Colonel Warden told me that the Air Force should concentrate on the capabailtiy to put a loaf of bread (or whatever) right into the hands of people/soldiers on the ground from the Air:eek: Precison Effects!
Printable View
Excellent question -- and I submit they'll try and thereby dissuade us from action on occasion. However, as Old Eagle pointed out and I said earlier:"Could be conjecture; could be a ploy, could be a misstatement of intent (accidental or deliberate). We'll have to wait and see..."Quote:
Does AQ/Taliban care whether they kill civilians or get us to do it for them? In fact, given the choice, wouldn't they deliberately structure the situation to force us to kill civilians?
Tom:We can disagree, that's okay -- but just as a point of interest, here are the two points I made:Quote:
Ken, I will disagree with you on this one.
"...Me, too. I'll give it a month or two before it quietly disappears. Not a smart move on several levels... "
"...I suspect the civilians who are nominally innocent will get more visitation by various bad guys and said civilians will not really appreciate the extra attention (nor will they be happy that a small source of income, claiming non-existent casualties, has been removed)."
Note I said not smart on several levels -- not that it was wrong -- and the only level I spelled out was the second quoted paragraph above. Do you disagree with that? What are your other disagreements? (my other concerns are below)
You also said that Blackjack putting it in terms of running away, etc. etc. -- the way I took what he said was that message could be sent to the local populace if it appears you're unwilling to fight.
Wilf said:To my mind that's the gist of this; the thread has been mutated into a COIN best practice tutorial and I don't think anyone is questioning what best practice is -- and killing ANY excess civilians -- even 1, une, ee, fagat yek, hannah, ichi, mot, ein, uno solamente -- is to be avoided. Tactical efforts to preclude harm to civilians should be constant, no question. I see no one above disputing that.Quote:
"No one should intend to kill civilians, but rewarding the use of human shields may well come home to rest in ways those advocating it, cannot yet see."
That's not the issue -- the issue is the possible guidance which none of us has apparently seen and its potential effect on the effort of units in Afghanistan. I specifically raised the issue of second order effects and unintended consequences. I have seen such orders before and have seen them fail and be allowed to die, unenforced. The problem: As Cav Guy said, the US Army habitually significantly overreacts to every order...
The Afghan attitude toward fighting differs from the Arab attitude. What effect will the order have on the population it is designed to aid?
I go back to Wilf's comment: ""...rewarding the use of human shields may well come home to rest in ways those advocating it, cannot yet see.""
We need to see the order but when we do whatever we say will have little to no effect -- however, the issue to me is the tone of the order and potential adverse effects; the positive effects and the possible need go without saying. With a kid likely to be there again soon, I got one a them there vested int'rests... :wry:
Oh and Tom, on thisI have to ask WHY have we been dancing with a problem like that -- and it is one -- for several years; why has it not been fixed before this?Quote:
This has been overdue and we have been dancing with the effects for several years now.
I know the answer and it's not pretty and that really needs to be fixed. I doubt this order will fix it, it is attacking the symptom...
That said, I understand that need, really do -- but rather than "this," I would have greatly preferred better training. That would have, should have, meant no need for "this." :D
your use of me as an example was a bit too kind, and apples & oranges - for one, I didn't have a guy wounded, which CAN definitely affect your decisions, and two, we really didn't have a plan to get the guy if he didn't come out soon (other than get ready to go get him, just like you).
I really think Blackjack hit the nail on the head when you look at the actual language - air power is the big stick. It discredits us with the locals to use air power because of the likely CDE and the risk-averse nature of using it in close quarters. If you risk some butts and clear it with direct fire, and civilians are wounded/killed, I think the locals will still respect what you were trying to achieve.
Perhaps the criteria for air power needs to be raised - troops in heavy contact on their own base, or an enemy isolated and trying to break contact, etc.
I know there are some who think this is too restrictive, but I think the real intent is for troops to really measure the gain (couple of knuckleheads dead, who will likely be replaced tomorrow) versus the loss (an entire village committed to supporting AQ, due to exceptional losses, especially among women/children).
Oh and Niel, I am at Leavenworth, give me a ping.
Tankersteve
We have a winner! That is exactly what I was trying to get at.Quote:
You also said that Blackjack putting it in terms of running away, etc. etc. -- the way I took what he said was that message could be sent to the local populace if it appears you're unwilling to fight.
Exactly, that is why I compared an airstrike in COIN to a thermonuclear warhead in large wars. Sure, we could use it, but imagine the political, sociological fallout from it. We end up losing the high ground in the battle of hearts and minds a little more with every 155 HE round, or JDAM we drop. How do we get it back? Put one foot in front of the other, chamber a round and start hunting. Let the people know that they will not be robbed by bandits, they will not have to worry about their children going to school only to be slaughtered. They will not have to endure public beatings by madmen, and a hundred other things.Quote:
If you risk some butts and clear it with direct fire, and civilians are wounded/killed, I think the locals will still respect what you were trying to achieve.
I don't view ROE as ironclad, nor do I view them aa restrictive. Fail to train your troops properly in their execution, and they can be. For the most part they are permissive from my experience.Quote:
so, top-down ironclad rules are laid down which try to fit everything into neat little boxes.
I will admit that in my prearation for three deployments in support of OIF, the option of fixing, cordoning, and waiting out has NEVER been discussed, trained to, or published as a potential solution.
That commanders have employed it as a tool in the toolbox is a testament to that individual's ability to think on their feet, becauseI for sure haven't seen it ever as a bullet on a training slide. I can't speak for the JRTCs, however.
That is where my disagreement comes in--it was a necessary move and one that we have needed to make for the past few years. It is not being done in a vacum; McChrystal's manning plan to improve command consistency should help in its execution.
Blackjack used the term flee; that means running. How the population takes such a change depends on what you do. CAV offered a scenario that did not kill civilians nor did it allow the bad guys to escape.Quote:
You also said that Blackjack putting it in terms of running away, etc. etc. -- the way I took what he said was that message could be sent to the local populace if it appears you're unwilling to fight.
I would agree that better training would greatly help. I also believe that a command level directive was and is necessary as a rudder shift. That seems to be what McChrystal has in mind. Whether the shift lasts or slowly dies remains to be seen.Quote:
Oh and Tom, on this I have to ask WHY have we been dancing with a problem like that -- and it is one -- for several years; why has it not been fixed before this?
I know the answer and it's not pretty and that really needs to be fixed. I doubt this order will fix it, it is attacking the symptom...
That said, I understand that need, really do -- but rather than "this," I would have greatly preferred better training. That would have, should have, meant no need for "this." :D
Tom
Given the extensive and negative publicity that has been drawn by actual or alleged civilian casualties from air strikes, and given the very public nature of the announcement under discussion here, is it possible that the announcement is aimed less at altering the tactical environment on the ground than at creating or reinforcing a perception of a shift away from the use of air power in environments where civilian casualties are likely?
I have no doubt that Gen. McChrystal wants and intends to reduce collateral damage, but I'm sure he also wants everyone in the picture to be aware of this intention. When a change like this is announced in the mass media before the new rule is even released, it suggests to me that there's a strong "for popular consumption" factor in the picture.
I would certainly agree with those here who point out that if the JDAM is option A and running away is option Z, consideration needs to be given to the options in between - with full awareness that options are restricted by circumstances.
IF this is what it appears to be, then it looks to me like another case of "Some are abusing it so we will deny it to everyone." Maybe it's just me, but I hate taking proven tools out of my toolbox. This particular tool probably has been abused and greater controls over its use are probably warranted, but outright removing it doesn't seem like a good idea. CavGuy's scenario is a great one, IF you have the time and IF you have the resources and manpower and IF you can control the terrain. It is definitely a tool to keep in the box but that doesn't mean it will always be the right tool. It also doesn't mean that assaulting the building or even striking it with indirect or CAS is always the wrong answer.
Again, we don't know what the full ROE will be but Ken is right, IF we create areas where our troops are reluctant to engage the enemy for fear of creating civilian casualties then we can virtually grantee that the enemy will be there.
SFC W
This morning, Fox news broadcast a piece by Steve Harrigan, on the ground in Afghanistan. The thrust of the piece, which may or may not be accurate, was that the new ROE are intended to place restrictions on the use of air support, particularly with regard to bombs in "urban" areas.
My point exactly.
Look, I agree with Ken. I wish we would invest in the upfront training and guidance to ensure subordinates aren't denied tools/flexibility they need to do the job.
The unfortunate reality is that time and time again we have failed to exercise restraint.
In an odd way, this turns back to the discussion I have had with COL Gentile over "dogma" and doctrine. We seem to have a recurring pattern of commanders following "letter of the law" in risk adverse fashions rather than tailoring to each situation. Yingling has offered one reason why. I believe it goes back to the late 90s zero-defect checklist approach to training mentality. I don't believe it's the doctrine's fault, it's a sign of a massive failure in our Leader Development and Education System, and our inability to develop individual leaders and hold individuals responsible for their actions. We see every problem as a fault of the system, and issue blanket one size fits all policies as a result. It is sad.
As a final note, although this thread started with the title ROE, we are really talking RUF - Rules for use of Force, which can be more restrictive than ROE. ROE in a legal way hasn't changed, and doesn't really cover specific weapons systems. It's more general. GEN McChrystal is changing the theater guidance for RUF. There is more than a semantic difference.
"Why Johnny Can't Think for Himself" is an excellent question.
All good points and in many ways this change reminds me of what happend in Iraq with the change in leadership, change in doctrine, boost in forces, and strategic focus. Different AO with different issues I will readily agree. But I would also say similar in the need to make changes, not all of which can be affected by better training at the tactical level.
Best
Tom
Totally true -- but that's the wrong focus. Cav Guy's got it right:THAT / those are the problem. Not tactical level training but the mentality we have developed over the last 30 years or so. That, I contend is inculcated by trying to define 'training' down to the lowest possible level and it is exacerbated by a culture that treats minor foul ups as major crimes while ignoring major crimes as non events. We have a minor tactical training problem -- we have major personnel management, integrity and military professional education problems.Quote:
"I don't believe it's the doctrine's fault, it's a sign of a massive failure in our Leader Development and Education System, and our inability to develop individual leaders and hold individuals responsible for their actions."
This is the result:It's beyond sad, it's flat dangerous.Quote:
" We see every problem as a fault of the system, and issue blanket one size fits all policies as a result. It is sad."
It results in this truth:My points are that:Quote:
"...It's more general. GEN McChrystal is changing the theater guidance for RUF. There is more than a semantic difference.
"Why Johnny Can't Think for Himself" is an excellent question.
- McChrystal should not have to change the rules at any level. We have been in Afghanistan for Seven years and seven months, for chissakes -- or more correctly for seven plus one year or less tours -- that he has to do so is an indicator of institutional failure. The institution really needs to acknowledge that.
- The 'change' as understood thus far is cosmetic -- it attacks the symptom, not the problem. I do not question the need for him to do that; I do strongly question WHY he should have to do that. I also question whether it will achieve his apparent goal though I acknowledge it will temporarily assuage some Afghans.
- Johnny can't think for himself because he belongs to an organization that goes to great lengths to discourage such activity in very subtle ways and allows malfeasance and incompetence to survive as compensation. That is indicative of flawed personnel policies, less than competent professional education and a dangerously skewed value system.
Those things need to be fixed. New rules in one theater will not fix them -- nor, given the pervasiveness of those ills, are said new rules likely to have the desired effect.
Lots of intelligent comments. When you're being population centric, there really is no rush. The population was there in 2001. They'll be there in 2021. It really doesn't matter if the enemy occupies the village today, tomorrow or next week. It only matters whether the enemy is able to reoccupy the village after you guys have cleared it.
As an ad guy, if I were selling the new ROE to the boots on the ground I would say in this one specific situation, if it is safe to do so, treat it as a hostage situation and not a firefight. Part of the safety, of course, is making sure you're not setting yourself up to be ambushed by the hostage takers colleagues. (I don't know the buzzwords for that. "Establish, secure defensible, oversight positions?")
As to the fact this may encourage human shields. Perhaps that's a good thing. people don't like being taken hostage. They don't like their hostage takers. They like their rescuers. After the hostages are rescued, the takers almost always face justice.
KenQuote:
My points are that:
- McChrystal should not have to change the rules at any level. We have been in Afghanistan for Seven years and seven months, for chissakes -- or more correctly for seven plus one year or less tours -- that he has to do so is an indicator of institutional failure. The institution really needs to acknowledge that.
- The 'change' as understood thus far is cosmetic -- it attacks the symptom, not the problem. I do not question the need for him to do that; I do strongly question WHY he should have to do that. I also question whether it will achieve his apparent goal though I acknowledge it will temporarily assuage some Afghans.
- Johnny can't think for himself because he belongs to an organization that goes to great lengths to discourage such activity in very subtle ways and allows malfeasance and incompetence to survive as compensation. That is indicative of flawed personnel policies, less than competent professional education and a dangerously skewed value system.
Those things need to be fixed. New rules in one theater will not fix them -- nor, given the pervasiveness of those ills, are said new rules likely to have the desired effect.
Well said and I agree with all but would say in a case where the alligators have us by the ass we need to pass on draining the swamp. McChrystal has got to start somewhere, quickly.
Best
Tom
Well elaborated on by Ken and Tom. I'll add that we also induct privates into basic training after given them 12 years of experience that mistakes means you're a "failure," with an "F" on a piece of paper to prove it to the entire world. Those who go on to college get another 4 years of reinforcement to the "lesson." (I've had to go so far as telling new graduate employees that if I don't see at least one mistake a week, it will be proof they aren't doing anything.)
Here's the problem: if we want initiative and independent thinking, people must know that they won't be pilloried for getting it wrong. When that happens, you create a risk averse culture. You also start eliminating the possibility that people will learn from their mistakes and become the better for it. (I met an officer from the 11th Cav who stranded his troop on an island during maneuvers. Career over - and the Army lost an officer who for damn sure would never let his unit get trapped on the wrong terrain again.)
The flip side problem, is creating a cultural environment where mistakes are accepted as the price of initiative and independent thinking, without creating one where the duds can "fail up."
So to summarize, solving the problem seems to require creating a culture that addresses two points:
- Tolerating mistakes as the result of initiative and independent, creative thought.
- Weeding out the people who can't or won't learn from their mistakes, or believe that initiative and independence somehow mean out of control.
I agree that a zero defect mentality exists within the institution but I am not convinced that the root of the problem resides within the institution. In today's modern, media saturated hyper-partisan politcal environment, ground commanders are subject to very public scrutiny of their actions in the press and in the government. Of course our elected officials have always had oversight of the military but I think they are more willing to intrude on operations for political reasons. That's going to foster some risk adversity.
SFC W
"...The 'change' as understood thus far is cosmetic -- it attacks the symptom, not the problem. I do not question the need for him to do that; I do strongly question WHY he should have to do that..." (emphasis added / kw)It also seems you are corroborating my point that this is a bandaid and that we are attacking a symptom... ;)
Not sniping at you but I think this all too pervasive general idea and attitude "...where the alligators have us by the ass we need to pass on draining the swamp." is endemic in the Army, more so today as it has been increasing in intensity for over 20 years and that it is exactly why we are where we are in a great many respects.
We have a bad tendency today to put out fires instead of removing the combustibles that allow such fires. People acquire credit and gratification from 'fixing' things that are wrong -- and being seen to do so...
Few seem willing to put in the hard thankless effort required to change the direction of the elephant. That attitude is dangerous and is not good for the long term health of the institution -- or the nation.
I'd like to amend something I said earlier: "...that he has to do so is an indicator of institutional failure. The institution really needs to acknowledge that. Append: and fix it before it gets worse..."
JP 1-04 (pp.73, 72):Quote:
from Cavguy
As a final note, although this thread started with the title ROE, we are really talking RUF - Rules for use of Force, which can be more restrictive than ROE. ROE in a legal way hasn't changed, and doesn't really cover specific weapons systems. It's more general. GEN McChrystal is changing the theater guidance for RUF. There is more than a semantic difference.
Explanatory article, ROE vs RUF in Marine Corps Gazette (linked from SWJ Library).Quote:
rules of engagement. Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. (JP 1-02)
....
rules for the use of force. Directives issued to guide United States forces on the use of force during various operations. These directives may take the form of execute orders, deployment orders, memoranda of agreement, or plans. Also called RUF. (JP 1-02)
I find the distinction between ROE (in foreign ops) and RUF (in domestic ops) to be pretty straight-forward. Where the two are both programmed into the same operation (as JP 1-04 allows or requires ?), I understand the definitions ("will" vs "guide" ?), but do not really understand the possible implementations.Quote:
Because RUF generally assume a nonhostile host with a generally friendly population, RUF primarily focus on using force in self-defense as a matter of force protection based on mere presence—rather than an assigned operational mission—or using force in the exercise of a very limited law enforcement or security mission. ROE policy concerns tend to focus on relations with foreign actors and furthering international political objectives. RUF policy concerns tend to focus on domestic or host-nation political objectives and domestic or host-nation public opinion.
I think MAJ Smith has revealed to us a real legal can of worms - as well as a project for education and training of soldiers that is beyond me.
Current SROE/SRUF and consequent ROE/RUF date from the complete 2005 overhaul of that system of rules. The changes are described, with various problem areas highlighted, by Major Daniel J. Sennott, Interpreting Recent Changes to the Standing Rules for the Use of Force, Nov 2007, The Army Lawyer DA PAM 27-50-414, pp.52-78.
MAJ Sennett sums the distinction between the SROE/ROE family and the SRUF/RUF family as follows (pp.52,53; footnotes omitted here - see original for extensive footnotes):
Not a doubt exists that the primary doctrinal use of the SRUF/RUF family was intended to be in domestic operations within the US.Quote:
The Department of Defense (DOD) released the current Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF), dated 13 June 2005, in early July 2005. These rules are drastically different from prior versions. Both the format and the language have changed, but probably the most important modification is the addition of new terms and definitions. While some of the modifications serve to simplify the SRUF, other modifications may not be as favorably received. The SRUF, which are designed for use in the United States, and therefore based on domestic law, now include language that is identical to the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE), which are rooted in international law. As a result, the potential for confusion in application of these two distinct sets of rules may be significant.
....
The DOD defines rules for the use of force as “[d]irectives issued to guide United States forces on the use of force during various operations.” This rather general definition is further augmented by the definition contained in the current SRUF: Standing Rules for the Use of Force “establish fundamental policies and procedures governing the actions to be taken by U.S. commanders and their forces during all DOD civil support and routine Military Department functions occurring within U.S. territory or U.S. territorial seas.”
Perhaps the best way to define SRUF is in the negative: SRUF are not SROE. The SROE “establish fundamental policies and procedures governing the actions to be taken by U.S. commanders and their forces during all military operations and contingencies . . . occurring outside U.S. territory . . . and outside U.S. territorial seas.” Although SRUF and SROE share some common principles, SRUF are based on domestic law, while SROE is largely based on international law. Therefore, any definitions and concepts contained in RUF must be rooted in the U.S. Constitution and domestic laws.
That having been said, Niel is entirely correct in saying that the SRUF/RUF family can be used outside of the US without violation of doctrine. The Clamo article in the Marine Gazette expressly says that (e.g., references to "host nation", etc.). The 2008 Operational Law Handbook, chap 5, lays out the state of SROE/ROE and SRUF/RUF as its CLAMO authors saw it. Whether a specific extension of SRUF/RUF to a foreign operation is wise or not is not an issue for lawyers, military or civilian - it is a command decision.
The combo of SROE/ROE and SRUF/RUF is, to say the least, complicated. Can this combo result in the end state defined by Jon Custis:
especially re: his "to train your troops properly in their execution" ?Quote:
I don't view ROE as ironclad, nor do I view them as restrictive. Fail to train your troops properly in their execution, and they can be. For the most part they are permissive from my experience.
It is not within my expertise to suggest education or training methods; but unless there is adequate education and training, all this complexity (add EOF - Escalation of Force to the mix) promises to become a mess (IMO).
It is within my expertise to wonder what the Federal courts will do with this. For the past 9 months, the DC District and DC Circuit have been deciding detainee cases based on a strict AUMF-LoW (LOAC) standard. As such, they have accorded NO constitutional rights to detainees other than a limited habeas right; at most, releasing them into the diplomatic custody of the US for possible future OCONUS transfer.
It will be interesting to see what SCOTUS will do with the concept that "definitions and concepts contained in RUF must be rooted in the U.S. Constitution and domestic laws" when SRUF/RUF are applied to Astan. I haven't the foggiest WAG as to whether the U.S. Constitution and domestic laws will become applicable to Astan as a consequence.
----------------------
As further support for Niel's legal position (that SRUF/RUF can be applied), JP 1-04 (cited in my prior post) allows - but does not require (that being a command decision as I interpret it) - use of SRUF/RUF in the Course of Action Development process, across a very broad spectrum:
Quote:
(pp.32-33)
(b) The joint force SJA reviews other staff section proposals for legal sufficiency. As an example, the joint force SJA assists other staff elements (typically the operations directorate of a joint staff [J-3] or the plans directorate of a joint staff [J5]), in determining whether the standing rules of engagement/standing rules for the use of force (SROE/SRUF) are sufficient to accomplish the mission, and, if not, which supplemental ROE/RUF measures are needed and why. The joint
force SJA should consider and assist other staff elements in considering, for example, whether and
under what circumstances the JFC should request or authorize the following: authority to declare forces as hostile (who and under what circumstances); use of riot control agents, offensive operations, and cross border operations; and use of all necessary means during special operations, collective self-defense (defense of non-US persons and property), beyond visual range engagement of airborne objects, exercise of national self-defense, use of wartime reserve modes, training or spotlighting with a directed energy weapon, collateral damage (LOAC-standard or minimum possible), attacking space assets, computer network attack, destruction of designated lines of communications or facilities, destruction of designated major supplies or resources, and detention of civilians. Other areas that require review include detention and interrogation operations, treatment of civilians, integration of contractor personnel, and intelligence operations.
The one thing that gets me is how widespread this information is, part of the way to win any conflict (or battle) is to deny the enemy information on our tactics and battle plans. Announcing to the world (and the enemy) what we will or will not do in a situation is just asking for some "smart" opponent to use this against our troops.
my other point to be made is how this can be confusing to anybody on the ground (or air), the last thing we need is for the troops and/or leaders to start second guessing themselves (or third....) for concern on how their action will be view by others.
just my two cents to a interesting thread
*plink, plink*
Lobo
No sniping detected. Again I agree on the need for institutional change and I am not saying ignore it. I have advocated change too long to say that. I am saying that whether it is cosmetic or fundamental, an immediate change in approach was needed and McChrystal is doing that. Gates is clearly involved as well.
As for the renaissance or revolution that will come from the younger generation as they move up--at least that is what I hope.
Best
Tom
Great thread, which has cleared up some of my false assumptions.
A short video clip of the UK Commander in Afghanistan (I am sure it is longer on the BBC News itself) and the US Commander - on these issues: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8119396.stm
Incidentally BBC have added a lot of items in last few days.
davidbfpo
Call me naive, but...
If you presume that the enemy will read this traffic... and that the enemy will then tend to fuse itself in large numbers to population centers in order to leverage a perceived seam in NATO/US RUF...
Maybe, just maybe... that is part of the design of the public release... in addition to assauging some Afghan sensibilities, perhaps a second order effect of the the wide spread release of the directive is exactly so the adversary will read and respond as mentioned above...
A significant problem in dealing with non-compliant forces in AFG is exactly the fact that after getting some "sch-onion" laid upon them in 2001, that got smart and stopped "pooling" into targetable entities...
Of course that's just a wag... stranger things etc etc etc
Time to make the donuts
And an excellent idea you also have. You're more energetic than I am; I'm off to Krispy Kreme ®.
:D :D
the BBC transcript (with the audio feed):
Just before this, Dutton outlined the problem of creating guidelines for troops from 42 nations, etc. He also noted that the rules (RUFs do seem more appropriate a designation, though he used neither ROEs nor RUFs expressly) were intended to address the primary problems of air and indirect fires. However, his quote above encompasses direct fires as well.Quote:
The deputy commander of Nato-led forces in Afghanistan, Jim Dutton, said a "fundamental mindset change" had been taking place for some time and was now being reinforced under Gen McChrystal.
"If you are in a situation where you are under fire from the enemy... if there is any chance of creating civilian casualties or if you don't know whether you will create civilian casualties, if you can withdraw from that situation without firing, then you must do so," he told the BBC.
I wonder if AQ has a Micromanagement/Risk Aversion/Lawfare Exploitation cell? If is does it is probably working overtime right now.
As I have said several times, I agree with a lot of the members here about the use of air strikes and indirect fires. However, it is fairly obvious the general is speaking of direct fires as well. General Dutton made that abundantly clear as to the commander's intent of these changes. The problem is the overuse of air strikes and arty, yet the change according to General Dutton is clear that the policy applies to direct fires as well. This is precisely why I used the wording I did in previous statements. It went from a suggestion to a lawful order just like that.Quote:
“If you are in a situation where you are under fire from the enemy... if there is any chance of creating civilian casualties or if you don't know whether you will create civilian casualties, if you can withdraw from that situation without firing, then you must do so".
All of this has left me with a few more questions like:
Could the fact that there is potential for civilians to be injured or killed in any built up area, this could effectively put build up areas off limits?
How is this going to effect commanders and NCOs? Will we start seeing a more timid form of engagement, unwillingness to engage in the first place if for no other reson than avoiding a lot of investigations, or murder charges?
How long is it going to take for the Taliban and other insurgent groups to exploit these changes and game the system like they usually do?
Yes, that is very possible, and the same British General that spoke is speaking of ramping up operations this summer. I still have my doubts, but I will know more by the end of September, as we all will. Hopefully the airstrikes bit is not a play though.
true, that is a point to consider. But I can also see certain members of our political leadership and the media screaming that they were used in tricking the enemy and that we need to play by the rules.... *snort*
Lobo
"We few, we happy few, we band of brothers. For he today that sheds his blood with me shall be my brother...."
William Shakespeare, Henry V
Niel (if you're still tracking)
Heard, understood, appreciate your previous comments here.
In a slightly different scenario, I wonder how application would have impacted an event like the battle of Sufia, in terms of conduct of the battle and the decision process to engage in the first place. (Would you hesitate to send in ground troops knowing airpower could be denied?) I contend the significance of that event is still under-appreciated in terms of impact on subsequent events in Iraq, but that's a side issue.
I'm talking rotary vice fixed wing here, but much of the discussion I've seen above seems to have fixed wing in mind - I've seen no indication that "the rule" (aka the elephant we haven't seen) will make that distinction.
for linking SWC and this thread at Mudville. :)
Also, thank you in advance for taking the time (at your convenience) to fill out your About Me. Not needed for today - since the SWJ Blog feed takes us to your webpage, etc.; but for future posts (hopefully many), the lack of background will cause readers to say "Who is that guy ?" ;)
the Captain's Journal (please read the About), which is linked from Greyhawk's Mudville (I've visited both sites before) and which has two commentaries on this topic, and many links in the commentaries:
Update on ROE Changes for Afghanistan (opinion piece)
Changes to the Rules of Engagement for Afghanistan (analysis piece, mostly; cites this thread :) )
Links to some sources (in latter link; and some caveats about the sources linked - "lesson learned" - check for updated sources)
standing rules of engagement (at fas; these are the 2000 version, completely revised in 2005 - especially as to SRUF, which is the basic issue here. So, these show what SROEs look like - that's it. Google up what has been released in 2005 and since; much of them are classified).
theater-specific rules of engagement for Iraq (from Wikileaks. Without getting too violent, classified should mean that - beyond the legalisms; and a leaked classified document has no good means of validation, anyway. End discussion; except to remind that discussion of specific ROE/RUF are potential OpSec man traps).
rules on the use of force (at dtic; again a 2000 version - this particular RUF, as revised, was part of the 2005 SRUFs package, of which Enclosure L was intentionally unclassified to provide a discussion point for LE input).
I haven't an online link to Enclosure L of the 2005 SRUFs - if someone has one, a link would be appreciated.
-----------------------------
Also from the Captain's Journal:
Concerning Snipers, Rules of Engagement and General Kearney (21 Sep 2007) - dealing with UCMJ (and potential War Crimes) charges vs Soldiers and Marines for alleged ROE/RUF violations. Many links (at bottom of page) to Mr Smith's commentaries (11 in all) on ROE/RUF issues.
For the most part, I've stayed with what JMM believes the "Law is", rather than what the "Law should be" - I think I've been doctrinal, but if not please correct me.
(start IMO)
We shoot ourselves in the foot ("suicide by Lawfare") when we turn ROE/RUFs into iron-clad, restrictive, legislative and legalistic tight boxes.
We also have to remember the source differences for ROEs (Laws of War aka LOAC, international law and relations) and RUFs (Rule of Law, domestic constitution and laws of some jurisdiction - ICONUS: US Constitution, Federal and state laws).
We also have to remember that the default under SROE/SRUF is based on the conduct, not status, of the target. Under SROE, NCA (or an authorized CCOM) can define a "hostile group" allowing its members to be killed or captured based on that status. So, in the sniper example (unarmed Taliban), a conduct-based rule = murder and war crime; a status-based rule = no charge.
So far as I know (please correct me, if I an doctrinally incorrect), SRUF themselves are solely conduct-based (classified portions and mixed ROE/RUF combos aside - which may be what the upcoming rules will turn out to be). So, the differences between ROEs and RUFs are more than semantic (as Niel stated), but also can have horrible consequences to the Soldier or Marine who gets on the wrong side of restrictive and legalistic rules.
In War Crimes (and elsewhere), I have commented on my preference for status-based rules in an armed conflict - as allowed by the 2001 AUMF and the GCs accepted by the US, as so far interpreted by SCOTUS and the lower Federal courts.
That is not to say that an unlimited "hunting license" should exist. Carefully defined command guidance should outline the parameters and provide for specific education and training in real-life situations on an on-going basis - training, training & training (and not reams of paper).
In short, they should be permissive, non-legislative and non-legalistic (the average shooter is not a U of Mich Law grad).
(end IMO).
...24 years, 2x Iraq (04/05, 07) last as SWO to 3CAB/3ID (and part of EASOG) - which is pertinent to discussion here but hopefully in no way shape or form apparent from reading Mudville, which has always been an effort separate from that role.
But enough about me... :cool: / ;)
JMM,
Here's my amateur take on ROE vs. RUF and a response to Greyhawk:
Violating ROE usually is a Law of Armed Conflict violation, that can get you sent to jail. e.g. Shoot an unarmed civilian.
Violating RUF is a UCMJ violation, disobeying (or failure to follow) a direct order. That said, I think there is some leeway in RUF, situation dependent, and commander dependent. e.g. utilizing force that while within ROE violates rules imposed by the command.
Correct me if I'm wrong, but this is my take.
Greyhawk (welcome!) uses our Sofia battle as an example. He asks the impact of the new rules on that. Here are my observations as the guy who managed the BCT level fight:
1) We didn't fire indirect into populated areas, because of standing RUF rules.
2) We utilized aircraft "shows of force" to scare the insurgents away from the populated areas, as well as artillery fired into empty nearby fields.
3) We waited until the insurgents were "in the open" to engage and destroy them.
Now, the obvious danger is that the insurgents didn't necessarily know we couldn't engage them with the aircraft and artillery in their engagement against the tribe. However, if that had been the situation I think we could have rapidly gotten permission to use other assets. I can't go into what our restrictions were on weapons employment in public but let's say most of our larger strikes required 2-star level approval, which usually could be had in less than 10 minutes. I think tactical flexibility could be granted rapidly as well. The broader point is that even if we hadn't had the restrictions, attempting to separate the enemy from the populace was the right thing to do. Leveling the Soda tribe area wouldn't have helped the awakening to get at the AQ guys.
And then there is the Cavguy solution. If you're on the ground, and the right and obvious thing to do is staring you in the face, just do it, and take the consequences. That's actually what we did that day of the video. My army experiences tell me well considered violations of rules/guidance is generally underwritten by most commanders, especially if conditions warrant.
Niel
Niel,
Thanks for the response.
"...attempting to separate the enemy from the populace was the right thing to do. Leveling the Soda tribe area wouldn't have helped the awakening to get at the AQ guys."
100% concur.
And "the Cavguy solution" as described is where we will win or lose any war we are ever unfortunate enough to fight. (Revisiting the training piece, written or not those oughta be the concluding words in any training session.)
"the insurgents didn't necessarily know we couldn't engage them"
aye - there's the rub. Headlines (accurate or not) to that effect don't help. (I tip my hat again to the "Cavguy solution".)
Mine also with some emphasis on the 'well considered' (i.e. you have to know the rules so you know where they can be bent) and the caveat added -- as long as a reasonably acceptable outcome was obtained... :cool:Quote:
"...well considered violations of rules/guidance is generally underwritten by most commanders, especially if conditions warrant."
Doesn't have to be superb or even all that good but it cannot be a disaster. :wry:
Not quite (though in the right direction) - we have to work on this. Ruby Ridge, BTW, is a good case study - that is, without getting into its politics. :)Quote:
from Cavguy
Violating ROE usually is a Law of Armed Conflict violation, that can get you sent to jail. e.g. Shoot an unarmed civilian.
Violating RUF is a UCMJ violation, disobeying (or failure to follow) a direct order. That said, I think there is some leeway in RUF, situation dependent, and commander dependent. e.g. utilizing force that while within ROE violates rules imposed by the command.
Yup, gold standard (there are some later cases); but I don't like some of the language, which depending on how far you push interpretation puts too heavy a burden on LE.Quote:
from Slap
Tennesse vs. Garner
Niel's battle - great factual scenario (leaving out specific rules). The 2-star ref. reminds me of the "Ultimate Aircraft Stack" as visualized by the PL on the ground (a friend who was a SSG, PSG and sometimes acting PL, in Vietnam):
AirForce 1 - LBJ
DoD 707 - MacNamara
chopper MACV - Westy
chopper DIV - MG
chopper BDE - COL
chopper BN - LTC
chopper COY - CPT
Wish I were a cartoonist. :D
I'll look at the first two items - to find some consise sources. But later, I'm existing so far today on coffee - got engrossed in this forum. ;)
Has the Air Force ever tried dropping inert munitions? As in Concrete Practice Bombs? They can be GPS guided but do not produce a Blast effect which generally causes the most injury and damage.
...it doesn't take a psychic to expect that at some point we will do something in Afghanistan that appears to be (as in 'is reported as') a violation of this (still as yet unseen) rule. The question becomes "how fast can a (senior enough) commander make an accurate and definitive public response?" ("We're investigating" doesn't count.)
The answer to date has been "not fast enough." I know there are corporate (and legal) reasons for that, but unless there's some sort of "incident qrf" to deal with such things (emphasis on "q") the truth won't matter, and we lose.
This is not new (stomp foot, provide other subtle visual emphasis here), but given publicized "new rules" it will be infinitely more important.
What I have been wondering is, is this policy really General McChrystal's? Or is something that has been quietly dictated to him by someone higher in the COC? Civilian casualties aren't just a liability to our operations in Afghanistan, they are a political liability to our elected officials. Airstrikes in particular look bad on TV. Perhaps it is my cynicism speaking but this could be an attempt to become a more effective COIN force or it could be political expediency.
SFC W