Usage of Soviet-produced 240-mm rocket-assisted cluster mortar shells (3-O-8 "Nerpa") continues in Eastern Ghouta
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Usage of Soviet-produced 240-mm rocket-assisted cluster mortar shells (3-O-8 "Nerpa") continues in Eastern Ghouta
Please read my comments fully before replying. I specifically and explicitly referred to defeating Daesh “on the battlefield”. If you have read my past comments, you will see that I have consistently asserted that Sunni Arab supremacism cannot be defeated by other ethnic and sectarian groups nor without resolving Sunni Arab grievances. I have also asserted that only Sunni Arab egalitarians, such as elements of the Free Syrian Army and Iraq’s Golden Division, can defeat Sunni Arab supremacists such as Al Qaeda and Daesh.Quote:
Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
However, there must be the perception of victory over Daesh before Americans will countenance efforts to deal with the Turkish-Kurdish conflict.
As a historical parallel, in 1944 Stalin delayed the Red Army’s drive towards Germany in order to conquer Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. He did not have to justify this deviation, or his vision beyond Germany’s defeat. Yet what Briton would have tolerated Churchill pondering conflict with the Soviet Union, or Operation Unthinkable?
Thus, we need a publicity stunt so that the real work can begin. Who better to deliver on that then the current president?
Lister is pleased with the airstrike on Shayrat.Quote:
Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
Regardless, millions of Americans now believe in a new lost cause: the “stolen” election of 2016. Prior to the campaign, I had considered the current president to be vain, vapid and venal. Now, I would say that his former opponent exhibits those qualities to a far worse degree.
And? One could question whether the MOAB is more powerful than the MOP. I didn’t realize that a single MOAB was supposed to defeat Daesh in Afghanistan. Why did Obama keep it in storage for so long, then?Quote:
Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
Isn’t guerrilla warfare and subversion preferable to conventional mobile warfare?Quote:
Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
Curious. I would imagine that they would remember the bloody hands of Iran and Russia, to say nothing of China watching with disinterest, while the West at least made some effort. The leading Sunni Arab state is a U.S. ally, whereas Iran and Russia are adversaries.Quote:
Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
Second Russian military death in Syria in as many days.
http://www.interfax.ru/world/561062?utm_source=topmain#
Is it a surprise that the 2 least honest & reliable sources, Putin & Trump, would have 2 different versions of their phone call on Syria?
English translation of #Erdoğan's senior adviser's threats on #Chinese radio @criturk to hit U.S. forces in #Syria.
http://www.criturk.fm/cevik-cri-turk...rinda-olacak/#
In recent weeks, #Assad (backed by #Russia) has pursued an escalatory campaign of bombing hospitals, IDP camps & civil defense in #Idlib.
You really need to rethink this comment...sorry but a conventional war one can in fact "militarily end" but guerrilla warfare....can take decades BTW...ask the US Army about VN experiences...Quote:
Originally Posted by Azor
Quote:
Isn’t guerrilla warfare and subversion preferable to conventional mobile warfare?
Assad officially hands over Syrian army command / field troops/ to Iran, and he even signed it.
US military official suffers slip of the tongue and says PKK is part of the SDF
Ah, speaking truth is now called 'slip in the tongue' in Pentagon's jargon?Quote:
...In response to a question regarding the Turkish attitude against the YPG during press briefing on Wednesday, Colonel John Dorrian, the spokesman for the U.S.-led coalition against Daesh, accidentally acknowledged that the PKK was part of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
"But with regard to the PKK, they are a part of the Syrian Democratic Forces, and the Syrian Arab Coalition is a part of the Syrian Democratic Forces as well. The forces that are isolating Raqqa are now largely made up of Syrian Arabs, but they are a part of the Syrian Democratic Forces," he said.
...
Good to know that.
Guess, this happened to the CENTCOM Because they are in a rush. Namely, the CIA seems to be active in Syria again:
Analysis: The Free Idlib Army’s Role in the U.S. Battle Against Al-Qaida in Syria
...and that's 'no good news' for any of generals currently trying to run the US foreign politics in the Middle East.
Actually, that's the page 3 of a document stating the following:Quote:
Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
Page 1:
Syrian Arab Republic
General Command for the Army and Armed Forces
Organization & Admin Branch
Organization and Arming Division
No. 1455
Date: / /1438 AH
Corresponding to 4 April 2017 CE
Memorandum
Dear Lieutenant General [/field marshal]: the general commander for the army and armed forces, president of the republic [Bashar al-Assad]:
- Implementing the decision of the brigadier general, the deputy general commander, deputy head of the council of ministers, minister of defence, on the memorandum of the leadership of the popular army- operations and training division- no. 45 on date 19 January 2017 guaranteeing the formation of a committee headed by the organization and administration branch in order to organize the forces working with the Iranian side within the organization and propriety of the local defence units in the provinces and put forward suggestions to your excellence.
- The committee specified by admin order no. 562/67 date 11 February 2017 held a number of meetings and studied and discussed the situation from different angles, including organization, leadership, combat and material guarantee, rights of the martyrs, wounded and disappeared, sorting out the affairs of those commissioned who have avoided obligatory and reserve service and deserters, and the civilians working with the Iranian side. And it culminated in the following suggestions:
1. Organizing the Syrian personnel (military and civilian) who are fighting with the Iranian side within the local defence units in the provinces according to the following table.
2. Sorting out the affairs of the military personnel (deserters) and those commissioned who have avoided obligatory and reserve service, and transferring them, appointing them, and modifying the party of their summoning to the local defence units in the provinces and including those personnel who have sorted out their affairs and are working with the Iranian side within the local defence units according to the following table:
Page 2
3. Organizing recruitment contracts for the interest of the armed forces- the people's army, for a period of two years for the civilians working with the Iranian side for whosoever desires, regardless of the conditions of recruitment implemented in the armed forces (permanent matter no. 1 and its modifications/recruitment) and renewing it by agreement of the two sides according to the following table:
4. Commissioning an administration of the affairs of the officers by sorting out of the affairs of session 69 of active officers and those who are working with the Iranian side currently in Aleppo province, their number being 1650.
5. The leadership of the local defence units in the provinces that work with the Iranian side remain affiliated with the Iranian side while coordinating with the general command for the army and armed forces until the end of the crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic, or issuing of a new decision.
6. Combat and material guarantee in all its types for Syrian military personnel and civilians working with the Iranian side on the shoulder of the Iranian side after organizing them into the local defence units in the provinces in coordination with the relevant parties.
7. Guaranteeing the material rights for the martyrs, wounded, and disappeared who have been working with the Iranian side since the beginning of the events, placed on the shoulder of the Iranian side. As for the rest of the determined rights for the martyrs, wounded and disappeared according to the systems and laws as follows:
a) Military personnel and those commissioned who have avoided obligatory service after sorting out of their affairs in principle.
b) Civilians in the framework of the comprehensive solution.
8. Issuing organization instructions guaranteeing implementation instructions for military personnel and civilians working with the Iranian side after organizing them into the local defence units in the provinces.
Attached is a table of the combat equipment handed to the Iranian side from the popular army and that which is present with it.
Please review and decide.
Brigadier General Adnan Mahraz Abdo
Head of the organization and administration branch.
. Opinion of the major general, head of the general chief of staff for the army and armed forces.
I agree to the suggestions: 5 April 2017
. Opinion of the major general, deputy general commander, deputy head of the council of ministers, minister of defence.
I agree to the suggestions: 5 April 2017.
. Decision of the lieutenant general [/field marshal], general commander for the army and armed forces.
Agreed- 11 April 2017.
Page 3
24 April 2017
To: the national security office, the intelligence branch [military intelligence], general intelligence administration, air intelligence administration, political security branch, criminal security administration, migration and passports administration, military police:
. Implementing the decision of the general, the general commander for the army and armed forces on our memorandum no. 1455, dated 4 April 2017, and the decision of the major general, the deputy general commander, deputy head of the council of ministers, the minister of defence on our memorandum no. 1681, dated 21 April 2017:
- You are asked not to obstruct or detain personnel working with the Iranian side who are carrying temporary cards for the local defence forces as long as their affairs are being sorted out.
- Attached is a copy of our memorandum no. 1455 date 4 April 2017 and our memorandum no. 1681 dated 21 April 2017.
Major General Ali Abdullah Ayoub
Head of the General Chief of Staff and the Armed Forces.
With the mandate of:
Brigadier General Adnan Mahraz Abdo
Head of the branch of organization and administration.
****
In essence, this gives a 'carte blanche' to the IRGC to continue organizing Shi'a militias in Syria as it likes: these are to be considered 'SAA', and the IRGC's work is not to be obstructed.
...and here the source of that copy, and the story: Administrative Decisions on Local Defence Forces Personnel: Translation & Analysis.
Mind: the author of that article, has a giant problem understanding what he's got. And, sadly, that's meanwhile no exception in his work, but a rule.
Namely, the author - Aymen Jawad at-Tamimi, somebody who became quite 'famous' for works of this kind - is not only failing to understand and explain the paper he's got, he's also not aware of its importance.
1.) Tamimi can't put together a story and simply explain facts: when reading his work, I've all the time got a feeling he's circling around the actual topic like a cat around a mug of hot milk. The only exception from this rule was hit 'critique' of Guttman's recent article of the PKK.
2.) He also seems not to understand the simple brutality of the Assad regime. Or is he intentionally downplaying the importance of networks of patronage and crime...?
In this case he starts 'wondering loud':
Actually, the principle is simple: the regime pays next to nothing to the SAA; SAA has no other choice but to defect and is thus criminalized; there come the 'saviours' of some militia, offer amnesty; and the ex-SAA should not only be 'happy', but indeed is 'in debt' with 'merciful regime' that gave his life a new sense...Quote:
...As a result, there has been widespread evasion of compulsory and reserve service, along with desertion from the army ranks. Fear of arrest for these offences would also prevent many people from venturing too far beyond their hometown or area, on account of the risk of encountering a security checkpoint that might have their names on a wanted list.
Instead, militias may be seen as offering a better alternative, as the salaries are often higher than those of army conscripts.
...
And now, with this document, the IRGC is offered a carte blanche in regards of related work. :roll:
3.) Tamimi has also got an immense problem with drawing simple conclusions about the NDF and the LDF. Surely enough, the Russians are trying to change the situation lately, but essentially, both of these are nothing else but an attempt to formalize all the sorts of militias and PMCs, with the LDF usually standing for different 'units' of Hezbollah/Syria.
4.) And, he's paying too much attention at the purported 'symbology': sure, it's nice to have some unit crest explained, but what some insignia stands for or should depict is one thing, while the actual nature and purpose of the unit in question is another. The fact the regime lets militias recruit and pay better means not the resulting unit is 'SAA', just for example.
Therefore, it is not - or it should not be - the least surprising the LDF 'exists beyond Aleppo' (like it is for Tamimi): in essence, the LDF might be wherever the regime decides to call one of IRGC's local surrogates that way - or whatever local gangs prefer to call themselves.
What a 'surprise' then: what the regime considers 'LDF of Mhrada' for example, is calling itself 'Mhrada NDF'.
Overall, the piece is informative in regards of existence of few of armed groups in question. But, Tamimi's narrative and failures to understand the nature of the regime, and the purpose of the NDF/LDF legend, is severely smudging the picture.
BTW, and to make sure, the IRGC is not the only one to get such permissions. The Russians are meanwhile neck-deep into repeating IRGC's example:
Russians 'proposing the creation of a local militia' in Suweida is silly: the area already has some 5-6 own militias - all Druze. Actually, this is indicating the Russians are trying to recruit some of these to fight for them, i.e. for Assad.Quote:
A #Russia|n delegation was allegedly in #Suweida today & proposed the creation of a local militia. Pic via Suweida24. #Syria
-> Members would get $200 a month, some health care, and have their status regularized :!: (for those who missed service)...
CrowBat....my compliments on a rather good translation....did not notice it was page 3 but the significance is still massive and YOU wonder if CENTCOM/Trump and the SOF community "will get it".
BUT I seriously doubt it....
IMHO this clearly indicates that Syria is now fully under Iranian IRGC control and no longer a "so called sphere of influence zone" that Obama/Rhodes were pushing for in the end........
Hama Battle: #Iran announced death of #IRGC Brigadier General Mahab Ali Farsi, veteran of Iran-Iraq war. Killed by Rebels 2 days ago.
Here's the Kremlin transcript of Putin's press conference with Erdogan yesterday, in English.
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54444#
Russia stated that they together with Iran and Turkey will setup four "safe zones" and be the guarantors of the agreement for the four zones..to be presented at the ongoing Astana talks....
What's new is that there's a 3-page memorandum circulating in Astana with a May 22 deadline for establishing the zones' exact borders.
IF this is anywhere close to being accurate/confirmed the US (Trump), CENTCOM and US SOF are now involved in one hell of a total mess.....
PYD (PKK) signed an agreement to cooperate with the Regime and Russia for upcoming offensives in Aleppo and Idlib.
http://www.basnews.com/index.php/en/...e-east/347692#
So Trump, CENTCOM and US SOF are in fact supporting Assad in genocide, ethnic cleansing, fighting together with sectarian Iraqi Shia militias and the Iranian IRGC along with support of a Communist terrorist group PKK....
Can it get any worse???
Azor...back on my soap box for this morning in a very rainy Berlin.....while we have sparred a lot over the Russian Trump connections and the Steel Dossier...we are slowly seeing the FBI close in on indictments...Quote:
Originally Posted by Azor
If you noticed yesterday Comey did admit to three ongoing investigations....
A social media poster had pointed to three grand juries in progress with two being close to and or finished with indictments/warrants coming out of them...
Many bashed him and his sources for being incorrect, BUT Comey did in fact confirm yesterday what he had posted...
THEN he posts this....
I now have 2 sources within legal community confirming that a D.C. area judge has signed 2 warrants related to Comey's Trump investigation.
(Warrants could be to force someone to testify in a grand jury and or actual arrest warrants...although normally a person would not refuse to testify unless there is something to hide and a GJ can provide immunity to get you to testify).
So exactly if you are the Trump WH on the verge of being charged with obstruction and or worse just how do you conduct FP...ANY FP?
"Wag the Dog" takes over as the easiest way to deflect from his "troubles" does it not........???
Even yesterday the Chinese were warning the US to stop their bomber overflights hardening their line actually and coming to the open support of NK which many said they would in the end...."as a cause for potentially triggering a war".
In Syria if you have read the CrowBat postings and mine from today... Trump/CENTCOM/US SOF are now in one hell of a mess....
With Trump/CENTCOM/US SOF now supporting openly terrorists of multiple stripes and all Shia based...and supporting FIVE US named terrorist groups when they are suppose to be fighting two terrorist groups?
SEVEN terrorist groups and the US is in the middle of all SEVEN?
What in the hell did Trump get the US into in his "rush to eradicate IS from the face of the earth" and ALL just in under 110 days?
Even Obama did not stumble this badly....
THIS goes to the heart of all the Trump lies.....remember he bashes constantly the "failing and fake news NYTs" on just about anything....
The failing @nytimes added 308k new digital/print subscribers in the first quarter of '17, according to our latest Fake News press release
308,000 new subscriptions in one quarter and MSM is :failing and fake"?
Thanks, but that translation is not mine: it's Taimimi's (see the link to his article I've posted above).Quote:
Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
The importance of his 'find' is as follows:
1.) It's a definite confirmation that the Assadists are running the policy of letting the IRGC do whatever it wants to do in parts of Syria that are nominally 'regime controlled'. I.e. the parts of Syria in question - even those directly controlled by nominal 'regime forces' - are actually not under control of the same. The regime actually has no say at its own home turf: even at the time it's so short on troops like never before, it must let the IRGC recruit and establish militias as it likes.
And that's 'official'.
2.) The official nomenclature of 'National Defence Forces' and 'Local Defence Forces' is a farce; a big PR-show, and nothing else.
3.) Assad-Regime knows very well what the IRGC is doing, but has no other choice but to make it its official policy to let the IRGC do whatever it wants to do in Syria.
For Trump, Pentagon etc. there should be no clearer message than this: if they are so eager to confront Iranians, and as eager to do so in Yemen... then why to hell do they miss all the Iranians are doing in Syria?
Like you, though, I strongly doubt Washington will be doing anything about this. Namely: development of this kind is playing directly into the hands of Israel (free along the motto 'the IRGC in Syria is mortal danger' etc.).
Oppo's delegation in Astana are fragmented and unqualified. They belong in the field, not negotiating table.
Where is Hijab
In Astana: Russia, Iran and Turkey signed memorandum on 4 "safety zones" in Syria
Guess all other areas will be "free fire zones a la VN 1968"...
Outlaw,Quote:
Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
What is there to reconsider?
The Army would doubtless agree that aside from Operation Desert Storm, subversion and guerrilla warfare would have been far preferable to conventional mobile and siege warfare.
As for Vietnam, the Communists paid an absolutely terrible price for harassing U.S. forces. Even including ARVN fatalities, the NLF and NVA experience was akin to the Red Army's experience on the Eastern Front.
The Korean War was a hideous conflict and the risk of a U.S. military defeat was far higher. Indeed, Eisenhower basically had to threaten to use the bomb in order to secure an armistice. Yet this is regarded as a decisive victory...
The issue is one of perception, not objective reality.
There is a very old battlefield saying...the last one standing on that field is the "winner".....Quote:
Originally Posted by Azor
Ask the NVA and the North Koreans....they were the last one's standing.
Kuwait does not count as the Saddam army was not prepared to withstand a full scale US Army rolling thunder full TWO Corps armored attack fully patterned on a possible NATO/Soviet war.
Not going there.Quote:
Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
To date…
- Russia has less of a free hand in Syria and less prestige in the Middle East than it did under the previous administration
- There is no evidence that Operation Timber Sycamore has been wound down
- There have been no efforts to rein in Turkey’s Operation Euphrates Shield or its attacks on the YPG
- There appears to be no micro-management of the military by the administration
- Washington appears to have warmer relations with Ankara and Riyadh
- Clashes between the FSA and YPG have been reduced
None of these developments indicate an attempt to placate Russia, dismantle NATO or other alliances, or to retreat from MENA.
Really...you really think this??Quote:
Originally Posted by Azor
Hanoi had a strategic and Pyrrhic victory over along with a tactical defeat to the U.S.Quote:
Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
Beijing and Pyongyang suffered strategic defeats.
Operation Desert Storm does count amigo, because no one knew exactly how effective the Second Offset/AirLand Battle would be, and various members of Bush's NSC were suggesting that tactical nuclear weapons be considered for use.
But you still do not get it...they walked away as "winners".....as they were in fact willing to take the massive loses as they knew the West could not absorb the same loses..it was a game of staying power and they "stayed..we left"....Quote:
Originally Posted by Azor
As one involved on Desert Storm tact nukes were never discussed nor even in the AOR....nor were the handlers of tact nukes ever placed on alert and move status...
Secondly, what is far more interesting is did Bush actually sucker the US and Saddam into the war.....US intel assets inside the Indications and Warnings divisions repeatedly warned Bush of Saddam's invasion moves...and you know things are serious with you pick up tank commanders talking 600 meters from the Kuwait border and you warn the President physically of an impending invasion AND YET that President does nothing but wait for the crossing to happen....
Saddam/we got suckered...simple as that...
BTW...hate to disappoint you but everyone knew Air/Land Battle would work...go back and reread the Soviet MoD comments on it...Kuwait just allowed them to array two full Corps on the ground...which one could never exercise in Germany...as an arrayed Corp takes up a lot of space....the German defense and attack model did not foresee an arrayed Corp but several attack fronts once the Soviets came to a stand still...
Are you referring solely to the NLF/NVA? Yes they did.Quote:
Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
The U.S. campaign in Vietnam was doomed because of:
- Poor intelligence and therefore understanding of the conflict i.e. not Korea redux
- An overly ambitious objective i.e. a strong and friendly state in South Vietnam
- A restricted commitment in order to placate Beijing and Moscow on the one hand, and the American electorate on the other
Imagine if the U.S. had simply denied the Communists control of Vietnam, relying upon anti-Communist insurgents, small special forces/intelligence teams, and airpower…
Yet returning to the issue of comparing conventional warfare with guerrilla warfare and subversion, every strictly conventional war that the U.S. has fought with major ground forces has been far more costly to those soldiers than the counter-insurgencies in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq (*).
On the contrary, according to Khalizad and Bush himself, Cheney among others, advocating using tactical nuclear weapons. Bush, of course, was strongly opposed, but the mere suggestion indicates the anxiety over Iraq’s conventional capabilities. Indeed, the U.S. forces committed at the beginning of 1991 indicate a major overreaction to the possibility of war.Quote:
Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
The threat that the U.S. faced from Iraq in 1991 was the Soviet one, in miniature, and although a U.S. victory was assured, there was anxiety over how costly that victory would be. Would quality overcome quantity, and to what degree? If liberating Kuwait was hard-fought then the ramifications would be felt by NATO forces in Germany opposite the crumbling Warsaw Pact and the still formidable Soviet Union, as well as the U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific facing North Korea and China.
If you are intending to claim that “everyone” knew that AirLand Battle would work as advertised, then why did Hussein not back down?
Moreover, why did the Soviets express surprise at the effectiveness of U.S. doctrine and technology in action as the following sources indicate?
- Glantz: http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/rs-storm.htm
- DIA: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1...military-force
- CIA: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingr...0000266048.pdf
In 1990, 39% of the total U.S. combat aircraft inventory was deployed to Desert Storm, whereas 30% was deployed to Iraqi Freedom, and elements of the latter were already in theater supporting the ongoing NFZ/NDZ in Iraq and Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.
So because it’s rainy in Berlin, you’re using tinfoil to stay dry while on your soap box? :PQuote:
Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
Hussein had more than five months to withdraw from Kuwait and refused to do so despite the Desert Shield build up in Saudi Arabia and the UNSCR authorizing force to expel Iraqi forces. If those gathering Desert Storm clouds – pun intended – did not convince Hussein, how could Bush have done so in 1990?
* Referring to the Civil War, World War I, World War II and the Korean War
I find it interesting that you have never participated in either VN nor Desert Storm nor sat in the actual planning phases of DS or even during the Cold War in Germany yet you quote like wild....Quote:
Originally Posted by Azor
If you really did do your research on SVN you might have noticed that actually the SVN Army was holding up well and with heavy B52 strikes effectively stopped the NVA Easter invasion in it's tracks and pushed them back into Laos and Cambodia...
The NVA licked it wounds and waited...WHAT exactly was the next US government move...they simply cut off SVN from any further military aid...and then the NVA moved again.
If you the reread a lot of the 1975 battlefield reports coming from SVN army/marine units...they basically ran out of ammo and there was nothing there to supply them with and then broke and ran....
Back to tact nukes..US politicians can talk all they want to but at no time were the handlers of those weapons "alerted to move" a key sign they were going to be used.....so again understand what you are talking about.
BTW you avoided my comments on the I&W warning Bush but Bush not reacting...why was that...if you knew the history behind I&W and their mission and where they sit in the IC and the role they play in national level command authority decisions you should have jumped on my comments but you did not.....
Long time I&W types who are very in tune to intel openly questioned what Bush was up in totally ignoring their warnings even SIX hours before the actual invasion and they called it to the exact invasion minute....Bush could have forewarned Kuwaiti forces but did not..but no action from a sitting US President...they indicate that had he gone on national TV and laid out all the intel evidence down to SIGINT as the buildup was occurring Saddam would not have invaded...but he did nothing....
Their reasoning is still today this and it has not changed with time...he wanted the war with Saddam...
But somehow we do not talk about that do we Azor?
Azor...BTW you are badly off topic so drop this line and get back to answering what CrowBat and I have posted....which is far more interesting that reliving the past...
What is ongoing now in Syria will directly impact and badly impact the US in the coming decade and Trump is leading the US down that path in a worse way than did Obama...
So prove me wrong...
Tin foil hat off now...
Why do I say that....the Russian Trump connections will draw Trump far more into trying to survive it and will thus cause US FP to drift in a way never seen before...much like the Nixon WH days after the Watergate break in....
And as we have seen with the TLAM/MOAB strikes that impressed no one he shots to distract not to underline a strategic strategy...
Azor...this is why you must pay more attention to what CrowBat and I both post here.....
Although in Iraq..this is a serious indicator of IS eventually going back to gerrilla warfare from which they evolved in the first place.....
I saw the first versions of this in a major battle in Diyala 2005...and it has further evolved....
They will never be "militarily defeated"...
The first launcher is a standardised anti-tank weapon cobbled together by IS in Mosul. The second appears to fire a more powerful rocket.
BREAKING
Infighting between Turkish backed Lisa Sultan Murad and Ahrar al-Sham in western and southern entrance of Jarablus. (ANHA)
Abu Ibrahim, president of al-Bab's Military Council, has been hospitalized after an assassination attempt by unknown assailants few today.
Azor...heads up ..now tell me what the Trump FP response will be on this....and then check the actual locations of the four safe zones....you will notice somethin...but will allow you to "see" the connection to this statement...
Russia: Syria safe zones to be shut for U.S., coalition planes - agencies
http://reut.rs/2qGMQdR
Russia says U.S. coalition forbidden from operating in planned Syria safe zones
http://tass.ru/politika/4233897?utm_..._social_share#
https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/ch...ern-caliphate/
Selected Excerpts with emphasis added:
In the pantheon of possibilities ranging from complete collapse to a future resurgence, the organization will likely survive its looming military defeat. This outcome is supported by historical research on insurgencies that indicate groups rarely collapse and disappear. In fact, like the past history of ISIL itself, groups are quite capable of withstanding the loss of territory by returning to earlier stages of organizing, recruiting and fund raising. While ISIL has been fixated with securing and controlling sympathetic populations in the past, it has demonstrated a remarkable ability to survive without territory, as it did between 2008 and 2013. In the future, the underground struggle that follows on the heels of the conquest of Mosul and Raqqa will not require large numbers of fighters. The group’s veterans are experienced in blending back into the local population to wage a low-level insurgency...
Yet there is no reason to think ISIL is close to being vanquished. The two major factors that led its predecessor, the Islamic State in Iraq, to resuscitate its organization and evolve into a truly global threat — the Syrian civil war and the political manipulation of sectarian tensions in Iraq — remain important variables in what comes next. RAND research that examined all insurgencies between 1945 and 2009 found that the most important factor in reducing their duration is the ability of the counterinsurgents to reduce the tangible support of the insurgents. To achieve this, state security services, police forces and border control are critical, and neither Iraq nor Syria can currently claim to have any of these in abundance or quality...
Who Governs the Sunnis?
This political question has been at the heart of the conflict since the U.S. military conducted a surge of troops and diplomats that opened the door for rapprochement between Sunni-dominated areas of Iraq and the national government in 2007. This relationship, which at one point held real promise, failed to develop and since 2010 ISIL opportunistically capitalized on its slow deterioration. By 2014, Iraqis in the Sunni majority areas gave a lukewarm embrace of ISIL that was as much of an indictment of the inept and corrupt Iraqi Sunni political class as it was of the Maliki administration’s loss of perceived legitimacy and right to rule.
Now that Sunnis have learned the hard way that ISIL’s utopian revolution overpromised and under delivered, who will fill the vacuum? The strong organizational structure of the Iraqi Islamic Party that ruled many of the Sunni provinces failed to translate into good governance, creating the opening for ISIL to offer itself as a viable alternative. The hardliners within the broader Sunni political establishment’s attempt to return to power after its previous failures (including the embarrassing loss of Mosul) — coupled with its historical anti-western attitude — means it will be a poor partner for the Iraqi government. Still, as researcher Rasha Al Aqeedi points out, issues including corruption, mistrust in local and central politics and radical ideologies all remain major obstacles to good governance in Iraq — even more so than the conventional wisdom that Sunni rejection of a Shiite order was the primary factor leading to ISIL’s resurrection throughout the most volatile parts of the country.
One difficult challenge in wooing Sunni politicos has been ISIL’s long-time tactic of preemption and elimination of future Sunni rivals. Starting with the dismantling of the Sahwa in Iraq, local Sunni tribal militias, and the cooption of tribal figures after 2008, ISIL’s use of calibrated violence against its own population has crippled local leaders and torn apart the social fabric— possibly permanently. Nonetheless, if regional Sunni actors can inspire the resurrection of a functioning local governance structure supported and protected by powerful benefactors ISIL will find it difficult to compete anywhere outside of the rump of the remaining caliphate...
Furthermore, the overreliance on Iraqi counter-terrorism and special police forces as regular infantry in the fierce, door-to-door urban combat of Mosul is destroying the very capability the Iraqi state will need to win the occupation phase for a successful transition to stability, whatever form that might take. Who will fill that security vacuum? If by default the Iraqi government is forced to rely on its ad-hoc mix of popular mobilization forces, ISIL’s chances of a return in Iraq will be much higher due to its lack of legitimacy in Sunni areas. The legitimacy of the Abadi administration has been an underappreciated aspect of Iraq’s success against ISIL. This political mandate must be carried forward if the defeat of ISIL is to be a permanent one, and impending robust challenges by Abadi rivals — including former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the populist Muqtada al-Sadr — could sour Washington on future cooperation if either of these two attain power.
In Syria, the Assad regime’s chances of reclaiming territory in former rebel-held areas are much more suspect than its counterparts in Iraq, and surprisingly more complex due to the sheer number of actors in Syria with differing political end states. Any ISIL retreat east to its remaining rump state along the Euphrates will likely open up a fierce competition for resources and influence between tribes, jihadi groups, rebel groups, the state, and state-aligned proxy forces. Unlike in Iraq, ISIL has been an outsider with limited ties in Syria, although those relationships have grown stronger as ISIL has controlled territory and influenced populations. ISIL success since 2013 in exploiting divisions and stealing away fighters demonstrates how conducive this environment is group survival, and for this reason it will remain an influential entity for some time to come...
The challenge in Raqqa and the rest of eastern Syria will be the growing Kurdish-Arab and Kurdish-Turkish tensions. If the Kurdistan Workers’ Party aligned with Syrian Democratic Forces becomes involved in liberating urban areas, these tensions will likely erupt. Moreover, the Turks will likely never accede to a People’s Protection Unit (YPG) role in governance and the Kurdish militias could have trouble giving back what territory they are able to conquer. Despite being among the most effective fighting forces on the ground, will the Kurds eventually be jettisoned as an ally in favor of maintaining positive relations with Turkey? The United States finds itself in a precarious position, seeking at once to placate its NATO ally Turkey, while simultaneously reassuring the Kurds their hard fought gains are not just fleeting...
In best traditions of modern US-made international-security-related... erm... 'journalism', the authors are conveniently talking themselves past the problem.
Wrong. Alone the notion of 'the Assad regime's chances' indicates they've got no clue about what's going on in Syria.Quote:
In Syria, the Assad regime’s chances of reclaiming territory in former rebel-held areas...
Then, if at all, they should be discussing 'IRGC's chances of conquering and ethnically cleansing areas predominantly populated by Sunni Arabs, and this in order to establish firm presence and thus political influence for decades in advance, but also to reap economic benefits.
But, that is something the USA are staunchly ignoring. Instead, and should they ever come to the idea to write a similar feature on Yemen, the same authors are 1000% guaranteed going to talk about 'Iran-backed Houthis'...
'likely open'...?Quote:
Any ISIL retreat east to its remaining rump state along the Euphrates will likely open....
Welcome on planet Earth, dear aliens!
By side the fact that the Daesh is actually no part of the Syrian 'Civil' War - not for Syrians, not for Syrian insurgents, not for Assadists, not for the IRGC, and not for Russians - and thus a mere sidenote within the context at hand... but foremost: this is already happening. It just so happens the authors missed what happened in al-Bab area when this was liberated from the Daesh by Turkey-supported Syrian insurgents.
The same again: 'will be'...? I.e. this is not already the case?Quote:
The challenge in Raqqa and the rest of eastern Syria will be the growing Kurdish-Arab and Kurdish-Turkish tensions.
'If'?Quote:
If the Kurdistan Workers’ Party aligned with Syrian Democratic Forces becomes involved in liberating urban areas....
Do I have to post all citations of the PKK being the essence of the PYD, therefore the YPG, and thus the SDF too...? And, who 'liberated' Manbij and few other towns in the area? Who is currently on the brink of 'liberating' Tabqa? Vanuatuans, with aerial and SF-support from Chile...?
Well, the fact the Americans don't mind the Pentagon - i.e. the US military - messing around with the governance of the USA, means not this is right. Actually it is so that the - YPG - which is a military force - should be completely outside the loop of civilian governance. However, thanks to the USA, and thanks to the US ignorance of the fact that the YPG is at least 50% staffed by the PKK, this is ignored, just like it is ignore that the PKK - which is a Marxist terrorist organization of Kurds from Turkey - imposed itself (and thus the PYD and the YPG) upon Kurds in northern Syria.Quote:
Moreover, the Turks will likely never accede to a People’s Protection Unit (YPG) role in governance....
...standardised phraseology, making one wonder by what standards are they 'the most fighting effective force'? Provide the same support to any other party there (except Assadists: they wouldn't manage it even with full support of the entire US military), and it's going to become as effective.Quote:
Despite being among the most effective fighting forces on the ground...
Why? Why should anybody demand this? And, is anybody demanding this?Quote:
...will the Kurds eventually be jettisoned as an ally in favor of maintaining positive relations with Turkey?
No. All the various people around the World 'protest' against is the US cooperation with the PKK, which is a Marxist terrorist organization, the cooperation with which is against the law - in the USA, in all of the NATO and nearly all of the EU.
This means not even that Turkey would mind the US cooperation with Kurds - IF the Kurds in question wouldn't be from the PKK.
And the reason for this is that one just can't expect anything else from a Marxist terrorist organization, but to terrorise - i.e. apply violence. Which means that the only possible result of any war fought with such an organization on its side is just another war.
Now somebody tell me why is this so hard to understand...?
...for which the USA are themselves to blame. So, a US problem, but - and as so often - with tragic consequences for all those to whom it's directly related, vast majority of whom are no US citizens.Quote:
The United States finds itself in a precarious position...
Rus MoD held a briefing on principles of implementation of #Memorandum on Syria de-escalation zonesQuote:
Originally Posted by Azor
https://youtu.be/5cF-gIL8yzk
AND remember the US cannot fly and or participate in these safe zones...
Not taking that bait. Nice try though.Quote:
Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
Nice strawman. When did I laugh off the ARVN?Quote:
Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
Of course, with U.S. materiel aid and airpower, the ARVN could have held off the Spring Offensive, but the NLF insurgency would have continued indefinitely, particularly given the developments in Cambodia.
Cheney was SECDEF at the time, not a mere “politician”. As Bush strongly opposed the idea, why would there be any alerts or redeployments with regard to these weapons?Quote:
Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
You will note that in the aftermath of Desert Storm, the Clinton and Bush the Younger administrations believed that the U.S. could use conventional weapons to neutralize WMDs, including Russia’s; Russia and China, for their part, agreed and were very concerned about the Prompt Global Strike program.
Yet prior to Desert Storm, the Bush administration repeatedly warned Iraq that if it used WMDs against the U.S. or its allies, it would be open to U.S. nuclear strikes.
There was an obvious sea change in strategic thought after the Second Offset/Fight Outnumbered and Win/Precision-strike/RMA was successfully tested in the crucible of battle.
You avoided my response on why Hussein did not back down during the intervening five months, or how Bush could have prevented the invasion of Kuwait despite being unable to coerce Hussein's withdrawal...Quote:
Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
Yawn. We were discussing whether it was preferable to be facing guerrillas/subversives or conventional fighters, which is germane to this thread, as Daesh is defeated as a conventional fighting force. I have never claimed that Raqqa’s fall would end Daesh or that it would not revert to 2008-2013 form. What I did say was that once the American public sees Daesh driven underground, Washington has a greater ability to help resolve the other and more important conflicts plaguing Iraq and Syria.Quote:
Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
And? Russia is in no position to impose no-fly zones on the Coalition.Quote:
Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
I have not been able to find a map of the proposed NFZs but regardless, I would welcome it.
Basically, it would be a reversal of the scenario I suggested to CrowBat earlier, with Russia now being forced to fire first upon Coalition aircraft or back down. Russia will also have to explain how imposing a NFZ on the Coalition furthers the supposedly common goal of defeating Daesh. From a public relations standpoint, this places the onus on Russia to make a claim and then defend it.
Turkey supposedly agrees with the Russian "safe zone" concept in principle, but that is meaningless in practice as Turkey is not about to shoot down U.S. aircraft operating in Syria. While Turkey is enraged at the U.S. lionizing of the YPG, Russia has provided CAS for the YPG as well. If the PKK-PYD links, allegations of YPG ethnic and sectarian cleansing and the Turkish-Kurdish conflict are being discussed so openly, rest assured that behind closed doors there are efforts to deal with the problem...
Turkey has deployed more tanks to Akcakale, Urfa Province, opposite the #YPG/#PKK-held Tel Abyad, #Syria [v @metesohtaoglu].Quote:
Originally Posted by Azor
Azor...so are we now going to see a rain of Trump unleashed TLAMs?????
Assad continues to produce chemical WMD, #Iran and #Russia are aware of this, Western intel agency tells @BBCNews.
http://bbc.in/2p4nf1k
Assad is producing chemical WMD at branches of the #SSRC in Masyaf (Hama), Dummar and Barzeh (both near Damascus).
"Masyaf and Barzeh facilities both specialise in installing chemical weapons on long-range missiles and artillery."
Latest OPCW report [24 April] mentioned Barzeh and Dummar (Jamraya) as sites that had been inspected, samples taken. https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/...e_.pdf#…
Assad—surprise!—lied about "one of [SSRC's] research branches," claiming it did "defensive" work; it "develop[s] offensive capabilities."
Intel given to @BBCNews names Bassam al-Hassan as key in ordering CWMD attacks.
Was sanctioned by Treasury, 05/14
https://www.treasury.gov/press-cente...1.aspx#…
Turkey is recruiting Syrians in #Bursa to join Turkish police & stating that Syrians who in Turkish police will be given Turkish citizenship
Thuwar al-Sham fighter: "I think it is just a matter of time until [#Syria's rebels] all go to war with #HTS [al-Qaeda]."
U.S. supplied rebels enough support to make them targets for AQ/HTS, not enough to allow them to defend themselves.
SDF denies it reached a deal with ISIS that secures the evacuation of the extremist group from #Tabqa, reports ongoing "intensive clashes"
Analysis by @PaulIddon: Alleged deal for #ISIS’s withdrawal in Tabqa is not unprecedented in Syria
https://goo.gl/8gESGv
@ForeignPolicy Putin Has a New Secret Weapon in Syria: 1000 Chechen SF Troops.....
http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/04/...yria-chechens/
Azor...heads up....
Senior PKK commander Rıza Altun says PKK to declare Iraqi Kurdistan as a war zone and target Turkish military outposts there
So here's fun. The U.S. has "no evidence" of an overlap between #YPG and #PKK, says the Pentagon.
https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcr...ce-from-bag/#…
While DoD can't detect evidence for a #YPG/#PKK overlap, here is one of their employees stood next to Sahin Cilo, a living embodiment.
Here is the @CrisisGroup on the total integration of the #YPG within the #PKK's command structure
https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-e...-raqqa#…
NATO's Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism explaining that #PYD/#YPG *is* #PKK, not an "affiliate". https://imes.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/i...ft.pdf#…
The leadership, ideological, and personnel integration of #PKK and the #YPG/#PYD is detectable. https://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/...ganda/#…
Azor..........
USG has to continue the charade of distancing the PKK from the YPG/PYD for legal reasons......
But analytically it's an ex-argument.
WHY because it is hard to distance yourself in the US MSM if you are "suddenly seen" as supporting a Communist Kurdish terrorist group....while supposedly fighting another terrorist group...
WILL not be good for Trump's popularity numbers if that gets out...
BTW...these Russian proposed safe zones are the Russian way of "freezing the conflict"...just as they did in eastern Ukraine and Transnistria or Georgia....Quote:
Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
BUT WAIT......
Neither #Syria’s opposition nor the #Assad regime agreed to sign or attend the signing of the #Astana “de-escalation/secure zone” document.
Assad's delegation vetoed any language that implied the opposition retaining control of territory in #Syria, even if in an interim period.
Assad’s delegation also vetoed the inclusion of language (in earlier drafts) banning #Syria’s airforce from operating over opposition areas
Opposition is [rightly] skeptical due to lack of *any* enforcement mechanism/guarantees by stakeholder countries.
This is the same as previous CoH/ceasefire “deals”
We get a little calm, but then escalation after #Assad had time to prepare for Round 127
Ragıp Soylu
Verified account
@ragipsoylu
Top Turkish officials visiting Washington today: Chief Advisor İbrahim Kalın, Turkish Military Commander Gen. Akar, Intel Chief Fidan
Some tough conversations ahead, here.
*U.S. isn’t going to drop the #YPG/#SDF.
*#Turkey considers #YPG/#SDF its greatest security threat.
BREAKING: US troops in #Syria.
LCCs report 250 US troops & 48 armored vehicles just entered #Syria's al-Malikiya, across from #Iraq border.
After several months in #Turkey "Abu al-Tow” had returned home to Jabal al-Zawiyeh.
He recently posted pics of him mocking #HTS signs.
“Abu al-Tow” (affiliated w. #FSA’s 1st Coastal Division) returned to #Idlib as 12+ FSA groups are considering a large merger in #Idlib.
Sources: Suheil al-Hamoud ("Abu al-Tow") only briefly went to #Turkey in early-2017. He has mostly been in west #Aleppo & northern #Idlib.
Sources: While “Abu al-Tow” has maintained contact with the #FSA’s 1st Coastal Division, he’s recently established work with Faylaq al-Sham.
For those, not so firm with #Syria's geography.
This is what the #Kremlin regime's "zones of de-escalation" mean for Western military jets
AND Trump's FP response to this is what again????
"even with notice"
To be very clear: #Russia's "de-escalation zones" are indeed a justification to defend #Assad bases vs. #US air strikes.
US and western jets will only be allowed to fly over #Raqqa and #DeirEzzor to fight ISIS.
Also southern ISIS-held areas seem to become NFZ.
Meanwhile in #Syria ...
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k1enrmxRjZg#…
By Pavel Felgenhauer at Jamestown Foundation: https://jamestown.org/program/putin-...n-supervision/
Selected Excerpt:
Quote:
Moscow wants to win the Syrian war and use this victory as a basis of a future dominant role in the Middle East. But this is impossible to achieve only through bombing: Moscow must split and undermine internal Syrian and international resistance to its actions. If Trump, Erdoğan and Merkel want “safe zones” in Syria for a public relations win and to curtail the flow of refugees, they may have them, the Kremlin apparently believes. Selected Syrian opposition warlords may, in turn, receive designated fiefdoms—“de-escalation zones.” Such a strategy worked in Chechnya; it could work in Syria. Or at least that is seemingly the plan.