Just for my own edification...
...what's the "Peter Principle" that both TAH and KW are refering to?
Maybe it's impractical but I wanted to know what people thought
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Originally Posted by
Fuchs
The corps is the largest army structure that's affordable for most European countries unless the horizon darkens. It's going to stay in one form or another.
That sounds sensible from a European standpoint.
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This means that with all those compatibility efforts at NATO level it would make little sense to delete U.S. corps because this would mean one unnecessary level of command in multinational campaigning.
I asked if eliminating the corps would be practical because the U.S. does business through it's regional Unified Commands. If the four-star commander (are they still called CinCs or "sinks"?) already has a couple of three-stars working for him does he still need corps commanders between him and the divisions? Don't know, maybe he does.
But the discussion is usually about flattening the command structure by eliminating the division. I never see any talk of eliminating the corps and keeping the division so I thought I'd ask.
Sustainment = CSS = Logistics not Command & Control
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Originally Posted by
gute
Had a thought the other day of why not making the Division HQs/Base its' own brigade type. C2/staff/HQs Bn + Signal Bn + Troops Bn (MPs, NBC, local security force units, other odds & sods), + CAV Sqdrn/Recon Bn.
This is different then the sustainment brigade?
According to Wikipedia:
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the sustainment brigade for the 1st Infantry Division consists of a STB, a CSSB, 1DHHB, and 84th ORD BN.
A sustainment Bde will normally consist of a Hqs a supporting signal unit and a number of single function (trans, QM, maintenance etc) and multi-function CSS battalion. There role/mission is to sustain the force.
My proposed DIV HQs Bde would focus on C2 and include those units (staffs, admin signal, force protection, intel and recon&security) a division would normally need to operate.
TAH
makes all the piece parts Bdes
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Originally Posted by
82redleg
The 3 GOs and 3 COLs are probably the least of the BN CDRs worries (I assume that's what you meant by "his" staff)- and that issue is already there.
The problem with adding HQs and staffs for "small" BCTs is that we create a lot of FGs and SNCOs that don't provide much to the fight. What is this HQ & C2 BDE doing? All of its elements are TACON of some element of the DIV G staff (with the exception of the sustainment elements and the security company). All he has left is ADCON, and does it really take a BDE to ADCON 2000 +/-? Or to C2 the employment of an IN/MP CO conducting fixed site security?
My thought was that making the DIV HQs a "Bde Type" makes all of the units in the division a Bde.
The DIV HQs Bde could/would/might have as base:
1. A HQs Bn of the Division Staff
2. A Signal Co to support the HQs Bn
3. A robust DIV CAV Sqdrn
4. A Security/Field Jager Bn for site security and rear area protection & response force/rear area patrolling
5. Bde HHC
To address the UAS question in your other post.
You pretty much got it right, it/they would fly under the direction of the Recon Sqdrn to support the BFSB/DIV requirements. The problem it that teh A/C are Shadows. Only 4 A/C means no to limited 24/7 coverage and only out to 60-75 Kms from launch site. Too few A/C with "legs" that are too short.
Operation Yes, Logisctics....
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Originally Posted by
82redleg
Understand all on the UAVs.
I'm not sure that the operations of a DIV CAV SQDN (which is going to end up TACON to the DIV, as the old DIV CAV generally were) and the Security BN justify a BDE HQ.
The SIG CO is already in the HQs BN.
You end up with (at best) a BDE HQ and BN HQ for a couple of companies, most of whom are doing fixed site security (low overhead) and (when employed as a response force) becoming TACON to someone else (whoever is in contact with whatever they are responding to).
I believe you are better off with a robust BN (put the SECFOR in the HHB), and another robust BN (the DIV CAV) that interfaces directly with the DIV. I think a BN should be able to handle 3 ground troops, a LRSC and an air troop )or two)(preferably with lift, so it can insert the LRS, too).
Could each of the Bns operate seperate from a Bde, sure. My thought is to standarize thsi new modular brigade type (DIV HQs) to simplify the CSS aspect. Which means I now need to add a DIV HQs CSS Bn capable of supporting: a HQs Bn (with organic Signal Co), a DIV CAV Sqdn, & a SECFOR Bn.
Another way to view this issue is as a transformed/modularized Division Base.
What happened to Sink or Swim?
Perhaps the BCT is not the best solution, but it has certainly been a step in the right direction. To revert back to a Division/Corps centric Army would be a complete devolution of combat effectiveness.
The Army's inability to delegate roles and responsibilities to lower echelons has contradicted and doomed the success of the BCT. I think that many have never wanted the BCT to succeed.
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
the Colonels didn't like it. That and the fact that the intended equipment got stalled in the bureaucracy and only started appearing in units AFTER the decision was made to revert to the tired and true -- and easier to control if you're into centralizing things -- Brigade of ROAD. The Pentomic concept had a great many good things, but it was designed for those who are willing to delegate and trust subordinates. Not the Army way...:wry:
I think that Ken has hit the nail on the head. Today's Army does not perform well in a decentralized state. This, in my opinion, lends evidence to a larger problem... The Army's quality vs. quantity problem.
Lets be real and frank, the average (pick your rank) fails to embody the level of responsibility, proficiency, and professionalism necessary for the success of the BCT. Furthermore, the truly exemplary junior officers/NCOs have been virtually neutered of their authority/responsibilities. This has a detrimental effect on the entire Brigade.
What we need is the SOF mentality pushed out into the broader Army. Field grades should not be afraid to fire people, junior officers and NCOs must have the opportunity to succeed and/or fail. Eventually these mentalities will rub off onto the lower enlisted who will forgo their Halo tournament (video games) to concern themselves with putting rounds down range.
And now for something completely different
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Originally Posted by
Tukhachevskii
How different, if at all, would that look compared to current cav Bn's?
It would not look anything like any of the existing BCT Recon/CAV Cdqrns.
Probably something like I have outlined over on the BCT thread:
2 hvy Cavalry Troops that have the capabiity of "fighting for information"
1 light recon troop most likely in scout/armored cars for the smaller/light footprint to be able to manuever thru terrain that the hvy toops are too big/heavy for and for missions that require more stealth/surveillance capability.
1 Mounted Infantry Co for staying power and to augment with more dismounted patrolling capability.
Each Co/troop has it own short-range (5-10 km) UAV, Sqdrn has longer range A/C to look deeper and stay longer.
6-8 heavy mortars for organic fire support.
Another option I have kicked around in my head is a 21st century up-date to the 1944 Panzer Aufklarungs Abtielung.
2 Recon companies (one tracked one wheeled)
2 mounted infantry compnaies (one in IFVs and one in APC)
Support/Heavy Company with mortar, AT, engineer/sapper Plts
Add UAVs as above.
Mounted supported by Dismounted
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Originally Posted by
Tukhachevskii
So how many dismounts is that? IIRC ther were LRRP detachments assigned to Div HQ in the 1980s
For the mounted scout/recon/cav, the larger the number of dismounts, the greater number of dismounted patrols & LP/OPs each unit can support.
A 36-man scout plt (could be CFV or Stryker) can dismount 18 (CFV) or 24 (Stryker) Soldiers. six or eight 3-man teams or three or four 4-man teams per platoon. These folks are recon/scouts with training, manning, and equipping focused on the recon aspects of the mission. Could a Scout platoon defend or clear a building, sure but I don't see that as their primary job.
The infantry company is there to address the recurring issue from recon/cav units that they insufficent dismounts for sustained combat operations. These are infantry Soldiers trained, manned and equipped for their set of combat operations. Could these guys man LP/OPs or conduct dismounted patrols, again sure, but need them focused on missions that will normally require more then 3-8 folks at a time.
The DIV CAV must be capable of BOTH recon (route, area, zone) AND security (screen & guard) operations. Mine will also be a viable canidate for economy-of-force missions, delays etc. None of the existing Recon Sqdron currently have ALL of these capabities without outside augmentation.
Chiarelli's a tanker whose only wars were fought in the Desert,
the only type of terrain on earth that is conducive to modern Div operations. We fought Divs in WW II in North Africa only, everywhere else, the Divs formed Regimental Combat Teams to fight. Korea and VN, RCT and Bde fights. Then came Desert Storm, he missed it but his buddies in the 1st Cav told him about the majesty of an Armored Division in full sweep and then he went to Iraq and heard and saw what the attack force had done.
That's point one. It ignores the issue of Divs in Viet Nam being useless and having little to do. If we go back in the Jungle somewhere -- or to Korea, we are not going to fight as Divs.
Point two is the Math. Disregarding Separate Bdes, We had ten Divs @ three Bdes each, total of 9 maneuver Bns each for 90 maneuver LTC cmds. We now have essentially four BCTs per Div Hq with two Bns plus a 'Cav Sqn' each for 80 Bns plus 40 'Cav Sqns' -- that's 120 maneuver LTC cmds.
Take out some 'Cav Sqns' for the reconstituted Divs and that equals 12 Divisions at nine maneuver Bns (12x9=108) plus a Div Cav Sqn (2x1=12. That 12 plus the 108 = 120). That's two more MG slots and four more BG slots at a cost of 8 COL spaces (10 deactivated BCTs less 2 new Div Chiefs of Staff).
Whether that will happen or not remains to be seen, the modular bit works and can be improved to work even better but I suspect that is not the issue. It's a change and we older folks don't like change. Any time budget cuts loom, the power structure seeks to minimize the 'damage' IAW their view on what's important. In my experience that has rarely coincided with what was best for the nation or even the Army. We don't do "It wasn't designed here" nor do we do "it wasn't designed by me." :rolleyes:
Plus modularity leaves the Div Hq (and their GO slots) subject to Congressional questions of "what do they do..." :wry:
Minus 47,000 Active-duty Troops
Based on what I read today, the Army is being asked/tasked to cut 27,000 active-duty troops (plus 22,000 already programmed to go) by 2015.
Will be interesting to see where the cuts go.
If out of the TOE force, 47K is somewhere between 2 and four divisions.
In round figures, the combined HQs (BCT HHC+STB HHC+2 CAB HHC+BSB HHC+FA HHB) of an HBCT is 1100 troops, IBCT is 1000.
Only a total of 49 BCTs (18 HBCT, 23 IBCT & 6 SBCT) in the active force.
AVN Bdes have lots of troops but will be surprised if any of those go.
The rest of the Modular Bdes are generally a HQs + a SPT BN + a signal Co.
Lots of room to cut in the CBT SPT area (FA, MPs, ENG ect) but alot of that stuff (50% plus) is in the RC.
Waiting to see.