strategy...for pursuing U.S. counterterrorism objectives in Yemen."
Link:http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/iss...208_Drones.cfm
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Info Ops in Yemen: how effective in Yemen?
Hat tip to Jihadica for a perplexing story on US information operations (IO) in the Yemen, which is almost an IO itself.
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Several months ago, President Obama signed an executive order establishing an interagency center to coordinate the US government’s public messages against terrorist organizations. A major component of this Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC) was in the news lately for its clever campaign against AQAP on Yemeni tribal forums.
Link:http://www.jihadica.com/state-depts-...da-propaganda/
It sounds on-target at first:
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...the State Department has for a year and a half now tried to counter Al Qaeda's affiliate in the Arabian Peninsula by rhetorically shooting down the group's propaganda when it pops up on Yemeni tribal forum websites....Within 48 hours, our team plastered the same sites with altered versions of the ads that showed the toll Al Qaeda attacks have taken on the Yemeni people,
Except that:
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...in many places in Yemen there is no Internet or even electricity
The linked story is:http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign...-war-is-fierce
On the broader aspects back to Jihadica:
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More broadly, people are unaware of the complexities of government messaging against terrorist organizations. To shed light on these subjects, the first coordinator of the CSCC, Ambassador Richard LeBaron (now retired), has given me permission to post his recent remarks on what he learned during his tenure. It’s very instructive for anyone interested in counter-propaganda and how the US government is coping with the new information environment.
Link to the remarks is embedded and is in docx format - so unread by moi,
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Yemen: Beyond Resolution 2051
Yemen: Beyond Resolution 2051
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A positive view: Part 2
Helen Lackner returns with a "boots on the ground" assessment of the situation in the Yemen:http://www.opendemocracy.net/helen-l...hose-interests
Rightly she lauds the critical role of non-government factors in defeating AQAP in the southern provinces; yes, once again tribes came to the fore. Her wider cautionary remarks on the weakness of the Yemeni state are familiar, although I expect the West and other friends downplay what the Yemeni people wants are.
In parallel there is a less optimistic, external factors first review on SWJ:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art...esolution-2051
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FP: Whose Side Is Yemen On?
After watching the Yemen from afar this will not come as a great surprise. The article's sub-title is:
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Ali Abdullah Saleh's government colluded with al Qaeda and duped the West. Has anything changed since his ouster?
It ends with:
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It's the highest-level leaders, who don't actually believe in the preachings of Ansar al-Sharia, but who manipulate them to remain in the government or bring a particular party to power.
Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...n_on?page=full
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Keep Calm and Carry On: A Plan for Yemen
Keep Calm and Carry On: A Plan for Yemen
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AQAP: Leaders and their Networks
Thanks to CWOT on Twitter for this AEI PPT, twelve slides and you know far more:
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This slide deck provides information on AQAP’s leaders, both current and former, and their networks.
Link:http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen...tember-27-2012
Interesting comment by Leah Farrell on Twitter, which asked whether any analysts from way back in the early 1990's were still in government service who'd recognise the names and the networks.
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Yemen: laboratory or roller coaster?
An excellent article on this forlorn country, by Gregory Johnson's new book 'The Last Refuge: Yemen, al-Qaeda, and America's War in Arabia' and an excerpt is on FP Blog:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...emen?page=full
A details a country that under President Saleh appeared to effortlessly pull the right levers with the USA and so he ends with:
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After more than a decade of on-again, off-again aid to Yemen, the al Qaeda branch in Yemen is stronger than it was on September 11, 2001. The money the United States has spent in Yemen has enriched dozens and the missiles it has fired into the country have killed hundreds -- and yet AQAP continues to grow.
There is an excellent contrast on Clint Watts blog, with several linked articles by others:http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=817
Has AQAP retreated under pressure from the state's security forces or the tribal militias? What have drone strikes done? More than stopping AQAP's use of vehicles.
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Iranian Influence, Rising Asian Powers, and the Significance of Yemen as a Long-Term
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Strongly Recommended
Clint Watts blogsite has a detailed, review of Gregory Johnson's new book 'The Last Refuge: Yemen, al-Qaeda, and America's War in Arabia':
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It is clearly the best book available on AQAP in Yemen..... the best-written book on al Qaeda I’ve read since Lawrence Wright’s The Looming Tower.
A little more:
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Young Saudi foreign fighters have been the largest portions of recruits and leaders for years supplying one jihad after another. With the decline of Iraq, Saudi foreign fighters flowed into Yemen and today I imagine AQAP in Yemen is now competing with Syria for the collection of fresh recruits. Having read Greg’s book, I see the influx of Saudi foreign fighters, the failures of rehabilitation programs and repeated prison escapes as the driving factors in AQAP’s recent heights.
Link:http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=823
Link to book:http://www.amazon.com/The-Last-Refug.../dp/0393082423
A book to add to my Christmas list!
Two podcasts, short on PRI (6 mins):http://www.theworld.org/2012/11/yemen-al-qaeda/ and a longer discussion @ Brookings:http://www.brookings.edu/events/2012/11/13-yemen
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Who & Where in Yemen
Via Twitter a recommendation, even if not updated since June 2012:
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Interactive: Fractured Yemen
Guide to the various factions involved in the ongoing conflict in the troubled Arab state.
Link:http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/int...233575914.html
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Quote:
According to Gregory Johnsen, a journalist who has covered Yemen and Islamic insurgency in the Middle East extensively, al-Qaida's presence has tripled in size within Yemen over the past three years. Johnsen charts this growing influence on the country in his new book, The Last Refuge: Yemen, al-Qaeda, and America's War in Arabia.
http://www.npr.org/2012/11/27/165936...da-and-the-u-s
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The issues with on-the-ground intelligence gathering in Yemen
Good catch AdamG.
Gregory is rather direct in his observations. I draw attention to this, slightly edited portion:
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On the issues with on-the-ground intelligence gathering in Yemen
"The U.S. soldiers, the U.S. operators that we have are trained particularly well. They are some of the best in the world at what it is that they do, but all of this is dependent upon the human intelligence on the ground and this is where the U.S. seems to do very bad both in the special forces in the shadowy part of the world where they are attempting to collect intelligence for targeting purposes, as well as on the political and on the State Department side where they're attempting to get out and speak with a lot of people and find out what's actually happening on the ground so that they can inform policymakers in Washington. ...
"[T]he Achilles' heel for the United States in Yemen is that too often it just doesn't know what's taking place on the ground. The CIA doesn't know what's taking place, it doesn't know who is in a particular car, it doesn't know who is really a member of al-Qaida...... So both the CIA and policymakers in Washington tend to be operating more on assumptions than on hard facts... "
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Drones help in the fight against AQAP?
Twitter has been alive with pointers to events in Yemen, a re-organisation of the Yemeni security forces and of late a suspected US drone strike that was "off target" hence the FP headline:
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Anatomy of an Air Attack Gone Wrong: In rural Yemen, a botched attack on a terror suspect kills 12 civilians and destroys a community
Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...dead?page=full and a CFR article:http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2012/12/2...-war-in-yemen/
Moderator's Note
This thread was till today called 'The End in Yemen? Thread for 2011-2012' and has now been re-named for 2013 as 'Yemen: all you want (2011-2013)'.
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'The Last Refuge' reviewed
Gregory Johnsen's book 'The Last Refuge' has now been reviewed by Bruce Hoffman:
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In The Last Refuge, Johnsen provides a useful depiction of how that war began, even if he, regrettably, offers no prediction of how and when it will end. The book relates a compelling story about an implacable and formidable enemy. Although more descriptive than analytical....
Bruce's review is a useful summary of how AQAP in the Yemen has got to where it is today.
Link:http://nationalinterest.org/bookrevi...7892?page=show
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Making Yemen even more complex
A BBC report:
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A recent crackdown in Yemen against protesters calling for southern independence has inflamed tensions in the country, and divisions look set to deepen....
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21586344
Now whether AQ can exploit this situation is a moot point, partly as working in a coalition is not their way:
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What will be worrying to the Americans and Saudis is that some young people - in anger and desperation - are turning to al-Qaeda in the region. The group's numbers have grown in the south since 2011.......That is not to say that all Southern Movement protesters are supporters of al-Qaeda. Herak is an umbrella group for different groups, including those who want more autonomy under a federal system, those who want independence and also some parts of Ansar al-Sharia, which wants a religious emirate. They are very disorganised and all that unites them is a shared animosity to the central government.
(Added) A link to a Yemeni site giving more details:http://www.yemeniaty.com/2013/02/the...2007-2013.html
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The Ansar of Yemen: The Huthis and al-Qaeda
The Ansar of Yemen: The Huthis and al-Qaeda
Entry Excerpt:
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Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.
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The United States’ War on Yemen: Drone Attacks
I am sure events have happened in the Yemen since the last post, in February 2013, but we have all been distracted. Or is it "more of the same"?
I have posted on the drones thread a link to a Swiss / Yemeni NGO report for the UN Rapporteur on Human Rights & CT - on drones in the Yemen; it is unusual in gathering eyewitness testimony and providing local contexts:http://en.alkarama.org/documents/ALK...3_Final_EN.pdf
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Small update and a map
A short article in The Economist (free registration req'd) on the situation in Marib Province, where there are - diminishing - oil and gas resources and an interesting passage:
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For sure, it is undisputed that fighters loyal to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which the Obama administration has marked down as a direct threat to the United States, hide in the province. But local tribes have not given them an eager welcome. Rather, AQAP fighters have exploited the security vacuum in areas where tribal structures have broken down and people are too weak to drive them out.
Link:http://www.economist.com/news/middle...e_for_al_qaeda
Of note is a small map showing where the drone strikes have hit. I was struck by their absence from the eastern province, which borders Oman and a broad swathe of the western, coastal provinces.
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Interesting article on water and qat in Yemen...
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articl...5YWhvby5jb20S1
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In a little over a decade, Sana’a, Yemen, may become the world’s first capital to run out of water. Failed governance and environmental mismanagement share some of the blame for drying up the city. But there is also a more surprising culprit: a national addiction to qat, a narcotic that is incredibly water-intensive to cultivate...
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Yemeni people on drones creating enemies
An intrepid BBC lady journalist, Yalda Hakim reports from southern Yemen, where she asks is the use of drones creating as many enemies as they are killing? Hat tip to Gregory Johnsen via Twitter.
Podcast (13 minutes):http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-23606812
In which many Yemeni's giving their answer, ordinary people and the Foreign Minister, whose answer is:
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I've heard this argument, there might be some truth to it ... but no alternative.
There is a main thread on the Yemen, into which this will be merged:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=12784
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We have not gone away, thanks for your help
A short review article 'Yemen al Qaida group appears to think globally, act locally', a month after the predicted massive attack:http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/09/0...#storylink=cpy