No COIN Left In Afghanistan – Or The Elephant In The Room That No One Is Talking About
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No COIN Left In Afghanistan – Or The Elephant In The Room That No One Is Talking About
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Guard Should Specialize In COIN: War College Study
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How COIN Theory Explains Organizational Change
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The COIN Conundrum: The Future of Counterinsurgency and U.S. Land Power
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Where Are the Women? The Unfortunate Omission in the Army’s COIN Doctrine
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Nine threads merged in, a few were one post with high views.
There are over a hundred threads, in various arenas which have COIN in their title so searching is needed still.
Citing David Betz @ Kings War Studies acclaim for this new book:The publishers, Hurst & Co (London) intro says:Quote:
Insurgencies win by out-governing the status quo power and the primary thrust of their strategy is nearly always the provision of alternative justice to populations hungry for better law. Frank Ledwidge’s brilliant book plugs the gap in the literature commendably. It is indispensable reading.
Link:http://us2.campaign-archive2.com/?u=...0&e=80d42c7c0aQuote:
This indispensable book explains how courts are now part of the broader battlefield, deployed by both insurgents and state forces in a world convulsed by unconventional warfare.
In most societies, courts are where the rubber of government meets the road of the people. If a state cannot settle disputes and enforce its decisions, to all intents and purposes it is no longer in charge. This is why successful rebels put courts and justice at the top of their agendas. Rebel Law explores this key weapon in the arsenal of insurgent groups, from the IRA’s ‘Republican Tribunals’ of the 1920s to Islamic State’s ‘Caliphate of Law’, via the ALN in Algeria of the ‘50s and 60s and the Afghan Taliban of recent years.
Frank Ledwidge delineates the battle in such ungoverned spaces between counterinsurgents seeking to retain the initiative and the insurgent courts undermining them. Contrasting colonial judicial strategy with the chaos of stabilisation operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, he offers compelling lessons for today’s conflicts.
The author has an interesting bio indicated here:http://www.port.ac.uk/strategy-enter...-ledwidge.html
This was a 2012 conference, held in Austin, Texas, with Kings College London, University of Queensland and the hosts The Robert Strauss Center. There is a list of articles by the speakers and on a quick check the links do work. Some names are familiar, others not and SWJ does appear.:)
There is a strong British emphasis, so a couple of Northern Ireland articles will appear on that thread.
Link:https://reassessingcounterinsurgency....com/articles/
Hat tip to WoTR for this commentary cum book review of Walter C. Ladwig III, The Forgotten Front: Patron Client Relations in Counterinsurgency (Cambridge University Press, 2017):Link:https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/ho...ency-campaign/Quote:
The King’s College London professor takes direct aim at FM 3-24, and the West’s thinking on counterinsurgency, specifically its naiveté that the patron and client will share common political goals if the patron is doling out large sums of cash to the client.
(Later) Ladwig shines a bright light on some of the deficiencies in counterinsurgency literature and the United States’ naiveté about its relationship with its clients. His goal is to improve the West’s performance in future counterinsurgency battles.
British Counterinsurgency: Returning Discriminate Coercion to COIN
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A scathing critique, entitled '‘Savior General’ Petraeus Gave Us the Wrong Bible;The fatal flaw in his vaunted counterinsurgency strategy' by an academic William Smith in The American Conservative.
It ends with:Link:http://www.theamericanconservative.c...e-wrong-bible/Quote:
Unfortunately, for those who have backed U.S. military interventions, setting aside issues of history and culture is a part of the great appeal of the manual. Supporters tend to think in terms of abstract secular ideals, not concrete cultural obstacles. Understanding the yawning differences in culture between the U.S. and, for example, a Middle Eastern country, should give great pause to planners contemplating the invasion of a foreign nation. But it is precisely this pause and reflection that our military planners and policymakers have been lacking.
Understanding the “IN” in COIN
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Post 1059 refers to a book published in 2017, namely Walter Ladwig's 'The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relationships in Counter Insurgency', I have just discovered a podcast when he spoke @ Kings War Studies (1hrs starts at 3 mins). It is worth listening to and is summarised:Link:https://www.facebook.com/WarStudies/...4732894914595/Quote:
Why has it been so difficult for the United States to effectively assist countries like Iraq and Afghanistan in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency? That's the question Walter Ladwig asks in his new book, The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relationships in Counterinsurgency (Cambridge University Press 2017), which analyzes the often-fraught political relationship between the U.S. government and a local regime it is attempting to advise and support in its conflict against terrorist and insurgent groups. Although a patron and its client are often presumed to be partners in such an endeavour, in this study of American interventions in the Philippines, Vietnam, and El Salvador during the Cold War, Ladwig details the stark differences of preferences and priorities that can exist between them. This often means the U.S. must give as much attention to modifying the behavior of its local partner as it does to countering the insurgents.
In conversation with Deborah Haynes, defense correspondent for The Times, he discussed the challenges of intervening in internal conflicts and how the United States can best exert influence over a government it is supporting in counterinsurgency to change their policies.
He is political scientist, not a historian and his website is:http://www.walterladwig.com/
The book has several 5* reviews:https://www.amazon.com/Forgotten-Fro...ter+Insurgency