It may be necessary in your view
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Originally Posted by
Misifus
Yes, necessarily. And if they don't have the personnel, then they, the Army, should have planned better for the position.
I doubt it is achievable in the Army's view for the reasons I stated and you probably knew. Wishing and ideals won't change that. You view it as necessary, the institution that is the Army almost certainly disagrees. Thus instead of getting GOs with WW II experience in the Pacific to fight in Viet Nam, we got a slew of them with north western European experience...
Yeah, that makes your case -- it also makes the Army's case. Those guys may not have done great but they did perform generally adequately. As another Tab Ranger unhappily recently told me, Mediocrity has a quality all it own...:rolleyes:
I go a step further than you -- since the Army knew it would not have such people, it should not have established the Command in the first place. As I said, I disagree with the existence of CoComs. We haven't gotten much right in the world since they were invented -- or, more correctly, over-empowered. That means I disagree with you and the Army. :wry:
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Referring to your use of 48's. My opinion is one can't gain 'experience' by transference of the 'experiences' of another. One can gain 'knowledge' like that, but not 'experience.' ...
Obviously, agreed. Kniowledge cannot substitute for experience but some knowledge is better than none.
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...For regional commands, I would opine that these commanders need firsthand experience in that region prior to their Caesar-like ascendency.
One approach -- also one that has major difficulties in implementation. The size of the force and the vagaries of mission locations -- and shifting focus -- will not allow such a tailored approach. It could be done -- anything can be if one wants it badly enough -- but I suspect it would be a hard sell to Congress, much less to the Army heirarchy. Recall also that developing GOs is a 30 year or so process and while that could be shortened -- might benefit from being shortened -- it still will entail more than 15 years or so; a lot can happen in that time. You're also confronted with the changeover in US national focus every 2,4,6 and 8 years due to the electoral cycle; continuity r not us...:wry:
Consider also that you'll be faced with the fact that you have a crowd of area experienced Commander types -- that the vagaries of international politics (as you know, all those other folks out there get a vote on what happens tomorrow...) may cause to be not needed in 'their' area but badly needed in another sector of the globe. I suspect we'll have to get by with are knowledge and not area experience -- it'd be really cool if they'd just use that knowledge... :cool:
"Prestige" -- dealing with peers...
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Originally Posted by
KingJaja
Secondly, (I am no expert), why does the AFRICOM commander need to be a four star? It is not as if he has too many assets under his command.
The Geographic Combatant Commanders do a lot of face to face 'diplomacy' -- or the military to military equivalent -- with the commanders or Chiefs of Staff of Armies and Armed Forces in the nations in their area of responsibility. Military folks are notoriously rank sensitive... :wry:
That's why the French have no one star general and their equivalent to a US four star wears five French stars... :D
Dysfunctional systems do not stand up...
as the Actress said to the Bishop...:D
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Originally Posted by
Misifus
Well sure they disagree. However, when we get stymied by three nations in Southeast Asia whose leaders were rice farmers , and then today, by two nations in Southwest Asia whose leaders are goat herders...maybe the Army should rethink their position. These guys didn't have the benefit of West Point degrees and follow-on Ivy League degrees. Talent is so over-rated these days.
Ain't that the truth...
I think a big part of the problem in both regions was that the rice farmers and goat herders were deemed to be just that. Hudson High and post grad degrees could not / cannot conceive such persons to be a threat. And yes, trying to fight a land war in Europe in the rice paddies didn't help. Egos... :mad:
However do recall (as those aforementioned graduates did not) those Rice Farmers were well traveled internationally and had the benefit of some good foreign education and training plus a heavy supply of effective combat goodies -- and competent, experienced advisers -- from others.
Further consider that the current problem is not the goat herders -- it is our less than stellar state of training and general competence plus the penalty of being the Armed Force drawn from and representative of a very risk averse civilian society that has no clue about the application of force. Couple all that with a lack of will to be mean for fear of international and US public condemnation. IOW, it's not the goat herders; we have met the enemy and he is us in the current sessions. :rolleyes:
None of that is to excuse the US Army who did not and is not doing as well as could rightfully be expected for the support it is freely given. :mad:
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Three dominoes fell in Southeast Asia. That was "adequate?"
All things considered, yeah. Trust me, it could've been worse and it could not have ended much differently no matter what -- or who had been in Command. Wrong war at wrong time, etc. etc. The Brothers Kennedy wanted to boost the US economy and it spiraled rapidly out of hand.
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But if they are going to form it. Then they might as well develop the right "talent" to handle it...
I don't disagree but I think (a)Africom was not solely the Army's idea -- in fact. I heard they tried to squelch it; and (b) The Per system is too dysfunctional to handle that. That should not be the case but it is and part of the responsibility for that lies outside the Army and within the Congress.
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Yes, I believe we start things and don't finish them because we really don't want them badly enough.
Absolutely -- probably didn't really want it that badly in the first place but unfortunately the 'system' needs crises. Any crisis will do just so long as we have to one to which to move...
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You know, the world isn't really so big, and regional experience for at least one designated region, is not that hard to obtain.
That's essentially true but when you meld that regional experience requirement with other requirements believed to be important it isn't all that easy. Age old problems; priorities and time. My perception is the grand schema places regional expertise below tactical and technical competence which in turn is below pedigree and / or appearance or presentation. That's unfair to many but too applicable to some -- the system allows that, even encourages it. It should not.
Parallels between Victorian Britain and 21st Century US
In understanding the African aversion to AFRICOM it is important to consider the parallels between the last great imperial power in Africa, Britain and the United States.
1. Unchallenged Naval power: The greatest beneficiary of the Napoleonic Wars was Britain. It allowed Britain to dominate the World's seas during the Victorian era. Similarly, the greatest beneficiary of the Cold War is the US and the US Navy dominates the 21st Century the same way the Royal Navy dominated the 19th.
2. Privatisation of War: The major fallout of the Afghan and Iraqi campaigns is the reluctance of the US to commit ground troops to on foreign soil. As Robert Gates so delicately put it; "anyone who wants to send American troops to a large scale war in either Asia or Africa should have his head examined". This creates a wide space for non-state actors like the South African mercenary community and Blackwater. It is interesting to note that the primary agents of British imperialism were private companies (Royal Niger Company, East India Company) with their own private armies.
The process of arriving at this point may be different. For the Brits, private companies came before British army engagement and for the US, private armies are a result of US reluctance to conduct risky operations on African soil. The consequences are similar, both the British and US Government believed/are beginning to believe they have reduced the risks of military engagement in Africa.
3. Small Wars: The title of this discussion board says it all. The Victorians fought a series of small wars across Africa, ranging from battles against the Mahdi in Khartoum, to the Boer war, to campaigns against the Aro and the Bini in Nigeria. The US army /marines, like the British Army before it is gearing up to fight a series of small wars across Africa. The transition from "advisor" to "combatant" can be very short, and events have a way of creating their own dynamic.
4. The Wonder Weapon: For the Brits it was the Maxim gun. It was used to devastating effect in Matabeleland and in Khartoum.
In the words of Hilaire Beloc:
Whatever happens, we have got
The Maxim gun, and they have not.
(I learned that poem in high school).
For the Americans, it is your drones. (Sadly, Beloc is no longer with us, so we have to make do with tepid consultant-speak like Asymmetricization) :D
The effect is the same, the risks of going to war are reduced.
5. Great Power Rivalry: Up until the Berlin Conference, British faced off a number of imperial rivals: France (primarily), Portugal, Germany and Belgium. For the US today, its China.
6. The Allure of a Noble Cause: For the Brits it was spreading Christianity and civilisation. For America it is eliminating terrorism, spreading democracy and human rights and securing our national security interests.
7. You both speak English!!
I am by no means suggesting that Americans have the same imperial designs as Victorian Britain, but the parallels between Victorian Britain and 21st Century America send alarm bells ringing in our minds. We may be silly or paranoid or both, but you cannot erase 100 years of history.
We all know how the Victorian Brits ended up in Africa, it was a pretty bloody affair.
America's New Frontline - Diplomats or Warriors? - Part 1
Al Jazeera documentary on AFRICOM.
Moderator Adds
Link to this 2009 documentary:http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/...135544650.html
Padlocks have no purpose. The vast majority never do or accomplish much.
However, they do help keep people sort of honest so perhaps I should've said they have "next to no purpose..."
About like SSN Patrols. ;)
Patrice Lumumba: the most important assassination of the 20th century
This is the last time I'm going to post this sort of thing. To understand where the unease about American military / quasi military organisations comes from, read articles like this.
These articles are written by intelligent, well-educated people and they are discussed whenever educated, politically-aware Africans meet (like in Nigeria's many beer parlours). The other reviled and vilified US-dominated organisations are the World Bank and the IMF. (That's a topic for another forum and another day).
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The US-sponsored plot to kill Patrice Lumumba, the hero of Congolese independence, took place 50 years ago today
Patrice Lumumba, the first legally elected prime minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), was assassinated 50 years ago today, on 17 January, 1961. This heinous crime was a culmination of two inter-related assassination plots by American and Belgian governments, which used Congolese accomplices and a Belgian execution squad to carry out the deed.
Ludo De Witte, the Belgian author of the best book on this crime, qualifies it as "the most important assassination of the 20th century". The assassination's historical importance lies in a multitude of factors, the most pertinent being the global context in which it took place, its impact on Congolese politics since then and Lumumba's overall legacy as a nationalist leader.
For 126 years, the US and Belgium have played key roles in shaping Congo's destiny. In April 1884, seven months before the Berlin Congress, the US became the first country in the world to recognise the claims of King Leopold II of the Belgians to the territories of the Congo Basin.
When the atrocities related to brutal economic exploitation in Leopold's Congo Free State resulted in millions of fatalities, the US joined other world powers to force Belgium to take over the country as a regular colony. And it was during the colonial period that the US acquired a strategic stake in the enormous natural wealth of the Congo, following its use of the uranium from Congolese mines to manufacture the first atomic weapons, the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs.
With the outbreak of the cold war, it was inevitable that the US and its western allies would not be prepared to let Africans have effective control over strategic raw materials, lest these fall in the hands of their enemies in the Soviet camp. It is in this regard that Patrice Lumumba's determination to achieve genuine independence and to have full control over Congo's resources in order to utilise them to improve the living conditions of our people was perceived as a threat to western interests. To fight him, the US and Belgium used all the tools and resources at their disposal, including the United Nations secretariat, under Dag Hammarskjld and Ralph Bunche, to buy the support of Lumumba's Congolese rivals , and hired killers.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-dev...-assassination
It's also instructive to note that there are very few, if any emphatically pro-Western African public intellectuals. If you read Ali Mazrui, Julius Nyerere, Wole Soyinka, Chinua Achebe and George Ayittey, you'd understand that immediately. Chinua Achebe's seminal novel Things Fall Apart has an interesting theme. George Ayittey is of the opinion that the West cynically uses to prop up dictators and Nyerere's views are well known.
These men are widely read.
Now we have a better understanding of where the perception problem comes from.