Vigil Held For Oakland Cop Killer
Article here. Aside from the obvious nausea over this it's worth noting that someone is trying to get some mileage out of perpetuating the rift. The group's website is straight out of the Cynthia McKinney playbook. (Or vice versa.) Maybe the ten pound brains at NPS should forget about Salinas and work on Oakland.
Convergence: Special Operations Forces and Civilian Law Enforcement
JSOU, Jul 10: Convergence: Special Operations Forces and Civilian Law Enforcement
Quote:
....The requirements to obtain warrants prior to execution of raids for high-value targets, collect and preserve evidence for criminal prosecution, and on occasion present testimony in courts of law are new missions for SOF. They are not relatively simple changes in the rules of engagement or comparable techniques. As far as can be determined, previously no U.S. military combat arms unit has ever been tasked with such a mission during combat operations. The thesis is straightforward; if such missions are to continue, then consideration must be given to adequate training for them.
In addition, the dangers faced by civilian LEAs in the U.S. have been constantly escalating. Many criminals are equipped with fully automatic weapons and in some areas conducting small-unit operations. The response to these threats requires additional SOF-like civilian units within LEAs. As such, SOF and LEAs will be competing for personnel from a limited subset of the American population.
The purpose of this monograph is to examine the elements precipitating this convergence, provide SOF with a better understanding of changing domestic threats and operational capabilities of LEAs, and draw insights from the similarities and challenges imposed by transnational gangs and terrorists both domestically and abroad. The monograph will argue that SOF need new skills and training to assume the law-enforcement-like missions they are being assigned. In addition, it will provide leaders of major LEAs a better understanding of special operations and potentially facilitate a basis for future cooperation and mutual support. The monograph is written as a forward-looking document and a harbinger of emerging trends; some are quite clear, and others more subtle, but all worth contemplating, especially by those engaged in planning for the future of SOF. It is also argued that the public attitude toward conflict is changing and perhaps the legal underpinnings on use of force as well....
The Criminalization of Terrorism
The monograph is certainly on point in suggesting that a closer educational relationship should exist between SOFs and LEAs. I'd say that, where the outcome hinges on the quality of local governance, seeking guidance from those in the civil and criminal justice system is simply logical.
Where the author (a non-lawyer) jumps the track (to some extent) is in the section "Criminalization of Terrorism" (pp. 72-75), particularly in citing LTC Mike Hoffman's 2005 article, Rescuing the Law of War: A Way Forward in an Era of Global Terrorism; and then not following up on how LTC Hoffman's 2005 recommendations were treated in terms of what US courts have held since then.
Thus, the author says:
Quote:
The issue of how to deal with terrorism is not new, nor is the debate concerning whether terrorist acts constitute war or a crime.[192] The lines are certainly blurred when terrorist actions are embedded in a war zone and constitute a basic tactic employed by the adversary. Since 9/11 and the inception of the GWOT, the debate has intensified with serious concerns about how to deal with perpetrators. A review of terrorists’ prosecutions by Michael Hoffman in Parameters noted, “Terrorists are gaining an astonishing legal edge over the U.S.” The rights and privileges they are now afforded exceed those of enemy soldiers or even insurgents in civil conflicts.[193] The implications for SOF are significant as they, like law enforcement officers, are often the people who are executing operations that bring them into direct contact with the terrorists and must then meet legal challenges. Hoffman indicated that this trend would increase.
No doubt that Hoffman wrote what was quoted; but Hoffman (vice the Rule of Law trend he saw in 2005) recommended instead a Laws of War approach (snip from his 2005 Parameters article):
Quote:
A Way Forward
The judicial branch of government is the one least qualified to apply the laws of war and determine national security policy, but these issues are undeniably generating crucial legal questions, and the courts consider it their duty to move with rapidity when urgent issues come before them. Though an incremental approach to these issues by the executive and legislative branches reflects their appreciation of the complexities involved, this leaves a gap that the courts are quickly filling.
32/33
When applied against post-9/11 challenges, earlier American state practice arguably can be used to support either a pragmatic law-of-war approach or an utterly impractical law-enforcement approach. In the absence of a firm law-of-war framework, the courts are furnishing their own answers. There is simply no time to spare if the executive and legislative branches want to weigh in with alternative answers. The following two principles offer a way forward.
• Terrorist warfare represents a form of unlawful belligerency that sovereign states can meet by adapting customary rules of war.
Not all warfare is necessarily covered by the Geneva Conventions, and where it isn’t, the customary law of war should apply. The 9/11 Commission observed that such rules can form the basis for an operational response to terrorism.[24] The executive branch needs to establish clear, firm guidelines for the application of the customary rules of war in operations against unlawful belligerents. Legal issues will arise that haven’t been foreseen, but that’s inherent to all military operations and they will have to be addressed as they arise. There is little time, however, to build a complete customary law-of-war framework ad hoc, and relying upon the judicial branch to sort out uncertainties in the rules of war is not an option.
• The customary laws of war, when adapted for conflict with unlawful belligerents, must always incorporate rules of humanitarian restraint.
Any set of customary rules of war adapted for this purpose will have to include rules for humanitarian protection of civilians and military captives. There simply is no getting around this. While certain rules found in the Geneva Conventions may not be appropriate or obligatory when dealing with terrorist organizations (e.g., the rule limiting the scope of questions that prisoners of war are obligated to answer[25]) there are still lines that can’t be crossed.
The US courts involved in the Gitmo cases (SCOTUS, DC Circuit and DC District) have applied the Laws of War - primarily developing Common Article 3 - since 2005. Those courts generally have followed Hoffman's advice.
So, if an SOF trooper is proceeding against terrorists under US law, he is not subject to LE rules - unless (1) the ROE/RUF have been tightened to incorporate LE rules (e.g., if EU-NATO rules are being used in an ISAF context); or (2) if a SOFA (or other HN agreement) requires the local Rule of Law to apply (as in Iraq, and in Astan under some circumstances).
The exceptions to the application of the Laws of War are not something imposed by US courts. They have been imposed by political, diplomatic and military considerations (e.g., "best practices COIN"). That conglomeration of the Rule of Law and Laws of War has led to a much stickier quagmire than COL Alexander describes in his monograph.
More directly to the use of police (including paramilitary police) in "COIN" is this JSOU monograph by Joseph D. Celeski, Policing and Law Enforcement in COIN — the Thick Blue Line (2009).
A snip indicating his perspective agrees with mine:
Quote:
7. Conclusions
The primary frontline COIN force is often the police, not the military. The primary COIN objective is to enable local institutions. Therefore, supporting the police is essential.
The ability to prevent an outbreak of insurgent activities rests on the perceived legitimacy of the government to provide its citizens security, rule of law, and a better way of life within some type of moral framework acceptable to the culture. When effective, police and law enforcement institutions can control just about any level of criminality and violence to a level acceptable to the populace. If the violence emanates from the armed actions of insurgents, police and law enforcement retain the capabilities to manage the situation at an acceptable level—that is, if the government correctly identifies the origins of the violence as insurgent in nature. If policing efforts cannot contain the insurgent threat, then they must either be reinforced or the government must choose to inject military might to defeat the insurgency.
Whether the government chooses a course of action to reinforce policing measures or deploy its military, maintaining the rule of law will remain paramount throughout the crisis to buttress legitimacy. In order to prevent a protracted conflict, which is a central component of insurgent strategy, combined military and paramilitary policing efforts, while simultaneously continuing community policing, are often the best method to defeat the enemy and return society to a level of law enforcement reasonable to control societal violence.
The police and law enforcement sectors are key enablers for the COIN practitioner. The police and law enforcement organizations often outnumber the personnel in the military, are closest to the problem, and are normally the first responders to insurgent violence. Conversely, a low level of perceived legitimacy on the part of the populace towards its law enforcement institutions, often due to corruption and ineptness within the police, can almost guarantee that the COIN effort will become more difficult in achieving its objectives.
COL Celeski's article seems more practical (IMO).
Regards
Mike
Home to Springfield, Mass: COIN at home?
Early in January 2012 this SWJ article was published 'Counterinsurgency and Community Policing in Afghanistan':http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/cou...in-afghanistan
The relevance here is in the comment, with links, by a Massachusetts State Police & SOF veteran Michael Cutone aka ODA944, which opens with:
Quote:
Massachusetts State Police initiated a pilot program during the fall of 2009 at the north end of Springfield Massachusetts. A high crime area of gangs, violence and drugs. Below is the project we initiated. Utilizing the eight COIN principles to combat gangs and drug dealers.
Lessons From the Battlefield: Counter-Insurgency for Domestic Law Enforcement
Springfield, Massachusetts, was ranked the 12th most dangerous city in America and had a rampant gang problem. A rise in crime and gang violence was exacerbated by budgetary restraints on the police force. Massachusetts State Trooper Michael Cutone had recently returned from a tour of duty in Iraq where he and Trooper Thomas Sarrouf had played essential roles in a Special Operations mission in the Avghani region of Iraq...
Mike Few, who whilst at NPS looked at the problems faced the city of Salinas in California, added a SWJ article in October 2011 'Gangs and Guerrillas'; which looks at the work NPS did, a very short taster:
Quote:
The goal of this project is to share the ideas developed to fight insurgents and terrorists and
see if they can be adapted or modified to help the people of Salinas think about their city’s problem with gangs in an innovative way.
Link:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/gangs-and-guerrillas
I know awhile back MikeF also posted on his experiences in Salinas, but there are too many hits on the city name.
Important enough to add this post, perhaps others will ask how community policing can be married to COIN in the USA or other developed, liberal democracies.
Demilitarizing Domestic Policing?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
David,
This sounds like good police work to me, not COIN. I thought we borrowed a lot of community policing tactics to inform our COIN doctrine, so if the police are using COIN doctrine to inform community policing efforts, maybe that means the police let this skill set erode over time? If so, why?
Regardless the outcome appears to be positive, so I'm not criticizing the approach, just trying to learn why the police needed to borrow from our COIN doctrine to learn it? Maybe budget cuts reduced police manpower to the point community policing wasn't possible? Maybe the increase in deadly engagements with gangs, made it impractical?
Bill M,
Conversely, after 9/11, the flow of money from Department of Homeland Security down to local police forces allowed many groups to outfit SWAT type units. There is some serious concern that many police groups have taken this technology and resources as a substitute for community policing.
Have we reached a point in our domestic policing where it has become over-militarized and raids are replacing patrolling?
Not Real Green Beret Tactics IMO
Not real Green Beret Tactics IMO. Real Green Beret Tactics in this situation would be more like the book Killing Pablo which would be highly illegal in the US. Creating a Counter-Gang like Los Pepes would be real Green Beret stuff.
The whole article is more like a Police Public Realtions event IMO. Real Green Berets don't like publicity on real operations....messes up the whole thing.
Counter Criminal Continuum (C3) Policing
The website mentioned in post #65, perhaps - MSP C3 Policing, with its most pertinent points defining itself being:
Mission Statement (emphasis added):
Quote:
The MSP Special Projects Team facilitates unity of effort and criminal intelligence gathering by, with, and through interagency, community, and private enterprise cooperation in order to detect, disrupt, degrade and dismantle criminal activity in North End of Springfield, Massachusetts.
The Origins of C3 Policing
Quote:
The Avghani Model, Stanley T. Grip, Jr. (Army, May 2008) (ODA 944, 19th SFG) (
pdf)
Using the Bob Jones "Flag Test", Avhgani was FID; this C3 Policing (presumably - since it's INCONUS) might be regarded as some form of "COIN" .
Principles of C3 Policing Model
http://mspc3policing.com/wp-content/...rinciples3.jpg
C3 vs Community Policing
http://mspc3policing.com/wp-content/...ifference1.jpg
My take: LEOs <-> Community (interactive support via the "from the people; back to the people" loop - true rule of law).
Regards
Mike
Economic Cost of Raiding Strategy
I would suggest exploring the economic costs of raiding and imprisonment. Below is one cost-prison in the state of Massachusetts.
The Cost to Taxpayers
Quote:
Overcrowding
- MA prisons are at over 140% of their capacity, with many operating at more than 200% of their intended capacity, and some over 300%.
- As of March 2011, there were 11,388 inmates in 18 facilities managed by the Department of Corrections. That number is projected to grow 26% — to almost 14,000 – by 2019.
- Parole rates in MA have dropped dramatically, from 58% in 2010 to 35% in 2011.
The Cost to Taxpayers
- It costs about $46,000 a year to house just one inmate in MA, 56% more than the national average.
- In 2010, MA spent $514.2 million on prisons, up from $408.6 million in 2001.
- Inmates are far more expensive than parolees and those on probation. In 2008, prisons cost an average of $79 per inmate per day, while it costs only $3 to $8 per individual per day to administer parole or probation services.
- Massachusetts spends nearly $100 million a year on prisoner health care, nearly double the cost from 2001.
Phase 0 Counter-insurgency
I'd like to quote Bob Jones from 2 years ago, FID or COIN? does it matter - Big Difference:
Quote:
As to last US COIN; as I have stated on other threads I have come to believe that it is most helpful to look at COIN as Governance. COIN is a condition between a governance and its own populace. When you travel to another country to intervene in the relationship between that governance and populace you are either conducting UW or FID (in US doctrinal terms), depending on which side you are there to assist.
Arguably, viewed in this manner, all governance and every populace in every country is at some level of COIN/Insurgency at all times. Most are bumping along in what I would call "Phase 0". It is only when the government loses the bubble on the populace, that some segment of discontent will rise up from the masses to compete with the government for the support of the populace through illegal and typically violent means. This is when one enters Phase I Insurgency and typically needs to bring in military assistance to help move the conditions back down into Phase 0, or within the Civil government's span of control.
The major points are differentiating "COIN" from UW and FID; and also the introduction of a Phase 0 to "COIN".
Graphically, Phase 0 (and the normative Phases 1-3 of Mao) looked like this to Bob (12-17-2009):
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...1&d=1261104721
More generally, I looked at it using different terms, as so (12-17-2009):
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...6&d=1261107331
My small green "Rule of Law" triangle (under the red "Violence" line) corresponds to Bob's Phase 0 "COIN". The larger blue "Laws of War" area corresponds to Bob's Phases 1-3 "COIN". As Slap points out, TTPs "legal" in a "Laws of War" context are not necessarily "legal" in a "Rule of Law" context.
In terms of the nuts and bolts of it, Bill Moore has pointed up a few basic rules (whether the situation be FID, UW or "COIN") to support the overall concept of Be flexible, be realistic (12-06-2009).
Regards
Mike
Small-Town Cops Pile Up on Useless Military Gear
The title of a 'Wired' article on an issue that lingers around and irregularly returns, as seen in:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=15971
The article has information I'd not seen before on the scale of this largesse, if not greed:
Quote:
the Fairmount Police Department. It serves 7,000 people in northern Georgia and received 17,145 items from the military. The cops in Issaquah, Washington, a town of 30,000 people, acquired more than 37,000 pieces of gear.
In 2011 alone, more than 700,000 items were transferred to police departments for a total value of $500 million.
Citing a former Seattle PD chief:
Quote:
.. having small local police departments go around with tanks and military gear has “a chilling effect on any effort to strengthen the relationship” between the community and the cops. And that’s not the only danger. “There’s no justification for them having that kind of equipment, for one obvious reason, and that is if they have it, they will find a way to use it. And if they use it they will misuse it altogether too many times,” said Stamper.
Link:http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012...tary-gear/all/
Countering Criminal Street Gangs: Lessons from the Counterinsurgent Battlespace
Countering Criminal Street Gangs: Lessons from the Counterinsurgent Battlespace
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Counter-Gang Strategy: Adapted COIN in Policing Criminal Street Gangs
Counter-Gang Strategy: Adapted COIN in Policing Criminal Street Gangs
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Counter-Gang Strategy: Adapted COIN in Policing Criminal Street Gangs
Counter-Gang Strategy: Adapted COIN in Policing Criminal Street Gangs
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Persistent Area Surveillance
A short PBS video (7 mins):
Quote:
A report from the Center for Investigative Reporting and KQED delves into a wide-scale surveillance system being developed for police forces. How can the trade off between safety and privacy be negotiated as technology gets more and more sophisticated?
Link with a transcript:http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/new-p...vacy-concerns/
The system originated from a counter-IED tactic in Iraq, so the clarity of the images has been reduced, so for example a number plate cannot be read. The system is more of a pointer after the event to look at other CCTV. That might explain why no-one has purchased it.
Tom Ridge on DHS mission creep
Within a short article reviewing the growth of the DHS In New Mexico. centred around Albuquerque, are some comments by Tom Ridge, ex-DHS head, which I have not seen before:
Quote:
The last thing in the world you want is a Department of Homeland Security involved in a day-to-day basis with traditional and state and local law enforcement. It’s not their role or their function, unless it’s related to terrorist activity.
On "fusion centres":
Quote:
I think fusion centers are a great idea. I think the proliferation of fusion centers makes no sense. My vision then was to start with building fusion centers that covered four or five states for all hazards, natural weather events and law enforcement sharing. They’ve gone much beyond that. It would be foolish to build that capacity and limit it exclusively to dealing with terrorism..
APD's deputy responded the rejected the notion that DHS has become too involved in local policing:
Quote:
I don’t believe they are taking on too active of a role. We are collaborating with HSI as a force multiplier and we are sharing resources.
Link:http://www.abqjournal.com/390807/new...uparmored.html
Community Policing in a ‘War on Terror’ Environment: More Difficult, More Vital
Community Policing in a ‘War on Terror’ Environment: More Difficult, More Vital
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