in Beyond the Abu Sayyaf, by Steven Rogers (January/February 2004 Foreign Affairs).
Perhaps a trustworthy bundoks source.
:D:D:D
Mike
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in Beyond the Abu Sayyaf, by Steven Rogers (January/February 2004 Foreign Affairs).
Perhaps a trustworthy bundoks source.
:D:D:D
Mike
If I was going to write that again I'd change a few things. Not all that much, but some... clarity with hindsight, I guess. Of course that dealt more with the islands to the west... a quite different situation from Central Mindanao, though with similarities.
There is actually a window of opportunity at this point (driven by both the MILF's uncertain control and the overreach and subsequent divorce from government of the Ampatuan dynasty) for the Philippine Government to step in with a strategy that is both within its legal capacity and capable of real progress toward reducing, if not fully resolving, the tension in Central Mindanao, and for that matter in the islands. Might almost be worth another article... but nobody would read it, the strategy would never be adopted in any event, it would be a hell of a lot of work, and I wouldn't get paid for it, all of which induce a certain lethargy.
Meanwhile, back at the ranch, Umbra Kato's boys are allegedly up to some nasty work...
http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx...CategoryId=200
Emphasis on "allegedly" and "suspected" here... Umbra Kato and Co. are certainly capable of this sort of thing and may very well be responsible, but others are equally capable, and there are a number of groups who would have an interest in provoking military action against the breakaway faction. Never wise to assume that things are as they seem, or as they are reported.Quote:
COTABATO CITY, Philippines (Xinhua) - Suspected followers of a former Muslim rebel field commander blamed for the attacks that left 60 civilians dead in several southern Philippine towns in 2008 torched houses as they raided a Christian community in the southern Philippines yesterday, military said today.
Seven houses of civilians in a remote village in the township of Mlang in North Cotabato province were set on fire by suspected followers of Ameril Umbra Kato during the raid, the military said, adding the rebels also took away farm crops and animals as they fled.
There's a major corruption scandal unfolding in Manila. Started with investigation of a retired general who served as military comptroller and who had allegedly accumulated a personal fortune of roughly 300 million pesos; a plea bargain was hit and the usual sweep-under-the-rug was in progress, but a bunch of witnesses have emerged from the closet, including retired officers and a retired auditor, and the beans are spilling faster than anyone can count. Allegations include massive diversions of troop pay, the modernization budget, UN funds paying for peacekeepers, US exercise budgets, and almost everything else imaginable. Numerous instances of huge purchases from unknown suppliers, multiple accounts being billed for the same expenses. Large payments to legislators are being openly discussed. Lots of names on the table. Various hearings going on and a great deal of amnesia being expressed on the witness stand.
It all escalated today, former defense Secretary and General Angelo Reyes apparently committed suicide. Doubts are being expressed. He knew a lot of stuff about a lot of people, to put it mildly, and was coming under intense pressure.
There's undoubtedly a great deal to reveal, and it runs from top to bottom: these guys don't have skeletons in their closets, they have cemeteries. Hard to know how far it will go or what will come of it, but well worth watching. Long term it's undoubtedly a good thing; short term there could be significant operational disruption.
Although it is certainly true that Kato is NOW off the reservation that has only taken place within the last 8 months. The belief that he, Abdurahman Macapaar, aka"Kumander Bravo" (102 Base Command) and Aleem Sulaiman Pangalian, aka "Kumander Pagnalian" (103 Base Command) have been "outside of MILF control" isn't rooted in fact. Two of the last three MILF "wars" ("Estrada's All Out War" in 2000 and "MoA" in 2008 and 2009 were calculated gambits on the part of the MILF Central Committee to try and force the government's hand in the Peace Process. The third, "Bundiok Complex" in 2003 was reactionary but entirely condoned by the leadership since the AFP's stated objectives (Policing of KFR on the edges of Liguasan Marsh, primarily against the "Pentagon" organisation) was merely a ruse to force the MILF's hand after GMA found herself neck deep in a failed Peace Process that was very quickly spinning out of control.
GMA, like all Filipino Presidents was incredibly insecure on her status vis a vis the AFP (the actual seat of power in the Philippines). Coming to power in a coup less than 2 years before she had immediately and literally begged Malaysia to assume the role of Facilitator in the Peace Process. Having internationalised what should have been solely a domestic issue, and having done so with a nation who until the early 1990s had largley been responsible for the existence of the MILF she was terrified of having the MILF gain the upper hand. Of course the moment GMA appealed to Malaysia in 2001 the MILF had gotten that and a whole lot more.
Estrada's war was a war of opportunity and though it turned out very well for the government alot of factors have been overlooked; As they say, "timing is everything." On the very same day Kumander Bravo stormed Kauswagan a very large contingent of the Marines 1st Brigade re-deployed to Camp Evangelista (Cagayan del Oro, Misamis Oriental Province in Northcentral Mindanao) Kumander Bravo's 102 Base Command (rather, what would soon become the 102 Base Command since the BIAF, the MILF military wing only converted its conventional structure into more mobile "Base Commands" following this very war. At the time of the attack the 102 Base Command was still the 303rd Brigade) decided to push the Estrada Government back to the table by invading and occupying the largely non-Muslim town of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte Province. The Marines were in the very next province and hadn't even unpacked their kitbags.
I won't go off onto a long tangent about that conflict. Sufficient to say that the 102 Base Commandzg303rd Brigade was operating with full knowledge AND agreement of the MILF central commamd structure. Here is a unit commander (Kumander Bravo) who, if we buy into media accounts (dictated by the Philippine Government), single handedly decides that for an unstated reason he simply wants to take over a large non-Muslim town, terrorise, pillage and kill. This act then leads to the near destruction of the MILF at the height of its power. Its 11 main camps functioned completely independently of the government, with hundreds of thousands of peasants living as quasi-citizens of the MILF's parallel government. Kumander Bravo's actions led to the loss of every single one of those camps, near total destruction of that parallel government and the deaths of what is generally believed to be 1,200 guerillas, a huge loss. So what does the MILF do to Kumander Bravo for causing all this? Not a thing. He isn't even publicly censured.
Of course, you cannot blame a commander when you yourself were the one who ordered the attack on Kauswagan.
Fast forward to the summer of 2008. After nearly 2 decades of Talks, public and private, the Philippine Government goes for broke and takes a gigantic gamble by agreeing to the Memorandum on Ancestral Domain, aka"MoA." This is done in secrecy so as not to have to circumnavigate what would be years of political and judicial opposition (and to a lesser degree the threat of military coup). The MILF Central (and Executive) Committee sit with baited breath knowing that the very next day both sides will ink the document. That afternoon though the Supreme Court issues a Restraining Order barring the signing as it deliberates on the legality of the document. Imagine the feeling on the MILF Central Committee. Then Kumander Kato launches his attack on the non-Islamic portion of North Cotabato Province.
Again, the traditional narrative, courtesy of the Philippine Government, is that Kato undertook this wide scale attack on his own, despite his AOR intersecting with that of 5 other Base Commands. MILF Base Commands operate independently of one another and view encroachment, without full coordination (usually affected via the Central Committee), as Casus Belli. Despite this huge operation that encroached upon 3 of those other Base Commands not one case of in-fighting took place. The attack was extremely well coordinated. When Kumanders Bravo and Pangalian jumped into the fray the MILF STILL refused to condemn their actions which if we buy into that traditional narrative, effectively constitute mutiny. In fact, the MILF did everything it could to stymie AFP interdiction.
There was actually 1 renegade Base Command in that war, the 107. It had recently relocated its AOR to Sarangani Province where it launched a large opportunistic attack on the municipality of Ma'asim. Unlike the other 3 Base Commands the 107 was dissected by the AFP who rapidly captured its main camp in the hills above Ma'asim. In fact, MILF Central Committee provided valuable intel that played a central part in the 72 IB's attack on that camp.
Back to Kato...Despite his having done no worse than Kumander Bravo it was Kumander Kato who became the central villain in the Govenment's narrative. Pressuring the MILF for a huge concession the Government was handed a Goodwill Gesture when the MILF Central Committee replaced Kato with his Executive Officer, sub-Kumander Goma, in early 2010. Kato was laterally transferred into the political echelon and given a paper position as an Ustadz (Islamic Scholar, in this case acting as a consultant) for the MILF Shari'a Court (Islamic Court). This gesture was given because Kato's star was in ascendance. Ironically the Philippine Government's concentrating on Kato had turned him into an icon in Central Mindanao. A huge cult of personality has developed around him. Having commanded he BIAF's largest and best armed Base Command (the 105) he was clearly a force to be reckoned with. In addition he had been quite blunt in his disdain for the Central Committee's abandonment of its most valued objective, full independence for the "Bangsamoro." He saw the evolution of independence into a "state:sub-state solution" as tantamount to sacrilege. Finally, al Haj Murad (Murad Ebrahim, Chairman of the MILF) had a debilitating stroke in the autumn of 2010. Transported to Sabah (in Malaysia) for hospitalisarion the MILF was sinking into chaos. Knowing that IF he were to cleave from the MILF/BIAF he ought to do it BE0fORE Murad died because of the lack of suitable replacement (the probable successor, Vice Chairman Jafa'ar lacks charisma and support amongst the BIAF Command).
So, in October Kato set out his shingle and created BIFF (Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters). As yet he's playing it close. The organisation has less than 800 Regulars but there are a great many MILF/BIAF that are almost ready to join him (just as in the 104 and 111Base Commands many guerillas are jumping to the 2 MNLF factions in their respective AORs). To date BIFF has 2 engagements though the Midsayap KFR they were accused of was not connected to the group.
Re "militias have been quietly forming"; Paramilitaries have existed here since the post-WWII Era and have never gone away. The poster is correct to note that the Islamic Insurgencies began with Muslim and non-Muslim (not "Christian" per se) paramilitaries fighting in the late 1960s. It actually began in Lanao del Norte Province with the Dimaporo Clan and its paramilitary, the "Barakudas." The Barakudas merely existed to exert control on the Dimaporo lumber concessions, at first. To the south. In North Cotabato Province the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM, later re-named Muslim Independence Movement) spawned a militant faction known as the "Black Shirts." It was these Black Shirts who actually spawned the communal fighting still ravaging the island today.
As the Black Shirts were first forming, a non-Muslim group began taking shape in what is now the municipality of North Upi, in Maguindanao Province. At the time Maguindanao was part of North Cotabato. The town of Upi (now split into Upi and North Upi) was home to very poor Ilonggo whose forbears settled there in government re-settlement schemes from 1904 until the late 1950s. At the same time the area was largely populated with a Lumad ("Lumad" is a Cebuano word meaning "Born of the Soil," synonymous with "Hill Tribes"and denotes the non-Negrito Animists of Mindanao, analogous to the "Igorot" of Luzon) group, the Teduray. Both the Lumad and the Ilonggo co-existed perfectly, respecting each others different life styles. The 3rd facet of the dynamic in Upi/N.Upi was the Maguindanowan Tribe. They are a Moro (Muslim) group inhabiting the lowlands and flood plains in that area.
Since shortly after Islamisation in the late 16th Century the Maguindanowan had exploited the upland Teduray and this included laying claim to all Teduray lands which they then deigned to "permit" Teduray" to work as sharecroppers. Since the 3 Moro Sultunates (actually 2 Sultunates and a confederation of principalities constituting the 3rd "sultunate": Maguindanao, Buayan and Maranao in respective order) refused to recognise American Law and Civil System the sultunates' lands largely remained unregistered until late in the Modern Era. In Upi/N.Upi this led to Ilonggo peasants being given lands claimed by the Manguindanowans. In one particular case a poor Ilonggo family moved to Upi/N.Upi in the 1940s and was settled on a tract of uncultivated land on a steep mountainside. After this family, surnamed "Luces," had cleared and terraced their small plot the chief of a Maguindanowan Clan surnamed "Ampatuan" (people familiar with the Philippines will probably know that name well) claimed it. Having been cleared and made arable it was now worth a decent amount of money.
The Luces were told to pay a very high price for land they already owned and so naturally they refused the Ampatuan's offer. Before too long Ampatuan Clansmen came and murdered the entire family, an event all too common in that era and in fact not unusual now. The family's son Felipe escaped death because he had been at the town's main market on an errand. Hearing what had happened he turned to Teduray friends who introduced him to a group of extended families who had refused to bow to the Maguindanowans, and who were periodically doing battle, mostly over land related issues. Felipe then lived among them and eventually rose to leadership of the small group. Adopting the moniker, "Kumander Toothpick" his victories attracted more Teduray, and eventually fellow Illongos as well as ( to a lesser degree) Cebuanos as well (Cebuanos and Ilonggos are culturally similar, both rooted in the Visayan Islands).
As the Black Shirts began launching attacks against Ilonggo and Cebuano villages in North Cotabato Province low level local politicians appealed to the PC (Philippine Constulbary, a COIN force organised by the Americans in 1901 and disbanded by the Philippine Government in 1991) for succor. Soon recognising that it would be advantageous to have an allied group not constrained by protocol and Standard Operating Procedure the PC encouraged Kumander Toothpick to work with the afore mentioned politicians.
Toothpick's group, still loosely organised, were referred to as "Ilaga," a Cebuano/Ilonggo word meaning "Rats." Moro propaganda claims that the word is actually an acronym standing for, "Ilonggo Land Grabbing Association." Forgetting that the group wasn't known for its English speaking skills, what organisation would define itself as "Land Grabbing"? For those not familiar with the nuance. In the Southern Philippines "Land Grabbing" is a euphanism for "Land Stealing." As the Ilaga expanded, and it expanded rapidly, it became more cohesive and received formal training AND weaponry from the PC (all the more so after 1971 when the Ilaga joined the fray against the NPA, the Communist Insurgency).
By 1969 the Barakuda to the north had taken on an ideological sheen and converted themselves into "Mujahadin" ( Islamic Warriors fighting in defence of the faith). Spreading from Lanao del Norte into the Zamboanga Peninsula and to a lesser extent into Misamis And Lanao del Sur Provinces they were far out numbering the Black Shirts who along with their parent organisation MIM fell by the wayside. Thus the Ilaga followed the outbreaks of violence by the Barakuda with neither group gaining the upper hand.
By the time of Martial Law in late 1972 the Ilaga had primarily become a tool for the anti-Communist push. It was in this vein that the Ilaga would become infamous as it absorbed Tad Tad elements. "Tad Tad" is Cebuano for "Chop Chop" and is applied to synchrestic Christian faiths that engage in canibbalism. Probably the case that defined, and tainted, the Ilaga was the case of Father Tullio Favali and Ilaga "officer" Norberto Manero Jr. In Tulunan, North Cotabato Province. Fr. Favali was an Italian priest and communist sympathiser who was killed and partially eaten in broad daylight un the spring of 1985. After its hey day in the mid 1980s the Ilaga faded into obscurity...until its re-emergence in response to the MILF/BIAF "MoA War" in 2008 and 2009.
The Ilaga are merely 1 group however, with literally every province on the island having several pro-Government paramilitaries. Whether as part of the CAA Program (CAFGU,CVO and SCAA) or as part of the Force Multiplication facet of the current and preceding ISPs, particularly the ISP-IPs (Internal Security Plan-Indigineous Peoples). Code named "Oplan Alsa Lumad" (Operational Plan Lumad Arise) it has created extremely well armed pro-Government paramilitaries like BULIF/bLA (Bungkatol Liberation Force/Army) amongst the Higaon-on Lumad in Agusan del Sur, Agusan del Norte and Bukidnon Provinces, BLPs (Bagani Longrang Platoons) amongst Manobos in the Davao Region and so on.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/...s9H_story.html
Apparently the woman is Filipina, from Basilan, and owned the resort, presumably through relatives.Quote:
MANILA, Philippines — More than a dozen armed men abducted three people before dawn Tuesday, including a 50-year-old naturalized American woman and her 14-year-old son, from a southern Philippine island near a stronghold of al-Qaeda-linked militants, officials said.
Suspicion fell on the notorious terrorist group Abu Sayyaf, which has been blamed for ransom kidnappings, beheadings and bombings in the last two decades, or a Muslim rebel commander whose group has been linked to previous abductions.
The Abu Sayyaf will certainly be blamed, and ASG or one of its splinters may actually be responsible. There are other possible culprits as well, both organized groups and simple armed gangs that snatch people and "sell" them on to larger groups who are more capable of negotiating ransom, for a share of the profits. Silly place to be for an American, really, even one with Basilan roots.
Too early to tell yet how it will play out, and what role US capabilities in the area will have in the response.
The answer is both yes AND no. When the AFP issued its SOMO in July of 2009, and the MILF/BIAF reciprocated a couple of days later, they did so without consulting Kato. For 3 months prior to the SOMO Kato had been effectively sidelined from the chain of command. A sub-Kumander by the name of Zacarias Goma had been made de facto Kumander of the 105 Base Command (Kato-s unit). Goma was issuing orders to Kato's #2, sub-Kumander Alo Binago on behalf of the BIAF General Staff (BIAF being Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces, the armed wing of the MILF). So then the SOMO, and Kato feels he was being excised from the unit he himself created (the 105 existed before Kato transferred from the 109 but was ineffective).
At that point Kato admits he began sending out feelers to allies within the BIAF about possibly branching out on his own. Then, when the Peace Process resumed, the BIAF General Staff had been in regular communication with Kumander Bravo, CO of the 102 Base Command, and had even promoted Kumander Mars (Pangalian) of the 103 Base Command, the other 2 being the Base Commands who with Kato, formed the so called "Lawless" faction of the MILF/BIAF. They ignored Kato, they didn't try to resolve the warrants issued against him for the 2008 War, they continued to refer to him as "Lawless" so that in effect they condoned the AFP/PNP campaign being waged against his Base Command without considering it a violation of the SOMO, or previous Ceasefire mechanisms.
Kato says that this caused him, in the early months of 2010 to resign his commission as Kumander of the 105 while simultaneously having both underlings AND the MILF political machine within his AOR submit petitions to both the BIAF General Staff and MILF Central Committee NOT to accept Kato's tendered resignation. Instead, the BIAF stayed silent and the MILF CenCom accepted the resignation and offered him a position as a teacher's aide, knowing he would reject it (he is a distinguished theologian in addition to his military experience which only began in middle age).
In December of 2010 he firmly separated from the MILF/BIAF and publicly outted his new organisation BIFF. However, this outting caused unexpected problems for the MILF in that it offered the Government a way in which to hedge in the Peace Process, to avoid substantiative progress while placing the onus on the MILF. Since then both Kato and the MILF Central Committee have played both sides of the fence, refusing to burn that final brisge. It is all rhetoric.
Even when Kumander Bravo deployed 4 senior officers to try and cajole Kato into renouncing this new group Kato has remained steadfast. Moreover, the MILF CenCom has co-operated with the AFP in framing BIFF (Kato's group) for every hiccup in Central Mindanao. CenCom did avert a meltdown when it created the new Base Command, the 118, to sap the 105 and 106 of disaffected personnel so as to circumvent a jumping of ship to BIFF but that is neither here nor there.
She is a Sama from Sacol Island, Gerpa Usman, who was adopted by American missionaries at age 9 and brought to the US. There they changed her first name to render it phonetically correct, Gerfa, and with her new last name, Gerfa Yeatts. In America she met a half Japanese half Norwegian man, Hiko Lunsmann, whom she worked with at the healthcare corporation Health Central in Lynchburg, Virginia. Togetjer they bough a tract home in Campbell County, continued working together and had a son, Kevin Eric Lunsmann, now 14.
After having a baby she felt as if a part of her was missing, never having kept in touch with her family in Mindanao. It was shortly after the birth of her son that she took the first of what would become six trips to re-connect with her family. Finding her Sama family living a common life, but by her American-bred standards unbelievably poor, sh did the wrong thing, she began throwing money at them. In fact, the island where the kidnapping took place? 8 km off of Zamboanga City proper? She had had three inter-connecting compounds built. One was simply for her to use on visits every two or three years. The other was for her mother and siblings. Still, like many Filipino-Muslims she had a fair number of half siblings and this is where the problem lies.
One sister, Alma Jakaria of Malmawi Island off of Isabela City on Basilan had asked her for cash after Gerfa's arrival at the end of June. Gerfa only gave a relatively small amount. One day before the kidnapping Ms.Jakaria arrived with a 19 year old sold. Though it isn't being released at this point the young man is ASG, and led his pals to the island in question. After the kidnapping the Lunsmanns were sighted entering Tuburan (Basilan, not Cen.Min.) from al Barka. They are currently with the same ASG sub-faction that took them but if there is no hand over in the next few days they will be sold to Jamiri who has taken a loss on his last 4 KFRs.
Anyway, another day in paradise. My issue though is the last American KFR in Misamis Oriental 2 months ag being overlooked but more so, we have Pinoy (and others, currently 1 Japanese, 1 Malaysian, 1 Indian from UAE) being grabbed every other day. This woman gets got and the PNP Dirrector General hops on a plane within two hours. Maybe if they took all KFRs this seriously we would have far fewer...well maybe.
I doubt they would have needed to be led to the island; the location would have been common knowledge... but the inside guy is quite likely. As for the rest of it; yes, that's the way it typically works, on both sides. Americans often believe that the rash of people ratting out ASG members was a consequence of development projects winning over the people, more often than not it came down to internal fights over distribution of ransom. People who get less than they think themselves entitled to have a way of taking action...
Maybe to keep the local subordinates from trying to get in on ransom payments? Not that they're likely to get much of that from Americans. We shall see. In any event, business as usual, emphasis on business. Interesting to see what, if anything, the US does...
That depends on who you listen to. As discussed elsewhere, both sides in that conflict have adopted self-serving historical narratives casting themselves as victims and their opponents as aggressors. Neither narrative is particularly credible. There were acts of outright aggression and atrocity on both sides, and the militias on both sides preferred to target the other side's unarmed civilian base.
That would be Feliciano Luces, no?
Again, I've heard that version of the story... spent a lot of time with Mindanao Ilonggos in the late 70s and early 80s and emerged well steeped in their mythology. I then spent some time in Cotabato listening to their mythology. The two are very different, and obviously incompatible, yet both sides accept them as absolute truth.
The refrain about settlement on "unused land" only goes so far. Anywhere that you still have indigenous control in the Philippines, tribal units have extensive tracts of "unused land" within their ancestral domain claims... these may be disputed by different tribal groups, but none of the disputing parties would generally be amenable to outside settlement. In my area forest, hunting grounds, watersheds, and simple buffer zones between groups are all considered an integral part of the tribe's territory, even though those areas might seem "unused" to an outsider. Certainly if someone tried to settle there and claim the land (none of which has government-recognized titles) an immediate and probably violent reaction would ensue. Looking back at the history the surprise is really that settlement went on so long before it produced a violent backlash.
I never heard anyone claim that "Ilaga" was actually intended to stand for "Ilonggo Landgrabbers Association", and I've listened to some extreme propagandists on both sides. It was an assigned meaning, bit of black humor. Lang grabbing did go on, and lots of it, often with the cooperation and in some cases participation of the military.
You could go on forever trying to decipher who started the actual violence, and never come up with a really satisfactory answer. Certainly you'd have no chance of coming up with an answer accepted by both sides. Ultimately, though, the cause of the conflict was clearly the sponsored large-scale migration into Cotabato and Lanao. That had been going on a long time, but it accelerated dramatically in the 50s and 60s, to the point that areas where settlers achieved a numerical majority and political control in areas where indigenous groups once had both. There's no way a government can impose that sort of demographic change without producing violence.
It's useful to see the Moro propaganda for what it is, but the propaganda from the other side is no less distorted. It's a bit like listening to Israeli and Palestinian narratives: it's useful (if depressing) to know what both sides think, but one wouldn't want to confuse either version with truth.
This one sounds pretty grim:
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/...88cbedf91d4b5c
The Government is trying to spin it as a "strategic victory", but 7 dead and 21 wounded out of a unit of 30 sounds like the kind of "victory" you wouldn't want much of.Quote:
7 Filipino troops die, 21 wounded in rebel clash
By JIM GOMEZ, Associated Press – 1 day ago
MANILA, Philippines (AP) — Abu Sayyaf militants killed seven Philippine marines and wounded 21 others who were about to raid their jungle camp Thursday in some of the fiercest fighting this year between the military and the al-Qaida-linked rebels.
About 30 marines maneuvered in stormy weather close to the encampment of more than 50 militants in mountainous Patikul township in southern Sulu province, setting off the gunbattle before dawn, regional military spokesman Lt. Col. Randolph Cabangbang said.
It was not immediately clear if there were casualties among the militants, who were led by Radulan Sahiron, a one-armed commander long wanted by U.S. and Philippine authorities for a string of bombings and kidnappings, Cabangbang said.
Subsequent coverage; apparently beheading and mutilaation are still very much part of the ASG repertoire:
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/33101/5...yaf-aquino-mad
And another angle:
Reports are not entirely clear and some are inconsistent. Later reports refer to 7 dead and 26 wounded, though the Marine unit apparently numbered only 30. Possibly other Marine units arrived on the scene. Also very possible that some or all of the reports are not accurate... that's quite common with incidents in that area.Quote:
Villagers 'set up' soldiers vs Abu Sayyaf?
MANILA, Philippines – Members of the Marine Battalion Landing Team-11 were not expecting to face 70 heavily armed terrorists when they headed to the base of Abu Sayyaf commanders Radulan Sahiron and Isnilon Hapilon in Barangay Panglahayan, Patikul, Sulu on July 28, authorities said.
One military official, who declined to be named, said the soldiers were "set up."
He added that several residents came to the aid of the Abu Sayyaf.
Not at all clear what actually happened, but it doesn't sound like anything good.
The Philippine press isn't always accurate, but I suspect there is some truth to this, and if it happened as described then the locals in the area were very likely pro Abu Sayyaf and anti-government/military. This once again calls into question the efficacy of our approach to countering insurgencies through development efforts, since we have spent tens of thousands of dollars in that area on civil affairs activities, etc., and of course conducted MISO for years, and yet the ASG still maintains considerable support from the populace. This ties into another discussion we had on the blog about the importance of honesty when addressing problems, and not creating false perceptions of success by cherry picking happy stories to present to the public. There are deep structural problems within the Phlippine Goverment and its military, and U.S. assistance is only effective at the superficial level (tactically, and then only when the military is willing to listen and apply the lessons). Building a school, building a road, building a clinic are all humanitarian acts that have obvious humanitarian value, but they do not represent real change in the relationship between the populace and the government. The Filipinos need to honestly seek out why the populace supports the ASG and develop a more effective approach than the standard fare of random COIN tactics that have been applied again and again year after year with the same effect.
Meant to include a link for the last story referenced:
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/re...-vs-abu-sayyaf
US development projects have generated some real goodwill... toward the US. This has not really extended to the Philippine Government, and there's no reason why it should. The local folks know where the largesse is coming from, and it only serves to underscore the decades of neglect they've had from Manila. They can also see for themselves that the local plutocrats are still very much in charge.
I don't really see the MISO side as having any meaningful impact on local sentiments. People generally know who their enemies are, even if they're told differently. People also have long memories, and there's a long history of human rights abuse in that area. It's going to take a fair bit more than what's been done to convince the Muslim villagers of inner Basilan that the Philippine military and government are no longer their enemies, and it's not something the US can do, even with all the miso in Japan, or wherever it comes from.
I recall a comment here (or in an article referenced here) from a US military officer, to the effect that we need information ops so the people will know how cruel the Abu Sayyaf are. That's just appallingly naive: they already know exactly how cruel the Abu Sayyaf are. The average Basilan villager knows more about the Abu Sayyaf than the CIA. They also know what we apparently do not: the Philippine military also has a long record of cruelty, and that cruelty has been directed at them.
I certainly don't know what specific grievances the villagers in this case had that led them to act as they are said to have acted, but I'd be willing to bet that it's local, likely personal, and has nothing to do with support a global jihad agenda or the very nominal Islamist agenda of the ASG.
First they'd have to ask whether the people support the ASG or whether they simply oppose the government, and support anyone who fights against it.
Ultimately they will come up against the need for fundamental changes in governance, and against the desperate need to bring the government's own functionaries in the military, police, and local government within the rule of law. In Basilan and Central Mindanao they will also come up against the need to mediate long-festering fights between entrenched settler populations and indigenous populaces, which is going to be very close to impossible. Typically these issues are not addressed, because nobody in power wants to touch them. Again, there is very little the US can do to address this. It's not our fight.
You're correct in my opinion, we have little leverage to push the Gov of the Philippines to change at the local and national level, and the locals in the Muslim south very well know that the acts of kindness they benefit from are "mostly" driven by the U.S., and if we weren't there it is unlikely that the military would reach out to the locals.Quote:
Typically these issues are not addressed, because nobody in power wants to touch them. Again, there is very little the US can do to address this. It's not our fight.
This isn't our fight, and much like other efforts we get involved in we find it difficult to extract ourselves from these activities. Our military involvement in the Philippines is small relative to Iraq and Afghanistan, and perhaps affordable, so the real question then is should it be sustained?
With the current President of the Philippines I think it is worth having a little more patience to see if he can push his promised reforms through, but to date he has not yet demonstrated that he has the leadership ability of Magsaysay, and doesn't yet appear capable of pushing his reform agenda through to completion. However, he does seem to have a good vision, one that we should support in my view. Of course it is the Philippines, and it may turn out he is as corrupt as everyone else.
My own opinion is that we've achieved all we're likely to achieve, and that hanging around is not likely to accomplish more. The issue now is not achieving military dominance, which the government has and has achieved before, but to follow that up with meaningful effort to change the style of governance. This, honestly, is not likely to happen: the political will is simply not there, and the US can't make it be there. No point in staying there and being seen as an accessory to the return of business as usual.
I wouldn't expect too much of the current President, especially where Mindanao is concerned (or for that matter anywhere). I don't think he's personally corrupt, but he also hasn't the commitment or force of character to drive real change (which requires more than just challenging corruption).
Historical side note: while Magsaysay effectively marketed the idea of reform, he also failed to push the agenda to completion, and actually produced very little change at ground level... one reason why the Huk rebellion subsequently re-emerged as the NPA.
The Philippine government has on several occasions achieved transient "victory" in its various COIN campaigns, but has never cemented that "victory" by following it up with real reform. The reason, in a nutshell, is that the local/regional elites refuse to surrender their traditional prerogatives, which are fundamentally incompatible with real progress.
Dayuhan: I) The Black Shirts were the first organised paramilitary, having been officaly formed in 1969. The Ilaga on the other hand, despite the Muslim propaganda that imagines them to have been created by a group of Ilonggo mayors, only coalesced under the PC in late 1970 so there isn't a question there. Prior to that sanctioning by the PC there were sporadic acts of violence but they were devoid of political ideology and context. You are correct that both sides targetted non-combatants but only on side did so without provocation, the Black Shirts. Each Ilaga atrocity was a reaction to a specific atrocity commited by the Black Shirts, and later the Barakuda, and then the MNLF. This simple gameplan was imposed upon them by their PC handlers. They weren't handed rifles and unleashed (well, not in the MNLF Era anyway).
II) Yes, Feliciano Luces, the infamous Kumander Toothpick. He is still alive and farming ube in Maguindanao. Not suprisingly he is left alone.
III) On land ownership and "settlement." The main problem is that the issue really only boils down to competing claims within the MILF AOR in Central Mindanao, yet the MNLF and MILF have portrayed it as island wide. Muslims, despite their claims, never controlled more than a very small amount of land on Mainland Mindanao. In modern terms the land in question comprises parts of N.Cotabato, Maguindanao, slivers of Bukidnon, S.Cotabato, Sarangani, and virtually all of Lanao del Sur Provinces. Within those areas the land was controlled by Sultans, Rajahs and their lesser Datus. There was no private ownership.
At the dawn of the American Colonial Era all groups were offered the chance to formally register their ancestral lands. Much has been made about the lower maximum amounts permitted for Muslims but the rationale was that if given free rein, the Tribal Aristocracy would compel its subjects to register land that would then be under the de facto control of the aristocracy. The Americans of course envisioned a Western style system of private land ownership that would enable the peasantry, as well as the aristocracy, to own land. Of course in reality the Americans allowed gross abuse of their own system by American owned corporations and investors but that is neither here nor there. The point being that the system now in place, first implemented by the Americans, sought to empower all groups.
Unregistered lands became Public Lands, which were then used in re-settlement scemes beginning with the Colorums but reaching full stride under Magsaysay in his anti-Huk COIN programme. I cannot speak on the Cordillera, at least authoritatively, but on Mindanao it is a bit more complicated. The Islamicised Tribes existed under a very different system of governance. The Lumad, the Animists, were non-sedentary so that becomes an easier subject to approach and if the Government ever reconciles its schizoid Mineral Rights policies I do believe it will go a long way towards solving that end of the equation. In the Islamicised areas however, the aristocracy owned everything ("owned" as in "controlled"). This is never going to reconcile with a Western based system of land ownership.
I believe that if the Government were ever willng and able to offer reparations in the form of socio-economic entitlements, it would neutralise most of the Muslim arguments over land. You never see conflict breaking out over fallow land. It is only cultivated, productive land, and to a lesser degree land under speculation for development. This is because unlike the Lumad, whose worldview and religion are intrinsically tied to specific geographic locales, the Islamicised Tribes view land as an indicator of wealth, or more specifically, productive land. IF a socio-economic package were offered in lieu of specific, tenable claims on land parcels it would stop a whole lot of the bloodshed.
"Ilonggo Land Grabbing Association." That is an incredibly widespread belief and repeated by Islamic groups as a mantra, especially the MILF/BIAF. I have been hearing that for as long as I can remember.
"The influx of non-Muslims into Central Mindanao during the Magsaysay Era caused the violence.": Surely you know that that region has never been devoid of incessant warfare. Datu Ali? Or in Lanao, the SE corner of the Lake? They have been attacking and slaughtering non Muslims for as long as written history has existed on the island. General Rufino (an Insurrecto operating out of Oroquieta in what is now Misamis Occidental) was dealing with the very same dynamic in 1902. If you couch it as "the influx aggravated the conflict" I would be in agreement but it didn't cause it. What caused it was the inability of Muslims to co-exist with non-Muslims, as Politically Incorrect as that may be.
Dapitan, Karaga, Surigao, and Misamis were all Christianised when Central Mindanao was Islamicised. Muslims do not pre-date any other group and never formed a cohesive society, nor exerted unified control. Challenging the right of a sovereign government to utilise Public Lands at the expense of a tyrannical ogliarchy like the disparate Islamicised aristocracies is non-sensical. There is a lot to be said about how the government handled, or mis-handled the issue(s) but when all is said and done the Muslims are fighting over formerly unused land that just happened to sit within one or another petty ruler's line of sight. In more than a few cases, such as with Luces, Christians and Lumads purchased tracts from Muslims (in Luces case his father bought their rocky hillside from Andal Ampatuan Sr's father) only to have the Muslims re-claim it by force once it was cleared and productive.
When the Muslims refer to all Christians as "settlers," there can never be peace. I have never met a single Christian on Mindanao who denied that Muslims have a right to live in Central Mindanao. Conversely, I have never met a single Muslim on Mindanao who would concede that all Christians are NOT "settlers." Using that as a barometer I think it is possible to assign a greater responsibility to Filipino-Muslims. Co-existence is inevitable, Christian Mindanowans are not going to flee en masse. If the Filipino-Muslims refuse to co-exist then yes, I place the onus on them.
The ransom is a no-brainer. Her husband has a Consultant negotiating so now its a question of price. On being led, the island is one of literally 120 off of Zam City, even city officials use guides. Sama live in mangroves, on boats (not just Badjao), etc.
When the AFP labels something a "camp" people tend to imagine a conventional setting. It is simply a village where most men of fighting age are fighters. Those that aren't are still effected by clan ties. The involvement of villagers is par for the corse on Jolo. The Xmas Eve IED in Camp Asturias? Though the church was inside a PNP compound the camp was protected only by chainlink and razor. All along the fence are squatter homes. ASG guerillas, assisted by friendly residents, infiltrated the compound via the roof of a squatter home. On and on and on.
Also, more would have been decapitated in this last incident but all they had was a rusted bolo (machete).
sadly I think that sums it up....Quote:
On and on and on.
Responding here to some things that are here and some that were posted elsewhere… again to keep the NPA/Eastern Mindanao stuff on one thread and the MILF/Central Mindanao stuff on another.
Who’s “we”? Cebuanos tend to use “Bisaya” and “Cebuano” interchangeably, but “Bisaya” or “Visayan” reasonably refers to native speakers of the primary Visayan languages (Waray, Cebuano, Ilonggo, Kinaray-a) and sub-dialects. Boholanon, Surigaonon, Butuanon are not discrete languages, but mutually intelligible variants of Cebuano. “Boholanon” is Cebuano with an accent; if it’s a language, so is Australian.Quote:
When we speak of Bisaya (Visayans) nowadays we tend to be talking about Cebuanos but from Oroquita City all the wat aropund the island, moving east, until the border of Davao Oriental and Davao del Sur was populated by Bisaya.
Not that any of that is really germane to the issue.
As I’ve said a number of times, the Mindanao Muslim historical narrative is undoubtedly distorted and twisted to support Muslim political aims. The Visayan narrative is no better. If you’re hearing the story from Mindanao Visayans, you’re hearing a version of the story that’s every bit as distorted and inaccurate as what you’d hear from the Muslims.
It’s true that there have always been Visayans in Mindanao, mainly along the northern coast with some minimal penetration up river valleys. What’s disputable is the assumption that because there have always been Visayans in Mindanao, Visayans from other islands therefore have the right to settle anywhere on Mindanao that they please.
It’s certainly not true that all Visayans on Mindanao are settlers. It is, however, very true that virtually all Visayans in the parts of Mindanao now afflicted by insurgency – whether the MILF insurgency or the NPA/Lumad insurgency – are settlers. You cannot reasonably ignore the impact of settlement from the causation of these conflicts, especially given the scale of settlement and the demographic shift, in which indigenous groups have moved from majority to minority in so many areas, and the extreme pro-settler bias shown by government agencies, the “justice” system, and the security apparatus.
Yes, there has always been conflict: I should have referred to THIS conflict; thought that was assumed.
At least they were allowed to remain. The settlers, especially the logging, mining, plantation and ranching interests, don’t want tribute, they want the land… and they take it. What’s the threat to these groups now? Are the settlers treating them any better than the Muslims did?Quote:
The Lambangians, Tedura, B'laan, and T'boli Tribes all lived as sub-humans and in exchange for giving the majority of their crops were allowed to remain on ancestral lands. The problem isn't Christians.
Certainly the Maguindanao and Maranao political culture is feudal and abusive, but the political elite in the Visayas, and among the Mindanao settler community, aren’t exactly shining examples of egalitarianism and social justice themselves. How well have the indigenous communities in Panay or Negros – what’s left of them at least – been treated? What’s happened to indigenous groups in settler-dominated areas? That shoe fits more than one foot. There’s little doubt that Mindanao’s Muslims have suffered as much from the execrable quality of their own leadership as from anything else, but the settler political leadership hasn’t been a great deal better.
That I fear is a complete load of bollocks. Settlers were as often as not aggressors, and initiated as many atrocities as they responded to. Of course you won’t hear it that way from them… you’ve obviously heard their side, have you spent equal time with Muslims - especially the ordinary farmers who took the brunt of it - and heard their stories? If you’ve read the academic literature on the conflict, you surely realize that nobody who has systematically studied the events of that period shares that conclusion… do you really believe that they’ve all been duped by Muslim propaganda, and only the Mindanao Visayans are telling the truth? Surely you know what happened in Manili in June ’71… was that a “reaction to a specific atrocity”? I’m sorry, but it’s a complete crock of one-sided self-serving nonsense.Quote:
You are correct that both sides targetted non-combatants but only on side did so without provocation, the Black Shirts. Each Ilaga atrocity was a reaction to a specific atrocity commited by the Black Shirts, and later the Barakuda, and then the MNLF.
In the early 80s I spoke to many militia members who were perfectly open about having attacked Muslim villages, not in response to any particular incident, just because Muslims needed to be killed. They thought it perfectly reasonable and defensible to kill Muslim civilians, including women and children… after all, the boys would grow up to kill Christians and the girls would have sons who would grow up to kill Christians. Easier to kill them when they’re small. These things were spoken as self-evident truth, often accompanied by display of assorted trophies. I was also told, among other things, that if I was ever speaking to a Muslim I should be certain never to turn my back, because if I did the Muslim would be possessed by an irresistible urge to stab me.
Of course I’ve heard the story of Luces and the Ampatuans. I’ve also heard a few other versions of the same story. The Ampatuans were notoriously the worst of the datu families when it came to treatment of settlers and the Muslim peasantry alike, and there were confirmed incidents of the Ampatuans allowing land to be settled and then taking it back. Whether those incidents involved Luces remains debatable: the confirmed incidents happened in Ampatuan town, not Upi, and Upi was Sinsuat territory, not Ampatuan. Again, if you’re hearing the stories from Mindanao Visayans, you have to consider the possibility that what you’re hearing is distorted, and if you’ve not bothered to seek out the other side of the story at source, you’re not seeing the whole picture.
I notice that your account completely omits the role of the settler political elite… are we supposed to pretend that they didn’t exist, that all the settlers were poor earnest hard working victims?
Poor Muslims were pushed off cultivated land, in substantial numbers. Most of them ended up migrating to Cotabato City shantytowns, where populations soared in the 60s and beyond.
Settler communities were exorbitantly favored by national government agencies: investment in roads, irrigation, schools, health care, etc was almost exclusively devoted to settler communities. Of course the settlers claimed that the stupid Muslims didn’t care and wouldn’t accept help, but that claim doesn’t stand up to even the most casual research or the most transitory look at period sources. It’s BS, to put a simple word on it.
When the violence began, the government took the side of the settlers, exclusively. Muslims who fought settlers were outlaws, pursued by the PC and the army; settlers who killed Muslims were considered assets and given arms and support. No attempt has ever been made to bring settlers who committed atrocities against Muslim civilians to justice… unless of course they subsequently committed atrocities against Christians. A number of Muslims pointed out to me that the Manero brothers killed Muslim civilians openly and with impunity for years and were considered valuable assets of the state. Killing one Catholic priest made them public enemies.
The extraordinary level of anti-Muslim prejudice, discrimination and outlandish caricature that prevails among the Christian populace, dating back to Spanish times (the Spanish of course had their own issues with Islam) is well documented and real. It exists to this day.
Again, look at the scale of migration, the demographic shift, the enormous bias of government toward the settler communities. Hard to expect anyone to simply “co-exist” on those terms.Quote:
What caused it was the inability of Muslims to co-exist with non-Muslims, as Politically Incorrect as that may be.
There’s a similarity, at times uncanny, to Palestine. Whoever you think is “right” or “wrong”, at the end of the day the fact remains that if you introduce a new population into an inhabited area against the will of the current inhabitants, and the new population becomes dominant and begins taking over political control, violence will ensue… and each side will develop an exclusive historical narrative that serves their interests. This may be right or wrong, good or bad; not my place to say. It’s inevitable.
The only thing that stopped the migration was the outbreak of violence. If the war hadn’t started, do you think the settlers would ever have stopped coming? Or would the settlement have continued, until the Muslims were relegated to the same role the Lumad now play in the east? What has happened to every Philippine indigenous community that decided to “co-exist” with settler intrusion?
In the areas affected by the Central Mindanao insurgency now prevails, virtually all Christians are in fact settlers. I’ve met quite a few Christians who told me that only a Muslim-free Mindanao will ever have peace. It’s been a bit of a mantra among the militias, and among the settler political elites when they think no outsiders are listening.Quote:
When the Muslims refer to all Christians as "settlers," there can never be peace. I have never met a single Christian on Mindanao who denied that Muslims have a right to live in Central Mindanao.
Not possible to boil this one down to right and wrong, good guys and bad… unless you want to take sides of course. We’re all free to do that, but representing either of the constructed narratives in this conflict (as with most similar conflicts) as truth is a bit of a farce.
How do you say "plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose" in Ancient Greek?
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/re...villages-unchrQuote:
MANILA, Philippines - Women ended armed clashes in 2 Mindanao villages by not having sex with their husbands unless the men laid down their weapons, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
The success of the "sex strike" allowed families to start rebuilding their communities, the UN's refugee agency said.
Well, in modern Greek; "το πιο πράγματα αλλάζουν. τα περισσότερα πράγματα μένουν τα ίδια".
This is as good a description as any of the latest round in the sporadically recurring effort toward a negotiated peace in Mindanao
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/F...20Mindanao.pdf
I'm not at all optimistic. Possibly a few lessons have been learned from the complete fiasco that resulted the last time out - the doomed-from-the-start MOA/AD that I once nominated for a "Peace Process Least Likely to Produce Peace" award, but still few grounds for optimism.
All discussion of Mindanao peace negotiations, past or current, is welcome!