Combat Tracking and Evidence Collection Paper Assistance
I have a request up regarding combat tracking anecdotes in the RFIs and Member's Projects section that Rifleman has already been kind enough to respond to.
If anyone else could assist by posting there regarding how combat tracking teams are making the difference in theatre, it would be much appreciated.
You two quit that. Don't you know that
if you pull away the veil, remove the legend, don't drink Kool Aid, etc. that our mystique will be ruined? Totally ruined!!! :D
I think, if you dig into it, the disconnect
Quote:
Originally Posted by
120mm
I have spoke to a plethora of SF guys who are absolutely convinced that we should not listen to John Nagle or David Petraeus, because only SF is capable of understanding/employing COIN. And these are guys with gold and black oak leaves on their collars.
The same belief is apparently rife in the CA community, as well, as I've bumped into the same viewpoint vis-a-vis C-M relations.
is on the size of the effort / numbers of people involved and concomitant tendency to use the "if you're a hammer, everything is a nail" approach. The Nagl / Petraeus methodology is the "Big Army" application. While that can certainly be made to work, on balance the track record is not good, not at all -- and it is very costly in terms of casualties, effort and money.
It also is becoming more and more politically unacceptable -- and that statement merits some thought...
The use of the small SF (and CA; they've done some good stuff, particularly in Central America) footprint, OTOH has essentially been quite good. It is effective, efficient and relatively cheap in terms of all types of costs. It is also politically acceptable because it's under the ignorant media radar screen.
I am very much in agreement with SF on this one; I don't question that the Army and Marines need to know how to do FID and COIN and that they must be prepared at all times to do that -- it just should be a course of last resort and not the preferred method.
I strongly question the current approach, the size of the footprint and, far more importantly, how efficient and effective the big battalion effort is. We are not doing ourselves any favors.
That, too is true, U-Boat.
There's a degree of 'we told you so' involved, no question but even more important is the fact that the big Army approach has never worked without great cost and much time; the small footprint of people who ingrain themselves, OTOH generally work well and the costs are not excessive -- and that type effort doesn't get the overly excitable (of whom this nation has too many...) perturbed.
There's always a rice bowl or too in the picture but in this case, there's practical evidence that the large effort is costly and prone to not succeed while the smaller, tailored one is less expensive and usually does succeed. Those SF Officers who reject Nagl and Petraeus have history on their side.
An analogy is Socialism. Some say the only reason pure socialism has never worked is because the right people have not been in charge. Color me dubious. The big Army approach to FID and COIN almost posits the same thing; "It'll work well and cheaply -- we just haven't done it right." I'm not dubious, I flat don't believe it.
With the caveat that I know it can be made to work -- but at what cost?.
My Wife, who aside from the fact she married me,
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Originally Posted by
120mm
One thing that is useful to point out, I think, is that all this "SF's long history of working FID/UW/COIN" is actually not that long of a history at all.
is a smart gal points out frequently that to those under forty, "...ten years is a long time..." :D *
* Aside from which, having been there almost at the start of that working, I am not even coming on the 'many years' and 'history' bit. That's almost as bad as going into a Cracker Barrel to eat and seeing the wall hung with 'antique' tools you've used... :eek:
British Tracking Training
For William-
I was under the impression the Brits were still quite heavy on training their own tracking operators at their Brunei Jungle Warfare Centre and also in Belize. Is this not the case?
Series of Internet Articles by....
Michael Yon. He participated as a writer and attended the British tracking school on Borneo Island. There is a whole series of emails at the link.
Combat Tracking Training
Absolutely fascinating reading.
Background on Michael Yon
Why we don't employ more dismounted operations
Sir,
Even with the proven tactical benefits of utilizing combat trackers, it's hard to get a commanders approval to dismount, and pursue the enemy. The military, and the public to whom they ultimately answer, are afraid of high casualty counts. They mistakenly believe mounted patrol with MRAPs is the silver bullit. In reality, because of mobility issues, they become road bound, and easier targets. I don't even want to address, leaving body armor and helmets behind to lighten the load, and increase speed and mobility, and reduce water requirements, somebody might have a stroke. Or worse, the ACU uniform which is absolutely abysmal, seems effective only on the crushed rock floor of the FOBs.. Many an operator has dug deep into their pockets to purchase Multicam uniforms, or got back in BDUs to enhance their own survivability. When I attended tracking school over 20 years ago in Malaysia, we stayed in the field, live out of our rucksacks, and slept on the tracks. I can't imagine that happenlng here, although I belive that's how we will deny the enemy of his mountain santuaries, and focus our combat power more effectively. That said, there are some enlightend commanders, who understand the concept of combat tracking teams, to include an IED defeat organization. Consequently, I have stayed busy.