Difficult to accept the obvious?
Stick with what Guderian wrote. That is enough. Fuller and Liddell-Hart provided the spark... no more... no less.
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Yes, John Mearsheimer wrote the book on that, I think it was called Liddell Hart and the Weight of History.
Liddell Hart wrote and said some interesting things, but he was also all over the map. He, along with many others, drew the wrong lessons from the Spanish Civil War, and was opposed to a continental commitment until pretty late in the game.
On the contrary. Hobart exercised entirely too much influence in the Thirties, and was a major factor in faulty British armor tactics (the lack of combined arms) that got them kicked around the desert for two years. Auchinleck and others had to rebuild an army that he had set up for failure.
Liddell-Hart never really said much about AFV per se. The guilty party is Fuller. Liddell-Hart was more imprecise about his ideas, and really majored on his supposed "Indirect Approach."
Dumb was not the problem. It wasn't ignorance. It was well-sold ideas put forth by supposedly smart men.
I beg to differ. If you mean the StuG III/IV were excellent at infantry support, I would agree. The creation of "Cruiser/Cavalry" tanks was a disaster. Correct me if I am wrong, but were not StuGs manned by the artillery and attached to the infantry?Quote:
The division into infantry and cruiser tanks wasn't a major mistake either, as proved by the StuG III later on. Guderian was actually wrong on this one early on.
Their were engineering and bureaucracy problems, and all was made far worse by the "Tank Avant Garde" who really screwed it up. Had they know what they had wanted, - and been right, they rest would have followed.Quote:
The British tank development mess of 1930s till 1943 looks to me rather like an engineering and procurement bureaucracy failure.
I am.... and all the ideas contained in that article are actually a plea to recover to the basics, and raise the bar. In point of fact, there is little wrong with the actual practice of UK infantry training. The fault lies with the ideas that underpin it. UK infantry tends to be very well built, but just poorly designed, if that makes sense.
Concur. Good analogy.Quote:
See it like a rising tide needing to lift all the ships rather than just cherry-picking the best of the rest and probably underutilising them.
Lunatic Health and Safety exist anywhere that UK troops do. Kenya makes not odds. There is also Cyprus, which is probably one of the best Coy and Platoon training areas anywhere in the world. - BUT, I also believe that some infantry training in the cold and wet is very essential, as that sort of environment really tests determination and personal administration.Quote:
Now why Kenya is a good option is that what I would propose for the training at the various levels is because it would probably be problematic in the UK given the lunatic Health and Safety gestapo that exist.
No, but watch this space.Quote:
(BTW have you updated that 2006 piece? If so where.)
Some. His work on Infantry Doctrine in the early 1920's was good. Some was a bit blue sky and stating the obvious, but never really wholly misleading. Having said that he copied and plagiarised Foch's ideas and then sort to destroy Foch's reputation.
After 1945, Liddell-Hart allied himself with the "blitzkrieg" and basically re-invented himself. - BUT, if you read his work, little he says is either insightful, original (not required) or really useful.
There is a far larger issue, that men such as Liddell-Hart, Fuller, and I would also include T.E. Lawrence and Boyd, were masters of gently walking the limelight path, in a way to ensures the actual content of their ideas is never really subject to investigation. MOST Military Theory is rubbish, and that includes the stuff that has come out in the last 10 years.
That's correct, but the key here is that a division between infantry-supporting tanks for solving tactical problems of infantry-centric forces (infantry divisions) were necessary next to more mobile tanks in motorized forces (armour/mech. infantry divisions or brigades) for solving operational problems.
History showed that the former had the potential of being more cost-efficient tank destroyers as well.
The British infantry tank/cruiser tank and especially the French dispersion of tanks has been bashed in military history and doctrine-related writings a lot, but unfairly. Guderian was wrong in the 30's on this, the British, French, Russians and Manstein were right: At that time the armies needed both infantry and cruiser tanks.
The exact designs (infantry tank with small gun in turret or assault gun with casemate gun with decent HE effect) was only a(n important) detail.
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot....nd-future.html
It is the system of the rifle section that is the problem. There you (UK) have an evolving structure. Take this article as the start point for discussion:
The Infantry Section: Lifting its Capability of June 2007.
Now the problem is with all these orgs and structures is for what war were they planned for? Have meaningful adaptations been carried out to cater for Afghanistan?
The weight factor is revisited in the article. Its the body armour that is the problem, not the other stuff.
The Health and Safety gestapo is self inflicted... so no one but the Brits can help themselves on this score.Quote:
Lunatic Health and Safety exist anywhere that UK troops do. Kenya makes not odds. There is also Cyprus, which is probably one of the best Coy and Platoon training areas anywhere in the world. - BUT, I also believe that some infantry training in the cold and wet is very essential, as that sort of environment really tests determination and personal administration.
I think you are missing my point.
This one month training phase (I am talking about) should be part of basic training and carried out as early as possible. Once the troopies pass out or the cadets get commissioned, then yes, for an army that my fight anywhere and everywhere over the world training should be carried out in as many environments as needed (or more realistically as can be afforded).
All environments have their challenges. For example I've seen snow a handful of time in my life and been in it twice... so training in that environment would have been a real challenge for me and the other locals.
BTW on my Cadet course in 1974 we did a weeks Outward Bound training. We enjoyed it. I'll email my course officer and see what he felt the army got out of it.
I have a number of issues with that article, but the basic message about Body Armour needs to be taken way more seriously than it is currently.
I had an article in the same publication here. - and I would now modify some of that position.
Inflicted via the Government via Europe. - Just like the Land Mine ban.Quote:
The Health and Safety gestapo is self inflicted... so no one but the Brits can help themselves on this score.
I don't think I am. I have had numerous discussions about a "Knife and Mess tin" type course and/or "Outward Bound/Adventure training." - It has great merit providing it is applied at the right time for the right reasons. Personally I wouldn't restrict it just to officer training, but there again, I wouldn't start training anyone as an officer until he had at the very least completed Basic Training anyway.Quote:
I think you are missing my point.
This one month training phase (I am talking about) should be part of basic training and carried out as early as possible.
Concepts like 3 to 1 ratios are only valid when comparing like or similar capabiity systems, weapons or units.
comparing the average WW2 infantry platoon armed with bolt-action rifles and a limited number of MGs to any of today's cutting edge infantry with magazine fed assault rifles, ICOM intra-squad comms, body armor etc will reveal that a straight comparison of numbers only is invalid. The concept of Relative Combat Power was an attempt by the US during the late 80s early 90s to address this issue. Sometimes it worked, sometimes it did not.:confused:
OK so we can agree that this sort of training has merit. I suggest that it be carried out early in the training. And yes as the modern requirement for more individually skilled and reliable soldiers across the board increases all soldiers should receive this training.
We can revisit the desirability of officers having been trained as basic soldiers before being selected for officer training if you wish. I put it to you it is not the (comparative) inferior basic training that is important but rather the experience of soldiering in the ranks for a year (including basic training) which has the value.