Centers of Gravity are connectivity
Read this article carefully, and it will challenge our doctrinal perceptions of what we think Clausewitz meant by centers of gravity. This will expand the conversation and COGs and EBO considerably. Our current doctrinal definition of COGs is wrong and for the most part worthless.
Use the link below to go this excellent article in the "Naval War College Review, Winter 2004, Vol LVI, No. 1"
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/art4-w03.htm
I attempted to post the PDF file, but it was too large. If you can't access it let me know and I'll send the PDF file to SWJED.
Bill
Article Excerpt from LTC Echevarria's article above
Clausewitz’s center of gravity, then, is a “focal point,” neither a strength (or even a source of one) nor a weakness, per se. Second, CoGs are found only where sufficient connectivity exists among the various parts of the enemy to form an overarching system (or structure) that acts with a substantial degree of unity, like a physical body. Third, a center of gravity exerts a certain centripetal force that tends to hold an entire system or structure together; thus a blow at the center of gravity would throw an enemy off balance or even cause the entire system (or structure) to collapse. Fourth, using the concept necessitates viewing the enemy holistically.
The U.S. military’s various definitions lack entirely Clausewitz’s sense of “unity” or “connectivity.” By overlooking this essential prerequisite, the U.S. military assumes centers of gravity exist where none might—the enemy may not have sufficient connectivity between its parts to have a CoG. In that case the analysis does little more than focus on the most critical of the enemy’s capabilities.
Clausewitz is [next to] Godliness....
Thanks for posting this, RTK. I think I am going to give it to my students to read since it is one of the best examples of a non-deistic, theological epistemology I have ever seen (wry grin).
What I have found most fascinating in this entire discussion is that there hasn't been any examination of the operational assumptions made by Clausewitz in his original work, i.e. no discussion of the assumed concept of "organization" (it's all ideal types) and no formalized discussion of the offensive | defensive | economic system ratio and how it effects the organization of military / ideological force. I think this ties in with Echevarria's comments about Clausewitz originally envisioning the concept as a process rather than a static.
Even if we go back to the Newtonian model of physics, there are certain processual issues that come to the fore. For example, gravity implies mass and some measure of density. Most mass is also moving along some type of a vector, at least in relationship with other units of mass. This vector is changing based on mutual attraction and / or the application of "force", and that rate of change (ΔV/ΔT) is the acceleration.
Okay, let's translate this analogy back into Iraq and the GWOT. The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and the spread of Wahhabist theology is the initial vector, where the "force" applied to produce an acceleration is primarily socio-cultural (e.g. pan-Islamic nationalism, a revitalization movement a la Wallace, a rejection of secular values, an increase in what Durkheim called anomie, the creation of the State of Israel, etc.). It starts as a fairly small diameter (i.e. small number of poeple), highly "dense" institutional / ideological object and gathers mass along its vector, gathering speed (accelerating) as it goes. So far, it is acting exactly the same as any other social movement in the literature.
Where it starts to change its vector is when certain crucial events happen ("strange attractors" in catastrope theory) - the short lived take-over of the Qa'bah, the Revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Each of these acts to redirect the vector of the social movement by defining an immediate environment: the core of Islam is under attack, it is possible to run a "pure" Islamic nation state, and the "crusaders" (infidels) have returned and are being aided by apostates exactly the same way as they were during the period of the Crusades.
This parallel to the crusades is crucial for a number of reasons. First, they happened when the Caliphate was internally divided and fighting amongst itself. Second, they happened at a time of a resurgence of non-state Islam based around the Ulama. Third, they were a time when the first serious attempt to reformulate Islam was happening in an integrative manner (cf. al-Ghazali, The Revivification of Religious Sciences; it is also interesting to note that al-Ghazali's work is enjoying a revival in the Sudan and Somalia amongst other places). Fourth, they marked the begining of a period of shame for Islam as the Caliphate disolves and "barbarians" who, while ostensively Muslim do not share the same cultural values (e.g. the Turks, the Mongols, etc.), gain control of large parts of Islamic lands. Fifth, the period produces one of the most reveared "saviour" figures in Islamic history - al-Malik al-Nāṣir Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Yūsuf ibn Ayyūb (the closest Western figure is probably King Arthur). BTW, this is what I meant by a cultural propoganda node in my earlier posting - it is the "mythic" justification for transforming "love of God" into "hatred of the apostate / non-believer".
So, what does this mean operationally? RTK, you described how you operated and the results you achieved. I was particularly impressed when you said that you had been "adopted". In part, what was going on was a hearkening back to an earlier "story" from the height of the Caliphate where Christians, Jews and Muslims worked together for the good of the community (~8th century ce).
What most people don't think about right now is that, at one time, Islam was the most "tolerant" religion amongst the Peoples of the Book, and the period when that tolerance was operational is the "Golden Age" of Islam. This was the time period when the Western Empire had been replaced by barbarian kingdoms and the Eastern empire was a theocratic / bureaucratic state that made Stalinist Russia look like paradise. The main "progress" of civilization was happening in the Islamic world, and Alexandria, Baghdad and Damascus were amongst the greatest cities in the world in terms of civility, technology, law, the arts and intellectual activity. This Golden Age had already started to fall apart when Alp Arslan destroyed Romanus IV's army at Manzikert (the proximate cause of the 1st Crusade).
Back to operational reality and the CoG debate. If the conecpt of a CoG is going to prove useful, then force needs to be aimed at not only the mass (i.e. the open insurgents) but, also, towards changeing the acceleration factors, which is why, IMHO, a strictly kinetic approach is ridiculous - it actually increases the acceleration as we have all seen. The proper application of "force" is to shift the vector from the perception that the proper "story" is the Crusades to the proper "story" is the Golden Age. And that is what RTK was doing - shifting the story one person at a time.
Marc
"Value added" from academia?!?
Hi Bill,
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
Marc, you're begining to soften my position on academia. You have made several observations that are value added, and ones that I'll think about at length on my next short TDY.
Thanks :) Just don't mention it to any of my academic colleagues, or I would be drummed out of the academy for "Conduct Unbecoming..." (LOLOL)
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
I find COGs of limited value at the military level, and as some claim if they are constantly moving then they are of zero value. However, using Clausewitz's original definition of a COG (and he admits they don't always exist), then they could be a useful construct at the interagency level, which is what EBO is attempting integrate.
In all honesty, I suspect that they are a heuristic of somewhat limited value in the type of battlespace we are operating in (i.e. global political, military, economic and symbolic conflict). I think they can be a very useful heuristic at both the interagency level, as you mentioned, and also at the level of Grand Strategy (i.e. the global population is the theatre of operations). Given the prevalence of the concept within the militray, they can also, probably, serve as useful heuristics in more restricted levels of operation.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
Then on the other hand, as mentioned earlier by one of the council members, it is a fanasty to believe that we actually have other government agencies beyond the military with any real capability to make things happen. State is severely underresourced, so they can stand up and say this is our job all they want, but they can't do it. Who exactly runs our national level IO? Seems to me that every agency plays in this game, but where is the over all coordinator?
And to add to the list, how about other nations agencies and militaries? If this is a Global War on Terror, then where is the Global co-ordination?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
It is a little bit late after the war starts to start thinking if we only had more civil affairs, better IO, more ground troops, etc. We could have (and did) accomplish much in both countries, the only reason it appears that we're struggling is our desire to emplace democracies there.
One of the things I dislike most about many of my colleagues is their habit of living in the past without using it to bring meaning to the present and help construct the future. You're perfectly right about playing the "what if" game - it is really counter-productive, especially in democracies where it is likely to be used by short sighted politicians for immediate election gains. We need to look at the past to find the problems, opportunities and patterns of action that can help us to achieve our current and future goals.
On the subject of emplacing democracies, I'm really unsure. On the one hand, there is a certain international perception about the message coming from the Bush administration "Democracy is good, and we'll give it to everyone." The problem I think that many of us have with this idea is that democracy, in the true, philosophical sense of the term, cannot be "given" it must be earned (Thomas Paine had some good things to say about this in Common Sense). At its heart, a democracy relies on an informed and educated citizenry that is both willing to engage in a pluralistuc debate and, at the same time, willing to defend the right of other people to hold contrary opinions.
At the same time, one pattern that has been repeated over and over again historically is the shift from a democracy into either an aristocracy (e.g. Rome) or a mob-ocracy (e.g. Athens). I'm not particularly sanguine about where democracy will go in either Afghanistan or Iraq. On a purely personal level, and, yes, I know I'm am showing my bias here :), I really wish that the old King of Afghanistan had either accepted the throne or let his son do so. Oh, well, that's water under the bridge.
Marc
Always great when you can begin at the end
Concur! Have seen all inexperienced staffs, and many experienced ones, die on the CG-CC-CR-CV hill early in mission analysis.
Unfortunately, it is a vulnerability's special relationship to the CG that makes it a CRITICAL vulnerability, rather than just a run-of-the-mill or trivial vulnerability. So can't completely dismiss the topic. Just need to move to it and through it more smartly.
Sometimes that may mean starting in the middle and working in both directions, say from CC or CR. Have seen that employed well. Have also failed miserably myself in attempting to do it, so that is not a panacea.
Wise commanders understand this
Quote:
Wise commanders understand this, while others look for the lockstep answer.
Steve, I'm not convinced that anyone gets it, and there are plenty of smart people on this site that are debating it. Neither the Marines nor Army nor SOF have yet found anything resembling a COG that we can effectively influence to achieve our objectives in our current conflict. The COG normally has little relevance in COIN, except from the stand point of identifying our own and protecting them.
The COG isn't a shifting thing or a process, it is a COG. It only shifts when your objective shifts or you didn't properly identify it in the first place, assuming it even exists. Obviously the COG for phase III in OIF is not the same as phase IV, but phase IV is really a different war, not a different phase.
Our process is MDMP, not COG. Many planners try to use COGs to focus their efforts, and in a strictly kinetic fight that makes perfect sense (it is a form of EBO). Normally, (never say never, and never say always) if you focus your efforts in COIN (e.g. identify the COG and mass your efforts against it), then you're neglecting the the bigger picture, and most likely you'll find what you identified as COG wasn't, such as Fallujah. It was an important battle, but not the COG of the Sunni insurgency that some folks said it was at the time.
Some of you mentioned using multiple COG's, but excessive COGs limit the utility of the concept in the first place. Every COG has decisive points (DPs) that we target/influence to achieve the desired effect on the COG, but DPs are not COGs. It sounds like the Marines use critical vulnerabilities instead of DPs. I wonder if our terminology and thought processes differ so much due to the French influencing the Marines and the Germans the Army in their formative years? (This was before the French were evil :-), if I didn't that the Corp make think I'm making a jab at them).
What is missing in this conflict is clarity of intent and thought and ambiguity leads to chaos. If a COG existed beyond their will, then it would be useful, but if it doesn't (I haven't seen one yet) exist, then lets use other models to figure the problem out. We're defending freedom, so let's not be robotic and defend dinasour concepts to the death. No one is rejecting the COG concept completely, but in many situations the utility of it is questionable at best. If it limits our ability to accurately define and solve the problem, shift to another model.
While I still think EBO has potential, the truth is I haven't seen it effectively integrated into our MDMP, so there is must be alternative models that we can collectively design. That is why this council exists isn't it?
Effects Based Process Special Studies
Bill,
We have in process 2 effects-based process studies at the BCT and battalion level that should be out soon. They represent 4 years of work, practice, and operational use and should be of interest to you.
Best
Tom
Al Qaeda and the people in Iraq
This poll suggest al qaeda has been firmly rejected in Iraq. Judith apter Klinghoffer writes:
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Al Qaeda has desicively lost the Iraqi battlefield.
Quote:
Overall 94 percent have an unfavorable view of al Qaeda, with 82 percent expressing a very unfavorable view. Of all organizations and individuals assessed in this poll, it received the most negative ratings. The Shias and Kurds show similarly intense levels of opposition, with 95 percent and 93 percent respectively saying they have very unfavorable views. The Sunnis are also quite negative, but with less intensity. Seventy-seven percent express an unfavorable view, but only 38 percent are very unfavorable. Twenty-three percent express a favorable view (5% very).
Views of Osama bin Laden are only slightly less negative. Overall 93 percent have an unfavorable view, with 77 percent very unfavorable. Very unfavorable views are expressed by 87 percent of Kurds and 94 percent of Shias. Here again, the Sunnis are negative, but less unequivocally—71 percent have an unfavorable view (23% very), and 29 percent a favorable view (3% very).
Iraqi confidence in Iraqi forces (as opposed to militias) is increasing while its confidence in US forces is decreasing. Given US policies there can be little doubt but that US forces have lost significant Shia support and gained some Sunni support. I suspect increasing number of Shia no longer believe that American forces are capable of protecting them and with increased confidence in their government's capabilities no longer fear the consequences of an American withdrawal.
...
If the people are the COG is it possible that both sides are losing? The poll results on the Americans seems inconsistent with reports coming out of Baghdad on the reception for US troops being brought back into the neighborhoods.
Analogies and institutions
Hi Selil,
Quote:
Originally Posted by
selil
Is this Center of Gravity an analogy like a black hole has a center of gravity with an even horizon an point of no return, etc.. etc...?
When I read Clausewitz many years ago, I just assumed he was using it as an anlogy from Neutonian physics. The discussions and information in this thread (and some others) has really made me wonder about that. For me, the position paper by Krieger was what really changed my thinking on how the concept is actually being used. I've come to the conclusion that the original analogy has been totally reified out of its original context and converted into an institutional formula that is bereft of any anlogic connections.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
selil
Or is it more like a tire ballancer shows displacement towards the weight thereby illuminating where more effort could be put forth? As an example some object/process such as the population is sucking down everything else and when a threshold is met other elements (food, freedom, determination) get sucked into a vortex never to exit.
Maybe it's a balance?
I'm thinking of a three sided triangle that has politics on one side, resources on the other, and time on the final side (just as an example). If politics becomes weighty than time and resources are light and are lifted. Simlarly if time and politics become weighted resources is exposed further.
I think that Bill hit it on the head when he said that
Quote:
I notice this conversation is getting a little more heated, which probably means we're about to break into new ground.
Honestly, I'm not sure if it is a case of breaking "new ground" or breaking through institutionalized mindsets. I'm also wondering what this "new ground" would look like once we start surveying it: a collection of heuristics? an inductive model? a reworked analogy? a formal deductive model?
As the discussion progressed, I certainly started to see it in terms of relinking a useful heuristic (Centre of Gravity) back into a complex system based loosely on analogies from quantum physics. That started me thinking about dimensionality at various operational levels which, in turn, made me think of the Malinowski material since the cultural/symbolic operational level seems to be the one that is least developed in current planning models. I think your suggestion of time, politics and resources is probably a good start at developing a series of dimensional scales, but may be too general.
My current thinking is tending towards the idea of conceptualizing operational levels based on time, information-communications density and format, resources, favoured elementary relational models, and environmental feedback loops (e.g. how information gleaned from the operational environment is processed and new models are developed and communicated back to level based actors). I am really looking forward to RTK's COIN handbook because, from what I gather, he has probably put together a really good model of that operational level (post #39 in this thread).
Marc
What is a Guerilla's Center of Gravity?
What is a Guerilla's Center of Gravity and Critical Vulnerability(ies)?
Strategic Level? Operational Level? Tactical Level?
Here is an example at Strategic-Operational Levels:
WWI, German East Africa. Col Lettow-Vorbeck and his German and Askari defense forces face overwhelming odds presented by the combined British, Belgian and Portuguese forces arrayed against him. Yet they where never 'beaten.' The Center of Gravity for the Germans in EA was their resolve, their will to resist. Note the main goal of Lettow-Vorbeck was not necessarily defense of the Colony but to draw the maximum enemy force possible into Africa and away from Europe. The critical vulnerability at the Strategic-Operational levels was simply Germany itself. Lettow-Vorbeck's force was small mobile and capable of prolonged guerilla resistance, no longer relying on the Colony for support, tying up thousands of troops and large amounts of war material. This resistance could have been continued for some time past the Nov 11th 1918, Lettow-Vorbeck stated he could resist indefinetly, but when Germany lost the war in Europe, his will was broken, their no longer existed a reason to resist.
Mao Tse Tung had a similiar will to resist as his COG. You could kill thousands of his supporters, force him to march a thousand miles, but his resolve remained. What was his CV? What could have broken the Communist insurgency at the Strategic-Operational levels?
I state (it seems obvious) that the global insurgent's COG is his will to fight, this would definetly apply to the levels of war. In this sense, what then is today's guerilla or insurgent, in the global war's, critical vulnerability? This applies to the trans-national insurgent not the local, who would have a different CV all together based on his local conditions.
Honor and A Nod of Approval From the Commander
you always fight for your buddies and your Commander. It is the latter's charisma, his personality, his paternalism, his spiritual power, his personal magnetism that binds the cohesiveness of a unit(s) together. Attached ideologies and goals are extraneous. Guzman from the Shining Path, Boudica of the Iceni and Massoud of the Northern Alliance are classic examples of the cult of personality. On our own land, the 250+ years of Native American insurgency was fueled by strong, competent, inspirational leaders. Seneca, Corn Stalk, Gall, Roman Nose, Geronimo, Quanah Parker, Chief Joseph, Cochise, Louis Rael, Tecumseh, Crazy Horse, 'King' Phillip, Red Cloud, Buffalo Hump, Little Turtle, Blue Jacket, Sitting Bull, Little Crow, Victorio, Pontiac and many others were the driving force behind the insurgency. These Indian guerillas didn't rush the cavalry with cries of " let's save the buffalo!" or " This one's for the deer!" - they charged, fought and died in emulation and loyalty to the men in front leading them. I think sometimes it's difficult for us to realize that people who blow up civilians, torture and behead have a sense of duty, honor and loyalty.