Perhaps I missed them but I didn't note any success stories
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Originally Posted by
jenniferro10
...for all the "success stories" that you guys are pointing out, there seem to be many more failures.
on this thread. If you're referring to comments on other threads, I'm sure there are some success stories -- and I'm equally sure there are far more failures.
That's mostly due to priority of effort followed by the size of the Armed Forces and a lot of bureaucratic impediments. It's also due to this phenomenon:
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"...People ask them about the functioning of their weapons, in order to improve the weapon or training to use it, but there's no similar system (outside of some informal loops, or "on paper" processes that aren't executed) to do the same for cultural training."
Rightly or wrongly -- and I'm making no excuse, just telling you what 'is' -- the weapon is seen as important, the cultural training is seen as as nice to have by most (not all) at all ranks. 'Important' beats 'nice to have.' That also means there's no good answer to your original question re: how do we capture cultural information from the soldiers' experience, make it useful... and also feed it back into the training system. The issue isn't seen as important enough to make a full scale press on it -- which is what your query would entail. The system is too big and too broadly focused (which culture is important next year? In 2015? 2025?)
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"...then I think it's to be expected that there's no real institutionalized method to avoid problems like the one I heard the other day: about 25 soldiers received language training specific to a particular region that, when they got there, was useless because all of the local people spoke a very dissimilar dialect. Not one person ever asked these guys: Hey, was your training useful? No? Why? What do they speak there, if not what we thought?
Bad, wrong -- but stuff like that happens frequently; not only with language or cultural training but with other even more important and more expensive training. A unit is destined to do something somewhere and before they arrive, events occur that mean a unit is needed elsewhere for a different mission. The planners have to weigh priorities and assign someone to the most important mission regardless of training. That again is not an excuse, just a reason. It shouldn't happen; we could certainly do better but it's a chaotic system, not a smooth machine and, again, the priority goes to life and death stuff, not aids to performance.
I'm old and long retired, so I can't talk about now with any facility, I can only tell you, based on experience, the 'why' of some things and wish you luck in your quest:
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I remain open to discussing directly with interested parties...
Although I'm pretty sure I know exactly where your coming from
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Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
...and that means not using silly words and phrases, like "human terrain."
Could you remind me again : Is it guns that kill or Humans with guns;)
Uh. Er. Humans with guns. Or rocks. Sticks. Knives...
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Originally Posted by
Ron Humphrey
Could you remind me again : Is it guns that kill or Humans with guns;)
and other items including occasionally even bare hands while ON terrain -- or flying above it or sailing on or under the sea that is overlaying some of it???
I think he means that anyone who tries to navigate the human 'terrain' will find out humans are not terrain -- and thus they are not truly mappable. Thus to try to equate people and the ground is to delude one self that a cursory recon will allow a great route to be chosen...
Or he could just mean it's not a well grounded idea for a term. I can dig that. :D
As usual perfectly capable of disabusing one
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
and other items including occasionally even bare hands while ON terrain -- or flying above it or sailing on or under the sea that is overlaying some of it???
I think he means that anyone who tries to navigate the human 'terrain' will find out humans are not terrain -- and thus they are not truly mappable. Thus to try to equate people and the ground is to delude one self that a cursory recon will allow a great route to be chosen...
Or he could just mean it's not a well grounded idea for a term. I can dig that. :D
Of such silly notions as attributing supposed knowledge of the human condition as being on par with awareness of the balance of power in the weapons and physical terrain.
One aspect of confusion on my part though. Perhaps the reason it is held as important to actually delineate human terrain(awareness of that an environmental factor worth consideration) is that so often we seem to forget this part-
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and other items including occasionally even bare hands
In other words just because I know where the weapons caches, airfields, command and control facilities, ports, etc are doesn't mean that I might not need to be aware of how I talk or interact with "X" human. Or that ignoring that may not cost me a whole lot more than I want to pay.
Would it be too much to suggest that a lot of this emphasis has to do with the fact that in stability ops have a whole lot more in common with police and detention than they do with HIC ops?
Thus the necessity for such analytic practices as Human Terrain awareness.
Feedback/Cultural Info---The gap
Jennifer:
I love the discussion on language, cultural training, feedback loops, and institutional retention/use of information.
Wonder why, in 2009, SIGIR called Iraq's 6-year long reconstruction effort a $141 Billion Fiasco, and Secretary Clinton, after touring Afghanistan, declared our effort there to be "heartbreaking?"
Your comments really start to cut to the heart of our reconstruction/stabilization efforts, with three additional caveats.
1. Institutionalization of knowledge/learning in an environment of constant rotations. How much is learned? By whom? In what fields (cultural, economic, social systems and structures)? How is it retained/passed on/acted upon?
Arriving in Iraq in December 2007 as a senior reconstruction planner for DoS (PRT), I was amazed at how little was known in so many civilian spheres.
When approached about dropping off a batch of portable generators to a village without power, I asked, in the fifth year of Iraq, how many years in a row were these things dropped off? No one knew anything beyond their rotation date. I asked why these things might not be working (lack of fuel, theft, lack of parts/arabic-language repair & maintenance manuals). No one knew. I asked whether there was someone in the village who had the ability and resources to actually sustain the generator's on-going operation. No one knew.
The real answer was that we had been dropping off portable generators every year, but they required fuel, parts, and careful maintenance (dust, 130 degrees, etc...). No one in the village had the where-with-all to sustain the generators, so they ended up as an expensive paperweight which was later sold for whatever could be gotten.
The big problem was agriculture---a lack of agricultural infrastructure support, and a pervasive drought. For decades before the US came along, Iraqi farm folks had been deserting the farms in what historian Pheobe Marr called "the ruralization" of Iraq's cities. Every failure to restart/support agriculture only built more pressure and instability in Baghdad, Mosul, etc... as farmers abandoned the farms for the cities. But we had no systematic responses or elevated focus on the need for agriculture, and, as of early 2008, the US did not know about poultry feed systems, or the scope of aquaculture. Clueless...
In 2008, we were just learning these things?
2. Collection/action on useful civilian knowledge. In Iraq in 2008, once the action shifted from war-fighting to economic restart, no entity (DoD, NGA or DoS) had the systematic information to support a sustainable civilian reconstruction program. Great imagery, and physical mapping, but there was no composite source for information on what people did there before, what assets were (or had been) available to support public services, industries, agriculture and value chains, what transportation linkages were essential to reopening the economy.
Our system was devoid of any useful information upon which to develop a cohesive reconstruction strategy, so health clinics and school buildings were fired off like grenades, hoping the smoke would protect the soldiers under some brigade or battalion commander's care, but with little understanding of how they would, or would not, fit into a sustainable Iraqi system of public health or education.
Having said that, once I began to seek it out, there was no end of wise CA officers who, at the end of their tours, would look me up to give me reams of data, site assessments and photos of critical economic and infrastructure assets. They always said, "I thought somebody might use this sometime."
Then, terrain folks, working with CA and engineering, began to assemble enough pieces to develop systematic maps and analysis, and local government contacts began to bring critical info to the table. Pretty soon, we were able to identify important gaps, and develop strategies to tackle the big and small picture problems, usually in conjunction with provincial and national service ministry representatives. (But this is 2008, not 2003!?!)
By early 2008, we had a functional economic map of Northern Iraq, including all the key economic and infrastructure assets needed for fast, effective reconstruction, and a basis for understanding critical economic linkages and transportation systems. From that, we were able to target civilian "systems" and get beyond the test project phase.
But, against a US reconstruction program hell-bent on accountability for delivery of US-funded schools, health clinics, refrigerated bongo trucks, etc., there was no way to integrate any of this into the Washington-based program structure. Some of us knew it in the field, and understood why the US programs were missing the mark, but there was no format to take the information higher.
Then, my tour ended and that of the folks I was working with. Like the departing CA folks, there was no one to give the info to, no out-briefing, and no lessons learned, so the info just sits in my head and on my hard drive in the States.
I can only hope the new folks picked up where I left off. (Six years in Iraq, one year at a time.)
2. Organizational awareness.
In Iraq, there was a complex governmental structure, born of post-Ottoman (and french-like) bureaus, accented by soviet-style central planning, and decades of half-imposed bureaucratic reform initiatives (including the US efforts).
Still, the revenge of geography dictated that Iraq, a large clay desert served by two rivers slicing through a central plain, with the key population centers arranged down the plain, was best managed by regional systems (public or private) of water, waste water, agriculture, etc..., and had been for centuries.
Dates from Khanaqin and Balad needed to be processed in Baqubbah, and the big cities were the key markets for all the grain, citrus, and livestock products. Feedstock came from outside, and had to be transported, stored, blended and distributed across Iraq. Fertilizer had to be trucked. Water used upstream didn't travel downstream. Etc..
After 2003, national ministries were to be avoided, and provincial government was to be created in isolation, even if from scratch. But the operational logic of locally-based effective governance was highly questionable in a country with such substantial inter-regional dependencies.
Soldiers on the ground often saw an impoverished and minimally-literate local folk struggling to get water, power, and food. The reality was that these folks had been optimized for the system they were in before. The only fast strategy was to re-institute what they had before, or spend the years and billions it would take to bring forth a new system---while everything sat dark, thirsty and waiting. But few US folks understood what the old system was, let alone how to activate it.
When I began meeting with national service ministry-types in Iraq, I found out that they were proud of having rebuild the country after the Iran/Iraq War, and having carried aging public service and infrastructure systems along through a decade of parts embargoes and strife. They were the key to addressing regional systems, not the provinces.
As with the economic system analysis above, Iraq's regions were highly inter-dependent for trade, agricultural support/processing, and much of it was under the national service ministries' control. But, apparently, they were the "bad guys." So, the ministry engineers, lacking security, transport, and direction, often stayed in Baghdad while regional systems continued to fail.
The Iraqis could basically fix their own systems, but weren't going to defy the US to do it.
In 2008, MG Mark Hertling began to break the provincial/ministerial gridlock by routinely bringing national ministry officials up north to address problems (drought, transportation, electricity, agriculture, etc...), and cajoled, pressured, and supported their efforts. In March 2009, he was quoted as citing effective national ministerial engagements as an important part of stability in the north. But that was no small feat on his part, and building national ministerial engagement ran against US province-by-province reconstruction policy.
Somewhere in my mind is the vision, borne of Iraq's efforts, of a Washington-based program to make sure every Afghan has a refrigerated bongo truck, whether they need it or not, and a whole lot of them on the black market in Kabul to bring much-needed relief to residents of the rapidly urbanizing slums.
It would be nice if I was wrong.
Steve
People, all people can use whatever terminology they're comfortable with.
I mean that -- but that does not mean I have to agree with them on some terms. For this one, as Wilf said,
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Human Terrain is a meaningless phrase, or should be. There is terrain and their is the population. They are very different things. The population has social, political and religious beliefs - call it.. er culture?
To my mind, the Human Terrain phrase is demeaning to people (either friends, foes or neutrals), is terribly imprecise (and words can be important) and it can send a bad message in several respects not least that people can or should be mapped or cataloged (they can but you better be real careful how you do that and have a lot of people working on updates). IOW, I think it is not a good selection for a title of an effort required in COIN and similar ops. That said:
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...disabusing one Of such silly notions as attributing supposed knowledge of the human condition as being on par with awareness of the balance of power in the weapons and physical terrain.
I don't think I said anything nearly like that. I just said humans weren't terrain. I did not say in any way that one did not absolutely have to know the people in ones AO and what their effect on the mission will be. OTOH, in that post you quoted, I did say this:
""Thus to try to equate people and the ground is to delude one self that a cursory recon will allow a great route to be chosen...""
That means that if you try to simplify people into a 'terrain' or general recon and use item; you're going to screw up. My gripe with 'human terrain' is that it can lead the ill informed to underplay the importance of the human dimension. It's a silly misleading phrase.
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In other words just because I know where the weapons caches, airfields, command and control facilities, ports, etc are doesn't mean that I might not need to be aware of how I talk or interact with "X" human. Or that ignoring that may not cost me a whole lot more than I want to pay.
I agree. Please tell me how that interaction or talking equates to terrain in any way.
And remind me what the first 'T' and that 'C' in METT-TC represent, perhaps explaining in the process why they are two separate items... :wry:
Still lost in the fog ...
but at least I found a starting point for something I understand - Human Terrain Mapping, as most simply exemplified by the map of Sunni, Shia and mixed areas (p.19 of article); but more specifically:
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Defining Tactical Human-Terrain Mapping
TF Dragon executed its data-collection effort through systematic people-to-people contact. The staff planned decentralized platoon-level patrols, conducted during daylight hours, that sought answers to specific questions about the population. These specific “information requirements” (IR) about each separate village and town included—
The boundaries of each tribal area (with specific attention to where they adjoined or overlapped).
Location and contact information for each sheik or village mukhtar and any other important people (government officials, Iraqi Security Forces, etc.).
Locations of mosques, schools, and markets.
Identification of the population’s daily habits (when they woke up, slept, shopped, etc.).
Nearest locations and checkpoints of Iraqi Security Forces.
Economic driving force (i.e., occupation and livelihood).
Employment and unemployment levels.
Population flow (i.e., people moving in or out of the AO).
Anti-coalition presence and activities.
Access to essential services (fuel, water, emergency care, fire response, etc).
Particular local population concerns and issues.
This seems a valid enough use of applying graphics (overlays, etc.) to show demonstratively the relationships between the population and its terrain (geography).
IIRC (always dangerous), something akin to that was suggested within the last two decades in Egypt by some civilian assistance agency re: the problem of collecting taxes, property ownership, etc. Seems Egypt had no records id'ing who lived where, owned what, leased what, etc. Solution (which I can't recall whether implemented or not) was what any rum-dum county tax equalization department has - a database of property "cards" mapping the data against the terrain (plat maps).
Seems that "Human Terrain" has morphed beyond those concepts into something I don't understand.
Agree with slap:
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You don't need 14 college degrees either. I know some double clutchin detectives that could run most intell ops with 3x5 cards and I don't think there is a college degree between the whole bunch of them. But if you ended up on there to do list....they would map your terrain alright.
Not really; some folks experimented and reinvented a wheel
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Originally Posted by
jmm99
Seems that "Human Terrain" has morphed beyond those concepts into something I don't understand.
and good for them for doing that kind of mapping, as Slap points out and as anyone who served above Rifle Platoon level in Viet Nam (knows not to mention above Cav Troop in the Indian wars or the Philippines in '01 -- 1901) it works.
While they did well to reinvent it (even though techniques are in several Intel Pams and Manuals or used to be...), they or someone somewhere did not do a good job of naming it.
You're correct, it has taken on a life of its own; jargon will do that -- and it is seldom helpful.
Sorry if my comment seemed somewhat snarky
While I recognize the wisdom in what you all are stating and yes as many have mentioned the current reinventions have been markedly less than stellar that unfortunately still leaves us with how come it had to be reinvented in the first place.
If somethings important enough how else do you get it back so those who knew it best can reshape it correctly than to throw it on the table in whatever form or format you can?
Reinvention is a constant human phenomena.
It is particularly bad in the Armed forces and more particularly in the Army -- and that will not change until three things occur. (1) We inculcate in schoolkids the importance of history and the NEED to avoid wasting effort on reinvention. (2) The personnel system stops insisting on up or out; on moves every three years (to better train and round out the troops -- or to justify jobs for the Personnel Managers? Try to lay off the excess in the Hoffman Building and Congress will be breathing down your neck); that forced lack of continuity is why we don't have six years in Iraq -- we have six one year tours in Iraq. (3) We can tune egos and the overwhelming desire to 'do it my way' can be stifled. Commanders think they 'own' units -- they do not (the term "My Soldiers" was made obsolete by A. Lincoln some time ago) and they 'own' battlespace -- they do not, they operate on it.
That owenership shtick makes them reluctant to accept advice or help -- particularly from anyone they out rank, don't know or don't like or whose PME credential are less. They also, in too many, not all, cases reject the written word because as one Colonel told me "...you can't trust that stuff; I remember when I was a doctrine writer at Benning, I didn't have a clue what I was doing." Let me emphasize that there are many -- most -- to whom those comments do not apply but they do apply to a great number (and the CSMs are worse :D ).
So, really long way of getting to the point -- you're probably never going to be able to tune the egos. Fixing the Per system is in the very hard box. Fortunately, the schools are getting better. Short answer -- reinvention will likely be with us always.
The answer to your important question:
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"If somethings important enough how else do you get it back so those who knew it best can reshape it correctly than to throw it on the table in whatever form or format you can?'
Is, I think, a two parter. First, who decides if it's important -- critical question, allies to all my garbage spouted above.
A lot of stuff that isn't important gets 'saved' by people over impressed with their or a unit's accomplishments or who just have skewed values or perceptions; that stuff clutters the system and can obscure the really important stuff. That is not to say that lessons learned and recorded aren't important or necessary -- they are, it's just that human nature is going to put some filler in there and the initial items will almost be overlong due to recollections of where Heebley was when the RPG hit -- which may not really be germane to the lesson. If it's a good lesson, it get's retained, edited and improved over time..
Secondly, you use CALL, the forums on AKO and such -- so we are getting a whole lot better. It's not perfect but it works pretty well. More importantly, we recall that every NCO and every Officer are trainers -- so the good stuff that works gets passed on and most of it gets captured as doctrine or in training material. It is not fool proof but for humans, it works pretty well.
Take Human Terrain. I once knew who coined that but I'm old and have forgotten. It made some sense at the time and it is a form of shorthand, it's jargon, just not very good jargon. Wilf and I aren't the only ones to knock it.
So. It'll likely get changed or die a natural death (and no major harm done if it does not) -- but demographic mapping, knowing your AO and having enough cultural knowledge to know what to avoid and what to look for have been around for centuries. Any Army that does a lot of COIIN doesn't lose that skill; one like ours that deliberately avoided COIN for many years will lose those kinds of skills.
They come back quickly, the key is not to try to put them back in the attic post-Afghanistan -- and I have this vague recollection Jedburgh earlier commented on the process and mentioned a pub...
Get me started on a lazy Saturday, will ya... :D All that can be summarized with 'reinvention is a human foible we have to live with, the system ain't broke, it's even getting better -- it's just really slow and has the hiccups.' :wry:
Introduce Yourself - Now - Thanks
Ken Wilson,
You jumped right in here on the Council - quite bold and short statements in reference to your first three posts - very opinionated to say the least. We like to know who we converse with here and appreciate first-hand accounts or authoritive second-hand citation for bold statements. Thanks for understanding. BTW - the END Bush avatar on your SWC homepage is quite sophomoric - I would recommend dropping it to be taken a bit more seriously here. We would say the same for a reference to our CINC Obama – so don’t go down that road.
Hail and Farewell thead to include the tell us about you placeholder where we start to size you up.
Dave Dilegge
