Er, could that be reversed?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bob's World
...and you could superimpose it over the Jones Insurgency Model.
As the latter came after the former one could also say the Jones Insurgency Model is the announced codification of "The building of a revolutionary movement" with a few current era tweaks and some personal beliefs added. :wry:
Nothing wrong with that -- and as I've long said the model is good. :cool:
Though I have also long said and still do suggest not getting too enamored of the pyramid or the model because there have been, are and will be some variations on the themes therein contained that can make target fixation a potential -- and problematic... :eek:
A Leader's Handbook To Unconventional Warfare
Hard to be first when studying something that is timeless...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
As the latter came after the former one could also say the Jones Insurgency Model is the announced codification of "The building of a revolutionary movement" with a few current era tweaks and some personal beliefs added. :wry:
Nothing wrong with that -- and as I've long said the model is good. :cool:
Though I have also long said and still do suggest not getting too enamored of the pyramid or the model because there have been, are and will be some variations on the themes therein contained that can make target fixation a potential -- and problematic... :eek:
I only pointed this out as the two products, developed wholly independently, tend to validate each other.
Personally I think the pyramid is WAY to specific and suggests a long, complex list of complex steps that an insurgent has to move through sequentially, which of course is probably never the case. But if viewed as general examples of how an insurgency can manifest as it grows and shrinks naturally as it wends its course to either victory or defeat, it is a good product. Insurgencies don't run on checklists.
Mine may be too generic for some, but it is intentionally so for the very reasons described above. So the suggestion of looking at the two together is show how that when viewed together they are consistent, but also help those who find one too specific or one too generic in of itself.
True. True. True. True...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bob's World
I only pointed this out as the two products, developed wholly independently, tend to validate each other... I think the pyramid is WAY to specific...Insurgencies don't run on checklists...Mine may be too generic for some, but it is intentionally so for the very reasons described above.
However someone has to keep you in check and I was reminding you that the SFOC may have helped ever so slightly in the development of some of your independent product... :D
1 Attachment(s)
I included the 5-page SORO pdf
for a good reason - to keep folks from jumping to conclusions such as this:
Quote:
from BW
Personally I think the pyramid is WAY to specific and suggests a long, complex list of complex steps that an insurgent has to move through sequentially, which of course is probably never the case.
The anti-Com "warriors" of the 60s were well aware that revolutionary phases do not necessarily flow sequentially; that one part of a country might be undergoing "phase 1", another "phase 2" and a third "phase 3". E.g., John McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary Warfare (1966) (also on West Point's reading list).
SORO makes this clear (p. 1 of 5 page pdf, here):
Attachment 1154
I realize, Bob, that you are unlikely to change what you think; but others here should be aware that those in the 60s were capable of nuanced thinking.
Regards
Mike
The 60's products are superior to Iraq-based products
Quote:
Originally Posted by
jmm99
for a good reason - to keep folks from jumping to conclusions such as this:
The anti-Com "warriors" of the 60s were well aware that revolutionary phases do not necessarily flow sequentially; that one part of a country might be undergoing "phase 1", another "phase 2" and a third "phase 3". E.g., John McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary Warfare (1966) (also on West Point's reading list).
SORO makes this clear (p. 1 of 5 page pdf,
here):
Attachment 1154
I realize, Bob, that you are unlikely to change what you think; but others here should be aware that those in the 60s were capable of nuanced thinking.
Regards
Mike
Mike,
Brother! You wound me! I am constantly refining my positions, I just refuse to abandon them and run away the first time someone lobs a poorly aimed round in my general direction...:D
What is interesting in much of the 60s products though is the fixation on Communism; just as we overly fixate on Islamism in much of the products on the street today. This is what led me to write one of my early pieces on the true role of ideology in insurgency.
One great thing about the 60s work was that the SF community took ownership of insurgency-based theory and doctrine far more effectively in those days than they have for the past 8 years. As Ken says, yes, the SFQC lays a foundation in UW, which is the art of waging insurgency. This is a foundation laid only in the SF community, and I am firmly of the belief that one can never truly understand counterinsugency until they first achieve an understanding of insurgency itself. This does not need to happen at the SFQC, and many who come out of the SFQC are no experts in the field either, but at least they have been exposed to the concepts.
My big beef with the current COIN manual, is that for all of its great TTPs on COIN, it is sadly, and I believe dangerously, disconnected from a solid rooting in insurgency itself. They are talking re-write, and I hope like hell USAJFKSWCS is forced (at gunpoint if necessary) to be a full partner in that effort. My one suggestion (besides making SF participate) is to lay a foundation right up front on what insurgency is; leaving room for the fact that reasonable minds can indeed differ on the subject. I would then follow that by a chapter on the American experience (as this goes to our principles as a nation, and suggests how we should approach others based on rights and duties we deemed essential for ourselves). Then, and only then, would I get into how to best go about intervening in the insurgencies of others.
(I feel about 50 other suggestions coming on, so I'll just leave it at this)
"...Either we're all senile, or ..."
Mike, the bad news is being senile. The good news is not knowing you are senile.
And my eyes are going because I first read the quote as "Either we're all sterile, or..." :eek:
Cheers
Mike