BG McMaster on the Army Capstone Concept (Quicklook Notes)
Brigadier General H.R. McMaster on Setting Conditions and The Army Capstone Concept
Certainty vs. Uncertainty / Theory vs. Recent and Ongoing Conflicts (Then and Now)
- Knowledge centric vs. fighting and politics centric.
- Planning process vs. design and education.
- Synchronization vs. initiative.
- Centralization vs. decentralization.
- Risk avoidance vs. risk mitigation.
- Efficiency vs. effectiveness.
- Fires vs. combined arms fire and maneuver.
- See / quality of firsts vs. find and understand.
- Rapid, Decisive Operations vs. sustained campaigns.
- ISR vs. recon and security.
- Command from the FOB vs. command from the front.
- Systems approach (EBO) vs. complexity (design).
- Dominance vs. strategy and continuous interaction.
- MCO focus vs. spectrum of conflict.
- Capabilities Based Assessment vs. Threat Based Assessment.
- Vagueness vs. transparency.
- Linear progression (leap ahead) vs. interaction with adversaries - continuous innovation.
Implications for the Army Capstone Concept
- Conducting operations under the condition of transparency.
- Conducting operations with partners and amongst diverse populations.
- Overcoming anti-access in the context of a joint operation.
- Conducting and sustaining operations from and across extended distances.
- Fighting for information (physical reconnaissance and human intelligence).
- Employing the manpower, mobility, firepower, and protection to close with the enemy.
- Conducting area security operations over large areas (including population security; precision fires to limit collateral damage).
- Developing partner capabilities (e.g. Security Force Assistance).
- Protecting the network and routinely fighting in degraded mode.
- Overcoming hybrid threats / complex terrain and overcoming enemy count-mobility efforts.
- Reshaping logistics and the demand side of sustainment to ensure operations without pause and freedom of movement in non-contiguous area of operations.
The first post (and subsequent) whilst intriguing,
lack context in the 'vs' , Can you elaborate?
Thanks
Mark
But can the U.S. build the Army McMaster wants?
BG McMaster delivered a broad attack on the DoD’s transformation plans from the 1990s. He asserted that the technological focus of that time neglected the human, social, cultural, and political factors necessary to prevail on the modern battlefield. According to McMaster, events of this decade have shown how adversaries have adapted to previous U.S. methods thus negating them.
McMaster’s capstone concept seeks to reverse many of the precepts and assumptions of the 1990s defense transformation program. Under McMaster’s vision, in order to prevail in ground combat U.S. forces will need to “go local,” by getting very close to the enemy and sustaining long-term operations deep into a variety of indigenous population.
During yesterday’s staff ride of the Gettysburg battlefield, we discussed how any army is the product and reflection of the society from which it comes. The nature of U.S. Southern culture favored the Confederacy early on, but the more industrial and commercial nature of the North later asserted its dominance.
The question for today is whether U.S. society can produce the kind of soldiers and the Army necessary to implement the capstone concept McMaster described. And whether U.S. society can support the operational concept McMaster believes is required to prevail.
-Robert Haddick
The Army reflects our society...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Westhawk
BG McMaster delivered a broad attack on the DoD’s transformation plans from the 1990s. He asserted that the technological focus of that time neglected the human, social, cultural, and political factors necessary to prevail on the modern battlefield. According to McMaster, events of this decade have shown how adversaries have adapted to previous U.S. methods thus negating them.
McMaster’s capstone concept seeks to reverse many of the precepts and assumptions of the 1990s defense transformation program. Under McMaster’s vision, in order to prevail in ground combat U.S. forces will need to “go local,” by getting very close to the enemy and sustaining long-term operations deep into a variety of indigenous population.
During yesterday’s staff ride of the Gettysburg battlefield, we discussed how any army is the product and reflection of the society from which it comes. The nature of U.S. Southern culture favored the Confederacy early on, but the more industrial and commercial nature of the North later asserted its dominance.
The question for today is whether U.S. society can produce the kind of soldiers and the Army necessary to implement the capstone concept McMaster described. And whether U.S. society can support the operational concept McMaster believes is required to prevail.
-Robert Haddick
Excellent point. We live in a society that is overall much more enamored with technology and hard sciences than with the humanities. How can a nation that routinely lags behind much of the world in social studies, geography, language arts, and other liberal arts studies hope to field armies that are culturally adept enough for the small wars that are likely to be a significant part of our future? The services are certainly making an effort, but without a solid grounding in our own culture, these efforts seem unlikely to ‘stick’.
I highly recommend Dr. Adrian Lewis’ book The American Culture of War: the History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom, which focuses on the role that American culture plays in how our forces organize, equip, and fight. It has some keen insights in this regard.
Capstone Concept will change Army doctrine
Capstone Concept will change Army doctrine
By Robert Haddick
At last week’s TRADOC Senior Leaders Conference, I heard BG H.R. McMaster deliver a presentation on the U.S. Army’s forthcoming Capstone Concept. Here is a news article from TRADOC and the U.S. Army that describes what the Army’s Capstone Concept is and what it will mean to the Army in the years ahead. A few excerpts from the article:
Quote:
The new Capstone Concept, McMaster said, examines how the Army operates under conditions of complexity and uncertainty in an era of persistent conflict. The concept's purpose is to put into operational terms Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Casey's vision of balancing the Army to win today's wars while describing how the future Army will fight the wars of tomorrow...
Quote:
The primary purpose of the capstone concept is to lead force development and employment by establishing a common framework to think about future Army operations; place modernization decisions in a broader context of future armed conflict; establish a conceptual foundation for subordinate concepts; guide experimentation in Army operations and capabilities; and guide capability development.
Quote:
"We looked at how the Army intends to operate and face the challenges in the future operating environment against what we're calling hybrid threats," said McMaster. "By looking at the current operating environment and the hybrid threats we face and could face in the future, this helps the Army make a grounded projection into the near future and understand what challenges our Army will face as part of a Joint, interdepartmental and multinational force, and then develop the capability our Army will need to fight the future battle."
BG McMaster is leading a team that will complete work on the Capstone Concept by the end of this year. The new Capstone Concept is then supposed to guide the development of subordinate Army doctrine. The Capstone Concept effort thus represents important guidance for Army training, leader development, and combat unit organization.
During his presentation last week, BG McMaster emphasized the differences between the doctrine his team is completing and the doctrine the Army operated under a decade ago. Small Wars Journal hopes to provide further discussion of the Army Capstone Concept as it nears completion. For now, I recommend reading the article linked to above.
Looking forward to watching it
Quote:
Originally Posted by
davidbfpo
'HR' spoke yesterday at IISS, London to a nearly full conference room on the project, with a small number of slides; in a nice touch he had to operate the PPT control himself and sometimes forgot. Very clever delivery and some wicked humour: UK Ministry of Defence (Strategy) questioner poses question and 'HR' responds did I hear you right Tragedy?
A lot to absorb and many points that could be applied to law enforcement.
IISS I think will add a video to their website soon:
http://www.iiss.org/ .
Later 'HR' added his praise for the contribution of SWJ / SWC.
More another day.
davidbfpo
Not up yet:(
McMaster speech now on-line
HR McMaster's IISS talk is now available, in two parts, his speech (33 mins) and the Q&A (29 mins): http://www.iiss.org/ scroll down slightly and click on 'watch the speech'. The 'strategy' or 'tragedy' quip is in the first minute of the Q&A, superb.
davidbfpo
We know that. Of course, we aren't going to, you know, actually DO it...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
J Wolfsberger
The issue of tactical responsiveness can be addressed through implementing auftragstaktik, and "two up, two down" communication, etc. (Which, by the way, I believe the Aussies have gone after in a big way.) That, however, requires leadership, trust in subordinates
For two reasons:
We have not done it that way in the time of service of the current crop of Flag officers -- the fact that we have in the past done it and been quite successful and that we have generally been less successful since we stopped doesn't seem to penetrate...
We cannot trust subordinates because we KNOW they're only half trained...:rolleyes:
:mad: :mad:
Future of Ground Forces with MG McMaster
http://csis.org/event/ground-force-m...-still-matters
MG McMasters is interviewed by Dr. Maren Leed at a CSIS event regarding the role of ground forces in the future security environment.
During the discussion MG McMaster identifies what he calls two scary lessons that some people have apparently learnt from the past decade of conflict:
1. We think we can wars by raiding
2. We think we can outsource our wars and have others fight them
Both of these comments seem to be making a swipe on some of the verbiage coming out USSOCOM, but I don't think anyone senior in USSOCOM thinks we can wars with a raiding approach. Most realize it is a tool in the toolbox that does have numerous applications, but rarely is it decisive.
Regarding lesson number 2, I think this argument is weak because it is based on a series of assumptions that are not credible when you scratch the surface, yet on the other hand assisting others with addressing their security needs when it is appropriate is still a valid strategy. Of course this isn't new, we have been doing this for decades.
At the end of the day the U.S. military is responsible for defending our Constitution and nation, not our partners. Most of the time we have done that with partners, but if someone is proposing a national defense strategy that hinges on outsourcing this responsibility to partners that seems to be irresponsible and dangerous.
Moderator's Note
There is an earlier thread 'McMaster on War': http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...read.php?t=647
Raiders, Advisors And The Wrong Lessons From Iraq
A "lurker" asked if SWC had spotted this speech by BG McMaster, at CSIS, on March 20th 2013. It appears to be mentioned on SWJ and was in the Daily News round-up.
The title was 'Raiders, Advisors And The Wrong Lessons From Iraq' and one news report was:http://breakingdefense.com/2013/03/2...ons-from-iraq/
Link to CSIS video:http://csis.org/event/ground-force-m...-still-matters
The Pipe Dream of Easy War
The latest McMaster article in the NYT; which ends with:
Quote:
What we can afford least is to define the problem of future war as we would like it to be, and by doing so introduce into our defense vulnerabilities based on self-delusion.
Link:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/op...pagewanted=all
Makes an interesting comparison with the restrictions placed on serving British soldiers to write a book chapter, a very different public exposure when compared to the NYT.
McMaster on "four fallacies” and “easy solutions”
McMaster at a Brookings seminar is reported as having made the Army’s case in his characteristically blunt language.
Quote:
“What concerns me the most is really that we’ll engage in wishful thinking that’s motivated mainly by budget constraints,” he said. “You get the army that the people are wiling to pay for in a democracy, and it’s our job to do our best with it.”
The “wishful thinking” that McMaster fears is what he calls “four fallacies” about future conflicts that promise “easy solutions”:
“The return of the revolution in military affairs,” a theory thought discredited in Iraq — “it’s like a vampire,” he said — with its promise that long-range sensors and precision strikes will let air and sea forces win wars cleanly and bloodlessly (for us) on their own.
“The Zero Dark Thirty fallacy” that we can solve our problems almost bloodlessly with Special Operations raids, “something akin to a global swat team to go after enemy leaders.”
What might be called the Mali Fallacy (my words, not his) that we can rely on allies and local surrogates to do the fighting on the ground while the US provides advisors and high-tech support.
All three fallacies, he said, begin with a core of truth: Air Force, Navy, Special Operations, advisors, and allies are all impressive and essential capabilities, but we can’t count on them to prevail alone.
The fourth fallacy, by contrast, McMaster considers just plain “narcissistic.” The idea that the US can “opt out” of certain kinds of conflict — say, counterinsurgency, or ground warfare in general — without giving our adversaries credit for what they may be able to force us to do. Invading Afghanistan seemed ludicrous on September 10, 2001, after all, and inescapable on September 12th.
Link:http://breakingdefense.com/2014/02/t...s-4-fallacies/
Q&A with Departing Benning Commander Maj. Gen. H.R. McMaster
Q&A with Departing Benning Commander Maj. Gen. H.R. McMaster
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