I can't be right all the time
No problem. I am not emotionally wedded to the idea. I do think that COIN has become the panacea for all conflicts and while I am a staunch advocate of it in the right place, I don't think rural Afghanistan is the right place.
You are probably right that there is no charismatic leader ... no Hitler or Stalin to attack, but I don’t see the people of Afghanistan as the center of gravity in the fight in the same way it was in Iraq. I see them more like the townspeople in "The Magnificent Seven". They did not support the bandits (Taliban), they would be happy to see them gone. They live with the Taliban to to survive, not because they believe in the revolution. So if you dedicate your assets fighting the revolution that is not happening, you are not fighting the right war.
As far as the security issue you are right, but it is much more difficult in Afghanistan as the towns are smaller and more remote. Here is where I do see the advantage of paved roads. They allow response in a much quicker and safer manner. Again, the distinction with Iraq must be made. There is no oil revenue. There is no funding source that is going to allow a police station in every town. There is not a tax base and once the donor countires stop paying there will be no way to keep the local tribes on your side.
Not sure there is a military solution to the problems of Afghanistan.
Have to go with you on this one
Quote:
Originally Posted by
TheCurmudgeon
No problem. I am not emotionally wedded to the idea. I do think that COIN has become the panacea for all conflicts and while I am a staunch advocate of it in the right place, I don't think rural Afghanistan is the right place.
You are probably right that there is no charismatic leader ... no Hitler or Stalin to attack, but I don’t see the people of Afghanistan as the center of gravity in the fight in the same way it was in Iraq. I see them more like the townspeople in "The Magnificent Seven". They did not support the bandits (Taliban), they would be happy to see them gone. They live with the Taliban to to survive, not becuase they believe in the revolution. So if you dedicate your assets fighting the revolution that is not happening, you are not fighting the right war.
As far as the security issue you are right, but it is much more difficult in Afghanistan as the towns are smaller and more remote. Here is where I do see the advantage of paved roads. They allow response in a much quicker and safer manner. Again, the distinction with Iraq must be made. There is no oil revenue. There is no funding source that is going to allow a police station in every town. There is not a tax base and once the donor countires stop paying there will be no way to keep the local tribes on your side.
Not sure there is a military solution to the problems of Afghanistan.
Some COIN practices from recent experience will work very well in certain more concentrated areas, more out-lying areas jab and move jab and move while developing "understandings with local leaders and make them and us accountable for those agreements (long and short offer them alternatives (when they tire of the Taleb's again they'll come to you), do whatever possible to work with the Pakistanis on border concentrations hard and relentlessly.
Lot's of time, whole lots of money, little bit of luck and a whole lot of sweat.
The answer would unfortunately be
Quote:
Originally Posted by
davidbfpo
In some respects Afghanistan is a "sideshow" to Pakistan.
I cannot see the Pakistani military changing to our benefit their policy stance; so what can the Pakistani politicians do? Clearly mobilising popular support is easier on "softer" issues and history indicates the public know their politicians are weak - often leading to military intervention.
The solution escapes me.
davidbfpo
beyond anyone considering it would seem to come down to making the border region the Pak military's problem rather than diversion. That however may be more readily accomplished by our common enemy there long before we figure out how to accomplish that?
If it all comes down to priorities how do you encourage another countries priorities to come more in line with your own?
Has there been a generational change?
Earlier models of insurgency spend a great deal of time building and preserving a cell structure while establishing a shadow government, a (semi-)legitimate political front, and eventually creating 'no-go' areas within the region. There has to be some form of sanctuary (historically geographical, and often in a different sovereign region) from the beginning, and usually external financial and material support.
AQ has written a new script. Their public statements assert that their plan is that
Quote:
"NO one should feel safe without submitting to Islam, and those who refuse to submit must pay a high price. The Islamist movement must aim to turn the world into a series of "wildernesses" where only those under jihadi rule enjoy security."
, Sheik Abu-Bakar Naji, in "Governance in the Wilderness". Rather than methodicly building up their capabilities, they are trying to disrupt their opponents and move in to the security void. They are not bothering with much in the way of a legitimate political front in the system (like Sinn Fein), but establishing a new political system in vacuums (like the Taliban). Much of this is done exploiting 'wannabes', viral disemination of TTPs, and rather than doing things themselves, encouraging others to do things for them.
What has stayed the same; the need for sanctuaries (although some aspects of traditional sanctuaries have migrated into the internet), and the need for financial and material support. Zakat (Islamic charitable donations mandated by the Koran) is a natural source of income, as they sell themselves as a "holy" cause, and historically, terrorists routinely use conventional crime as income source. I'm not saying AQ is in the opium business, but they would surely be tempted by it, and if their not in it, the 'good Muslims' in the trade have to make Zakat somewhere... Of course, there are many illicit and profitable trafficks in Central Asia, one of the more novel ones being the smuggling of birds of prey.
I think the AQ model is well suited to a theologically based movement, which explains the departure from the traditional models which were ideologically and politically based.
Not to put too fine a point on it...
Van,
Are we talking of the Taliban in AFG, or are we talking AQ and some sort of "global insurgency"? You seem to float between the two.
I know the two are related in some ways but they are not synonymous.
To characterize the AQ ideology (movement if you want) writ large as a Global insurgency would seem to stretch the definition of insurgency beyond its useful purpose. AQ is most at odds with the muslim world most of all. It seeks a fundamental revival that it sees as only possible with the removal of western influence.
Taliban is fighting the newly constituted government, it serves the purposes of AQ, but it can more properly be characterized as an insurgency. However, I don't see why we would deem people who blow themselves up as some new form of insurgency. Rather tactics, despicable in the sense that individuals are manipulated in such a way and certainly a difficult tactical challenge, but don't see how it fundamentally changes the way we think about COIN
If you take away the fact that your dealling with
human beings, whats the difference between IED's,VBIED's, SB's except the preparation and deployment process.
Wouldn't you still want to focus on the Pre-prep and prep phases just the same. It may sound callous but is it not still a reality?
"Inside the Taliban," Mail & Guardian (ZAF) Online, 23 Dec 08
Some highlights from this article....
Quote:
..."Salar is the new Falluja," said Qomendan Hemmet emphatically. "The Americans and the Afghan army control the highway and 5m on each side. The rest is ours." Salar district in Wardak province lies 80km south of Kabul. The Kandahar-Kabul passing through it is a major supply line for United States and Nato troops. Like the Baghdad-Fallujah road, it is littered with holes from improvised explosive devices and carcasses of burnt-out Nato supply trucks and containers....
Quote:
Hemmet is a Taliban veteran who started fighting against the Northern Alliance forces in the mid-Nineties, when he was 17. He went into hiding after the capital fell, becoming the commander of the Salar district after the previous leader died three years ago. "Against the Northern Alliance we fought face to face. This war is more difficult, the enemy controls the skies and they have many weapons. Sometimes I am scared. But we yearn for fighting the kafirs [unbelievers]. It's a joyful thing."
Quote:
Mullah Muhamadi, one of Hemmet's men, arrives wearing a long leather jacket and big turban. "This is not just a guerrilla war, and it's not an organised war with fronts," he said. "It's both. "When we control a province we must provide service to the people. We want to show them we can rule, and we are ready for when we take over Kabul, that we have learned from our mistakes." Muhamadi said his group aimed to carry out about three attacks a week, but they did not always have enough ammunition. "Each area has a different strategy. Here it's attacking the main road, but everywhere in this province the countryside is in our control."
Quote:
He said the Taliban's main problems were bandits and land disputes, and that in solving them "we win the hearts of the people". "We went from the jihad to the government and now we are in the jihad again. We have learned from our mistakes. The leaders are the same but the fighters are new and they don't want to be like those who ruled and made mistakes."
Quote:
"I convince them that the Taliban are coming. We use all the facilities we have, our words and our pens to recruit for the movement, in the university, the bazaar and everywhere in the city." The irony is that he is using the freedom of speech provided by the Afghan government. "There is free speech now and we are not scared of the government. We work cautiously, we talk to the people as if we are talking about political and daily issues. The government is too weak to monitor us."
Mujahid delink from Taliban
http://pakobserver.net/200905/01/news/topstories04.asp
Quote:
Afghan insurgents delink from Taliban
Akhtar Jamal
Islamabad—Afghan insurgents known as “Talilban” are apparently disassociating themselves from more brutal Taliban militants in Pakistan and have even stopped calling themselves as Taliban.
A close study of statements issued by Afghan Taliban showed that for some time they have ceased using the word Taliban and have began calling themselves as “Mujahideen of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.”
According to area experts the move is apparently designed to de-link with brutal Taliban who are getting highly unpopular due to recent atrocious moves and horrifying killings of kidnapped prisoners.
Afghan experts saye that Mullah Omar and his close acquaintances had more than once denounced any action inside Pakistan and had ordered concentration only against “occupation foreign forces.”
More at the link. Very interesting development, and frankly, one I'd expected long before this. Very few places in A-stan are the Taliban well-loved.
Not a good subject for armchair analysts ...
e.g., JMM. But below are some Wiki links (which might be used as a start to a lot of Googling). Probably best to keep in mind that Taliban generically means students - so, the "Taliban" are not a monolith.
Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM, English: Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law) - These are the folks in Swat and Buner creating recent news, led by Sufi Muhammad bin Alhazrat Hassan (commonly Maulana Sufi Muhammad), and his son in law Maulana Qazi Fazlullah. This group is an offshoot from Jamaat-e-Islami (Pakistani political party founded in 1941 by Syed Abul A'ala Maududi).
All above not to be confused with Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP; Students' Movement of Pakistan) is a mainstream Taliban militant umbrella group in Pakistan, with apparent closer ties to Mullah Omar and UBL. Baitullah Mehsud is the leader of the pack, which came together ca. 2007-2009.
All of this gets more complicated, as per the following from the last link:
Quote:
[edit] Leadership dispute
On March 27, 2009, Pakistan's Daily Times reported that Baitullah Mehsud's group was engaged in a dispute with a group lead by Qari Zainuddin Mehsud for control of South Waziristan.[38] The Daily Times described Qari Zainuddin as the "self-appointed successor of Taliban commander Abdullah Mehsud." Both groups had distributed pamphlets leveling accusations against the other groups' leader. Qari Zainuddin stated that Baitullah's group was not practicing jihad because Islam forbids suicide attacks. Baitullah's pamphlet claimed that Qari Zainuddin was a government puppet and a traitor to Islam and to the Mehsud tribe.[38] Qari Zainuddin was reported to have the support of Maulvi Nazir, a senior Taliban leader, and to have allied with the Bhittani tribe.[38]
Note 38 sources to this article.
Anyway, the "Taliban" are not a monolith - with quite a bit of linking and de-linking in "its" history.
Best I can do from my armchair on a Sunday afternoon.
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar backgrounder
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his group, according to Peter Bergen, received huge amounts of US aid, and of Saudi aid also:
Quote:
Author Peter Bergen states that "by the most conservative estimates, $600 million" in American aid through Pakistan "went to the Hizb party, ... Hekmatyar's party had the dubious distinction of never winning a significant battle during the war, training a variety of militant Islamists from around the world, killing significant numbers of mujahideen from other parties, and taking a virulently anti-Western line. In addition to hundreds of millions of dollars of American aid, Hekmatyar also received the lion's share of aid from the Saudis.[21]"
21. Bergen, Peter L., Holy war, Inc. : inside the secret world of Osama bin Laden, New York : Free Press, c2001., p.69
That's a version of a lot of things...
To answer your direct question, a literal translation of Talib or Taleb is "A Person in need (of something)" in Arabic. It is popularly used for 'student.' The normal plural would be 'tullab' in Arabic but the Pashto plural is to add the 'an (Which in Arabic makes it 'two students'). A large batch of Koranic students out of the Paksitani Madrassas became the best organized and the largest of many factions in Afghanistan after the USSR departed. Since they were mostly students and were quite religious, they called themselves the Students; the Taleb An in Pashto. They later became the de-facto government is Afghanistan.
The world Talib is also used for 'seeker,' context dependent, in Arabic, Urdu and Pashto. It's also a popular name for boys in both India and East Africa. Abu Talib was the uncle of Mohammed and the Father of Ali, the founder of the Shi'i sect of Islam.
Webb as he often does opened his mouth before engaging his brain... :wry:
Those links posit some stuff that has been said and / or corroborated by others and refuted by still others. The owners acknowledge they're apostate Muslims. Some of their stuff is over the top but most is sorta reasonable. Viewers choice...
P.S.
David is right below -- I should have clarified that those were Afghan Students out of the Pakistani Schools and that it was an Afghan aggregation. It was supported to an extent and partly funded by Pakistan -- and Saudi interests...
New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field
On Monday 23 November Dr Antonio Giustozzi, Research Fellow at the Crisis States Research Centre at the London School of Economics, spoke on his edited book “Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field” (C Hurst & Co, 2009). Described as 'the authority on the Taliban'.
Speech: http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-p...-afghan-field/ (27 mins) and Q&A (37mins). I had a snag as the volume was too low to listen easily.
Dr Antonio Giustozzi is a research fellow at the Crisis States Research Centre at the London School of Economics and has already authored “Empires of Mud” (C. Hurst. & Co, 2009), “Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan 2002-2007” (C Hurst & Co, 2008), and “War, politics and society in Afghanistan, 1978-1992” (Georgetown University Press, 2000). He is currently researching various aspects of governance and politics in Afghanistan and has written several articles and papers on this subject, covering 'warlordism', the formation of the new Afghan National Army, the Afghan insurgency in the 1980s and state building. He previously served in the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (2003-4).
Taliban strategy to capture foreign troops and civilians
All,
I thought I would highlight this since it is open source and to ensure wide dissemination. The Quetta Shura Taliban, in one of their publications, advocates capture operations of coalition troops and foreign civilians. More at the link and here.
The Taliban Are Still Here to Stay
I am sure SWC have discussed the Taliban in many ways, but possibly not under this heading.
SWC member Melissa Payson co-authored an article 'The Taliban Are Still Here to Stay' here:http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-a...-here-to-stay/
Melissa has worked both sides of the Durand Line and was last working in North Waziristan.
Just a few quotes:
Quote:
The only real solution to both nations’ existential crises is to engage directly in politics that are local, tribal, and perpetual. With the clock ticking rapidly for NATO to deliver stability in South Asia, success will depend on a paradigm shift in the West’s ability to grasp and act upon this.
Point 1:
Quote:
First, the local. Both NATO forces and the Afghan government are meant to follow the current Marja battles with a governance strategy of winning over Taliban commanders and fighters and engaging villages in economic reconstruction projects.
Point 2:
Quote:
Engaging directly with the tribal population must be the second pillar in any partnership...Any effective strategy must acknowledge and integrate the permanent staying power and territorial legitimacy of the Pashtuns....
Finally:
Quote:
Finally, we have to come to terms with the perpetual nature of negotiations with local and tribal populations. A longer time horizon can save us from repeating the mistakes of the past, such as focusing solely on military solutions and attempting to buy off capital elites. To avoid Afghanistan becoming another Vietnam, these will have to continue long after Obama has brought the troops home.
Amidst the "spin" over Marjah, the ambiguities of the "round up" of the Quetta Shura and far more - now the SWC can comment.