While not Solomon by any means, I can agree with both sides of that.
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Originally Posted by
jcustis
"The idea that military force cannot defeat the insurgency is rubbish. It's just in this case it's politically pointless, because the cost cannot match the benefit."
... I don't think military force can defeat a very critical component: insurgent will...For that effort, the full spectrum of resources need to be brought to the table, and frankly, force is probably about 20-25%.
Will cannot be defeated but it can be rendered only marginally if at all relevant. The determinant is simply how much force you are willing to use. If you use enough, their will won't be defeated but you will make it too costly for their will to be effective thus achieving a more acceptable result for yourself.
That, in essence, in this case, gets back to the cost not matching the benefit...
Which, in turn, creates a problem for the west in the current case because the west is unwilling to use enough force (or to be mean or brutal enough, to put it another way) and thus provides prospective opponents a very exploitable failure of political will. The Comintern and Socialist International did their jobs well.
The problem is thus lack of political will, not a failure of force. Applying minimal force -- up to your (and the COIN crowd's) probable level -- will doom us to a never ending conflict in which the opposition will ultimately gain the advantage due to western emotional exhaustion.
Turning the other cheek got us where we are...
Hanging pictures with sledgehammers...
...and railway ties in a room finished with gypsum.:wry:
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
Turning the other cheek got us where we are...
A market segmentation approach would acknowledge the impression two simultaneous wars have on the youth bulge while acknowledging the long-term view of our resident grey-beards.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
That, in essence, in this case, gets back to the cost not matching the benefit...
Can we find a way to cost effectively improve America's position?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
Which, in turn, creates a problem for the west in the current case because the west is unwilling to use enough force (or to be mean or brutal enough, to put it another way) and thus provides prospective opponents a very exploitable failure of political will. The Comintern and Socialist International did their jobs well.
The problem is thus lack of political will, not a failure of force. Applying minimal force -- up to your (and the COIN crowd's) probable level -- will doom us to a never ending conflict in which the opposition will ultimately gain the advantage due to western emotional exhaustion.
The Comintern & Socialist International comment has me scratching my head...are you saying these folks abolished the bourgeois and associated state in Afghanistan?
I take issue with the apparent implication that all that is needed to regulate conflict is the application of that single variable, force/security.
Over the course of a year in Iraq I learned first hand that the deft application of a mixture of variables (security, governance, economics, information, and diplomacy) in a AO can more or less cost effectively regulate conflict levels. I also note that the daily application of this multivariate formula, to regulate conflict, is often used to great success inside of a variety of nation-states to include the US :wry:
Good example of the problem...
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Originally Posted by
Surferbeetle
...and railway ties in a room finished with gypsum.:wry:
Bad allegory in most senses but very good in one -- do not try to do a job with the wrong tools and materials...
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A market segmentation approach would acknowledge the impression two simultaneous wars have on the youth bulge while acknowledging the long-term view of our resident grey-beards.
Equally bad silliness. No market involved; The youth bulge is, mostly, too shallow and narcissistic to really have a clue and the grey beards obviously aren't into long term views. If they were, we wouldn't be in this position. Apply that to, not least, the education system * , moral values * , the health care issues -- plural -- the economic situation or the wars ** . The wars at least have causes not solely related to US arrogance, greed, intransigence and stupidity even though all those adverse attributes plus a glaring lack of imagination and military acumen are obvious in the way we are 'fighting' them.
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Can we find a way to cost effectively improve America's position?
Easy -- stop interfering with other nations, develop that missing long term view and when attacked, repel the attack rapidly, forcefully, effectively with the right tools for the job and don't get stuck on stupid and expensive (in all aspects) long term building projects while fighting people you don't need to fight.
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The Comintern & Socialist International comment has me scratching my head...are you saying these folks abolished the bourgeois and associated state in Afghanistan?
Not at all; over the last three quarters of a Century, they purposely have preached non-violence etc. etc. (for the west, not themselves), they infiltrated the educational systems, provided moral dysfunction to weaken the west (see the asterisked items above) and have generally aimed toward world government on the so-called Social Democratic model and they did all that quite well. They effectively emasculated their perceived enemy in the strictest sense of the word. They also fomented hate and discontent on all the fault lines that the British and French created by drawing lines on maps to establish territorial jurisdictions which are now, nominally Nations. They did that in the course of weakening the west (the double asterisks above) and, again, were quite successful.
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I take issue with the apparent implication that all that is needed to regulate conflict is the application of that single variable, force/security.
Your perception of an implication is your problem. I did not write nor did I imply what you say. What I did write was that the measured application of force can negate willpower, no more. I also said that the west is unlikely to apply great -- I will now say 'adequate' -- force due to the aforesaid emasculation and current societal norms. That failure (and it is that) literally invites us into still more expensive FID rebuilding fiascoes when the object should be to avoid them due to their base inefficiency as a mechanism, their tendency to provide low rate but continuing casualties and the long term commitment and expense entailed.
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Over the course of a year in Iraq I learned first hand that the deft application of a mixture of variables (security, governance, economics, information, and diplomacy) in a AO can more or less cost effectively regulate conflict levels. I also note that the daily application of this multivariate formula, to regulate conflict, is often used to great success inside of a variety of nation-states to include the US :wry:
I do not doubt that, I've seen that application -- rarely at all deft, just clumsily adequate -- many places and know it can do that. I also have seen tailored and effective (not necessarily massive, just well designed) force properly and rapidly applied then as rapidly removed when the message was sent and received eliminate the need to do the multivirate, multi-year and multi-expensive thing...
Further, I've noted that such an effort removes the need to regulate conflict because the short sharp conflict causes less damage and fewer casualties of all types in the long term.
It is not cost effective to enter into a long term multivariate application of security, governance, economic, information, and diplomatic actions when a short, sharp blow can be as or more effective in eliminating a threat or ameliorating a problem. There may be times when such missions are unavoidable. I've not seen one that met that criteria since 1949. Not one.
The Asymmetric Political Fight
Posted by Wilf
Quote:
The idea that military force cannot defeat the insurgency is rubbish. It's just in this case it's politically pointless, because the cost cannot match the benefit.
Posted by Ken
Quote:
The problem is thus lack of political will, not a failure of force. Applying minimal force -- up to your (and the COIN crowd's) probable level -- will doom us to a never ending conflict in which the opposition will ultimately gain the advantage due to western emotional exhaustion.
Turning the other cheek got us where we are...
Quote:
Easy -- stop interfering with other nations, develop that missing long term view and when attacked, repel the attack rapidly, forcefully, effectively with the right tools for the job and don't get stuck on stupid and expensive (in all aspects) long term building projects while fighting people you don't need to fight.
I agree with Wilf to a point, but there is a large degree of asymmetry in our current western way of conducting political warfare compared to our foes. Insurgency is political warfare at the tactical level (conventional warfare is also waged for political purposes, but the political aspects are generally waged at the strategic level, military force compells State leaders to negotiate).
The communists, the taliban, and others are successful with their use of force because they direct it against the people to the degree necessary to force them to organize politically under their party (dissenters either keep quiet or have a short life). On the other hand, we come in with our western ideas of economic development, free markets, and democracy. In short we're pushing more chaos on top of chaos in a post conflict situation, under the "assumption" that the people will embrace this, when what they're looking for at this point is some degree of security and predictability, not blue dye on their finger. The other side is doing a better job of providing this. If we're going to meddle in other people's affairs, then we need to slow the train down, apply the appropriate level force to suppress the will of the people to fight us, force a form of political organization upon them (the closer to their accepted norms the easier it will be), and then, and only then, if we can afford to be altruistic we can gradually "encourage" them to evolve towards democracy and more effective economic models. I agree with Wilf, insurgencies can be defeated or perhaps more accurately suppressed, but probably not by western forces using our current doctrine. We're too impatient and prolong the conflict by pushing democracy too quickly.
To Ken's points I agree 100%. We have other options (or at least we did before we articulated to the world we were going to spread democracy and free markets) for detering attacks, and we can respond to attacks with overwhelming force when appropriate. We don't have to default to occupation and nation building in every case. Other options generally have a greater chance of success (regardless if that success is short lived or not, because realistically that is the best we can hope for in many cases). Furthermore, in the long run they are less cruel than the current norm of protracted conflict.
In some situations it is in our interests to engage in protracted conflicts, but there seems to be this thought that our nation's strategy requires us to rebuild Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia and a handfull of other countries in our image because that is the only way we can win, which IMO is simply a day dream, and a very dangerous one.
Good points, Bill. While the desire to provide better lives for people
is an admirable goal, folks forget that military force is not at all amenable to that -- those are intelligence, diplomatic and aid related efforts, all mostly civilian and non-combat functions. Plus the effort is most often not going to produce results worth the risk and cost.
I do not question that we need well trained and adequately resourced IW, CA and PsyOps elements to do FID and SFA. Nor do I question they will be needed when all other options fail. They simply should not be the first -- or the only -- choice. We neglected those areas for too long and while we have now hauled them back aboard, we still need to do more to enhance their capabilities.
However, we also need to do far better in efforts to avoid their use AFTER the issue has developed into a need for force and GPF commitment. We must have the capability to do that but we somehow have to sort out the conflicts that arise from simply having a capability means to many that it must be used. I've carried a concealed firearm, legally and illegally (in some places) for many years but I have yet to use any of them other than twice in quite different circumstances as a display of capability.
This statement of yours:
Quote:
"...there seems to be this thought that our nation's strategy requires us to rebuild Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia and a handful of other countries in our image because that is the only way we can win, which IMO is simply a day dream, and a very dangerous one."
is quite correct and attempts to 'help' that cause more problems and chaos do not really help anyone.
That statement ranks right up there with Dave Maxwell's:
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"Perhaps we should strike COIN and CT from the lexicon and talk about real strategy of ends, ways, and means instead of trying to devise strategy based on formulas (e.g., 20-25 troops for every 1000 people) - of course we love the science because it is too hard to explain the art."
Strategy is indeed an art -- and good strategy avoids conflict or if conflict must happen, sets the parameters to one's own advantage.
Playing by the other guy's rules is just dumb, no matter how well you attempt to play...
Any good evidence that foreign presence is the main driver of Pashtun insurgency?
I have heard this argument several times, mostly anecdotally. Matthew Hoh raised it in his letter of resignation.
The assertion is that most of the Pashtun insurgents are not fighting for the Taliban, but rather against foreign presence and a corrupt national government.
I have also heard some suggest - again, anecdotally - that the Taliban knows this and uses that rhetoric in their recruitment / propaganda efforts more than promoting Taliban ideals.
I completely understand that insurgent motivations can be complicated. You can't necessarily pin it on "one thing." But it led me to wonder about two things:
1. Beyond these anecdotes is there is any evidence - even polling or surveys or anything - that would support or refute the argument that at this juncture foreign presence and national government corruption drive the AFG insurgency more strongly than any pro-Taliban sentiment? (Maybe this even varies by region??)
2. Is there any merit - as part of a strategic assessment - to considering whether our mere presence (and possibly support for the local government) may make an insurgency worse, rather than better...independent of what we do when we're there? If so, how might a strategist (and I know there are a number of you out there) consider this is in his/her decisionmaking calculus?
A Study of Pashtun "Tribes" in Afghanistan
I checked up on Ghosts of Alexander today and saw that it has been declared dead (who knew that ghosts could die again?). D'oh.
But, I re-read a couple of his older posts, including Petraeus and McChrystal Drink Major Gant's Snake Oil and Gravediggers Disinter Tribal Militia Corpse. In doing so, I came across something that I had overlooked before. In his critique of the writings of the Jim Gants's of the world, he posted this piece from the Human Terrain System, published in September 2009.
My Cousin’s Enemy is My Friend: A Study of Pashtun “Tribes” in Afghanistan
I read through it and found it to be a good explanation for why tribes may not be a good (or even less bad) conduit for us to work through or not a good / less bad unit to empower. That is, it's a good explanation if the observations are valid and the reasoning is sound. It made sense to me, but I'm not an anthropologist and I've never been to Afghanistan.
My question to the board: Is anyone aware of any informed critiques of this paper - positive or negative? Or, for those with relevant knowledge/experience, what are your thoughts on the paper?
Helmand's head of council for tribal elders
This BBC story fits here IMHO:
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As the biggest offensive in Afghanistan since 2001 continues in southern Helmand province, the head of council for Helmand's tribal elders, Haji Abdurahman Sabir, tells BBC Pashto's Emal Pasarly about the frustrations of local residents.
More on this:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8522176.stm
When Taliban fighters change sides
Again the BBC:
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When Taliban fighters change sides. The Afghan government is having some success in winning over pro-Taliban fighters but the difficulty then is how to guarantee the security of those who give up their arms, as Martin Patience discovered.
More on link:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programme...nt/8520754.stm
Paktia & Khost: where tribes matter
Hat tip to FRI for this description of how engagement works and is apparently ignored by officialdom:
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While the battle for Marjah plays out I want to go back and talk tribes with a post about one of the few places in Afghanistan where the traditional tribal system is relevant – the border area with Pakistan in the southeastern provinces of Paktia and Khost.
See:http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=2604
Essential reading on Pashtun culture
Hat tip to Circling the Lion's Den, who commend reading 'Doing Pashto
Pashtunwali as the ideal of honourable behaviour and tribal life
among the Pashtuns' on:http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/uploa...wali-FINAL.pdf
I am sure there is a thread on such culture matters, but dropped in here. Ah, it was a 2009 RFI and has other sources:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=7941
I don’t know enough about Afghan social organization to speak to it specifically
but what I know about the study of social organization in general might throw some light on the initial posters’ query. Elman Service codified the traditional neo-evolutionary band –> tribe –> chiefdom –> state sequence in 1962. The inclusion of tribe within the model was critiqued by otherwise sympathetic scholars due to the lack of a unified definition for the term (Fried 1966; Hymes 1968). In 1985 Joan Townsend proposed ‘autonomous village’ as an alternative (see Carneiro 1987:760–61).
The band/tribe/chiefdom/state typology is still commonly trotted out in Anthro 101 lectures and introductory level textbooks but I personally find the substitution of autonomous village for tribe to be a vast refinement for the following reason: the terms autonomous village, band, and state are consistently used to refer to institutions that have governance as their primary function while the referents of the term tribe typically do not. There certainly do exist tribes which are about the doing of politics. Historical research of such an institution will typically reveal that it emerged out of colonial administrators’ need to have a formally delimited and vetted group with whom to transact business. Such is the case with those tribes recognized by the BIA as well as with the Montagnards (for which, see Salemink 1991). Correct me if I am wrong, but don’t the Tribal Areas of Pakistan have an analogous history?
All of that to allow me to say that if you are a representative and/or policy maker from a foreign land looking for parties with whom to negotiate, tribes—excepting of course those you know to be of the sort built to interface with colonial administrators—are probably not the best place to look.
Carneiro, Robert L. 1987. “Cross-currents in the theory of state formation.” American Ethnologist 14 (4): 756–70. doi:10.1525/ae.1987.14.4.02a00110.
Fried, Morton H. 1966. “On the concepts of ‘tribe’ and ‘tribal society.’” Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences, ser. 2 28 (4): 527–40.
Hymes, Dell H. 1968. Linguistic problems in defining the concept of ‘tribe.’ In Essays on the problem of tribe, ed. June Helm, 23–48. Proceedings of the 1967 Annual Meeting, American Ethnological Society. Seattle: American Ethnological Society and University of Washington Press. Reprint, Language in use: readings in sociolinguistics, ed. John Baugh and Joel Sherzer. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1984, 7–27.
Salemink, Oscar. 1991. Mois and Maquis: the invention and appropriation of Vietnam’s Montagnards from Sabatier to the CIA. In Colonial situations: essays on the contextualization of ethnographic knowledge, ed. George W. Stocking, 243–84. Vol. 7 in History of Anthropology. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Service, Elman. 1962. Primitive social organization. An evolutionary perspective. Random House Studies in Anthropology, AS3. New York.
Book Review The Pashtun Question by Abubakar Siddique
A book review by SWC contributor Hamid Hussain of The Pashtun Question by Abubakar Siddique:
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The Pashtun Question is a timely arrival in view of winding down of U.S. and NATO mission in Afghanistan. Abubakar Siddique is well qualified to tackle the Pashtun question. He is a Pashtun from the tribal territory of South Waziristan and spent his early childhood there. He is anthropologist by training and in his career as journalist he covered Pakistan’s tribal areas as well as Afghanistan. He spent lot of time in the field and familiar with major actors in Pashtun lands on both sides of the Durand Line; boundary separating Pakistan and Afghanistan.
This book is a good resource for general reader as it provides the background of the genesis of conflict on both sides of the Durand Line with detailed analysis of civil war in Afghanistan. For experts, it condenses the thirty year long civil war in less than three hundred pages. Book also provides details of rise of extremism in the region that is now plaguing a large swath of territory and impeding the political and economic progress both in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The book’s format is in chronological order of events that provides a very readable historical narrative. Abubakar provides some details about conflict in Waziristan based on his own and other available resources. This segment could have been expanded especially the process of dismantling of tribal structure in a very short period of time. Physical elimination and flight of traditional tribal elders, destruction of traditional instruments of stability in a tribal society and entrenchment of extremist elements in tribal lands needs further exploration. However, coverage of this subject is extremely dangerous and it is very difficult to engage people in serious discussion even those who have fled their lands in tribal territory to cities (this is based on my own visits to the region and interactions with Pashtuns from diverse backgrounds). Many tribal leaders have been assassinated even in major cities of Peshawar, Rawalpindi and Karachi. I was reminded of this fact when few years ago, I was reviewing some old colonial era files at Peshawar archives. I was going through the file of a tribal elder of Mohmand tribe spanning his life in first half of twentieth century. One of the officer working in the archives was also from Mohmand tribal agency and he told me that the son of this tribal elder fled to Peshawar after militants took control of the area. He was shot dead near his house in Peshawar.
In writing about an ethnic group, the narratives of a native and outsider provide unique perspectives. An outsider can be more objective in his analysis of the group as he is not part of the intra-group rivalries. However, he can easily miss the insight of the group due to language and cultural barriers. This is the case of most of the work done about Pashtuns in English language by British military and civil administrators. A native can bring the insight in view of being the member of the group but he can also downplay the inherent weaknesses of the group and tend to blame everything bad to outside forces. There is very limited scholarly material published by Pashtun authors. Abubakar’s work is a welcome addition and being a Pashtun, he is able to bring mirror in the room to highlight the weaknesses of Pashtun society. He skillfully analyzes how Pashtun groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan used outside sources for power struggles in their lands. Armed conflict is a painful event but it has its own rules. No matter what outside forces want, it was Pashtun who happily blew up electricity pylon on Jalalabad-Kabul highway for a handout of $100 in 1980s and 1990s and today ideological indoctrination from an extremist Arab and hand out from a rich Arab living in luxury in his own country, he is beheading his own people and blowing up schools. He is responsible for his acts and must be held accountable for destroying the present and future of his own people.
The author argues in the book that rise of extremism and violence in Pashtun lands is due to failure of nation states of Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is not unique to Pashtun areas and violence emerges from some kind of failure of the state and society. This rule is equally applicable to the carnage of two world wars where belligerents were developed countries as well as violence in failing states of Africa. Pushtuns have also been beneficiaries where they ruled Afghanistan as royalists, communists and Islamists and in case of Pakistan were able to get more than fair share in civil and military bureaucracies as well as economic sphere. The author addresses the important question of how to extricate the Pashtun society in Afghanistan and Pakistan from the violent cycles by resolving existing border disagreements, adhering to principle of non-interference and political and economic progress of both countries.
The Pashtun Question is a must read for those engaged in Afghanistan and Pakistan. More importantly, it should be read by Pakistanis and Afghanis especially Pashtuns. This will help jump start a discussion among Pushtuns about their future. Th author should seriously consider translation of the book into Urdu and Pashtu to make it available to a wider audience in the region.
Available from London based Hurst & Co:http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/...htun-question/ or via Amazon:http://www.amazon.com/Pashtun-Questi...shtun+Question
The Taliban and the Changing Nature of Pashtun Nationalism
A topical update from National Interest. It is sub-titled:
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The resurgent Taliban are driven only partly by religion. They are motivated equally, if not more, by the search for Pashtun dignity and revenge.
Link:https://nationalinterest.org/feature/taliban-and-changing-nature-pashtun-nationalism-41182?