Not to stir up the CoG debate, but
I have a feeling that there is a basic incompatibility between the Jones Model and the application of the CoG concept. Basically, i would suggest that they are based on different analogies: CoG (and Schwerpunkt) is based on a Newtonian understanding of physics, while the Jones Model is, implicitly, based on a more complex field model (sort of a la Kurt Lewin).
Getting back to Slap's point about Voodoo, then the factors / dimensions in the Jones model are not so much indicators as conduits / flow channels for the reification of perceptions / beliefs. "Governments" (and insurgent movements, religions and other groups of people) in and of themselves, do not exist outside the minds of those who believe in them and inasmuch as those people impose that belief, through their actions, on others. It is this belief when coupled with actions that helps to create the "mass" that CvC was referring to. In a military (conventional) context, think about "moral".
The creation / maintenance of this "mass" (and the means of continually re-producing it) is what a COIN fight is all about, and that means guarding and controlling the conduit channels of "belief" and consequent actions. It is not so much about applying your "will" to a group so much as it is about focusing your will to enforce a belief system about "reality".
Shessh, I think I need more coffee......
Some only need the model, some need a methodology.
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Originally Posted by
marct
Mediocre at best (Folgers). I really need to get my self down to the store and get the good stuff ;).
Anyway, yes, some of it does come out of systems theory but via some very weird channels (i.e. ritual studies and New Religious Movements). One of the nice things about the Jones Model is that it doesn't require specific end points where the content is pre-defined.
Recently MG Carter looked his commanders and staff in the eye and told them during a planning meeting for Kandahar: "The key to Hamkari is the creation of representative governance and representative opportunity."
Now, this is very much in line with what is proposed in the Jones Model, and I knew immediately what he was getting at, and more importantly, why it was so critical. To create these two conditions would strike at the heart of the causal perceptions of poor governance in Kandahar Provence.
Afterwords several of the commanders were discusing the meeting. One of them said: "I understand what the General wants, I just don't know what he wants me to do." This drew several nods and grunts of agreement.
This is complex stuff. Many well intentioned and very smart and experienced operators in the military, governance and development business are all doing their best to do what they think will bring stability to Afghanistan. All are operating within the guidance provided to them by their leadership. Many, however, know very little about insurgency.
Many military people want to simply defeat insurgent formations and disrupt their ability to generate decisive effects.
Many in the development business believe that if one brings electricty, paves roads, builds schools, etc stability will occur.
Many in the governance business believe that if they conduct elections and attack corruption stability will occur.
The Jones Model says that while all of those beliefs are reasonable, none are targeted directily at the perceptions of poor governance that give rise to the insurgency. They suppress the insurgent or artifically provide the things that good governance allows to occur, or they give semblences of legitimacy based on outsider perspectives.
The COG-based methodology provided here is for those who need a way to turn a fuzzy concept into specific things they can task, manage and execute. If it helps, use it. If it does not help, don't worry about it.
I have, however, made a few tweaks to the chart I provided to begin this thread, that I may post tomorrow.
What the Taliban want is moot.
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Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
What if the Taliban does not care about good governance? What if wants political power, to gain power over the population. If the population doesn't like it, they will kill them... just like they did before.
There was a civil war going in A'Stan long before NATO got there. What's that got to do with "good governance?" No one is fighting to "bring justice and peace." They are fighting to gain power over the population, to enrich themselves, socially, politically and economically.
COIN is not about defeating the insurgent, COIN is about out competing the insurgent for the support of the populace. If the populace believes that the insurgent is more likely to provide Good Governance, the insurgent is likely to ultimately prevail regardless of how much he is suppressed militarily, how much development is delivered, or how many elections one conducts.
If, however, the government can succeed in earning the support of the populace and address the perceptions of poor governance that the insurgent exploited, the insurgency will fade away, a death of natural causes.
This is the problem with military led COIN, it tends too often to be focused on defeating the threat. The insurgent is not what threatens the stability of the country, it is the failures of the governance to adequately provide good governance to some key segments of their populace that sowed the seeds of discontent that ultimately becomes insurgency.
Good post, Fuchs. As Bob's world says:
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"These things are rarely black and white, and as Ken White loves to beat me about the head and shoulders with (hey, a guy his age needs the exercise) there are no pat answers. There are, however, some underlying fundamental "truths" that help shape an effective understanding of the suface conditions we observe.
Yes I did, but I've sort of quit that except for an occasional stray round. He's too wedded to the dream to change. Much of what he advocates is worthwhile and it may do some good. Some is less worthwhile. Some is arguable.
One should take care to insure that ones desires do not become "truths."
I have long said that poor governance is not the only cause of insurgency and that good governance is not only solution. Others make the same points but Bob continues to see "truths." S'okay, everyone ought to have ideals and dreams. Maybe the good points will get some traction...
I draw comfort from knowing the Ken counseled my predecesors too
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
Yes I did, but I've sort of quit that except for an occasional stray round. He's too wedded to the dream to change. Much of what he advocates is worthwhile and it may do some good. Some is less worthwhile. Some is arguable.
One should take care to insure that ones desires do not become "truths."
I have long said that poor governance is not the only cause of insurgency and that good governance is not only solution. Others make the same points but Bob continues to see "truths." S'okay, everyone ought to have ideals and dreams. Maybe the good points will get some traction...
Young Henry Ford was too wed to the idea that horseless carriages were better than the way we had always done it with horses;
Those darn Wright brothers and their fool contraption were way to wedded too the idea of powered flight as well.
As to the "fuzziness" of goodness. Read the paper. Insurgency IS fuzzy. That's why governments and militaries stuggle with it so mightily. They try to solve it by "defeating it." Kill the members of your populace who dare to challenge your failed ways. Or worse for the US, go help the failed governments of another country kill the members of their populace. It's not working.
I say again: It's not working.
So, like the Ranger instructor in your face: "Are you as F'd up as you want to be??" There's no good answer to that. Sure we know were F'd up, but we don't want to be, we just don't know what else to do.
Legitimacy is not a difficult concept. It comes from the people. Figure out how the people in a troubled area bestow legitimacy and simply empower that. Don't force them to do it your way (elections); don't pick their candidates for them (Hello, meet Mr. Karzai); and most importantly of all, don't try to shape the outcome in terms of form, nature or manning of said government and be willing to work with or abandon whatever emerges from the process. That is not complicated. But it does fly in the face of 60 years of control-based Cold War Strategy.
Hope is not a difficult concept either. Why are the teabaggers in America not an insurgency right now? They challenge the legitimacy of the President; They feel that they are not receiving Justice; and they sure as hell don't feel that they receive any respect. (A fellow SF Colonel who is extremely liberal told me with a straight face that "conservatives just aren't as smart as liberals." They believe that, it rationalizes their behavior and empowers them to ignore the express will of the ignorant masses and provide what they know is best for them). But in all of that, the Tea Party members have one thing that no current government can take from them. Its the same thing that the Bush administration could not take away from a equally frustrated liberal community: Hope. They know the system is strong, and that it will prevent any one approach to governance from enduring. Sure it disrupts the good a bit, but it is a showstopper for the bad. We have a system in America born of insurgency, and it is designed to prevent insurgency because of it.
Or we could just do capture kill on the Tea Party Leadership; Or perhaps try to buy them off with development projects; or maybe if we need help, bring in a couple hundred thousand Chinese military and aid workers to help provide security and development. We could have Chinese Captains and Majors advising our Cabinet members, Congressmen and Generals. We could have the Chinese show us how they pick leaders, and have them apply that process to picking and sustaining the leaders here that they think are best for us (when we know they really mean best for them) That should work. Right?? Good luck with that.
No, I'll keep banging my drum. I like the sound of it. I think some of the otherr members of the band are sounding a little flat though
While I will refrain from simply replying "Jackass..."
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Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
Because they oppose your setting forth of policy, and the the opposing armed force is a minute percentage of the population in exactly the same way your army is. - it's called the armed force, not the population.
So politics works 53% of the time... wow... I will read with interest.
Ends, Ways and Means. This has been said many, many time before.
Non-violence does not stop the bad guys killing your family. Achieving policy goal by non-violence IS politics.
I will instead refer you to page 9 of the document you felt you free to deride without the benefit of a quick scan first to see how it might measure up to your dogma:
"Nonviolent resistance is a civilian-based method used to wage conflict through social, phychological, economic, and political means without the threat or use of violence. It includes acts of omission, acts of commission, or a combination of both. Scholars have identified hundreds of nonviolent methods - including symbolic protests, economic boycotts, labor strikes, political and social non-cooperation and nonviolent intervention - that groups have used to mobilize publics to oppose or support different policies to delegitimize adversaries, and to remove or restrict adversaries' sources of power. Nonviolent struggle takes place outside traditional political channels, making it distinct from other nonviolent political processes such as lobbying, electioneering, and legislating.
I have no dogma in this fight...
Recognizing that you don't understand the point of this particular thread
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Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
I did not deride the document. I merely expressed surprise at the conclusion as stated, because it did not seem insightful. Thus-
No threat of violence - thus politics in the truest sense of the word.
Again, all political instruments. None of this should be the concern of anyone in uniform - bar Policeman.
And? This statement attempts to draw a false distinction between formal political processes and real politics in the wider sense. Poll Tax Riots? Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament? Greenham Common? These are all well tracked and well understood aspects of politics since time began.
Sorry Bob, I full confess to not getting it. I grew up with Protests, Strikes and Boycotts. They pure politics in one of it's most unambiguous forms.
There is a good chance your persistent posts consisting of "I disagree" or "I don't understand" don't lend much to the SWJ community. There are dozens of other threads on this site where your comments typically add very much indeed. Post where you please, obviously, but I for one am not benefiting from what you are posting here.
Probably time to take a break and cool things a bit.
Disagreements occur on discussion boards and they should. Sometimes, we just need to take a beak and do something else for a bit. :cool:
Ok, I need to dig a bit deeper...
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Originally Posted by
marct
Well, populations are not singular; even in families :D!
That's exactly what I'm driving at. Obviously each population considers its own grievances to be legitimate, but addressing those grievances can cause another population to turn to violence. For example, consider the institution of slavery in the US from before Civil War and through the Civil Rights Act. Was there, for example, some kind of "good governance" which we might have instituted sometime before the Civil War that would have avoided that conflict? Was there any possible kind of "good governance" that could have brought us to where we are today in the 19th century? Was rebellion in the south a failure of governance? I don't think so. In fact, I suspect that had the feds tried to impose something like the CRA immediately following the Civil War, then we likely would have faced a post-war insurgency. So the question is, what can governance do when populations have irreconcilable differences?
Applying this to Afghanistan, I really need to be convinced that good central governance in Afghanistan is even possible, much less the highly centralized government that currently exists. The best that could be hoped for, in my estimation, is something along the lines of how Pakistan is currently organized, but that isn't working out all that well either. The alternative is the devolution of central power altogether - if centralized good governance isn't possible, then perhaps a highly decentralized state is. Certainly there is precedence for that in Afghanistan, but we are limited by the political reality and the conditions today, which is a highly centralized Afghan government wholly dependent on foreign powers.
In short, I question that there is any kind of "good governance" under the existing system which can satisfy all the competing factions.
The alternative is for the populations to change. Such change occurs very slowly. This is, I think, what happened here in the US with slavery. Good governance did not solve the irreconcilable differences between the North and South, even after the Civil War. Ultimately, and over a long period of time, the populace changed. In Afghanistan I fear trying to bring misplaced notions of good governance through a highly centralized government will set the stage for more violence in Afghanistan and not less.
In the end what we think is "good governance" may, in reality, turn into quite the opposite. Jcustis' comments highlight our continuing collective ignorance on Afghanistan which impedes our ability to understand what good governance is in Afghanistan, much less our ability to foster it.
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No state actually has a monopoly on violence. In the US, for example, each individual state has its own armed forces, as do many municipalities (aka police). Private corporations also have the capability of violence, either from their own security forces or by hiring them or by manipulating local politicians to use theirs. The idea that the "state", which is an illusion anyway, has a monopoly on violence is just one of those myths that have been propagated since the development of modern states.
That's true and I do understand there are various levels of government and/or authority depending on circumstances. "Monopoly" is the wrong word and I didn't mean a monolithic "state" so sorry for the confusion.
Let me put it this way - what is it that prevents me from taking justice into my own hands? In large part it is because I'm deterred from doing so because the "state" (ie. some authority with coercive power over me) will visit negative repercussions upon me that I cannot avoid. In short, one can't have a governmental authority without credible coercive power to include violence. If I tried to set up my own independent system of justice here in my neighborhood it wouldn't last long because the government has the coercive power to prevent it, even if my system of justice is superior and more legitimate in the eyes of my "population" (ie. my neighborhood). I would still fail because the government has the coercive power to prevent my system from being used.
Now suppose that the government had limited (or no) means to prevent me from forming my own independent system of justice. In that case my system has the chance to win based on its merits vs what the government can offer. I have the opportunity to supplant the government in delivering justice for my population. More likely, though, the government would have some coercive power and so would I. We are both, then, in the position of competing over the population as well as trying to reduce the other's coercive power. It may be the case that our justice systems are not that different, or are not sufficiently different that the population would not live under one or the other. In that case, legitimacy is not derived from who can provide the best system of justice, but who can exclusively provide any system of justice - in other words, competing over the justice system becomes a power struggle. This analogy isn't far removed from what's happening in parts of Afghanistan where people DO need a justice system to resolve disputes.
So legitimacy isn't just the ability to deliver a government service - it's the ability to deliver a service and prevent competitors from offering alternatives and that requires the credible ability to bring violence or coercion on those who would buck your system.
For years and years now we've read stories and reports where Afghan government and coalition efforts in any number of areas are stymied because once the government authority leaves, or the project is built, or whatever, a new authority moves in and either fills the vacuum or displaces what government authority there is. The population isn't going to accept your authority unless it is both perceived as legitimate and you posses the credible capability to enforce it. Afghans are notorious fence-sitters because they are so often caught in the middle of power struggles. So for any Afghan government or coalition project to succeed, it must have the durable and credible ability to keep the insurgent governance structure out. The ability to do that successfully is what will give you true legitimacy.
As I said, I think Col. Jone's model is useful and easy to understand, but I would like to know how his model accounts for these factors.
You have come to a critical point in your thinking
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Originally Posted by
Entropy
Col. Jones,
This discussion brought up a couple of questions in my mind:
1. Based on all the discussion of "good governance," I get the impression that the responsibility for the condition of "good governance" rests solely on whomever is trying to govern. This suggests that a population's motivations for entering into insurgency are always reasonable and therefore should be accommodated. Is this the case? If not, then how exactly do populations fit into your theory, especially in cases where the goals for two populations are mutually exclusive or are unreasonable?
2. Where does a state's capacity to provide a credible monopoly on violence fit in? I would argue that a credible monopoly on violence is part and parcel of legitimacy for a number or reasons. Justice is a good example. It's not enough to simply provide justice for a population - one must also prevent competing systems of justice from forming (consider, for example, white supremacist "justice" against African-Americans in the south). The point being is that legitimacy isn't enough - it must be backed by a credible monopoly of force both for enforcement as well as deterrence. It seems to me that the deterrent effect from a government's credible monopoly of violence is likely to cause disaffected populations to more seriously consider non-violent means for change. Do you disagree? If so, how so?
JCustis,
Amen to that. I've been banging on PIR's for quite a long time now.
The responsibility for Good Governance DOES rest solely on the government. That is why it is called "service" or "duty". When governmental leaders begin to think of the populace as existing to serve them you are on the slippery slope to Poor Governance, Subversion and Insurgency.
The population's rationale only have to be reasonable to them. As my wife is quick to tell me "don't tell me how I feel." Governments like to think that what they think is right, and what the populace thinks contrary to those offiicial positions is moot. This natural tendency is what allows subversion to grow among the people while the government rationalizes the danger away as being attributed to a few radicals.
As to the insurgent being right or wrong, I have to go with what was captured quite intentionally in our Declaration of Independence. It is both the Duty and the Right of a Populace to rise up in insurgency when faced with Despotism. As an attorney, I understand that a Duty is something that one must do, and a Right is something that cannot be taken away. As an SF officer I understand that insurgency can take many forms; that the formative causal factors that must be addressed are the same, regardless in what form the movement manifests. The natural tendency, when denied legal recourse, if for the populace to take illegal routes to change. As Maria lays out in her work, the non-violent ways are more apt to succeed than the violent ways.
To simply say violence is war, and war is a military matter, and the military's job is to crush said violence is the same supervicial analysis from the perspective of the Despot that has lead to many a long, drawnout struggle between a populace and its failed governance.
Better instead for Governance to see such movements as the clearest of metrics, the most accurate of polls, and to modify their behavior to the degree practicable to resolve their failures short of simply ramping up the oppression.
Dayuhan: Concur completely that AQ is not an insurgent organization. After all, they have no populace, and they have no state. They are a political club that employs the tools of the modern information age to conduct Unconventional Warfare to incite, leverage, and support the insurgencies of others to their ends.
This used to be the realm of states. Hitler needed a state to go from a Dissident in Munich to causing trouble on a global stage. Today, if AQ gained a state they would be crushed in days. By remaining in the "sanctuary" of their non-state status (no, Afghanistan is not their essential sanctuary, their status is), they remain outside the reach of the tools of statehood. What we need to focus on are the many unique, distinct troubled relationships between states across the Middle East and their populaces, and also assess our roles in those relationships as seen from the perspectives of the populaces.
The intel guys always cast this in friend-foe model that is wrong-headed and dangerous. It drives the F'd up PIRs that were mentioned. PIRs need to get to the critical questions that the boss must understand to focus his efforts to win. Those PIRs should be based in my four causal factors, not in what is the current manifestation of violence up to.
Oh, and final point. When one invades and displaces the governance of another, and replaces it with a government that has a higher duty to the foreign power than they do to their own populace; The despotism at work is that of the foreign power. To conduct such operations may sometimes well be necessary. But the aftermath must very much be rooted in allowing / enabling the populace to shape what comes next and for the foreigner to go home ASAP. He can always come back if need be, but to stay is to create conditions that are brutally hard to overcome.