This thread was called 'Interagency Assessment of the Afghan Police' and has steadily become the main thread on the ANA, so the title has been changed to reflect what it contains.
Undoubtedly some posts on the ANA are elsewhere.
Printable View
This thread was called 'Interagency Assessment of the Afghan Police' and has steadily become the main thread on the ANA, so the title has been changed to reflect what it contains.
Undoubtedly some posts on the ANA are elsewhere.
This morning's BBC Radio 'Today' programme had an interview with two-star General Nick Carter, the regional ISAF (South) commander, in Kandahar, and whilst a few papers have picked up a comment on it was safer to use the roads under the Taliban; see: http://www.defencemanagement.com/new...y.asp?id=11503.
I noticed this in response to the interviewer's comment on the appalling reputation of the ANP, when he challenges the General - will the people put their faith in the ANP?From: http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today...00/8392231.stm and there is a short recorded interview. His bio is: http://www.nato.int/isaf/structure/bio/rc_s/carter.htmlQuote:
The challenge we have is to create a local, Pashtun police force (my bold), that is as respected as the army (ANA). Ultimately it will be a local police force that makes the population feel secure...
Yes, that will be a challenge and where will the Afghans who want to serve in this way come from? Or do I see warlord militias in uniform soon?
Police reform by RUSI, a Whitehall think tank:http://www.rusi.org/news/ref:N4B0D427DD18DD/ which links to the actual report; which I did skim read a week ago and was un-impressed (oh yes, I'm a member of RUSI).
I missed this report, so thanks to NATO CIMIC's newsletter:He was later found and killed by the ANA / ANP.Quote:
UK press reports that on 29 November, an Afghan National Police (ANP) officer shot dead six fellow officers at a checkpoint in southwest Afghanistan. This is the second such event in the last two months.
on the Astan civil and criminal justice system, including the sorry state of the ANP, can be found at Afghanistan Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP).
CNN reporter Michael Ware, for the last couple of nights, has been talking about making local security arrangements with local Pashtun tribal leaders, warlords and governors (often the same person ?) in the south and east.
We'll see what the actions are.
Regards
Mike
A long article by Nir Rose, not a writer I am familiar with: http://www.bostonreview.net/BR35.1/rosen.php Somewhat dated as incidents were in July 2009, but ample illustrations of the issues we are aware of.
Here's one: LINK. A search will turn up a couple of others.
BR does a nice little roundup of opinion on Afghanistan based off Rosen's article from Andrew Exum, Syed Saleem Shahzad, Aziz Hakimi, Andrew Bacevich, and J. Alexander Thier here.
Hat tip to an article by Christina Lamb in 'The Spectator', in a scathing IMHO review of the UK presence in Afghanistan.
Link: http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/al...-targets.thtml
Amidst was this illustration of how the ANP behave:The citation comes from a report by a US think tank and a slightly fuller account:Quote:
A recent report from the (US) Institute of War details how British forces took the district of Nad Ali last year, losing a number of soldiers. They then handed control over to the Afghan police, who set about raping young boys. Eventually the people got so fed up that they asked the Taleban to come back to protect them.
Link:http://www.understandingwar.org/file...HelmandPDF.pdfQuote:
The Afghan Police did not maintain a significant presence in the area (Nad Ali). Those who were present prior to September 2008 were distrusted by the local population. According to villagers in the area, “the government’s police force was so brutal and corrupt that they welcomed the Taliban as liberators.” According to accounts from local villagers, the ANP’s exploits included beatings, robbery and rape. Locals stated that police would practice “bachabazi” (sex with pre-pubescent boys); “if the boys were out in the fields, the police would come by and rape them… you can go to any police base and you will see these boys. They hold them until they are finished with them and then let the child go.
I put this account recently to a UK Minister at a talk 'Why are we in Afghanistan' and it caused him to pause.
The think tank has several others reports on the war, a more recent one is on Kandahar and the ANSF. Note the founder is Kimberley Kagan, a name that has appeared on SWC before.
David. Thanks for this, but I would disregard the Lamb item.
Lamb is a journalist, and a nice lady by all accounts. She has lived there and has done time on the ground, but her "poisonous" account of the 16 Air Assault ambush makes it patently clear she has no understanding of what she is seeing, and she seems to only be interested in the human and emotional stories - with entertainment value.
What Lamb believes about military operations in A'Stan is interesting but irrelevant.
Sit in a UK mess with Officers who have been on the ground, and they simply do not reference any journalistic opinion, except to point out 99% is wrong.
I submit, we should all cease doing it as well. By various collect means, we do have access to the real facts, worthy of analysis.
Thanks - this I will read!Quote:
The citation comes from a report by a US think tank and a slightly fuller account:
Link:http://www.understandingwar.org/file...HelmandPDF.pdf
Found on a Afpak watcher's website: http://watandost.blogspot.com/2010/0...g-project.html that cites a NYT article on 2/2/10: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/03/wo...l?pagewanted=1.
Opens with:NYT article ends with:Quote:
ABUL, Afghanistan — The NATO general in charge of training the Afghan police has some tongue-in-cheek career advice for the country’s recruits. “It’s better to join the Taliban; they pay more money,” said Brig. Gen. Carmelo Burgio, from Italy’s paramilitary Carabinieri force.
No wonder there is caution about building up the ANP and the Afghan people themselves know far more what the ANP provides.Quote:
These guys wear the uniform of a policeman, but that is all that is police about them.
How long will it take for our government to revamp the laws the govern security force assistance? Our SECDEF has stated this will be our primary effort and the means to a sustainable victory, yet almost 9 years into the fight we're still having turf battles over who should control the training and serious resource constraints. Based on the enclosed article the coalition does a poor job of training these forces (several factors involved, but maybe if we would stop trying to make them look like western police forces and train to their level we would make some progress?), we do a poor job of equipping the forces, we don't pay them well, and if you believe the article the only metric we value is the number trained.
We should either drop the security forces assistance myth and do it ourselves, or we should fix the security forces assistance process. The Cold War legacy method is not adequate. I hear the call for Gramm-Rudman Act to fix the interagency (would be nice), but most pressing is a Gramm-Rudman Act to fix our ability to build partner capacity (the 5 meter fight we're in today). If the consensus is this is the way to win, then we need to resource the winning strategy with the right authorities, funding, and apply the right approach to ensure it is done effectively.
The Afghan National Police: Turning a Counterinsurgency Problem into a Solution – Naval Postgraduate School Master of Science thesis by Major David J. Haskell, U.S. Army.
Here is an article by Sean Naylor, also from this past summer.http://www.afji.com/2009/07/4231017/
90% of local complaints about police in my AO turned out to be false. Amazing how an Afghan will walk up and make a claim, and Westerners instantly assume its the god's honest truth.
A wide ranging article, citing a UK infantry colonel and headlined so:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...nsurgency.html
An accompanying article I missed (added 19/6):http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010...an-recruitmentQuote:
He said that the local force was "the reason for the insurgency" in the Nad-e-Ali district of Helmand and that the corruption meant the local population was more distrustful of coalition troops and less likely to be loyal to the Afghan government.
But more worryingly incidents of police "bad behaviour" were encouraging young men to join the Taliban, said Lt Col Walker, the commanding officer of the Grenadier Guards. "They were most often cited by people as the reason why there was a problem or a reason why people joined the Taliban."
As we all have seen, the Afghan National Police (ANP) has undergone several issues and is not as effective as ISAF wants it to be. Issues include corruption, unwilling to fight, lack of proper training, and many others.
With the Taliban insurgency still at large, ISAF has primarily been training the ANP in paramilitary skills. This has resulted with military advisers showing ANP units how to patrol, how to detect roadside bombs, how to maneuver in firefights, and so on. There is no doubt that these skills are needed; the Taliban are a very skilled enemy. By obtaining this kind of training, the ANP are more capable of fulfilling the "hold" section in ISAF's "clear, hold, and build." Essentially, they possess the capacity to conduct minimal military operations, which is useful.
However, paramilitary training leaves out basic law enforcement skills. These include handling evidence, conducting an investigation properly, enforcing the law properly, and building the right ties with the community. If these skills are obtained and used properly, then in the long term, the judicial situation in Afghanistan is likely to be better. But, ANP that are more focused towards enforcing the law are more prone to attacks from insurgents.
Clearly, there is no right answer. Heck, trying to straighten up such a large police force is already a large enough task. What approach should the ANP take? Or is there another one that I missed?
Huskerguy,
Just exactly what Law do they enforce? How is a population that is reported to be 80% illiterate become informed of the Law to be enforced? What do they use for a Criminal Code?
I am no expert in law, but I'm sure some form of "custom" law exists. Custom law never gets complex, but its "strong" enough to identify theft, trespassing, murder, etc; basically main "popular" crimes. I am sure that the Afghans understand some of this, so the police could possibly enforce some of these basic laws.
I also used to get hung up on the fact that many Afghans can't read; it makes the job difficult for us. However, I had a conversation with Dr. Kilcullen and my thinking change. Here's what he said:
The last sentence is the biggest part: Afghan's aren't stupid, they just can't read. Therefore, it isn't impossible to teach them, but we just need to approach it a different way.Quote:
We need to get more innovative and creative about the ways we train these guys...These guys aren’t stupid, they just can’t read
Amen.
For years now I have heard the constant rhetoric regarding how corrupt the ANP are, and how many problems are associated with their buildup. But the information available from several independent polls over the last five years strongly differs. Polls regarding Afghan perceptions of ANP trustworthiness, corruption, professionalism etc. certainly lag ANA results, but are still as high as 80%. (I'm sure some of our own police forces would be similarly viewed in specific cities.) However this urban legend of a totally corrupt and untrustworthy ANP paints a much more pessimistic picture and is almost self-reinforcing. Allied soldiers almost universally decry ANP professionalism, and claim ANP corruption as significant problems. These same officers also universally reject poll results because they don't agree with their perceptions. The old adage, expectation leads performance, applies to this situation and supports the lack of priority and effort towards the ANP.
A main source of this problem, from my perspective, is the over emphasis on our (western) buid up of the ANA to the detriment of what should be the primary security force for Afghans, the ANP. The ANA provide a false sense of mission progress because of the potential to have them support our exit strategy. We blindingly pursue a goal of building an Afghan Army which can stand in for our forces, conduct a relief-in-place, and facilitate a transition to the GIROA becoming responsible for its own security. But soldiers' contribution to the Afghan mission are limited to security operations and even then fairly narrowly.
I often ask people who they would rely on to address security issues in their own country, and the universal answer is - police forces. It is the police which are required to address the broader security to establish, promote and sustain: rule-of-law, governance, justice, the economy and development.
Carl Eikenberry, when serving as the Commander CFC-A in Kabul, was even quoted as saying something to the effect, 'ten effective Afghan police were better than 100 Afghan soldiers, however one corrupt policeman was worse than ten insurgents.' So why do we focus on the soldiers and the insurgents? Is it simply because - that's what armies do?
We need to stop complaining about the problems with the ANP and address the real priorites in their recruitment, development, mentorship and establishment; and not just as a secondary effort to building the ANA.
The whole debate regarding the requirement for some form of tribal militia(s) is a symptom of the lack of ANP. Let's not neglect the ANP and continue to reinforce this urban legend.
Seahorse -- I would go further and say that the ANP in most places should simply be dissolved. They are too few in number, too poorly equipped and supported, and too representative of an intrusive, victimizing government to be effective. One ANP station I visited claimed not to have received their pay for three months. How do you think they were making ends meet in the mean time?
And on this issue, another new report from the folks at CSIS:
Anthony H. Cordesman, Afghan National Security Forces: What It Will Take To Implement the ISAF Strategy, draft, 12 July 2010.
The report also covers the ANA.
Seahorse, I respect your opinion, but disagree. According to the reports I've seen and the polls that have been released, people are more confident with the ANA rather than the ANP. Also, I have had the chance to talk to some people very familiar with the conflict and they share the same opinion. Why? There are several factors, but there is one main point that I'm going to elaborate on. They (the ANA) focus on national interests rather than local (such as the ANP).
I know that is important to understand the local interests. However, when you have a soldier or police officer in an area that they are very familiar with, some problems can occur. They will be more prone to manipulation by the population in the district and will be more prone to corruption, especially in a country with an insecure environment like Afghanistan. So, when you bring in an outside force like the ANA, he's not going to know what's going on. However, he will know that he needs to accomplish _____ objective. Locals won't be able to threaten his home or his family because he's not from the area.
Do not get me wrong: it's important to have people familiar with the area to because of obvious reasons (intelligence, better understanding, etc). In fact, the ANP has been criticized for bringing in foreign Tajiks to Pashtun areas. It's just a matter of having a mix with local and outside forces; have enough to understand the situation.
Also, that quote from Eikenberry is incorrect. It is ""Ten good police are better than 100 corrupt police, and 10 corrupt police can do more damage to our success than one Taliban extremist." The main focus of his comments was on training strong leaders and how quality is better than quantity, which I agree with.
Recently, the ANP has encountered some success with "Combined Action" teams, so ISAF is currently pushing for that. However, I think the focus should be changed.
As mentioned in my earlier post, the ANP are being trained to act like a military force rather than law enforcement, which I don't agree with. I agree with you that it's important for police to establish a rule-of-law and justice system. Despite the lack of a strong justice system in Afghanistan, a very basic legal system does exist, and could possibly be enforced. The focus of the ANP should be shifted from combating the Taliban to enforcing the law. If this is done correctly, then the situation will hopefully improve.
Another thought: As I think about the ANP's difficult situation, they seem comparable to America's "Wild West" years. During this time in history, law enforcement in secluded small towns would be outnumbered by the gangs. As a result, they would either fight and die, do nothing, or join their efforts-just like the ANP today. How did these towns survive? I'm currently examining that and am curious if it could apply to Afghanistan.
Hopefully ISAF tackles the ANP issue in the future and corrects it.
You may be right. A Marshall Service may be more appropriate than a Police Service. We talked about such a thing a while back. Jedburgh our master Intel guy found a Rand Study that suggested the same thing. Use the search option and you may be able to find it. How they survived (The Marshalls) was by raising Posses...instant militias. A power they still hold to this day,so do some County Sheriff's in some states.
Dangerous analogies in some ways. You're right, Slap, with the suggestion about a marshal service (it also gave the Federal government a "hand in the game" in the territories, but was also subject to patronage appointments), but the law enforcement situation in the West was much more complex than "Marshal Dillon outnumbered by gangs." Often the local lawman found himself torn between political poles in a particular town or region (Tombstone - the region, not the move - is especially, and exaggeratedly, instructional here), and even the marshals found themselves undermanned and underpaid in most cases.
The typical Western small town wasn't quite as violent as the movies hint, and there was also the "Miners' Council" aspect to most of them. Most mining towns were established under somewhat collectivist principles, and part of that was the formation of the Council (usually any able-bodied male resident in the area). Such Councils served as 'police' and court, and could order banishment, forfeiture of a claim, and so on. Some of them took on very vigilante overtones (Virginia City, MT, is one example). There were pockets of wanton lawlessness to be sure, but it tended to come in cycles and was often controlled by local interests.
I just saw this and wanted to say thanks. However, I have a long ways to go and need to learn from others, which is why I participate at SWJ
I've searched, and I don't think I found the report (I messaged Jedburgh though). However, I found some interesting stuff along the way that discussed a similar idea. Having someone with "popular support" in the area they are patrolling may work better and might possibly prevent some corruption.
It's good to hear from someone who is knowledgable on the Wild West. Having officers work with the tribal "councils" may yield better results. But will this decentralize the government to much?
Huskerguy7, may want to check out Army FM 22-6 Guard Duty. Towards the back is small section on how critical Mobile Guard units are in what they called Counter Guerrilla Warfare in those days early 1970's.
Thanks for the idea; I found some interesting information on "Exterior Guards". I also examined FM 90-8 which discusses counter guerrila operations.
This really makes you wander how a police force could function in an insurgency environment against guerrillas. Reacting to an ambush, whether it's a lightly armed law enforcement agent or a heavily armed US Army Ranger, is very difficult. It's no surprise that you see ANP units taking casualties in many ambushes. It's a very difficult problem that needs to be solved.
I'm throwing it out there, but would having small "law enforcement" ANP patrols supplemented by a heavier paramilitary ANP quick reaction force work? Yes, ANP soldiers would still take losses, but they may possibly be able to enforce some law in the local area. It would be similar to a sheriff and his deputies with access to Federal Marshall assistance?
This quote is taken from the UK's ongoing Iraq Inquiry (Geoffrey Cooper UK Chief Police Advisor 18 Mar 08 – 7 Apr 09) Iraq Inquiry (IPS - Iraqi Police Service)
What I think this quote highlights is that the role of the police in stabilised environments is very very different from those in COIN environments.Quote:
However coalition military commanders perhaps naturally considered the primary role of the IPS to be security provision, and as a result envisaged (and trained) the IPS largely as a paramilitary force. The primary role of policing in a stabilised environments is not security but provision of criminal justice.
So what do we want the ANP to do? Provide security (primarily) with a little bit of law enforcement, or vice versa? I think at the moment we need security in order to enable (down the line) effective law enforcement. This means the ANP should be trained and equipped for security duties, but with the ability to transition (in due course) to law enforcement duties.
What does this mean? Well we can train them now very much like the ANA, but have a considerably tighter vetting process, regular drugs testing and an internal programme of education (literacy and numeracy) so that they can transition over time as/when/if the situation allows, to law enforcement.
Or you train an effective civilian police force whose primary focus is law enforcement. In areas where they are unable to carry out their policing duties they are escorted by ANA to provide the force protection. The UK did this in N Ireland. High threat areas saw the police escorted by the army, low threat areas the police did it themselves. It meant the police were trained and equipped to be police and did not have to turn into a paramilitary force.
The other issue is what type of police force does Afghanistan require? The UK police model would probably not work in Afghanistan, and a Middle East model would probably be more appropriate.
Last but not least, a police force is only the tip of the spear. How effective is the rest of the Afghan judicial system?
General Scaparotti in regional east has been promoting an idea called Combined Action (you may have heard of it). CA has 4 components: the ANA, the ANP, ISAF, and the Afghan Government. CA allows the Afghan government to reach out to the environment while being protected while the ANA monitors the ANP and ISAF has their resources available to provide backup. So far, CA has been very successful. I do like the idea of having ANA patrol with the ANP because they'll keep the ANP from peroforming corrupt activities and will offer a "security arm."
This is very true. The overall system is very fragile.
The US government should consider establishing some sort of civilian police force that can deploy abroad to help in situations like Afghanistan. The Italians have one, the French have theirs, so it is possible.
I know, Slap. Back then it was much more political than it is today, and many of the deputies were about as worthless as their political boss. This wasn't always the case, of course, but the trained Deputy U.S. Marshal is very much a modern phenomenon.
I think a modified version of the Deputy U.S. Marshal system/service is about the best you could get. The FBI doesn't really do this sort of thing well, and the marshal service is about the closest the U.S. gets to a national police force model. You might be able to copy some of the state police/highway patrol models, but that's about it.Quote:
The US government should consider establishing some sort of civilian police force that can deploy abroad to help in situations like Afghanistan. The Italians have one, the French have theirs, so it is possible.
I have not heard of CA, but it sounds like common sense. The police police, the army provides security and ISAF provide the overwatch and specialist capabilities. Is the role of the ANA to mentor, monitor or protect the ANP?
One of the lessons we learnt in the UK from Iraq was our lack of a deployable policing capability. The US Army's Military Police branch is however much larger then its UK equivalent, and with a much broader scope (rear area security) so it is more useable to fill the identified gap.
As far as I can make out the ANP is little more then a local protection force at the moment, and not what we would regard as a police force. Does AFG want the ANP to provide a policing service or an internal security service? Perhaps what we should be looking at is rolling out a paramilitary security service (the ANP) with limited policing expertise (and powers) and a separate more specialised policing branch. Many developed countries have a policing service and then a paramilitary 'knock heads' service (the French CRS, elements of the Italian Carabineri and the Spanish Civil Guard all spring to mind) with the balance weighted towards the policing. Perhaps in an unstable country we want to reverse polarity, with the majority of the policing being of the paramilitary type and a smaller civil policing / investigative branch?
First, I agree with many of your comments and appreciate the correction to the quote.
I have often depicted the Afghan situation as the 'Wild West' to friends and aquaintances and mused myself about examining the turnaround and its factors. For Canada, what effect did the RCMP federal police services, or the US Marshall's have in your country?
Another parallel if I may, what significant event contributed to the reconstruction and development of our national governments in the time of the wild west? I believe the national railway was very significant in the west's national identity, unity and fostered security, governance, reconstrution and development. I believe the building of a national railway could foster such a change in Afghanistan and the idea merits serious consideration. It would provide national transportation for security personnel movements, reliable public transportation and migration, linking of education and medical facilities, foster trade and goods exchange, facilitate industrialization, and in the interim, represent a significant source of jobs. If it isn't militarized, then insurgents should ignore or tolerate it's presence since they would benefit from it as much as others. Just a thought.
MikeF should have warned you that I like to compare Afghanistan (in general, not in some of the particulars) to Arizona between 1860 or so and 1876. The similarities are fascinating, including a transition from preparation for a high-intensity conflict to more Small Wars-style operations, muddled command arrangements after 1865, and a number of competing interest groups (to include a local government that profited from Indian wars, a number of different tribal groups, Federal government representatives, and the Army often caught in the middle).
As for the development of the West, the railroad was certainly an important factor, but possibly not the decisive one. It wasn't reliable or truly national for some years (the whole "Golden Spike" thing aside), and its impact was limited until the mid to late 1880s outside of its main corridors. I would contend that industrialization had a bigger impact, to include the national thirst for precious metals (something we had in common with the Spanish Empire not that long before us). Prospecting, and later deep rock mining, drove a great deal of the settlement and development in many areas of the West (miners have to eat, and they have specie to buy goods). There was also a great deal of displacement going on, even among the new Anglo arrivals.
And I don't know if you could count on insurgents ignoring a railroad. Railroads bring outside influences, modernization, and any number of assorted things they might not appreciate or welcome. Also, if it makes it easier for Government forces to concentrate it becomes a target for that reason alone.
Just some thoughts in response to your thoughts.
We do this.... Police mentor teams
and they have that ANCOP
just hasnt always been the priority
Texas Rangers
But most police mentor teams have a limited policing capability and focus on the security aspect of work. Who is mentoring the the afghan police on scenes of crime work (which is still applicable in the Afghan judicial system even if it consists only in taking a photograph or suspect with evidence at crime scene or video recording the suspect re-enacting the crime, both acceptible, indeed preferred by Afghan courts). Who is mentoring the Highway Police on how to ensure vehicles are roadworthy under Afghan regulations?
The ANCOP (Afghan Civil Order Police) appear to be an Afghan version of the French CRS, a highly specialised public order capability, possibly with some specialised anti-terrorist capability as well.
We appear to be focusing on the ANP as a security force and not a police force. Working on the Combined Action principle as alluded to earlier in this thread I think we can and should be playing things smarter.
I think there is merit in a centrally based investigative arm.
The issue hinges on what role do we expect police forces to play in society, and in a society in conflict. Once you know what you want then you look at a suitable mechanism for carrying out that role, then you can look (in Afghanistan) at the plan and TTPs needed to grow that capability in conflict.
Not to mention limited time to spend with each district's ANP, meaning plenty of time for them to get back into their bad habits.
Also, who is teaching them the value of the rule of law in the first place? We teach them tactics, but not how to determine the correct situations to use them, or even why.Quote:
Who is mentoring the the afghan police on scenes of crime work (which is still applicable in the Afghan judicial system [...] Who is mentoring the Highway Police on how to ensure vehicles are roadworthy under Afghan regulations?
Exactly -- we are confused about what the ANP should be doing and therefore so are the ANP.Quote:
Once you know what you want then you look at a suitable mechanism for carrying out that role, then you can look (in Afghanistan) at the plan and TTPs needed to grow that capability in conflict.
Speaking to people in Helmand, it is apparent that in parts of Helmand Province the ANP is now turning out in greater numbers and proving more reliable then the ANA.
A combination of several factors. The Helmand Police Training Centre is now up and running (and well resourced), and is turning out formed cohesive sub-units of ANP (who are local to Helmand). The emphasis is still on the ANP as a primarily security force, but if that is what is needed...
Interestingly, like Iraq it has taken us some time to focus on the police, and yet when we do focus effort and resources there we find that the dividends are quick and the police can change from being part of the problem to part of the solution, especially with the overlap between criminality and insurgency in most COIN situations.
Perhaps next time we should focus on building up the police first, recognising that in a COIN situation police provide the bedrock element of security and intelligence and that a police force is more likely to provide a pervasive destabilising influence then the army which generally remains free of insurgent and criminal elements for longer.
The problem is that there are not enough Military police who can do this partnering/advising quite effectively and everyone else thinks they can do it just as well. If its the sexiest part of the fight or where the action is then that is where all of the maneuver( non-LE ROL ) types do not wanna be on the FOB...or they want the civilian surge.......And of course Civi Police do not flock to warzones out of camoflauge in droves... and Contractors perpetuate their contracts.... and uh oh i am complaining... Repeal posse Comitatus and establish the Military Police as the proponent for stability policing units DSCA and FID/SFA. Thats our bag.
CA is a great idea (the ANA both protect and monitor the ANP), but as you can imagine, setting it up can be difficult; you're working with four different groups. My point is that we shouldn't rely on it.
I really like this idea. I think that that we should consider establishing a new organization that focuses on enforcing the law, not providing security. The ANP is clearly made to do the latter. This is nice, but who's going to enforce the law? Yes, the judicial system isn't very strong, but it may get somewhere if it is enforced properly. I'm looking at images of the ANP and they are patrolling with heavy PKM MGs. This just supports the assertion that they are a security force. In my opinion, this should change.Quote:
(From Red Rat:As far as I can make out the ANP is little more then a local protection force at the moment, and not what we would regard as a police force. Does AFG want the ANP to provide a policing service or an internal security service? Perhaps what we should be looking at is rolling out a paramilitary security service (the ANP) with limited policing expertise (and powers) and a separate more specialised policing branch. Many developed countries have a policing service and then a paramilitary 'knock heads' service (the French CRS, elements of the Italian Carabineri and the Spanish Civil Guard all spring to mind) with the balance weighted towards the policing. Perhaps in an unstable country we want to reverse polarity, with the majority of the policing being of the paramilitary type and a smaller civil policing / investigative branch?
This is a good suggestion that definitley should be considered. However, I think that securing it would be incredibly difficult, if not impossible. It's comparable to the construction of power lines in Afghanistan. Electricity can benefit both civilians and enemy combatants. However, the Taliban ignored this and continuously attacked the powerlines rendering them useless. Neither the contractor's PMCs or the contingent of the ANP could secure the lines until a couple hundred ANA and ISAF forces assisted. My point is that despite the benefits, it would be to difficult to secure.
I completely agree. Modifying the ANP from a paramilitary security force to a law enforcement group would be to difficult. Thus, I think we should investigate establishing a new organization that focuses strictly on law enforcement.
I like this idea alot. If there is a "next time", the invading country should have the capacity to provide security, so they should invest their resources into stabilizing the whole legal system starting with law enforcement.
I was at a briefing on the Afghan legal system a couple of months ago, given by European and Afghan experts on the (Afghan) legal system. To put into context some of the issues regarding the ANP I have included below some of the points that I picked up.
Background
Following his European Tour in the 1920s King Amanullah reformed the Afghan legal system introducing amongst other things a more liberal interpretation of women's rights. However this immediately ran into opposition from mullahs and tribes. Throughout the 1940s and 50s there remained no countrywide organised, formal legal system. Most justice remained local and religious, based on a local interpretation of the Koran and sharia law and having no reference to Afghan state or written law. Later on the mullahs were brought somewhat more into the fold through the payment of mullahs of a government salary, giving the government a degree of leverage on them. Historically penetration of the countryside by the (formal) law system was weak.
In the 1970s and 1980s the law was reformed again, this time modelled on the Soviet legal system. Under this system much more emphasis is placed on the role of the Prosecution Service or Attorney General's office. The office actively seeks to enforce compliance and will embed people in Ministries to enforce compliance. Certainly in Kabul this allows it a great deal of political influence. Many of the people now occupying roles in the Afghan judical system will have been trained under the Soviet system, and the corporate memory of this era remains strong.
Current
Afghanistan now has a proper constitution and one that protects Human Rights. However all laws must be in conformity with Islam and where an area is not covered by statute then Islamic law is to be applied. This was highlighted by the student blasphemy trial in Mazar - e - Sharif where the defendant was sentenced to 20 years for blasphemy, despite the fact there is no blasphemy statute on the books (this was presumably the technicality that saw the student released under western (donor) government pressure to the Karzai government…)
The Afghan constitution remains weak on judicial review and the Afghan Supreme Court functions more as a court of higher appeal then what we would regard as a Supreme Court in the western model. There is no concept of Habeas Corpus in Afghanistan and the Supreme Court has no power to judge the constitutional validity of legislation.
There is a national Justice Strategy, but it is probably correct to say that we need to focus more on getting desks chairs and telephones out to courts and staff in the short to medium term and educating judges into the concept of human rights in the longer term.
The Informal System
There has been some speculation about focusing more on the informal system of justice (jirgas and shuras) in Afghanistan as a means of enabling the delivery of justice. The two main problems with the informal system are:
- The system is geared towards conflict resolution and not for delivering justice.
- There is no fair and transparent means of appeal
The Stabilising Influence of Justice
Afghan encounters with the State are very often negative with violence, corruption and limited forms of redress commonplace. The British experience in India (including what is now Pakistan and Bangladesh) was the provision of a transparent and fair legal system was very popular. Whatever the perceived iniquities of the colonial system by the Indians, they recognised that the judicial system benefited them more so then previous local systems, and this made the imposition of (British) government rule much more palatable. How the British introduced their legal system in their colonies and the role it played in maintaining an acceptance of British rule is worthy of greater study.
Who is in charge of constructing a judicial system? Is it still Italy? If so, what exactly are they currently doing about it? Are "useless" written reports still being produced in Rome or are there actual personel in Kabul working on this.
Initially, when the new government was put into power, Italy was tasked with forming a judicial system. There were simply no results as little work had been done (I read somewhere that a handful of people were sent to Afghanistan to interact with judges and lawyers). That's why I'm curious if they're still in charge of this task, and if so, are they putting forth more effort?
I am not sure who is in charge of the judicial reform now. The consensus at the conference was the model currently being used by the British as part of their counter-narcotics effort whereby they select, train and fund a complete judicial system (police, jails, judges and prosecutors) specifically for counter-narcotics is working reasonably well.
The Italians had a good plan based on their experience of running a judical system that can cope with pervasive organised crime, but it was under-resourced and there was no impetus to get it established.
Whether the British counter-narcotics system could be expanded further, perhaps to deal with anti-corruption is another matter. Certainly the British have found it very difficult to keep their counter-narcotics stovepipe clean and untainted.
A gloomy observation on Afghan training
SUSAN SACHS
KABUL— From Saturday's Globe and Mail
Published Friday, Dec. 31, 2010 6:56PM EST
Quote:
In the nine months he worked as senior adviser to the chief of the Border Police, John Brewer relied on a local translator to navigate Afghan culture. Yet the Canadian Mountie spent as much time trying to interpret the actions of foreign forces to equally puzzled Afghans.
Why, they asked him, did Germany provide their training base with drug-sniffing police dogs but not dog food or kennels? Why would the Americans build a brand new border police headquarters on land with no water? And what should be done with the thousands of donated European radios that do not operate on the same frequency as the Afghan ones?
His polite response was to suggest that Afghans speak up for themselves and that NATO officers listen to them more. Still, the plain-spoken Superintendent Brewer will admit to some frustration with the waste of time and money through miscommunication. “A lesser man,” he says, “would say it’s pissing in the wind.”
...
Copied here for reference.
Police Mentoring in Afghanistan 2007-2009
Entry Excerpt:
Police Mentoring in Afghanistan 2007-2009 by Dr. William Rosenau, Center for Naval Analyses, Strategic Studies Solution Center.
The role of the police is an important but largely overlooked aspect of contemporary counterinsurgency and stability operations. Although academic and policy specialists have examined the role of police in post-conflict environments, the question of how police should be organized, trained, and equipped for counterinsurgency campaigns has received little systematic attention.Similarly, US military doctrine and the professional military literature, while not ignoring the subject entirely, do not consider it in any systematic way. This gap is particularly ironic, given the prominent role that soldiers and Marines have played in training indigenous police and other security forces in counterinsurgency campaigns from Vietnam to Afghanistan.If the broader topic of police and counterinsurgency is under-examined, the subject of mentoring—that is, advising and training—foreign police forces is even more neglected. American Marines, soldiers, and other military personnel preparing to deploy to Afghanistan for the police mentoring mission have few sources of information and analysis available to them.This monograph addresses that gap. Using a series of ten vignettes, this report examines in depth the experiences of individual American and British soldiers and Marines who served as mentors in Afghanistan during the 2007-2009 period.Police Mentoring in Afghanistan 2007-2009 by Dr. William Rosenau, CNA.
--------
Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.
Hat tip to Abu M, who commends this article from Harpers Magazine, December 2009:Link:http://www.harpers.org/archive/2009/12/0082754Quote:
What are the trade-offs for using a character like Col. Raziq? (On the one hand, he is seen as being effective, but on the other hand ... well, anyone who has not yet read the 2009 Matthieu Aikins profile of Raziq for Harper's should.)
The article is about the Afghan Border Police and I have not searched to see if Col. Raziq is still in place.