The UK in Afghanistan

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Originally Posted by Red Rat

As for Mil incompetence - the incompetence (IMHO) was to go in with such limited awareness of what we were getting in to. from the initial poor int assessment (IMHO) lead the equally poor extrapolation of what might happen.

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One would have thought that the process at Command and Staff College would include the insertion of troops into various theatres all over the world? (Like Afghanistan)

If it were merely the first such brigade deployment where such command problems were found then there would be some merit to the excuse of "going in blind" but it was not. Successive brigade deployments have failed tactically so therefore one needs to look elsewhere for the cause.

The introspective the Brits should be carrying out is into the competence and not the role of the army. Understandably to focus on the role issue will be less painful.

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As for the decisions on the ground after the initial Herrick 4 insertion I am not yet in a position to comment.

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As a serving officer that may be prudent. ;)

However, the info is coming out into the public domain of what has exactly transpired and what the shortcomings were. The facts are clear in that the starting with Herrick 4 certainly the operations were less competently carried out than what would have been reasonably expected from Brit forces arriving in theatre with the claim to be the world leaders in COIN warfare.

If this info filtering out is not the whole story then it is up to the Brits to publish the full story and not to try and hide the truth or apply spin to what actually happened in an attempt to hide the horrible truth.

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Originally Posted by Red Rat

I quite agree about the 2001 deployments, but there was (IMHO) a staggering lack of IPB conducted on Helmand linked with a woeful lack of joined up campaign planning by an operational (level) HQ.

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Looking everywhere except at the root of the problem?

Generalship.

The various brigadiers who were trotted through at six month intervals were just not up to the challenges of the job in Afghanistan.

That is where you need to look!

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Originally Posted by Red Rat

Tour DurationThere is a downside to longer tour durations. US military psychiatric casualty rates are significantly higher then UK rates. Kings College London have just published a study on UK Mil Psychiatric casualties that picks up on this.

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Why is no one considering whats best for the prosecution of the war in Afghanistan?

All these other issues are being thrown up to excuse having not taken the Afghanistan deployments seriously or having given the whole Afghan requirement a high enough priority.

Smacks of the arrogant way in which they treat Op Herrick as a side show that they can just take in their stride.

The USMC does 7months, the US Army does 12 months. Maybe someone should inform the Brits of the advantages/disadvantages if they are prepared to listen.

If the rationale is to avoid psychiatric casualties then why not say it? Why not just say that you slip Herrick deployments into the 2 year cycle and try not to hype them too much to avoid the psychiatric casualties?

Again the war effort in Afghanistan suffers.

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Originally Posted by Red Rat

Tour Intervals My personal perspective is that 6 months on and 18 off is not very relaxing! I spent the majority of my time deployed out of barracks in the intervening 18 months as a company commander - just ask my ex! ;)

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Well does this not come down to the question of priorities once again?

What are the duties that take units away from their barracks during the intervening 18 months? Are they relevant in the larger scheme of things? As Afghanistan has been around for four odd years and likely to last a few more should the Brit military not started to take the whole Afghanistan thing more seriously by now?

If the Brits are worried about psychiatric casualties shouldn't they also be concerned about keeping military families together? This smacks of more "muddling on".

Its a hopeless situation and little wonder so many junior officers are growing more discontent by the day.

Words like "competence," "hopeless" and "attempt to hide the horrible truth" are more likely to incite anger than to promote productive discussion. These are not all black-and-white situations that justify severe moral comdemnation.

Ok, I read the essay by King that JMA provided the link to; interesting:

1. King highlights dispersion as a primary cause of British difficulties. However, I felt he was grasping for straws at times. What defines dispersion? Out of eye-shot? Out of range for mutually supporting fires? Is he hoping to see a supporting company smash into the flank of an attacking insurgent force? Being dispersed usually implies implies a lack of freedom of maneuver as being a big problem, I'd buy it - partly. Lack of freedom of maneuver isn't a big thing if freedom of maneuver only means the ability to "mow the grass", which King highlights as the second problem. Dispersion isn't necessarily a bad thing - as I've said I've seen it employed to good effect; I'd argue that "dispersion" itself is only a result of how troops:task is executed. British efforts in Helmand aren't hampered by dispersion itself, but rather the dispersion was ineffectual due to poor troops to task (which King seems to get at by stating that the UK should have stuck to the L-G/Gereshk area). I've also seen "concentration" backfire, with insurgents moving into "unserviced" districts to build power bases. All the success in the world in one place comes to naught if the insurgent sanctuary next door is allowed to flourish.

2. King's second cause is offensive action and the British proclivity for it. I'd definitely buy part of this argument. As a friend of mine somewhere else stated, professional (peacetime) armies are always looking for a chance to "wash their spears" and this "battle of tactics" may not have anything to do with prosecuting the campaign. An unrealistic campaign plan that fell apart in the face of a vastly different situation on the ground and the lack of any operational guiding hand (RC-S was until recently, for the most part, a mailbox as opposed to a headquarters) likely led to the ease of "spear washing".

3. King's point on weapons encouraging poor counter-insurgency seemed silly. I highly doubt the presence of Apaches encouraged poor actions. If the Apaches weren't there, similar, if not the same, actions would have been carried out. Canadian units were just as aggressive prior to Leopard Tanks showing up as they were with MBTs in the front.

My opinion - Britain and Canada both moved forces to Southern Afghanistan with a poor strategic appreciation for the ground (troops:task - both put a battalion-sized task force to cover large provinces) and the enemy (who knew the Taliban would launch a large scale offensive!?!). Our relatively small contributions (although the British grew signficantly and the Canadian effort a bit) were never enough to effectively deal with the conflagration that followed - something about a guy with a bucket dealing with a burning house comes to mind. To make things worse, good tactics or bad (and there has been a mix) have chased a lethargic GIRoA strategy. Adding a cherry on top, the Pashtun people largely could care less if we packed up and left. It's not the greatest situation to get tied up into.

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Originally Posted by Infanteer

Ok, I read the essay by King that JMA provided the link to; interesting:

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My opinion - Britain and Canada both moved forces to Southern Afghanistan with a poor strategic appreciation for the ground (troops:task - both put a battalion-sized task force to cover large provinces) and the enemy (who knew the Taliban would launch a large scale offensive!?!). Our relatively small contributions (although the British grew signficantly and the Canadian effort a bit) were never enough to effectively deal with the conflagration that followed - something about a guy with a bucket dealing with a burning house comes to mind. To make things worse, good tactics or bad (and there has been a mix) have chased a lethargic GIRoA strategy. Adding a cherry on top, the Pashtun people largely could care less if we packed up and left. It's not the greatest situation to get tied up into.

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This article was not about the Canadian performance in Helmand so my comment remain in the context of King's comments which relate to the Brit actions alone.

Your first three paragraphs seemed to be merely random comment so lets look at your concluding opinion.

Yes the Brits had a poor strategic appreciation for the ground and the enemy but you must add to this a poor understanding of Pashtun people who they were supposed to be saving from the Taliban. Actually it gets worse because the Brits also ignored history.

“When people in Helmand heard the British were coming back, the cry went up all over: ‘Remember Maiwand? Our old enemy has come to the same area where they were once defeated to take revenge’. Then everyone, Taliban and nonTaliban, joined together. They told me on the phone, ‘Don’t worry, we’ll make sure the Brits don’t have an easy time’.” - Amir Sultan Tarar (aka ‘Colonel Imam’) a Pakistani who trained many of the Taliban leaders to fight the Russians - Read article here.

No one has a crystal ball but most competent commanders have contingency plans. Was there a contingency plan for the possibility of a major Taliban response? If there was it was as history illustrates and equally poor/weak/incompetent plan. The failure to respond to this Taliban action is not something that can be written off with a "these things happen" but is a further poor reflection on the ability of the British commanders in the field.

It appears that the Brits allowed their deployment of troops to be dictated by the need of the provincial governor (and above) not to allow any of the population centres in Helmand to be over run by the Taliban. Hence the wide and isolated dispersal of British troops during the Herrick 4 deployment.

Lets finish with these (kinder gentler words) from King himself:

"British troops have been committed to a campaign which far exceeds the resources available. However, although the political context cannot be ignored, it is reductive to explain the details of the Helmand campaign solely by reference to the neglect and ignorance of Whitehall and Westminster. Such an interpretation falsely absolves commanders in theatre from responsibility, robbing them of the agency which they have clearly exercised over the last three years. Even in the absence of adequate resources, British commanders have chosen to prosecute the campaign vigorously in Afghanistan. This activity was not demanded by No. 10 or the MoD. The decisions to mount specific operations that have determined the overall campaign design have been taken by successive in-theatre commanders. These operations—and the campaign design itself—have to be explained by reference to British commanders, the armed forces themselves and their interpretation of the operation, therefore."

King's paper can be found here: Understanding the Helmand campaign:British military operations in Afghanistan

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Originally Posted by JMA

This article was not about the Canadian performance in Helmand so my comment remain in the context of King's comments which relate to the Brit actions alone.

Your first three paragraphs seemed to be merely random comment so lets look at your concluding opinion.

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My first three comments were directed towards King's primary arguments and the fact that I didn't find them 100% convincing. King doesn't speak to much of the details of the planning that went on at any level with any of these operations (Op HERRICK in general or HERRICK 4 in particular) or the events leading up to these operations, he just kind of says that these Commanders up and did things as they pleased. If I'm going to see a critique of operations, I want more than just "this happened because they were aggressive paras"....

I mentioned all this in response to your unabashed use of the document as proof of severe problems at some level of British command.

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Originally Posted by Infanteer

My first three comments were directed towards King's primary arguments and the fact that I didn't find them 100% convincing. King doesn't speak to much of the details of the planning that went on at any level with any of these operations (Op HERRICK in general or HERRICK 4 in particular) or the events leading up to these operations, he just kind of says that these Commanders up and did things as they pleased. If I'm going to see a critique of operations, I want more than just "this happened because they were aggressive paras"....

I mentioned all this in response to your unabashed use of the document as proof of severe problems at some level of British command.

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Lets start with your last comment and work back.

"Unabashed" use King's document... absolutely. King's work is supported by other analysts as well in that there was something dreadfully wrong with the operational planning, command and execution in Helmand. The factors he raised were all consistent with my reading of the situation even before I read the paper.

Further, Theo Farrell (War Studies, King's College) raised as characteristics of the Brit approach being, "slow learners, cracking-on: make do attitude, and discontinuity of command". This is also all sadly clear from the conduct of Brit ops in Helmand. King, Farrell (Brits themselves) and others merely confirm what is "blindingly obvious" to astute observers.

That all said lets look at the question of dispersion.

As you appear to see a Canadian connection in the issue of dispersion about which I have no information I would like to keep this matter in the context of the Brit deployment in Helmand.

You asked the question: "What defines dispersion?" Yes its all about degree and also as King states

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Of course, there is no suggestion that the dispersal of troops is the only problem in Helmand."

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It is however necessary to consider dispersion as the Brit military have tended to lay all the blame on th politicians and the in theatre brigade level staff laying blame on the general staff who are apparently "*****" and thereby attempting to shield the field commanders from criticism in this regard.

The conduct of operations are judged on their success rather than merely whether the concept underlying the plan is OK. The dispersion as practiced by 3 Para was plainly incompetent and had it not been for the individual fighting skill of the toms the outcome would have been catastrophic.

King writes:

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Throughout the summer of 2006 isolated pockets of British soldiers were besieged in ‘platoon houses’ as hostile forces assaulted them on an almost daily basis. The fighting was particularly intense in Musa Qala, Sangin and Now Zad. In Musa Qala, for instance, the Pathfinders Platoon, the brigade’s elite reconnaissance team, was besieged in the district centre for over six weeks between 14 June and 6 August until their relief by a Danish reconnaissance squadron, which was, in turn, trapped there.13 On many occasions during that summer the platoon houses were in danger of being overrun.

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So when it comes to dispersion whatever Tootal (CO 3 Para) implemented and Butler (Brigade Comd) authorised was proved to have been inappropriate for the situation on the ground.

Were lessons learned? Apparently not. In 2008 when 2 Para arrived with 16 Air Assault Brigade instead of platoon houses they were dispersed into FOBs. The result of which was a King writes:

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The FOBs formed an archipelago of partially secure islands whose small forces were unable to suppress Taleban activity beyond a narrow strip of territory: ‘The soldiers might push the Taliban back a kilometre or two. In the process they might uncover a small-arms cache or a bunker which they would then blow. But they did not stay to hold the ground. They trekked back to base and the Taliban crept in again’.

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(The quote comes from Patrick Bishop's book "Ground Truth".)

Slow learners? Indeed.

Infanteer, if there is some common thread between the Brit deployment and that of the Canadians please say so. Maybe even start a "Canadians in Afghanistan" thread.

Moderators Note

Right SWC participants in this discussion please note this thread appears to be tipping over the edge of debate into acrimony. I have been critical from my "armchair" before of the UK role.

I ask that everyone who is contributing pause for awhile and reflect on how this debate is going. If necessary I will 'lock' the thread up for a temporary "cooling off" period.

Thank you.

I appreciate that there is growing discomfort in certain quarters at the direction this thread is taking. But the situation needs to be placed on the table for all to see.

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Originally Posted by JMA

Yes the Brits had a poor strategic appreciation for the ground and the enemy but you must add to this a poor understanding of Pashtun people who they were supposed to be saving from the Taliban. Actually it gets worse because the Brits also ignored history.

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I was scratching around to see what I could find to support the reported/supposed emphasis being laid on communications with the local people in Helmand. I had had my doubts as to this 'hearts and minds process' being carried out by people direct out from the UK with no local language skills nor knowledge of local customs etc etc.

Then I found this:

Understanding culture and customs in Helmand

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"The officer from Arundel is one of the first cultural advisors in the newly formed Defence Cultural Specialist Unit (DCSU) and is currently working on the ground in the Nad e-Ali District of central Helmand province."

One wonders what words one should choose to describe how after four years of the escalated Op Herrick the Brits finally get around to take understanding and communications with locals seriously?

Say no more...

In a new development...

Top bomb disposal officer in Afghanistan resigns

... maybe too early to speculate on this development.

JMA's link on the EOD commander's resignation was part of my reading this morning; but it also should be read in conjunction with this BBC piece, British bomb expert's widow recalls 'he was so tired' - re: the death of SSG Olaf "Oz" Schmid.

Not to get into the back and forth of this thread; but anti-IED stuff is the current reason to be for our local NG company (1431 Sappers), which I've mentioned elsewhere (here & here). So, I kinda follow it up when I see it.

Regards

Mike

Probably numerous factors involved, not least the fact that promotion is now very very hard in the UK army (the promotion lists were very noticably thinner this year). There was also this job advert which dropped into my inbox this morning:

Opportunity for an Army Full Colonel, Brigadier or Major General.

Our Client is a well known British owned defence manufacturer with world-wide sales, support and manufacturing operations. We have been tasked to find potential candidates to take on a Business Development Director role, based in the UK but with worldwide responsibility. The desired experience is for the successful candidate to have had command experience in the EOD and related operations, and is therefore most likely to have served in the Royal Engineers or Royal Logistic Corps.

I know of a full colonel who announced his resignation yesterday who fits the job spec perfectly...:D

I saw the TV programme on the EOD effort in Afghanistan. It focused on two issues - the work rate in Afghanistan and the fact that the UK Mil had ceased High Threat Operator training briefly in 2002. It failed entirely to address any of the steps that the UK mil has taken to improve IEDD capabilities.

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Originally Posted by Red Rat

I saw the TV programme on the EOD effort in Afghanistan. It focused on two issues - the work rate in Afghanistan and the fact that the UK Mil had ceased High Threat Operator training briefly in 2002. It failed entirely to address any of the steps that the UK mil has taken to improve IEDD capabilities.

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Funny thing this... when one asks for these "steps" that have been taken to be listed nothing is forthcoming apart from the "why do you want to know" routine.

open nature of this board and operational security concerns. While the respondent may in the view of the one posing an inquiry be over cautious or seem evasive, that respondent should be viewed as acting in good faith as he or she sees the issue. He or she may even believe that your question merits an answer but believes constraints imposed by his employer or service preclude a detailed response.

Most of us posting here and the owners of the Board ask that such concerns be respected. Most here are prepared to do that without snide comments. Your cooperation in that regard would be helpful.

WASHINGTON: The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress May 19 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the United Kingdom of 102 Mastiff/MRAP Cougar Category II 6X6 modified vehicles and associated equipment, parts, and logistical support for an estimated cost of $122 million.

Read article here

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Originally Posted by Ken White

open nature of this board and operational security concerns. While the respondent may in the view of the one posing an inquiry be over cautious or seem evasive, that respondent should be viewed as acting in good faith as he or she sees the issue. He or she may even believe that your question merits an answer but believes constraints imposed by his employer or service preclude a detailed response.

Most of us posting here and the owners of the Board ask that such concerns be respected. Most here are prepared to do that without snide comments. Your cooperation in that regard would be helpful.

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Ken, Red Rat said: "It failed entirely to address any of the steps that the UK mil has taken to improve IEDD capabilities."

Am I not correct to assume that if he expected certain of the "steps" taken by the Brits to have been included in the TV program they could be repeated here?

I ask for no more than what he expected to be aired in the public domain.

I should have been clearer.

The programme IMHO failed to ask the question as to what steps had been taken to rectify the IEDD and C-IED situation as a whole, beyond clarifying that IEDD operator training had been increased (a larger pipeline). As an investigative news programme it was quite unsubstantive, focusing more on the human story of SSgt Schmid.

There were a great many questions they could and should have asked (many articulated on this thread ;)) that were not.

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Originally Posted by JMA

Ken, Red Rat said: "It failed entirely to address any of the steps that the UK mil has taken to improve IEDD capabilities."

Am I not correct to assume that if he expected certain of the "steps" taken by the Brits to have been included in the TV program they could be repeated here?

I ask for no more than what he expected to be aired in the public domain.

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What you said was:

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Funny thing this... when one asks for these "steps" that have been taken to be listed nothing is forthcoming apart from the "why do you want to know" routine.

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Had you asked as politely as you did in the last sentence of Comment 399, I'd have said nothing.

As it was you unnecessarily implied willful evasion on his part and that of others. You frequently make implications of wrongdoing or malfeasance that have little basis in fact and make snide and condescending comments. When called on that you're quick enough to reply with injured innocence but without truly recanting or ceasing to use the technique. That penchant obscures your often valid observations and legitimate questions.

Seems unnecessary and counterproductive to me but certainly your prerogative so long as it stays reasonably civil.