Semper Fi...but a Grunt nonetheless...
Sir, greatly appreciate your willingness to engage the issues. For whatever its worth, I don't post rank as I hope that any ideas which I may or may not advocate/discuss/examine will stand or fall based solely upon their merits/lack thereof.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
PhilR
I believe this gets at the heart of the matter with FM 3-24, or "pop-centric" COIN, as its being described. I think that FM 3-24 describes a very specific COIN operational design to result in a specific political outcome. As Ken White and Col. Maxwell have described, we ARE NOT (or should not) be doing COIN in Afghanistan, but are supporting another government's COIN effort.
My take: technically it's FID or advising, but COIN works from a marketing standpoint...coins generally have value, etc. FM 3-24, FM 3-24-2, some of the CA FM's (CAG? ones) are important steps along the journey...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
PhilR
The ISAF guidance, however, clouds that fundamental fact by describing ISAF's direct responsibility to the Afghan people to both develop/influence a legitimate Afghan government for them, and to protect them from Taliban insurgents. It is emphasized to more work with the Afghan government, than through them. To do this assumes that we are developing an Afghan government that will eventually govern within the ethical framework of how we are conducting this campaign--that it will be "legitimate" in how we define legitimacy. I'm not sure we can dictate/influence this with any meaningful success. (The competing model currently seems to be how the Sri Lanakan government conducted its latest phase against the LTTE--an operational design that is not in keeping with FM 3-24 appraoch, but may better fit the ultimate political solution there).
OIF1 vet, Michael Yon reader...no Afghanistan experience, non-Dari/Pashto speaker which admittedly hobbles any insights...however...given the history of Afghanistan the possibility of a spontaneous leap into 'functional nation state status' appears to be remote from this armchair without the 'benefit' of some sort of catalytic event...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
PhilR
In the end, we may establish a more secure environment and better trust between ISAF and the Afghan populace, but we might do it in such a way as to develop an Afghan government that is fundamentally unsustainable over the long run and will not survive once we draw down. We will have conducted a tactically successful campaign that ultimately does not, and cannot achieve its strategic objectives.
Concur...
Clausewitz, Sun Tzu and COIN guidance
While it’s always a possibility, I’d offer that Clausewitz’s writings were more drawn from his interpretation of his experiences and history as he understood it. Peter Paret’s Clausewitz and the State (1976) is a useful biography that highlights this point. This is only foremost in my mind, because I only recently read the book. In looking not only at On War, but many of his other writings, Paret really reveals how Clausewitz zero’d in on the political underpinnings of every war. This is not simply in terms of policy, but that how any entity (usually as state, but not necessarily) goes to war and conducts war is a fundamental reflection of how their society is politically and culturally organized. Clausewitz’s thoughts and experiences are broader than just the phrase “Napoleonic Wars.” He realized that the true power of the French at that time was not in tactics or organization, but in how the fundamental changing of France to a nation that could tap the energies of the whole populace enabled it to wage total war against other European monarchies who still thought in terms of the limited wars.
Clausewitz could very well recognize the wisdom of Sun Tzu, but in all likelihood (and I can’t really speak for him), he’d assert that Sun Tzu’s tenets were applicable to the social and political makeup of China at the time he wrote it. Sun Tzu’s idea of avoiding bloody war, to win without fighting, reflected the tenuous hold Chinese kings/emperors had on their kingdoms. They could not bleed their kingdom dry, nor risk all on a long war. In this way, they were similar to the European wars of the 18th century before the French Revolution came on the scene.
Clausewitz actually focused much of his writings on politics. He understood that the concept of a nation in arms could express itself through a government and army, or through guerilla war without much account to an effective government or army (like Spain). In fact, as he became frustrated with the lack of reform in Prussia, he advocated the idea of the nation resisting through guerilla warfare.
All of this comes back around to the current discussion, because I believe it highlights how our own doctrine and “way of war” must be a reflection of our own political constitution and beliefs. In this light, population-centric COIN ala FM 3-24 is appropriate. However, FM 3-24 may not be the appropriate COIN strategy for the “host” governments and societies that we are aiding. By implementing 3-24 in a FID or SFA manner, its required that we and the host government have the same concept of what a legitimate and effective government is and that it will be the ultimate goal of the conflict.
s/f
Phil Ridderhof USMC
Cherry picking who we listen to
Posted by Dayuhan
Quote:
In my part of the world, and I suspect elsewhere, Americans in particular have a reputation for being very easy to manipulate. One piece of advice I'd give anyone who is bringing resources (military, financial, whatever) into a chaotic situation is to be very, very wary of anyone who agrees with everything you say, tells you just what you want to hear, and wants to be your loyal ally. An alliance that falls in your lap without hard work on your part is more than likely an attempt to manipulate you and use the resources you have in pursuit of an objective that likely has nothing to do with yours.
Dayuhan makes an important point that I hope isn't simply glossed over. I have seen this too many times. Some local befriends a senior American officer or other official and all the sudden this person speaks for all indigenous personnel in the area, because it what we want to hear. Anyone saying anything contrary to the party line is obviously a minority. I seem to recall we were dubbed by a couple of key manipulaters during the build up to invading Iraq. Later the Kurds dubbed us repeatedly to achieve their objectives, and amateurs fell for it hook, line and sinker. Just two examples of how dangerous this trait this, and it probably due to arrogance and an excessively rosey outlook of the world where we mistakenly assume everyone wants to be like us and shares our values.
Alternative link for guidance
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Red Rat
Tried that - doesn't work for me!! The aim of the UK's IT system is to add more process - not to enhance communications and make us more effective.
My own system at work (Canadian government) also blocks me from accessing Scribd.com - NATO's posted a copy here:
http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/offici...y_guidance.pdf
Appearances can be deceiving...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
Bottom line is we opened and held up the edge of the tent, the camel got his nose and then his body inside and now we don't know how to get him out -- and the rest of the world will, mostly, figure that out. Not least because we will very likely go to foolish lengths to be sure that government gets its own way on many things. Even to the point of self harm -- to the US... :wry:
...we can be likened to that big goofy kid who you have to keep an eye on because the wheels are turning in there even though he hides it well sometimes...fortunately he's big enough and young enough to recover from those hard hits resulting from inexperience....
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
Among other things, the US diplomatic coup of getting NATO to become involved has certainly been a double ed -- one of these (
LINK).
:D
Things are changing fast, we have passed the cold war thaw and are moving into a new spring in which we are really going to start having to pay attention.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
No body's going to win, there is no win in any insurgency; you can achieve most of your aims but you aren't going to win because lacking killing 'em all, the other guys aren't going away; they'll be back, one way or another and sooner or later. So winning isn't the issue. An acceptable outcome is the issue and that can be obtained without either of your alternatives.
Agreed
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
Now, it's likely to be a mix of more COIN support -- and yes, that means fighting -- and 'nation building' without going full bore on either and getting to the point where there is borderline stability in the area and it's better than it was when we got there.
When we get to that point, we'll leave. Then we'll have four win-less wars in a row; I did the first two; these two are for you guys...
Where we gonna intervene and do COIN stuff next?
Ouch.
We are slowly extracting our head from our economic point of contact and it has been much less traumatic than it could have been...this gives me a bit of hope that perhaps, just perhaps, a willingness to try a hybrid/conventional/interagency/COIN/FID/hezbollah-kepi's blu fusion journey can get us where we need to go...no promises though (step 1 in all CA/CMO operations) :wry:
Michael, all very doctrinal, but ...
who is actually doing the "strategic and operational planning", and supplying the bulk of the assets for "tactical-level operations" ?
If the answer is the US, then according to another JP (not writing from my home computer, so I can't cite chap and verse; but IIRC, it's the JP on FID), that situation goes beyond FID with combat support and enters the realm of "war". That might be Bill's point - that's for him to say. But, it is my legal point - we are essentially a co-belligerent in the Astan Govt vs Taliban armed conflict. Similar legal situation as in Vietnam (IMO).
Here's your post on that topic and it is relative
LINK. And we did do all this before... :D
Who's doing the bulk of the work is not terribly material; who's at least in theory providing direction could be. You legal types can argue that; the practical matter is that if the Afghan govt complains about civilian casualties, we react...
There are all sorts of doctrinal boxes. There are also reality boxes.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
... but if we're doing the bulk of information activities, the bulk of the PSYOP, the bulk of the fighting, the bulk of the economic development, who is really the assisted party? The Afghan government or the U.S. government?
Wrong question -- who's country is it?
Quote:
I'm sure jmm99 can help us on the legal front, but if you over throw a government and occupy a country in effect you are now within your borders. We conducted COIN in post WWII Germany (or COIN like tactics). You are legally bound to provide basic services to include security to the populace until your status changes. When does that status change? After you stood up a government, or after you stood up an effective government?
The former. Germany was occupied and governed from 1945 until 1949 by the Allied powers. The Occupation continued after the BRD Government stood up in 1949 for another six years, until 1955 and Germany was truly able to stand on its own. Ten years total. We've been in Afghanistan for eight and they've had a government for the last four. Like it or not, it's been recognized by everyone and NATO is there to help -- and that help is contingent on there being an Afghan government. They were not willing to help the US with what they saw as a US problem...
Quote:
We're doing FID in Columbia and the Philippines, but we were doing something else in Iraq and Afghanistan that was COIN like, but not COIN if Ken's and your argument is correct.
Since both those latter were and are several things aside from an insurgency, I think you could safely say we're fighting wars in both places -- no doubt in my mind that's accurate and should satisfy any purist.
Quote:
Are we conducting Stability Operations? Seems to be a little closer to definitional truth. Does it really change anything?
Works for me. As for change, not for you or me or the troops there but it probably changes something for both NATO and the Afghans and our relations with most of the rest of the world...
Quote:
WILF wrote something a while back roughly stating we're too eager to put something into a doctrinal box, instead of accurately framing the problem and addressing it effectively. Like Ken, I'm extremely leary of all the theories, especially those not grounded in history.
I agree that the problem should be accurately framed, as for addressing it effectively, jury's still out.
The history says that if you try to run a campaign as if it is your campaign and the 'host nation,' no matter how bad they are, no matter how little they may be contributing, doesn't buy into what you're doing, you'll probably lose. Trust me on that one.
Warden makes my head hurt
:D
Quote:
Bill, this whole thread is an example of why I became a Wardenfile as Bob's World would say. War is a system...understand it as that and you might figure out how to win, don't and you will get into all kinds of mentaly ill war concepts and stuff that just confuses the issue
How you been doin? haven't seen you here in a while. Slap
Slap, as always good to hear from you, and when I can I follow your posts on the other threads, always interesting, and the utube video links are always good for a laugh.
I think Bob's World identified an appropriate label for you :).
You have seen my posts countering "some" of Warden's arguments in other threads. I'm not vehemently anti-Warden, but I think he has a very narrow focus and is more of an advocate for his service than an advocate for developing the "right" strategy for our nation. Of course it can be argued that Army planners didn't do much better in Iraq or Afghanistan. As you may recall I am a fan of punitive raids, and of course we can do those most effectively with Air Power, but to demonstrate national resolve you still need to put some boots on the ground to show you're prepared to accept risk to pursue policy. As for leaving boots on the ground and trying to transform another culture that is another debate. In most cases I'm opposed.
Also I'm not convinced war is a system, it is conflict at the highest level, but are attempt to define things as systems have led us astray too many times. Look forward to more debates on this topic. Bill
Drink more bourbon, does wonders for slow brain cells...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
It concerns me when a senior citizen has a better memory than I do :D.
Also makes you dashingly handsome to the fairer sex...:rolleyes:
Quote:
I don't still don't agree with your opinion on this topic, because IMO the bottom line is if we are killing insurgents, we're doing counterinsurgency. I'm not sure that doctrine is sufficiently clear to determine the difference between when we're doing COIN and doing FID.
In one sense, I'm not sure it makes a great deal of difference to you, me or the troops -- war is war. OTOH, it does make a legal difference and, more importantly, a perceptual difference on the part of many. Including the Troops...
If you say the US is doing COIN in Afghanistan in the eyes of some, you're saying those folks are in an insurgency against the US. That doesn't compute to Joe, who also doesn't understand why he needs to care what the Afghans want since we're paying the freight...
Quote:
True we react when the Afghan government complains about civilian casualties, but let's me honest, these complaints have been going on for years, and our reaction was mostly a public apology, not a change in policy.
I think you just sort of made my case; "The delusion that we are -- or were -- 'doing COIN' is big part of the reason we're where we are eight years after we arrived."(emphasis added / kw)
Quote:
That seems to have changed with GEN McCrystal's new guidance.
True, thus, as I said, we'll see; "...as for addressing it effectively, jury's still out..."
Quote:
It doesn't matter to Joe on the ground doing God's work whether it is COIN or FID, but it does matter from a strategy perspective, because it determines how we're framing the problem and if we're framing the problem incorrectly we won't get the desired results.
Absolutely -- that's been my point. Like it or not, it is their country and we cannot go charging around as if it were ours. We did that once and it didn't work out at all well.
Quote:
I do think the COIN/FID debate should be addressed in more detail in another forum; probably in irregular warfare debate. It is being proposed that IW consists of COIN, FID, UW, SO, and CT, meaning these are the activities that "we perform", so if that is true, that sort of rains on the parade of those who say we don't do COIN. With that low blow, I depart the debate for the evening.
I'd agree that COIN is IW -- but that doesn't define who's doing what to who. That's what's important, the definition inside the IW continuum.
Not a low blow, just another example of our 'doctrine' problem -- too many cooks, all want their part of the pie included in everything and selection of terms is part of that. I don't particularly care about the terminology -- I do know that the "We are the US and we're here to help you, please stand back" mindset is not a good thing.
Saying we're doing COIN leads to that, the troops get frustrated because they can't understand why the host nation has a say in anything, the host nation gets their feelings hurt and won't cooperate and 'allies' who would help said host nation aren't all that happy to be seen helping the US. It's all politics and perceptions so the Joint pub folks better be smart in final their word selections and definitions.