I agree, so why the many biographies of Lawrence and very few of Allenby?
Objective military history should concentrate far more on Allenby and the role of the Arab Section of the British Intelligence than Lawrence.
Printable View
From the Mad Magazine spoof, "Flawrence Of Arabia", April 1964.
Backwards Observer,
Excellent catch and enjoyed by a non-Wilf audience. I think this is the first time SWC has cited such a laudable publication.:D
As I did not study the campaigns of both men in detail I have to ask others. How and how much did the activities of them influence the outcome in this theater of war?
Firn
Allenby commanded the operation that forced the Turkish army out of Palestine and captured Jerusalem in 1917. Lawrence helped to organize and lead irregular Arab forces in support of Allenby's campaign. Today there is an Allenby Bridge in Jerusalem. The image from circa 1918 in the link below shows that how one sees Allenby depends on one's point of view.
http://szyk.com/pics/iLrg-hs-print-c...ee-allenby.jpg
..
Quote:
Weapons cache halts building
Daily Dispatch
East London, South Africa
2010/01/26
WORK on a multi-million rand construction project at Lovedale Further Education and Training College in King William’s Town has not progressed since an arms cache was found at the site last year.
The R1.2 million three-phased classroom development was stopped in November after workers digging foundations came across a massive cache of Anglo-Boer War weapons.
Experts believed the find, which consisted of rifle barrels, bayonets, swords and burnt wooden rifle butts, was buried on the site by the British army after the war ended in 1902.
They said the college is situated on the site of the old Military Reserve, which traces its origins to 1847 when Sir Harry Smith, Governor of the Cape Colony, established King William’s Town as the administrative and military capital of British Kaffraria.
They said the weapons were buried by a British regiment after they abandoned the Military Reserve in 1913.
The thread pertains to Lawrence, good topic.
Moving right along... :cool:
Of note on Lawrence.
Sadly, IMO, this is more intellectual posing yearning after a romantic and arcane figure. Same as the Galula stuff. Perceived exoticness, rather than actual content. The deifying T.E. succinctly encapsulates all that is wrong with "new-COIN."
Lawrence is a pop-romance figure. Nothing more. Get over it!
it's just a tad bit of hagiographic rhetoric. Even in death TEL still manages to “back into the spotlight.” :D
I know! ....but I can never understand what it is about T.E> that causes the COIN-clubbers to drop their shorts and get on their knees. 90% of what is thought good about T.E. was announced to the world by T.E.
..just another example of apparently good men, using bad history and coming up with more bad ideas.
Wilf:
I thought that George Bernard Shaw wrote a great work in the Seven Pillars, so its a well-told tale that deserves re-telling,like any other literary work.
Allenby could have done just as well, too, if he had GBS do his book.
You want facts about ME? Try Gertrude Bell, a very good reporter of what she really saw and did. I particularly enjoy the glimmers of her insights into Ottoman systems which, in real life, provide the more appropriate context for understanding much of the genetic code of ME systems (for better or for worse). Understand Ottoman systems, and you understand the start points for, say, modern Turkish systems which actually do provides a path for positive evolutionary bridging between two worlds.
Otherwise, it is like an Ottoman trying to understand British/American systems with no knowledge of the Magna Carta, Bill of Rights, etc...the old foundations on which our Western systems of individual-focus societies are grounded.
Agreed on the whole COIN thing. Absent credible understanding of the way real things work in systems of governance, economy and politics, its just not practical to explain to die-hard Coinistas (or is that an oxymoron?) why it is that what they would like to believe will not bear the fruits they expect.
but for what he actually did do: an “intelligence” officer with no significant military training who was seconded, along with other British officers, to a group of Bedu to assist them in stirring up trouble along the Hedjaz Railway as a way to tie down Turkish forces and interdict supplies to the garrison at Medina. For an amateur he did a fairly good job of it and that is admirable.
As you no doubt know, TEL patently DID NOT start the Arab Revolt nor did he “lead” it. Allenby clearly saw the advantage of having the Bedu fighting on the British side and thus securing his own LOC while causing a certain amount of disruption and dispersion of Turkish forces.
TEL wasn’t an insurgent as much as he was a liaison officer and the “insurgency” was carefully crafted and controlled by the British to support their aim of keeping the Turks occupied with fighting in Palestine and to deny as much territory as possible to the French in the post war slicing up of the Middle East.
That he was quirky, eccentric, and self promoting is evident in TEL’s meandering memoir, the popularity of which was greatly assisted by the entrepreneurial Lowell Thomas and a host of other well placed admirers. More useful are his 27 Articles in the Arab Bulletin were good as TTP’s for operating with the Bedu and do have good general recommendations for any military advisor.
Another "bad" influence is David Lean’s film which, while cinematographically beautiful, has about as much relation to the reality of the Arab Revolt as Tolkien’s hobbits have to old English gentry. Hollywood as history is quite dangerous indeed, but has gone a long way towards setting TEL up on that pillar.
Glubb Pasha was much more the interesting chap.
NYT Book Review: Arabian Knight
Entry Excerpt:
Arabian Knight - New York Times book review of Hero: The Life and Legend of Lawrence of Arabia by Michael Korda. NYT review by Ben Macintyre. BLUF: "Most treatments of Lawrence’s life can be divided into debunkings and hagiographies. Hero by Michael Korda, as the title implies, is closer to the latter category."
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Book Review: Hero...Lawrence of Arabia
Entry Excerpt:
Hero: The Life and Legend of Lawrence of Arabia
by Michael Korda.
Published by HarperCollins, New York. 784 pages, 2010.
Reviewed by Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, MSC, USN
Understanding the complex and contradictory political arrangements of the Middle East can be best understood by reading the biography of T. E. Lawrence. In addition, no total understanding of guerilla and irregular warfare tactics will be complete without a study of this British officer, better known as Lawrence of Arabia. There have been movies, documentaries, and many books about Lawrence and the Arab Revolt. Initially, I was concerned about the title of Michael Korda’s new book on T. E. Lawrence. Hero gives the impression of delving into the mythology of the person, and not their complexities. I am glad to have not been dissuaded, and delved into the 702 pages of text, and found an important biography of Lawrence.....
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On reflection there are several threads on TE Lawrence and it would make sense to combine them - prompted by the new book on him.
Been a while since I dropped by the Council. (Sorry to my old SWC pals for being absent) I had an essay on Lawrence in early '09 to add as well:
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/jou.../183-burke.pdf
Pete has inspired me to pull out my copy of "With Allenby in Palestine". This should make for a good read on another trans-Atlantic flight.
Reading anything on Allenby is time well spent, especially the book on him by Wavell. Allenby was a total professional in sharp contrast to the total-amateur of Lawrence.
I'd also strongly suggest reading Yigal Sheffy. British military intelligence in the Palestine campaign, 1914-1918
It's an excellent corrective to the Lawrence view and basically shows how cool headed and methodical the British were, and what Lawrence actually did versus what he and others claim.
Ahh, but American culture is distinct from British culture (perhaps due largely to the nature of that separation). It is one that values the successful military amateur over that of the successful military professional. At least it used to.
For the past 60 years or so, that we fell into a very colonial sustaining/ containment role we drifted, like our Euro parent, to being more focused on the professionals required to perform those peacetime tasks and are coming to see that as the gold standard.
I think America was a better country, with a better perspective, when it valued the amateur over the professional. We've slid down that slippery slope. Crafty old amateurs, such as George Washington, would shake his head in wonder at the America of today for this change of perspective and approach to the world.
I'm sorry Bob's World, but I can't agree with that lamentation.
Considering most, if not all, Western armies didn't have an Army "profession" (as defined by Huntington) in the 18th century and that much of the officer corps consisted of aristocrats, Washington could hardly be considered an amateur when held up to them. He definately was a "seasoned" amateur.
Canada used to be dominated by the "militia myth", believing that the militia was enough and that when threatened, the patrotic citizen mustering to the defence of the realm was more effective than a standing army. A poor reading of history commonly accompanied the "militia myth". That myth has since been demolished and it is a common understanding that despite a history of successful amateurs like Currie and Hoffmeister, neglect of the profession means that amateurs generally learn their professional shortcomings with the blood of their soldiers.
Oh, we created the military academies to ensure we had that core of professionalism; but it was the "myth of militias" that fought and won the American Civil War; Spanish-American War; World War I and World War II to name but 4.
Count the regulars on the battlefield, and they are few and far between. Count the senior commanders with military academy heritage, and they dominate the field. Today's problem is made worse in that we have gotten into messy peacetime engagements that we have labeled as "wars" and that we are employing our modern militia far to heavily overseas to wage peace. Militias should only be called upon in time of war, and our nation is not at war.
A small regular force can't be employed by the government to cause too much trouble in the world during times of peace. It is a valuable check on the abuse of power. This is but one more example of where America has taken off former self-constraints on actions overseas. Our current willingness to quickly move to militarily delivered deadly violence in the sovereign space of others is another example of such relaxing of self constraint. For my money, there is few more effective applications of power than constraint. Constraint coupled with the absolute certainty that when a certain line is crossed that it will come down with a frightening degree of certainty and effect. Used to often, and one loses much of that effectiveness and gains a reputation as a bully or a loose cannon. This is where we find ourselves today.
We have gotten all mixed up in our approaches and priorities.
I don't know where the distinction of Amateur and Professional occurs. Amateur (Gentleman) has always been a term of derision to me. As far as I am concerned, the preference is always for Professionals, as a description of men who study what they do and take it seriously.
In my experience, many of our "Armatures" are more versed in the profession of arms than our "Professionals" are. It is a distinction of what one does as their primary means of income, not a distinction of one's competence in a particular subject.
In fact, many a disaster has occured by placing too much trust in one who wears the badges and titles of a "professional," but lacks any real talent or expertise in their chosen profession.
Sometimes the "hobbiest" sees what the professional cannot. Such as the small distinction that not all violence for political purposes is warfare!:D
(Ok, you know I had to bring that back around. Good discussion; I don't expect to convert you anytime soon, but think about it. The best answer likely lies somewhere in the no-man's land between our two positions. I believe us professionals need to put a finer point on some of these topics in order to help avoid some of the sticker messes we've been getting ourselves into with overly broad, and I believe, dated perspectives. It will likely be some old wolf like Ken White, or young buck like Infanteer who leads a patrol out there to bring that answer back.)
US ArNG like to foster that idea...True, though I disagree with the drifting or the 'Euro parent' ideas. We didn't drift, we were propelled by FDR et.al. ...Quote:
For the past 60 years or so, that we fell into a very colonial sustaining/ containment role we drifted, like our Euro parent, to being more focused on the professionals required to perform those peacetime tasks and are coming to see that as the gold standard.
Having been around before you arrove, I missed that. However, that's neither here nor there. We are where we are and dreams of returning to a kinder, gentler time are just that -- dreams. Nothing wrong with dreams but one must account for reality and not sugar coat the memories in order to convert the dream into meaningful progress.Quote:
I think America was a better country, with a better perspective, when it valued the amateur over the professional
More dreaming. In 1939, prior to the onset of WW II, the US Army and ArNG numbered about 400K -- about .3% of the then population. Smedley Butler would disagree with your "self constraints."Quote:
A small regular force can't be employed by the government to cause too much trouble in the world during times of peace. It is a valuable check on the abuse of power. This is but one more example of where America has taken off former self-constraints on actions overseas.
Today we have about 1M in the Army and ArNG -- about .3% of today's population. The more things change, the more they remain the same. Oh -- and Smedley would still disagree with you.
Infanteer also had this right: ""That myth has since been demolished and it is a common understanding that despite a history of successful amateurs like Currie and Hoffmeister, neglect of the profession means that amateurs generally learn their professional shortcomings with the blood of their soldiers."" The US has failed to fully comprehend that significant problem even though in the all the big wars you named, Civil War forward, there was ample evidence of its truth...That may be true but it is the policies that must be changed and I still await your proposal on how to get both the Politicians and the great unwashed to subscribe to your approach... :confused:Quote:
We have gotten all mixed up in our approaches and priorities.
I agree with the latter sentence, my experience with the former is that the statement is partly true but for few as opposed to many.Quote:
In my experience, many of our "Armatures" are more versed in the profession of arms than our "Professionals" are. It is a distinction of what one does as their primary means of income, not a distinction of one's competence in a particular subject.
That is totally correct. It is unfortunately exemplified by current US personnel policies which opt for 'fairness' (or the politically correct version thereof... :mad: ) over competence. The system produces far too many who are adequate or less so as opposed to the number who are good or better.Quote:
In fact, many a disaster has occured by placing too much trust in one who wears the badges and titles of a "professional," but lacks any real talent or expertise in their chosen profession.
That is an exceedingly long way of getting to my points.
- Wilf and Infanteer are right, a good pro can whip a great amateur most always.. .;)
- We can agree on flawed policies. We might not totally agree on which are flawed but that's broadly immaterial as we do agree on many. The question neither of us can answer is how does one turn the Elephant herd that is the US political milieu and its accompanying defense bureaucracy. Wishing will not get that done... :(
Perhaps. Of course my point of order with Wilf was that he uses "Armature" when he means "Incompetent." Such bias-driven loose applications of meaning are how bar fights get started.
As to the 30s vs. now; As I recall the US did not have compete dominance of Air, Space, Land and Sea then as it does now...and a small percentage of a small nation creates small problems, such as the banana wars that Smedley rightfully found distasteful after the fact. Today, a small percentage of a large nation with such dominating enablers is able to get out there and create trouble on a much larger scale, and need not stop by the Congress to ask for permission on the way out the door...
And all things being equal, a good professional is indeed better than a gifted armature. But go to a surgeon and he will recommend surgery. Go to a Priest and he will recommend prayer. Go to a General and he will recommend war.
Which brings me to my second point with Wilf; not all violence for political purpose is war; nor should it be. Waging it as such can lead to far greater problems than the events that set things in motion to begin with.
Though my observation is that he's pretty careful with words, says what he means and has never denied that there are incompetent professionals -- indeed, he takes pleasure in naming them. As do I... :wry:Nor did anyone else at the time. Nor does the US really have that dominance today. If we did we wouldn't be doing many of the things we are doing or buying many of the things we are buying.Quote:
As to the 30s vs. now; As I recall the US did not have compete dominance of Air, Space, Land and Sea then as it does now...
That's Smedley. I don't find them distasteful, not at all -- though they were rather shortsighted. The fact remains that in the 30s, the harbingers of US cultural hegemony were all in place around the world to include the ME.Quote:
...and a small percentage of a small nation creates small problems, such as the banana wars that Smedley rightfully found distasteful after the fact.
In order; not all that dominating or we wouldn't be doing what we're doing (or at least we'd be doing it far more efficiently and effectively...); This next is important: creating trouble or responding poorly to it? Two very different parameters requiring differing fixes. Really.Quote:
Today, a small percentage of a large nation with such dominating enablers is able to get out there and create trouble on a much larger scale, and need not stop by the Congress to ask for permission on the way out the door...
Ah, yes. Congress. What is your solution to them? As well as to the Executive Branch of the US government? According to you, both are behaving badly. I'm unsure how your plans and ideas can be implemented in view of that.Not to be snarky, but well, doh...:DQuote:
And all things being equal, a good professional is indeed better than a gifted armature. But go to a surgeon and he will recommend surgery. Go to a Priest and he will recommend prayer. Go to a General and he will recommend war.
However, I've known a number of Generals who OPPOSED war (and specific, recent wars); more than have advocated for one.
That's not the issue, though. the Generals, whether they recommend war or not, do NOT make the decisions to go or not go. The issue with Generals is how they perform once that decision is made by their civilian bosses. Currently, the consensus is 'not too well' but that judgment is significantly affected by the political milieu. There's your real problem, nominal professionals and some AGR amateurs (many better than their active counterparts) being OVERdirected by both amateurs and professionals from another line of work. IOW, to use your similes, the Political High Priests (and a few Acolytes and even the occasional lay Brother plus a Nun or two, all, of course, from the 'correct' denomination or order -- none selected for their competence, either...) are directing the war or simulation thereof... :rolleyes:That we can agree on -- and I don't think Wilf would disagree. Nor would Carl... :cool:Quote:
Which brings me to my second point with Wilf; not all violence for political purpose is war; nor should it be. Waging it as such can lead to far greater problems than the events that set things in motion to begin with.
Though Lawrence -- either a gifted amateur or a superb self promoter; perhaps a bit of both -- might disagree.
Amateur/Professional/Whatever?
Starbuck: Burke's Lawrence piece was very good.
I particularly liked:
There was a very unique group of Brits "walking around" the Middle East in the mid-1910's. Lawrence and Gertrude Bell are the two known in our histories.Quote:
While experts in the ivory tower of academia may debate whether or not the military is best suited to restore civil and social services to a city after capture, the argument is moot. In many instances, such as Damascus the military may be the only organization around with the manpower and equipment to restore civic order.
They were studying societies, histories, architecture, structure of organizations...
I was amazed in the Burke article to not see any reference to Bell, who shared many a camel ride with Lawrence throughout that period. The two, as I understood it, were two branches of the same tree, and were constantly cross-fertilizing the Arab Nationalist Ideal, one coming from Egypt to Damascus, and the other coming through Basra and Mosul to the same spot.
As far as I know, the corresponding westerners that were "walking around" the Middle East (at different, but recent times) were Ryan Crocker and Rory Stewart. Neither was really successful in the military, but, like Lawrence as a practical matter, were really external influencers of the military.
I take a little discomfort with the military analyst's idea of correlating Lawrence/Bell with Petreaus/Nagl for a lot of reasons, but particularly because what Lawrence and Bell knew was social/cultural/organizational, which was adapted to military, while Petreaus/Nagl were military who, at most, learned enough social/cultural/organizational insights to play them for military purposes (often short-term ones).
The gap is most evident in the failings in Iraq to understand how to manage the civilian structure and systems, and in Afghanistan to grasp the anti-foreign aspect that is deep rooted and confounds our efforts.
Lawrence was a welcome chameleon in the Arab insurgency against the beastly and inept Turks, but was adamant and protective of their aspirations for self-rule.
I find that authors like William Dalrymple, who are Lawrence-like in their immersion in Northern Indian post-colonial society provide a very important set of insights into much of what Lawrence and Bell were studying and using.
Eating soup with a knife is a great symbol, in my mind, of the continuing failed effort to learn just enough to coopt a few people to temporarily join OUR side, but with little real comprehension of where enduring success lies.
The above quote is right on that a military can and should be capable of effective public administration when needed. We have not yet demonstrated that capacity.
Heck, even Lawrence could have just paid out some graft (Clear-Hold-Bribe) along the way and have travelled far but accomplished nothing.
Even with that, he and Bell's fixation with Arab Nationalism proved to be, in the best light, a premature aspiration, and in the worst light, the seeds of much of what led to future problems.
Maybe they just didn't build enough "capacity" before they left?
Clearly, aiming the right folks to the right challenges is the path to success (at the risk of being too much of a Toynbeeist).
Found this in "Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890-1908" By Gökhan Çetinsaya:
Cetinsaya's Introduction uses this 1864 report as a frontispiece to explain the internal politics of the Ottoman Empire to its Arab territories, as they struggled to reform the struggling empire.Quote:
“In your humble servant’s opinion, no idea has ever circulated in central government, other than the forcible repression and devastation of the Arabs. And they (the Arabs) have never been viewed as potential friends…The Arabs are not savage, but they fear and hate us.
Abdullatif Suphi Pasa to Sultan Abdulaziz, 1864”
This stuff that Lawrence was feeding on was the air that Arabs breathed for generations: Hatred of the Turks.
How does this parallel our efforts in Kabul? Substituting Pashtuns for Arabs?
Which side are we on?
Is Lawrence's approach more useful to us or to Mullah Omar?
This is not the debate. Those of us focussed on informing practice are well aware that Military Power can and should be used to restore order. That is restore and maintain it, so as a political entity can exploit it.Quote:
While experts in the ivory tower of academia may debate whether or not the military is best suited to restore civil and social services to a city after capture, the argument is moot. In many instances, such as Damascus the military may be the only organization around with the manpower and equipment to restore civic order.
Martial Law works. Ask Allenby! - not Lawrence!
They were not unique. There were hundereds (possibly 1000+) of British Civil Servant and Army officers in the Mid-East who spoke Arabic and in many cases much better than Lawrence.
Lawrence was a Britisher Officer tasked with getting the Arabs to defeat the Ottoman Empire on behalf of the British. When he started to speak for the Arabs, he was basically guilty if a mis-conduct and should have been charged and dismissed. Only his self started publicity machine prevented that happening.Quote:
Lawrence was a welcome chameleon in the Arab insurgency against the beastly and inept Turks, but was adamant and protective of their aspirations for self-rule.
What most people don't get is that the old-school British Army is not proud of Lawrence. What you see today is the flow down of 1960's Liberal hero-worship. He contributed very little of use and probably did more damage with his dreaming that good. Of course what sells books is saying "Hero." Last time I counted there were 11 Lawrence Biographies.
Priya Satia's Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain's Covert Empire in the Middle East provides excellent insight into the depth and nature of penetration of Brits in the Middle East during that period; not just civil servants and Army officers, but also academics and private citizens.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
However, as a focused read on the subject, it has its faults and does not provide as much value as either Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914 or Military Intelligence and the Arab Revolt: The First Modern Intelligence War.
Wilf,
I appreciate where you are coming from in regard to Lawrence. I can see where the British military establishment would have problems with the self-promotion, etc.
As a point of comparison though, I am curious how they feel about an officer who had a similar mission of building local militia to defeat a rebel insurrection. One of the great villains of U.S. military history is Colonel Banastre Tarleton for his operations in the Carolinas. How does the "old-school British Army" judge him?? Obviously the American bias casts him as a war criminal of the highest order. I would expect more favorable treatment at home, but I am curious.
So, we took the Lawrence approach when we sided with the Northern Alliance; to take the Lawrence approach today would be to side with Mullah Omar and the Taliban.
I would argue that our goals in AFPAK today are far different than British goals in the Middle East 100 years ago. For them, picking a side made sense. For the U.S. I recommend a more neutral approach is the best; as we have no desire to establish our dominion over the region, do we?
Our problem is that our words, and perhaps intent say: "We're here to help,"
but our actions, as guided by a COIN manual derived from such colonial ventures, say "We're here to establish a government that we approve of."
We're conflicted, and the results of that inner conflict speak for themselves.
Wilf:
Couldn't have said it better myself.
Military power should set the conditions (security) and logistics for civilian operations.
Lawrence (and Bell) became too enthralled with love and admiration of the Arabs wrapped in a western sensibility about national self-determination and premature aspirations of the dream state of an Arab Nation.
Bob:
C'mon. We ARE picking sides.
Where you draw distinctions as to what we are not doing, it begs the question of why, if that is a well-trodden path to success, we are not following it.
Hello, folks.
I was doing some research for my dissertation when a came across a 1933 letter from T. E. Lawrence to B. H. Liddell Hart. Lawrence is commenting on Liddel Hart's book The Ghost of Napoleon when he writes something I hadn't seen quoted anywhere else, which intrigued me:
First, I started wondering, "Do I agree with those characterizations of strategy and tactics? What about this comment 'soldiers have to know their means?'" Secondly, the contrast of Belisarius and Haig struck me. As the editor of the collection, Malcolm Brown, points out, Belisarius used "hit-and-run tactics" with minimal losses and Haig used "massed forces at high cost."** I have never been high on Haig, so I can't tell if Lawrence intends this as an ironic comment or not.Quote:
So far as I can see strategy is eternal, & the same and true: but tactics is the ever-changing language through which it speaks. A general can learn as much from Belisarius as from Haig--but not a soldier. Soldiers have to know their means.*
At any rate, I wanted to throw the quote out and see what members of the council thought about it. Anything strike you? Agree? Disagree? What say you, SWC?
* - T. E. Lawrence, T. E. Lawrence: The Selected Letters, edited by Malcolm Brown (New York: W. W. Norton, 1989), 473.
** - Ibid, 473n.
Judging by how much clausewitz gets qouted in awe on this board, I'd have to say that more posters will agree with it than they will actually admit.
Stanley, as the great Karl might have said, evasiveness is merely an extension of obfuscation by other methods.
a.) Yes, soldiers have to understand their weapons performance and capabilities. So what? Lawrence is just coming to a realisation that most professional officers knew already.
b.) Comparing Haig, with Belisarius is an exercise in futility and shows an very poor understanding of the considerable challenges that Haig faced.
T.E. Lawrence was as much a charlatan and fraud as Liddell-Hart, albeit a possibly brave one. Why give any credence to a discussion of men poorly informed on the subject?
Some things are eternal... when I read the thread title... I immediately thought WILF will have a few pithy thoughts to share on this topic... low and behold, the most recent post was indeed from WILF... and none to my surprise reflected nearly exactly what I had presupposed...
I suppose that makes me a SWC junkie
Live well and row
Tactics seem to be rather constant as well - the difference seems to be largely about the tools and weapons used.
Cannae is still a valid blueprint for encirclement battles, and Epaminondas introduced the Schwerpunkt into tactics with his oblique order.
Indeed, just like ambushes in the Battle of Lake Trasimene or Battle of the Teutoburg Forest are still valid examples of the core tactical principles of an ambush. Even the Stone/Copper Age offers us pretty good examples of raids and ambushes.
IIRC, the "Art of War" has IMHO an apt quote:
Today one might say that the political aims, strategy and METT-TC drive the tactical combination making every engagement singular.Quote:
There are no more than five musical notes, yet the variations in the five notes cannot all be heard.
There are no more than five basic colors, yet the variations in the five colors cannot all be seen.
There are no more than five basic flavors, yet the variations in the five flavors cannot all be tasted. ?
It is also interesting to see how the basic tactical organisation of ancient warfare into Vanguard, Rearguard, Center, Right Wing, Left Wing have been used at smaller and smaller unit scale.
I apologize ahead of time for two posts; I managed to exceed the maximum character count for single post. :o
Honestly, that is part of the reason I wanted to see people's responses to it here.
I may not post here much, but I do read quite a bit and--like another poster said--I expected you to respond. I am glad you did, and I appreciate your thoughts on the matter. However, I will take issue with your argument.
First, you mischaracterize Lawrence and Liddell Hart. Whatever we may think about the veracity of their various claims or their theories about warfare, both men were hardly "poorly informed." Liddell Hart spent the better part of the twentieth-century writing and thinking war, so however wrong, deceitful, or whatever else he may be, he is not "poorly informed." Lawrence wrote this letter after not only his experience in the Arab Revolt but also his time as an advisor to Churchill. Again, whatever else he may be, he is not "poorly informed." Secondly, even if they are wrong about strategy or deceitful, both Lawrence and Liddell Hart warrant study, because they both continue to have significant influence on military thinking for better or ill. Ignoring them--especially in Lawrence's case, give his post-9/11 re-appearance in military rhetoric--will not make them go away.
I understand that you do not like these two men; that is fine, but an ad hominem attack does not offer anything new to the conversation. What do you think about this idea that strategy is something eternal and tactics is something ever-changing? Agree? Disagree?
Third, he is not comparing the two; he is contrasting them. By writing that "[a] general can learn as much from Belisarius as from Haig," it is clear that he is stressing their differences, not their similarities.[1] It is important to note, also, that there is no evidence in the letter that the contrast reflects negatively on Haig. So far, I cannot find any other references to Haig in his letters, so I am not sure what he thought of the man. (For my thoughts on Haig, see below.)
Lastly, you are missing what I believe to be the most interesting point of the letter: that not only can an ancient strategist be as useful as a (at least for Lawrence) contemporary one, but also that strategy as a discourse is not some march of progress in which contemporary strategists have more to offer by virtue of either the retrospection of history or the benefit of technology. Instead, tactics for Lawrence seems to depend absolutely on place, time, and technology. If anyone disagrees with this reading, I have reproduced the whole letter for context below:
I have have highlighted to passages above, because Lawrence seems to be arguing against a general thrust of Liddell Hart's theories: that Germany lost in World War I because of "old" thinking (particularly its devotion to Clausewitz) and that "new" thinking (specifically Liddell Hart himself) would win wars. In fairness, I have not read Ghosts of Napoleon, because I cannot find a copy at the moment, but this is how others have characterized his argument.[3] I do not agree with either premise, but, as the kids say, "it is what it is." :) If Liddell Hart is saying that the British had been too slavishly devoted to "old" strategy, Lawrence is warning Liddell Hart that future military thinkers may ignore valuable "old" thinkers in favor of the "new" at their own peril. This is the "pendulum" that Lawrence is discussing. Instead, Lawrence seems to take the stand that there is no 'progress of ideas' when it comes to strategy, that across time and intellectual traditions there is a universal value. A "new" idea is not more valuable by virtual of its "newness." At the very least, Lawrence's suggested subtitle--"A Tract for the Times"--would seem to delimit Liddell Hart's theory to a specific point in history and to offset any sweeping generalization that 'new' will forever be better.Quote:
Dear L-H
I have read this [Liddell Hart's The Ghost of Napoleon] twice, once to get its idea, and once with my pencil in hand. It has been a queer experience--like going back, in memory, to school--for by myself (though with far less knowledge, and hesitatingly) I had trodden all this road before the war. It is a very good little book: modest, witty and convincing. You realize, of course, that you are swinging the pendulum, and that by 1960 it will have swung too far!
So far as I can see strategy is eternal, & the same and true: but tactics is the ever-changing language through which it speaks. A general can learn as much from Belisarius as from Haig--but not a soldier. Soldiers have to know their means.
I can't write an introduction: none is necessary. Your sub-title should be 'a tract for the times.'
Yours,
TES[2]
This issue that "new" is not necessarily better seems obvious, but it is worth thinking about the ascendency of Revolution in Military Affairs, first in the Soviet Union and later in the United States.[4] Indeed, the date that Lawrence names, 1960, as this tipping point of the pendulum coincides roughly with RMA's emergence in the Soviet Union.[5] While it may be a stretch to link Lawrence and RMA, he most definitely predicted the perils of a time in the future when people's obsession with the new and newness would cloud military thinking.
[Continued below...]
What I find fascinating is that someone such as Lawrence who was obsessed with speed and technology whether it was motorcycles, armor, airplanes, or boats would be so measured in his approach to technology. In fact, Lawrence had been from a very cautious about the limits of airpower. He wrote in 1923 letter to A. P. Wavell:
At the time, Lawrence's contemporaries were raving about "air-control methods" and bombing "the natives" into submission throughout Iraq and India. To reiterate my previous point about Lawrence's worth, this is another lesson that not only his contemporaries but also folks like Ullman and Wade should have thought about before they imagined their "new" means of warfare.[7]Quote:
"Bombing tribes is ineffective. I fancy that air-power may be effective against elaborate armies: but against irregulars it has no more than moral value. The Turks had plenty [of] machines, & used them freely against us--and never hurt us till the last phase, when we had brought 1000 of regulars on the raid against Deraa. Guerrilla tactics are a complete muffing of air-force.[6]
Following on what I have already stated, Lawrence seems to be arguing that--as you say--"weapons performance and capabilities" is something apart from and subservient to strategy and that is properly located on a tactical level. That, for me, is a pretty significant "so what," because--even after almost a decade of fighting insurgents--there are many who think that the answer to asymmetric threats whether it be near-peer competitors or insurgents will be some whiz-bang stealth airburst something-or-other to win the day. Moreover, there is a real value to the mindset that--whether it is a complex global insurgency or designing a better mousetrap--one, someone else may have considered the problem, and two, that person may have had a better solution even though they did not have the advantage of being born in your century and couldn't leverage Google, a Blackberry, an XM25, a JSF, or whatever fancy-pants tech that the future holds. The mind will forever be the greatest weapon, and many who came before did a better job honing that weapon.
I was thinking along those lines as well, but I haven't quite made up my mind. (See my discussion of technology and tactics above.)
Off-Topic:
I, however, am no great fan of Haig. In my opinion, his greatest challenge was his own absolute lack of imagination and the existential burden of wasting hundreds of thousands of lives on an outmoded strategy that had been proven ineffective over a period of years. Let's contrast General Sir Herbert Plumer and Field Marshal Douglas Haig.
On June 7, 1917, General Plumer had utilized British miners to tunnel under key points of the German lines and planted high explosives. Ten-thousand Germands were killed instantly, and 7,000 panicked and were captured. As Paul Fussell writes, "Nine British divisions and seventy-two tanks attacked straightway on a ten-mile front. At the relatively low cost of 16,000 casualties they occupied Vimy Ridge."[8] The attack showed ingenuity and a willingness to divert from tactics that had produced an extremely costly stalemate for the duration of the war.
Even after this, Haig persisted with the same tactics. On July 31, 1917, British forces under the command of Haig attacked toward Passchendaele in what would be known as the Third Battle of Ypres. Direct frontal attack followed a prolonged artillery barrage. Fussell writes, "The bombardment churned up the ground; rain fell and turned the dirt to mud. I the mud the British assaulted until the attack finally attenuated three and a half months later. Price: 370,000 British dead and wounded and sick and frozen to death. Thousands literally drowned in the mud. It was a repose of the Somme, but worse."[9] I understand that Haig still has his defenders, but I have a hard time conceiving anyone, in good conscience, defending his strategy. To wit, I am not arguing he did not use armor properly or understand the machine gun; I am arguing that his strategy won out not because of its brilliance but because the German army had exhausted itself advances of 1918 and that he paid far too high a cost for that Pyrrhic victory.
Very respectfully,
Erich
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[1]. Lawrence, 473.
[2]. Ibid.
[3]. See John J. Mearsheimer, Liddell Hart and the Weight of History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 49-50.
[4]. See Frederick W. Kagan, Finding the Target: The Transformation of American Military Policy (New York: Encounter Books, 2006), ix-xix.
[5]. Ibid, xi.
[6]. Lawrence, 238-239.
[7]. See Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, Shock And Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance (National Defense University, 1996).
[8]. Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 14-16.
[9]. Ibid, 16.
And, as a final aside, much of the Lawrence bashing is unfounded. Seven Pillars of Wisdom is stylized autobiography in line with what many of Lawrence's Modernist contemporaries were writing. As such, there are distortions--many of which are either openly acknowledged by Lawrence himself. However, history supports the vast majority of his role in and account of the Arab Revolt. In A Prince of Our Disorder, John E. Mack disputed many of the claims of his more critical autobiographers and found almost universal support from the men with which he served:
Mack similarly pokes holes in Richard Aldington's 1955 book Lawrence of Arabia: A Biographical Inquiry, which--frankly--is very lame in its criticism. Most notably, he outs Lawrence's parents who were not married when he was conceived and claims that (paraphrasing very slightly) Lawrence liked being raped in Deraa when he was in Turkish captivity. The book was almost universally panned by the men who were there with Lawrence. Many wrote responses to the book:Quote:
The subscriber's edition of Seven Pillars, of which about two hundred copies were printed in 1929, was sent to thirty officers who served in the Revolt, including such men as Allenby, Joyce, Newcombe, Young, Peake, Stirling, and Winterton. Copies were widely circulated and read by many others who had firsthand knowledge of the events of the Revolt. […] Neither Sterling nor any other of these men every questioned the veracity of Lawrence's account. Concerning the attack and seizure of Aqaba by land, for example--the single exploit of the campaigns for which Lawrence is best known--he has been accused of undeservedly claiming credit for its strategy. Suleiman Mousa in particular states that "the plan for capturing Aqaba was devices by Faisal and Auda in Wejh." But for Colonel Edouard Bremond, the leader of the French mission (who resented Lawrence), confirms that the plan was discussed in conference before 'Awdah abu-Tayyi joined in the Revolt…[1]
I can go on citing first-hand accounts of Lawrence in Mack's book, but I will assume that the word of the soldiers who fought with him will be good enough…Quote:
When Aldington attacked Lawrence as a charlatan and a fraud he aroused most intensely the ire of Lawrence's fellow officers. The angry reaction of Captain L. H. Gilman, who commanded an armored-car battery in close association with Lawrence until near the end of the campaign, is typical… […] Gilman then proceeds to refute Aldington on specific matters of which he had firsthand knowledge, such as Lawrence's presence and courage in operations against the Hijaz railroad that Aldington had denied.[2]
(I would have included that in my early manifesto, but most of my books are still boxed up from a move.)
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[1]. John E. Mack, The Prince of Our Disorder (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1976), 177-178.
[2]. Ibid, 278.
Lawrence was a strange guy. Among his contradictions was his talent for "backing into the limelight," being self-promoting and self-effacing at the same time. His fame started with the American journalist Lowell Thomas and his stage show shortly after the war. To my way of thinking Lawrence's accomplishments shouldn't be categorically dismissed but at the same time they shouldn't be taken completely at face value either.
Whenever an outsider to the military serves in a war and later claims to have been a rare genuis casting pearls before the swine of the regular officer corps the institution usually closes ranks against him. The rumors about Lawrence's sexuality have also made him something of a hero among non-military types who for the most part have never served in uniform but still believe themselves to be intellectually superior to the dullards of the professional officer caste.
Erich:
Like Hacksaw, we were all waiting for Wilf's response, which doesn't need reprinting. His personal accomplishments may warrant the status of Hero, like with Charles Lindbergh, but I wouldn't waste much time on either's political advice.
My problem with Lawrence and Bell is not military, but political. They were deep believers, of not primary promoters of the very poorly conceived notion of a great Arab Nation which was like jumping from crawling to Moon Landing in an afternoon.
Remembering that, as much as these Arabists loved the notions of Arab history, the Arab culture/politics of old had been devastated by Mongols in the 1200's, followed by Ottomans who, for the most part, may have been worse as bad for Arabs as the Mongols. These folks that Lawrence and Ms. Bell were working with had a long way to go just to establish "some" countries, and certainly not their Dream Palace.
The continuing gap between the concept of the Caliphate and its reality is, in fact, the broad diversity of the Arab and Muslim world. The breadth and acceptance of Islam by so many diverse peoples is, for political/governance types, a built-in limitation.
No surprise about Lawrence's disdain for air power against desert peoples. Look at the Bomber Harris experiences in Northern Iraq.