Steelrain,
If you could ever get your hands on a copy of this book, you would likely enjoy it:
http://www.amazon.com/Britains-Rebel.../dp/1902304055
Britain's Rebel Air Force: The War from the Air in Rhodesia 1965-1980
Printable View
Steelrain,
If you could ever get your hands on a copy of this book, you would likely enjoy it:
http://www.amazon.com/Britains-Rebel.../dp/1902304055
Britain's Rebel Air Force: The War from the Air in Rhodesia 1965-1980
I NEED that book. I'll see if CARL has it.
Edited to say: CARL doesn't have the book, and neither does USAREUR libraries.
Here is a gratuitous 3 view of a REAL COIN aircraft:
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedi...-10_BRONCO.png
Based on the COIN Aircraft thread, I've started up some medium-duty research, when I discovered a couple of nice papers on-line by the designer/builder of the most successful military aircraft ever built in a garage out of spare parts, the OV-10 Bronco.
See the link for more information, including a nifty little flying car project the inventor, K.P. Rice, COL(ret) USMC is working on right now.
http://www.volanteaircraft.com/ov-10.htm
The OV-10 Story: Innovation vs. The "System"
W.H.BECKETT K.P.RICE M.E.KING
Background
At the end of WWII the era of boom and zoom had arrived for military aviation with mushroom clouds, jet speeds and an independent Air Force. Korea soon showed the continuing necessity for ground troops and old fashioned Close Air Support (CAS), but the Army was impotent against the Air Force's preoccupation with jets, and in the late '50's hadn't developed it's rotary-wing substitute. Naval Aviation was competing with the new Air Force for nuclear roles in order to maintain its very existence. The Marines still advertised CAS, but were following the Air Force lead and justified the transition to jets on the basis of speed, bomb load and nukes (eg: "One A-4 equaled three Corsairs on the basis of 'productivity'").
Here is a link to the original paper about the development of the OV-10 from 1960.
http://www.volanteaircraft.com/l2vma.htm
THE NEED, CONCEPT OF OPERATION AND GENERAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR A VERY LIGHT S.T.O.L. SUPPORT AIRCRAFT 1960
MAJ W.H. BECKETT, MAG-15
MAJ K.P. RICE, AIRFMFPAC
PREFACE
Sixteen years ago the aircraft industry hit the "con trails." The atom was smashed, the sound barrier broken. The era of boom and zoom was launched in the middle of the mushroom clouds. The man in the Buck Rogers suit became the new hero of the new age. Thermonuclear annihilation "push button" style was as real a possibility as the miracle of the dial selector washing machine. But when the dark rain of fallout fell on an awestruck world, both sides of the international political question had grim second thoughts about resolving their differences by leaving a vacant spot in the solar system. The possibility of such a war remains with us. It must assuredly be prepared for!
Meanwhile, back in the foxholes of Korea, the jungles of Indo-China and the sands of Israel and Jordan, war proceeds pretty much as usual. Not the blast of the atom bomb, but the burst of machine gun fire breaks the silence of this "twilight peace" we are enjoying. The rifleman is no anachronism. He is very much with us and in active service. Read the daily newspaper.
The aviation complex, industrial and military, in its rightful pride and zeal, in being the instrument of the future and the vanguard for conquering space, has neglected the exigencies of current warfare and providing the requisite airborne support for same.
One of the most interesting things about the OV-10 is the way it was used by the AF and the USMC. While the AF wanted to restrict it to a total FAC role, the USMC pushed the plane to its limits operationally (as did the Navy) and got very good operational value out of it.
I remember reading about the OV-10 in Popular Mechanics as a kid. Fascinating story then and now. The USAF always seemed to punish aviators who would go this route as lesser beings (that is of course a purely impressionistic view but one based on having friends inside the blue machine who fly lesser aircraft).
Thanks, Steve!
Tom
I can't remember when they went out of service with the Marine Corps, but I can remember seeing several of them buzzing around New River Air Station in 1992.
It would be interesting to find out what the justification was for the platform's retirement.
According to globalsecurity.org they were phased out of the USMC inventory in 1995. No real indication there as to why, although it's possible the age of the airframe played a role.
Interesting...I've also done a bit more digging, and it seems some Bronco aficianado claims that cutting them allowed the Corps to put more money into fast-movers.
As for the airframe age, the Philippines of all places still has some in the inventory.
I suppose that those who advocate a COIN fixed-wing platform stand to tip over UAS ricebowls. It'll probably come down to a simple matter of not enough funding to justify the acquisition.
Anyone know where this might be located? I ran a couple of google strings on it, but came up with nothing.Quote:
The Rand Corp. recently completed an unclassified report, "COIN Aircraft Systems for the USAF and Friendly States Facing Insurgencies,"
The OV-10 thread is great, but, ultimately we want something with a similar airspeed that is stealthy, can provide ISR, kill a target, and act as an airborne FAC as necessary. That sort of multi-tasking would require a manned platform as well as facilitate airspace de-confliction better than more UAS's.
Stealth is not an absolute, IMO. It's a "nice to have," but if forced to choose I'd skip it before I'd skip any other function. Adding stealth tacks years and dollars onto any program, and the returns tend to be somewhat theoretical. If you're talking muffled engines and acoustic stealth, that's a slightly different matter for COIN. But radar stealth is a bit of gold plate that could delay or kill a program that is needed.
Agreed Steve on stealth but agree also Blackfoot on manned platform versus UAS for COIN. By that I am referring to true COIN not select strike ops via Predator or manned platform. I guess I am too stuck in my ways but for COIN and CAS I want a manned platform with a brain and a soul on board.
Best
Tom
Agree completely on manned platform, Tom. You lose too much capability (and by that I mean all-around capability) by taking the pilot and nav/crewchief/door gunner/what-have-you out of the equation.
Except for the stealth part, an A-1 Skyraider airframe with a big modern turboprop engine would provide everything required; great endurance, very large payload, many many weapons stations, 4 20 mm. cannon and a capacious fuselage with room for whatever you want to put in there.
All for naught though, after the A-10's are gone, the Air Force will make sure there will be no more fixed wing CAS airplanes. The ground soldiers will have to make do with other things.
carl,
I want something small enough to land on the road next to my CP, so the AD1 is a bit much. But agreed on the uselessness of stealth in a COIN environment.
OV-10s can and have carried small groups of people in internal stores. The basic assumptions of fixed-wing, light, use of infantry munitions and radios are good assumptions. As electronics keep getting smaller, lighter and cheaper, the avionics suite can be quite sophisticated within the initial OV-10 concept, prior to the Air Force attempting to kill it.
I would say also in this discussion--and I am equally guilty of not doing this--is that we need to distinguish between pure CAS aircraft and COIN aircraft. The two are not really the same--as 120mm indicates above and as Carl reminds us of the most excellent AD. The COIN bird like the OV10 has to do the FAC role--and the CAS on call with perhaps a limited lift capacity in a STOL airframe. The classic CAS bird like the AD, the A10, or even the A26/B26 (depending on variant and time frame) puts steel on target.
Tom
Funny just watching the news about the fires on Catalina Island off California and there was an OV-10 doing its thing.
Tom
An interesting thing about the OV-10 on the Marine side is that the 2nd seat was reserved for a ground MOS officer. I served with a Company Commander who had done an air-tour as an OV-10 observer. Similiar to having a FAC on the ground, same argument for putting a grunt in the air on a slow moving platform. There is no electronic replacement for context and experience. This company commander was one of the last to fly in OV-10's his assumption for the phase out was battlefield survivability, but then in the early 90's we only looked at former Soviet style enemies.
-T
Excellent point on the ground MOS observer. For the unfamiliar, when the Rhodesians (yes, I'm bringing them up again) got hot and heavy into their Fire Force employment techniques, the overall contact commander remained aloft in an Allouette armed with a 20mm cannon or quad .303s. He in turn directed the ballet on the ground.
jcustis,keep bringing them up they were a fantastic unit!
Anyone else remember in the '90s when the conspiracy theorists asserted that these OV-10s were going to be used to assist in the takeover of the US by the "shadow gov't?"
I'm sure that footage is just part of the deception plan. Those OV-10s are probably reconfigured to "mind-reading" duties by ZOG by now:eek:
Those missions could shift depending on the situation. A shootdown would result in the A-1 turning into a Sandy, a combination CAS-FAC and everything else.
At the risk of getting into a this old airplane vs. that old airplane arguement (interesting but sterile), the A-1 wasn't that much bigger than the OV-10; 50 ft by 38 ft vs. 40 ft by 41 ft. If you put some simple high lift devices on the wing and bigger tires on an A-1 you might be able to come close enough to the rough field performance of an OV-10 to make it worthwhile.
My basic point though isn't to advocate on airplane over the other. It is that at this level of aerodynamic performance why go through the trouble of designing a new airframe? An OV-10 or A-1 airframe will get you close enough to where you want to go. Modern engines and avionics (I hesitate to say avionics because people will spend years and billions making those do everything for everybody) will take you the rest of the way.
:wry: We have done this before--big surprise I know :wry:
Look at the A26/B26 transition from medium bomber (A26) in late WWII through Korea to the Congo in 1964 as "COIN" A/C. It was around that time that the Mohawk showed up and the Army did its best to slip it under the Air Force radar screen as an "unarmed" platform, which it ultimately became as a SLAR and IMINT bird.
Then again never forget that the Blackbird (SR71) as an Air Force system was designed as an interceptor (fighter) 1962-1971?. It was the CIA that fielded it as the A12 recce bird in 1962; the SR71 replaced it as an Air Force recce system in 1968.
Gratefully neither the recce nor the interceptor version could be flown slowly enough below their Mach 3.35 speed to allow them to be configured for COIN. That really would have made for interesting CAS. :wry:
Best
Tom
The original post reads like a press-release for Stavatti Aerospace. It appears Stavatti is a paper tiger and likely a hoax or fishing for R&D money, and I suspect the cited RAND study is nonexistent. Stavatti's page has a lot of pretty pictures but no indication of any aerospace or defense background.
http://defencetalk.com/forums/showthread.php?t=3930
http://www.defensetech.org/archives/000009.html
http://www.defensereview.com/modules...rticle&sid=304
Recent White Paper from HQ AFSOC:
http://smallwarsjournal.com/document...cept-may07.pdf
Cheers,
jak
Hi:
The Philippines badly needs a squadron of new COIN aircraft for operations against Islamist terrorists mostly and the NPAs from time to time. Its OV10s are badly aging.
During the Huk rebellion the Philippine Air Force made effective use of F-51 Mustangs in its against the Communist-led guerillas.
I do know that there is a twin-engined version of the F-51 that goes by another name.
An upgraded version of this would suit the Philippine armed forces just fine.
It could be used to give hot pursuit to Islamist terrorists riding in pump boats who could use their crafts' speed to seek refuge in Sabah, Malaysia.
lt could also double up for maritime patrol missions from the the Batanes islands near Taiwan to Tawi Tawi near Malaysia.
That was the F82 Twin Mustang, developed originally because it would double the range of the already phenomenol P51. 272 were built commencing in 1945; a handful flew iin Korea and were withdrawn by 1952.
Tom
Hi Tom:
Yup.
Are there still any left in the USAF boneyard?
If not, how much would it cost to revive production lines?
The engines would of course have to be turboprops this time.
But that alone would be enough for the modest but immediate needs of the Philippine Air Force. Together with the Philippine Coast Guard, these planes could also be used to patrol against pirates and smugglers.
Cheers.
I would seriously doubt it. The boneyards only keep air frames so long and then they are sold for scrap.Quote:
Are there still any left in the USAF boneyard?
If not, how much would it cost to revive production lines?
Tom
I have never flown any but commercial aircraft in peacetime but it seems to me that in order to orient yourself and find your target, you would have to fly at altitudes, say between 1000 and 3000 feet, that would put you in grave danger from small shoulder fired guided missles. When putting something on target then perhaps you would be so low it wouldn't matter.
The following is a list of general comments about this subject that may or may not be pertinent:
A COIN airplane would greatly benefit from having two seats for two sets of eyeballs. Really tough terrain requires full attention to not hitting the ground and having somebody else to look outside would be a big help.
Turboprop engines are great for this mission but you should consider what kind of heat signature the engine produces. The PT-6 has two very hot exhaust stacks exposed all the time. Something like the PW-120 series is more powerful and it might be easier to shield the exhaust.
F-82's are long, long gone. If you could find one, or even the remains of one, it would be worth far more to a collector than any government would be able to pay. Besides the last thing you would want on a low and slow airplane is two radiators exposed at the bottom of the airplane for all the world to shoot at.
I wonder if vertical dive bombing might not be reinvestigated. I read the JU-87, in 1939, could put a bomb with 30 ft of a target, without the benefit of gee-whiz electronics. Combine that capability with the new small diameter bomb, or even a specially fitted 120 mm. mortar shell, it might be a way to put fire support very close to troops without as much expense.
Some kind of cannon, 20 mm. or better, is indispensable. There are many accounts of aircraft like the mighty A-1 Skyraider laying down cannon shells within feet of troops in contact.
One last thing. I recently read an article by an AC-130 aircraft commander lamenting the fact that when he was in Iraq, his airplane was tied to one ground unit all night and it was hell to have it re-assigned. The article also stated that in VN gunships were just flown in a general area till they were needed then away they went. Does anyone know if the AC-130's are still tied down to just one unit in Iraq? It seems that is a waste.
Do you have a link to the article? If so, I might be able to answer if I could grasp the context of the statements.Quote:
One last thing. I recently read an article by an AC-130 aircraft commander lamenting the fact that when he was in Iraq, his airplane was tied to one ground unit all night and it was hell to have it re-assigned. The article also stated that in VN gunships were just flown in a general area till they were needed then away they went. Does anyone know if the AC-130's are still tied down to just one unit in Iraq? It seems that is a waste.
Carl posted good points about susceptibility to shoulder-launched projectiles. Mogadishu '93 definitely highlighted the danger of an enemy who employs new TTPs against you with a dated weapons system.
On the matter of flight profiles for aircraft, I'll share this interesting moment, even though it occured with Kiowa scout a/c, and not a fixed-wing platform. I recently served as an umpire during Exercise Talisman Saber 07, and the Aussies made excellent use of scout helicopters against light armored recon and tank formations. On more than one occasion, a section of Kiowas would fly nap of the earth and identify our elements on the ground.
On two occasions, once they spotted a cluster of vehicles, they made a direct run overhead and dropped a smoke grenade on the position to mark it for follow-on Cobra or F-18 airstrikes. It's an old Vietnam/Rhodesian tactic, and I have to admit that I had a smile on my face even though I knew I'd be assessing casualties against our side.
What is notable about all this is the fact that the Kiowa aircraft were difficult to pick up and even track due to the single canopy vegetation. We could get a bead on them for only a short window, and typically when they directly overhead. I'm no SAM guy, but I can hazard a guess that it would be very difficult to achieve a lock with such a short exposure window.
I'd have to add to my previous list of required capabilities, and in addition to the leaflet pod, a good COIN aircraft would need a smoke projectile pod to designate targets or the center point of a ground contact. Done right, the pod could be configurable to support both leaflets and smoke devices.
Here is the address of the AC-130 article to which I referred:
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pa...ons/i45/19.pdf
Regarding the low altitude flight of the Kiowa: at the begining of the current war I read an article by a VN helicopter pilot in which he expressed surprise at the altitudes the Army helos were flying in Iraq and Afghan. He said that way back when they flew one of two ways; either as absolutely low and fast as they could or above 4000' agl. Low and fast for the reason you state and high to be above .30 cal range.
http://aimpoints.hq.af.mil/display.cfm?id=20181
Quote:
US Air Force ( USAF) Chief of Staff General Michael Moseley has told Jane’s he is considering the creation of a new counterinsurgency (COIN) squadron of A-10A Thunderbolt II aircraft for the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC).
Folks,
I have posted a Concept paper on acquiring the AT-6 for COIN operations at my site here: http://www.excaliburrd.com/projects/
Also, I have also stood up a collaboration and innovation national security thinktank, please take a look at http://excaliburrd.com/cs/
and join or let me know what you think. I love this site and have it linked over at mine,
Thanks
Otto
Otto,
Interesting A/C. I have to confess that I was wondering why drag out the T6Texan and again try to hang weapons on it. we did that in the Congo in the 60s and there were problems.
Keep posting and welcome. Tell us more about you here.
Tom
Very interesting. The A1 Skyraider was used very well for CAS in Vietnam et al. My dad used to convert the Skyraider at Alameda Naval Air Station for service in Southeast Asia when I was just a kid. I think they went straight to the RVN Air Force.
That A-1 was a beast, another similar aircraft was the T-28, initially used by both the Navy and USAF for training and later by the USAF as a close air support weapon. I've attached a link to my friend Brian Shul's Q&A on his background with training foriegn pilots, his deployment and subsequent shootdown in Vietnam, and what he thinks on modern day concept of using a prop driven airplane. If you are interested, please take a look here
http://www.excaliburrd.com/docs/AT-6...6BrianShul.pdf
Just one question about the Skyraider.
The warbirds association I was member of owned one Skyraider (and two T-6 each of them propelled with 2 blades propellers). It was the biggest and the most powerful one propeller plane of the club; still bigger than the F-4 (though the Antonov AN-2 seemed to be the biggest, but that curious Russian bird was neither a fighter, nor a fast plane, by far).
So, this Skyraider was equipped with one 20mm cannon in each of its two folding wings, whose mechanisms were accessible for maintenance purpose once the wings were folded.
But there is something else about that plane I didn’t find much allusion to on the web, eventually. It consisted of a little door located on the let side below and behind the cockpit. Once you opened that door you could see quite a Spartan seat on which, strangely enough, one should find himself looking at the rear of the plane, that is not at all what a co-pilot or a crew bomber would be supposed to do! Moreover the infortunate guy who was supposed to seat here couldn’t see much of what could happen outside; for, thus "trapped" he had no cockpit and just, if my recollection is correct, one or two tiny round shaped windows: one on this small door, and the second located at the opposite side on the fuselage.
I once asked to someone what this second passenger was supposed to do in that plane, and I was just answered in an humorous and purposeful tone: “oh, that’s where the “monkey” seats down, but I don’t know what he was supposed to do while the plane was flying, actually.” It was certainly awful to be the monkey because this guy couldn't by no means anticipate on what the pilot could do!
My question is, does anyone know something about that, or was this Skyraider a special version?
From what I understand, all the Skyraiders acquired by the USAF and RVN were supplied by the U.S. Navy. The USN was replacing a lot of their Skyraider squardrons with jet aircraft. I do know that over the years there were some counter electronics types with a second seat. Other than that I would assume you are describing one these special types.
That’s actually a great question Dominique! I knew there was a door on the left side of the fuselage and never knew what it was for either. On this site:
http://www.boeing.com/history/mdc/skyraider.htm
"Different configurations carried a pilot in an enclosed cockpit, a pilot and another person (either a radar operator or a co-pilot), and a pilot and two other crew. The AD/A-5 could carry a crew of four, plus four passengers or 12 troops, four stretchers, or 2,000 pounds of cargo."
There were versions with 1, 2,3, and 4 seats, talk about designing a versatile aircraft! It's funny to me now, with all of our incredible computers, with modern production designs, all that, back in the "day" we made weapons systems that could be modified into other versions and today our F-22's couldn't cross the International Date Line without their computers tumbling.
Air Force Doctrine for Irregular Warfare - The US Air Force recently (1 August) signed off on its latest doctrinal publication - AFDD 2-3 Irregular Warfare...
Cavguy made some very interesting comments about what a CAS aircraft needs in another thread. He mentioned guns and JDAMs (preferably 250 lb).
He also noted the tactical value of having a loud jet buzz the enemy at low altitude, a "show of force."
Kiowa's hard to see, but the OH-6 is harder to see. Quieter, too, on the whole.
I just got a research publication done in 1970 that compiled questionnaires done by scout pilots and observers who'd been in Vietnam. Interesting stuff, and I wonder how much of that actually made it into the training and doctrine? Somehow I doubt that much survived the 1980s....
carl, I finally got through the article, and I think the author forgets that when he references "being tied down to a single unit" he is dealing with brigades and regiments. These gunships aren't tied to single companies or battalions. Take the regimental combat team that is oriented on Fallujah. That RCT owns an area that encompases areas of the peninsula, the next town to the west, east to Abu Ghraib, etc. His portrayal of being tied down to a single unit is a tad misleading.
While I applaud the major's desire to get out and hunt, I don't think any of the ground commanders are willing to have Spectre roaming about on a loose leash, no matter how self-assured the author is about effectively applying C2 to any engagement. Maybe the ground guys need to get their act together better, but so long as we control that ground, air folks need to be patient with the box we put them in.
The Al Hayy vs. Najaf argument is a non-starter, and the statement, "...it was obvious to the crew that the chance of engaging insurgents was slim to none," is a dangerous one that ignores the reality of the ground fight. The enemy's ability to aggregate and conduct attacks is measured in seconds and minutes, and although Al Hayy seemed benign at the time, a commander requested the ASR for a reason. If the author had delved into the nature of the ASR and its justification, he might have a stronger argument.