Fuchs is on the right track
But I can't see most western politicians accepting that; the need for 'control' drives their thinking...:o
Zenpundit:
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What I found to be very odd, on a board where strategic thinking is highly valued, that no one addressed Arquilla's introduction where he raised the critical variable of cost-effectiveness of large unit operations against smaller, irregular and networked opponents. Maybe Arquilla was not explicit enough. Let me try.
Perhaps because cost effectiveness in this context is either a red straw or a herring man. As is your example. WW II expense are largely irrelevant to fighting today. A WWII Infantryman carried on his person or had usually readily available about $500.00 worth of clothing and equipment in 1944. That's roughly $5,620.00 in 2006 dollars.
His 2006 counterpart will have had about $25,000.00 in clothing and equipment in that year dollars. The majority of that difference is for materiel that did not exist in 1944. The NVG alone can run from 2 to 10K type dependent. Optical sights on all weapons...
Then consider UAVs and other factors.:wry:
That's merely one small point, a far larger issue is what capability those dollars bought and what combat effectiveness was or is produced. Cost effectiveness is too easily skewed to prove that money is being 'wasted.' What should be purchased for the spending is combat effectiveness. I have no doubt what so ever that the average Infantryman in Viet Nam was more capable than his WW II counterpart probably by a factor of two-- and I have no doubt that my serving Son and his contemporaries are miles ahead of us old guys, probably by another factor of at least two and quite possibly up to four. So yes, we're spending more but we're buying far more capability with fewer but considerably more expensive people.
As an aside, comparing wars is rarely wise, all are different and each must be taken on its own merits. My favorite is to point out that we usually fight as Brigades or RCTs and only in two recent wars did we really fight Divisions, so compare WW II to Desert Storm... :D
Further on Viet Nam. You may be correct in your statement of the Historians perception of the embassy seizure in Saigon and I'm old and thus have a suspect memory but my recollection that the embassy seizure was a quite minor blip except for the political wonks who made a big deal out of nothing. Most American pretty much ignored except for being hacked at the politicians US who allowed,even encouraged it to happen. I have to agree with Wilf, most of the Historians have made a hash of Viet Nam -- way too much politics involved in the 'scholarship.'
Shloky:
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Which brings us to Ken's point, on which he's absolutely right. It does take a different kind of culture, particularly in regards to training. (Don Vandergriff's leading the way on that front. I'd recommend his books on the topic. )
True on the cultural change and there's another point. First the culture change; Not going to happen. Two reasons, the desire for control by Politicians and senior people who do not trust subordinates because they know that our training is weak. Add a refusal to provide the training really required in a Democracy where Mommas get upset at a 1 to 2 percent KIA rate in training -- and that's what effective training will cost. We've only been able to really do that in major wars (Civil, WW I and WW II). We could not or did not do it during Korea, during Viet Nam and we are not doing it now. We train better than we ever have but we are still a long way from training competent soldiers and Marines, Officer or Enlisted right out of initial entry.
Another factor is recruiting people who can and will do the things Argquila and you suggest. I strongly doubt the numbers are there. They could possibly be but you would then create a culture that would make Congress very, very uncomfortable. There are many there who think the Armed forces are already a little to competent...
I agree that Vandergriff's proposals are an improvement but even though only go part way -- and do recall he's been pushing that for over 10 years... :(
Does Wilf not understand how information drives decision making or
is he saying that flawed perceptions from erroneous or politically skewed information should not drive decisions?
I suspect he like I knows that happens but bitterly regrets that it does. It isn't a question of wishful thinking, simply stating the fact that it happens, should not -- and need not. As he said, a lot of 'historians' write drivel -- and a lot of decision makers do not allow themselves to be swayed by 'information' (see Bush, G.W. for a recent example).
Take the Saigon Embassy and Tet, both discussed above but in the terms of the historian's views on them . Some of us who were around back then have a totally different take on the actions and reactions to them. While it is true that perception is reality, it is not quite true that Politician's perceptions are deliberately attuned to what they THINK their voters want, they are attuned to what the Politician personally wants and attributes to what his or her voters should want in his or her view.
I believe that and a few other aberrations are the issues Wilf alludes and object to...
Fuchs:
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There's no way how a look at effect only (ignoring cost) could be superior to a look at efficiency.
Depends on your viewpoint or emphasis. Militarily to look at effectiveness is the only sensible option.
However, holistically and politically for the majority of circumstances you're certainly correct. Cost is, of course, always a factor and in times of peace or near peace it dominates. Frequently in times of minor war it is an inconsequential issue; it literally becomes a non-issue in total existential war or anything near it (like WW II) when military effectiveness and/or combat effectiveness (not the same thing) take precedence, occasionally totally.
The military professional should look solely at effectiveness for his plan and recommendation, the Politicians will then tell him what they will support and he must retool his plans accordingly. In many cases, there will be minimal constraint imposed by 'cost efficient' models and the effectiveness can and will rule what happens. If, however, one plans with an eye on efficiency (which entails giving costs undue emphasis), then one is likely to produce a flawed plan that will not be effective. I emphasize that in this respect, I'm speaking of financial costs only; impacts such as economy of force or effort, casualties, terrain or initiative lost or gained are in reality more an effectiveness issue, current and future, than one of efficiency.
REALLY excellent point, Rex...
My first thought on reading about the the swarms in the article was of a US or generally western 'swarm' element operating under western constraints confronting an opponent who did not operate under those constraints...:(
Not at all simplistic, that's an accurate statement.
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Originally Posted by
Ron Humphrey
Long and short
Is it too "simplistic" to say that the key strength in swarming might be found in its ability to recognize and act on any vacuum afforded in a given path
I believe it to be accurate at any rate. However, militarily, problems arise in several areas:
- Recognizing. The really big one...
- Getting the massive numbers available to a swarm of bees is problematical; add getting most much less all the actors in a swarm of humans, unlike bees, to do the correct thing at the right time...
- Rocks are tough and durable but they are also static and rarely react to, evade, withdraw temporarily or counterattack the water that erodes them over considerable time -- time which may not be available to a military force...
That's not to say that swarms won't work, just that the fates must be kind and the reliability of effective action is unlikely to be adequate to satisfy most commanders or politicians -- the human factor (on the part of the Swarmers, the Swarmees and their respective bosses... :wry: ).
The Mongol Crow Swarm ...
and MAJ Shannon's thesis. The FP article by Arquilla, The New Rules of War, mentioned the Mongol "Crow Swarm":
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Simultaneous attack from several directions might be at the very cutting edge in conflict, but its lineage is quite old. Traditional tribal warfare, whether by nomadic horse archers or bush fighters, always featured some elements of swarms. The zenith of this kind of fighting probably came with the 13th-century Mongols, who had a name for this doctrine: "Crow Swarm." When the attack was not carried out at close quarters by charging horsemen, but was instead conducted via arrows raining down on massed targets, the khans called it "Falling Stars."
Classing the highly organized Mongol forces under Subodai (I'd call them conventional light and heavy cavalry) as "traditional tribal warriors" seemed a bit suspect to me, so I Googled up "Crow Swarm" and "Mongol". I found a master's thesis by MAJ William D. Shannon (USMC), Swarm Tactics and the Doctrinal Void: Lessons from the Chechen Wars (June 2008), U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (John Arquilla was a thesis advisor).
MAJ Shannon's issues (pp.16-17 pdf):
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Is there potential to turn swarming concepts into doctrine for U.S. forces? In order to answer this question, this thesis will ask the following questions:
• Are there relevant historical precedents that provide sufficient analysis to explore development of swarming concepts?
• Does the concept of swarming address any gaps in military doctrine?
• Can we [U.S. forces, and more specifically, Marines] incorporate swarm tactics into our doctrine for use in the offense and defense without drastic changes to organization, command, control and communications (C3), training, and logistics?
and Conclusion (pp.91-92 pdf):
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G. CONCLUSION
The research conducted here and in other scholarly and professional publications, coupled with military doctrine and experimentation, all but leads to the conclusion that there is potential to develop doctrinal swarming concepts. This is based on developing answers to the three research questions posed in Chapter I.
First, that the Chechen Wars did provide additional information and lessons learned in relation to not only the war in general, but to this thesis’ independent variables, regarding the use of swarm tactics.
Second, reviewing doctrine and warfighting experiments has confirmed the existence of doctrinal void in the area of swarm tactics, which implies a need to construct doctrinal swarming concepts, engage in experimentation, and promulgate swarm TTPs in doctrine and training.
Finally, with the implementation of the DO concept, our knowledge from the first two research questions and previous scholarly research on swarming, a potential future swarming doctrine concept foundation is set. This would allow Marines and other forces to employ swarm tactics offensively and defend against and repulse enemy swarms. The only thing left for us to do is “do it.”
So, tossing out another piece of red meat to be swarmed on .... ;)
Regards
Mike
PS: MAJ Shannon presents four "swarming" examples from history (pp. 18-23 pdf)
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1. The Mongol Swarm ....
2. Napoleon’s Retreat from Russia ....
3. The Winter War ....
4. The Soviet Afghan War ....
I expect there will be some controversy about those examples. :)