Didnt see the last two posts
Amen.
I started writing my long winded reply and had to do some work, so missed the last two replies..which seem to me to pretty much sum it up.
As a continuation from ("What If We Fail in Afghanistan?")
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I am in fact in favor of a VERY different operational idea; I WANT them to take over control of territories (territories in which their opponents can wage war freely, unlike the U.S. inside Pakistan).
They're vulnerable once they leave their covert mode, and they spend much manpower on running things once they're in control. Even more; they become more responsible for what happens, and can disappoint the population.
I wrote a text last year ago about how we could use a COIN equivalent of mobile defence; lure them to take over control, become visible, become careless, expose themselves - and then we could hit them badly.
That, of course, necessitates that we're able of waging war instead of merely a mix of peacekeeping, mentoring and occupation. It does also require that our art of war goes beyond logistics, beyond just piling more resources on a problem.
Quote:
A strategic Mobile Defense equivalent for COIN
I read Manstein's "Verlorene Siege" recently. He's recognized as one of the greatest generals of WW2 and wrote that book in the 50's.
One of the interesting parts of that book was a repeated side-note; an accusation at WW2 generals that they failed to break the trench war pattern by voluntarily sacrifice ground to resume mobile warfare once the enemy advances into the widened neutral ground.
That fits pretty well to his WW2 operational concept "Schlagen aus der Nachhand" (Mobile Defense) which allowed the enemy to go beyond the Clausewitzian "Kulminationspunkt" (culminating point) before a decisive counter-attack destroys the attacking armies.
It requires a great deal of patience, discipline and military understanding by the politicians (Hitler most often lacked that) to allow the generals to use such a devastatingly effective operational plan.
I believe that I found a modern-time parallel for COIN.
The low level of Guerrilla combat in Iraq seems to me to be at least in part due to the overwhelming combat effectiveness of the occupation forces. The deterrence is so strong that the classic Maoist Guerrilla warfare stage of open confrontation was never really attempted. There were some major fights as in Fallujah, but those were in their size rather reminiscent of the numerous combat actions in Vietnam than Vietcong's all-out Tet offensive or Castro's drive to Havanna.
The parallel is probably not yet clear: Imagine the counter-Guerrilla parties would be able to provoke a general, decisive uprising that could be defeated conventionally and decisively.
The Vietcong didn't recover from the Tet offensive - regular Northern Vietnamese troops did most of the fighting afterwards.
To provoke such a large-scale open uprising would require less, not more military power in the country (but availability of quick strategic reinforcements).
The counter-Guerrilla forces would need to give up some strength and ground first and to deceive the Guerrillas about the relative physical and morale strengths.
That's certainly a risk; to give up some strength and ground to entice the enemy into an extremely vulnerable action to defeat him decisively.
To give provoke a risky Guerrilla offensive by intentionally giving up some control and strength could be a counter-Guerrilla strategy, resembling the extremely demanding operational concept of mobile defense / "Schlagen aus der Nachhand".
It might work in Afghanistan.
The equivalent to the culminating point would be the switch from covert to overt mode of operations; the critical point in regard to vulnerability.
Warden's way: Attractive and then not so attractive
Slap,
I liked - at first - the last paragraph in Warden's piece:
Quote:
This cursory strategic review would suggest that the best course would be to end the war in return for an agreement from the Afghan government not to allow any foreign group to operate against the West from Afghanistan. Verification would be easy and deviance could be addressed with tactics ranging from increased payments to Afghanistan to air operations against strategic targets within the nation.
Then on reflection is there an Afghan government capable to stop a foriegn roup, now or in the likely, traditional future we can glimpse? No. Verification would be easy. No, not convinced and in the future as hostile groups learnt more difficult. Clearly our ability now to "fix" is poor and done remotely as I think is envisaged even less reliable. The tactics used, well what strategic targets exist in the Afghanistan foreseen? Not many I venture, unless the heroin is collected to be bombed.
Now if we could persaude and "rent" enough Afghans to get agreement on excluding hostiles, even counterin them - then I could see the merit in such a strategic approach.
Made me think, thanks Slap.