Look to the Content, not the Label
You may call "it" an insurgency, revolution or several other alternatives (including an "armed conflict not of an international character"); and then add "counter-" to show you're against "it". But, whatever you suggest, pontificate, etc., will have merit (if any) based on its content, and not on the label you attach to the piece.
So The Art of Counter-Revolutionary Warfare (1966) by Jack McCuen (RIP, COL) works fine for me - not because magic lies in the phrase "counter-revolutionary warfare" (he might as well have entitled it "Examples and Lessons from Recent Irregular Warfare"); but because he captures the military lessons and the political lessons (especially the political lessons) from the then-recent armed conflicts he analysed.
That "counter-insurgency" literature is not dead is easily evidenced in a couple of other recent articles from SWJ.
E.g., John A. Kendall, Afghanistan: The Importance of Political Maneuver in Counterinsurgency Operations (SWJ 2010):
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Summary
Any commander operating in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment is besieged by the constant need to make numerous and varied decisions critical to the successful execution of a COIN campaign. While all military and political campaigns are challenging due to the “fog of war”, COIN campaigns can prove particularly difficult for military personnel due to a military culture that does not understand how to politically maneuver in semi to non-permissive environments.[1] This paper demonstrates the need for military organizations to gain a better understanding of their operational environment before executing political maneuver in a full spectrum COIN campaign.
[1] David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New York: NY, Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 71. Political Maneuver is defined by Dr. Kilcullen as an operational plan that seeks to separate the insurgents from the people by finding local allies amongst the power players, connecting the government to the population, and increasing local governance capacity in order to generate progress across the four principle dimensions of counterinsurgency (security, governance, development, and information).
Co-ordination of the political struggle with the military struggle follows the approach taken by MAJ Jim Gant - e.g., Tribal Engagement: The Jirga and the Shura (SWJ 2010).
Some revisionism seems to be entering the "COIN" literature - at least where the political effort must mesh with the military effort - as in CPT Kendell's citation of none other than Roger Trinquier:
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Police action will therefore be actual operational warfare. It will be methodically pursued until the enemy organization has been entirely annihilated. It will not end until we have organized the population and created an efficient intelligence service to enable it to defend itself.
--Roger Trinquier
What we are talking about is the civil side (the police and its intelligence service of "Special Branch" talents and networks) operating under the Laws of War in a paramilitary fashion, until it can transition with stability to the Rule of Law.
Still sticking with the shades of a revisionist past we have a 2010 book review, A Third COIN Course of Action, of A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq (2009), by Mark Moyar (Wiki):
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As a military professional who has read most recent works that have been heralded as "must-reads" or as works providing unusual or original insights into counterinsurgency, I have been disappointed the vast-majority of the time. Rarely have I read anything on counterinsurgency that provided true "food-for-thought" other than that which was produced by Galula, Kitson, or Thompson. But Dr Moyar has produced a volume that may be as influential as those written by the Big 3 COIN savants. The book is very well organized, and it provides overwhelming evidence for the author's hypothesis in a manner that does not become repetitive and boring. While those currently benefitting from the lack of original thought within counterinsurgency circles may deride this work and Dr Moyar personally, he is an expert, and his assertions deserve further examination and your considered thought. For all true military or national security professionals, take my advice - take a week of leave and digest all three of Dr Moyar's books.
LtCol Adam Strickland is a Marine Infantry Officer with previous combat tours in Iraq. During his last tour, he engaged daily with former insurgents, members of the former regime, and civic leaders as part of Marine counterinsurgency efforts in Anbar Province, Iraq. He is a graduate of USMC Command and Staff College, the School of Advanced Warfighting, and MIT’s National Security Studies Seminar XXI Program. He is scheduled to deploy to Afghanistan in 2011 in support of continuing USMC counterinsurgency efforts.
It is scarcely surprising that Moyar would suggest a "leader-centric" approach since his first literary effort of consequence was Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The CIA's Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet Cong (1997) ISBN 1557505934; republished in 2007 as Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism in Vietnam with a foreword by Harry Summers and a new preface and chapter; ISBN 0803216025.
Bringing in Roger Trinquier (for his counter-organizational theories, not his torture theory) and CORDS-Phoenix (with its neutralization of - kill, capture or convert - political cadres), might be too much for the "Boy Scout" image; but perhaps we should realize that we have not been Boy Scouts, and that there are constraints and restraints (short of merit badge qualification) that still accord with our principles.
Regards
Mike
The CIA Does Pretty Good With B-52's To
jmm99, here is 3 for you from 1962. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency an Anthology. Done for the Industrial War College.
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/imag...171701001a.pdf
More like a Divorce Lawyer than an insurgent...
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Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
I think Major Few nailed it!!
Facilitated an ugly breakup with one abusive partner, then set up a deal to move in on some other poor unsuspecting bastard and take everything he had.
JMA, I'm neither risk nor casualty averse,
but I don't see where the 5307th Composite Unit (provisional) fits into the present picture. According to the Wiki (I didn't check Bidwell's book on my shelf), they began operations in February 1944 and ended in August 1944:
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A week after Myitkyina fell, on August 10, 1944, the 5307th was disbanded with a final total of 130 combat-effective officers and men (out of the original 2,997). Of the 2,750 to enter Burma, only 2 were left alive who had never been hospitalized with wounds or major illness. [39]
39. ^ Hunter, Charles N. (Col.), Galahad, Naylor Press (1963) p. 215
This looks like a 6-month tour to me, with very little institutional memory to pass on at the end since almost everyone belonged in a hospital bed.
That is not to pi$$ on your parade (re: the length of tours), as that is not my SME; but merely to point out that you might come up with a better long-term tour example which was not used up in the course of the tour (your RLI ?).
Regards
Mike
Why do villagers not turn on the Taliban?
JMA asked this:
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A question: if it is true that by killing a civilian you turn the family, the village, the whole tribe against you then why does that not apply equally to the Taliban?
I asked a friend who studies local culture along the Durand Line and in reply came this:
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The first rule of thumb in Afghanistan, eradicate the outer menace before you turn the guns on yourself. Outside influence in the land of Roh is considered sacrilege and must at all costs be defended.
Hewad is detailed in Pashtunwali as defence of culture and land, the Coalition is viewed as the invader, once this has been settled they'll turn on themselves.
We need to understand the pyschology of occupation and in this case the occupied, if Britons were murdered by a fellow white Briton would this cause more of or less of a stir than if the perpetrator happens to be a Muslim occupier.
Now multiply that scenario a hundred times and you may begin to understand the stance of a tribal Pashtun, a fella who probably takes courage from his ancient code, thrity years of instability, killing of local civilians, his religion and a heap of other local grievances
There are several posts on Pashtunwali, but on a quick check I could not find an answer there.