Actually, no. Few European settlers in Algeria were actually from France. There were many Spanish and Italians.
Printable View
Worth noting perhaps, that functioning governments are generally not established. They have to evolve, and they evolve in parallel with the evolution of the nation and the society that they govern. Insurgency is sometimes part of that evolutionary process.
If a "nation" is really not a nation at all, if a society is fractured along ethnic, religious, tribal, or other lines, if its economy remains feudal, if the society is trying to resolve its respect for tradition with its desire for modernity, all of these conflicts will be reflected in government. It is not possible to simply establish a good government and expect it to resolve these conflicts: government is not going to be more coherent and more directed than the society it governs.
As we've seen, any attempt by an outside power to resolve internal conflict by simply establishing good government is doomed to failure. We cannot build a nation. We can try to cultivate a nation, by helping where we can with the evolutionary process and trying to mitigate the adverse impacts of the disorder that comes along with evolution, but there is no way we can simply go in and fix it.
"Established" simply means that it has matured and devloped so that it functions (ideally) both effectively and is accepted and represents across all segments of society as equally as possible.
I agree that it would be very hard for outsiders to establish such a government; and that it must be by and for the people it is to represent.
I mentioned outsiders only because the US has made a habit of trying to establish governments lately.
I do think there may be excessive emphasis on the idea of "establishing" as the critical stage in the development of governance. Americans in particular seem to become easily obsessed with structure, though the world around us provides abundant evidence that admirable structures do not necessarily function admirably. For example, on paper the most democratic and modern government structure on the Arabian peninsula belongs to Yemen. It's also the least functional government, far less effective than the medieval autocracies that surround it.
We have to recognize that government isn't simply "established", whether from inside or out. It grows along with the society it purports to govern. What we call "insurgency" is not simply between government and populace, it's also related to internal issues among and within factions of a populace. It's not always reasonable to expect a government to resolve and unify a fractured populace, because government will generally include those same fractures. Growing nations have to work out their issues, and the process isn't always peaceful. Our capacity to influence the process is generally limited, and any attempt to influence it is likely to generate unintended consequences.
A very poor article.
One can learn something from just about every past conflict one just has to have an open mind and the ability to analyse and sift through the information.
Perhaps we are pushing an information overload onto soldiers of all ranks? Is too much expected of soldiers who have more to do and remember than ever before?
Study the Algerian war and read what Galula and Trinquier have to say and then figure it all out from there. Because it was a brutal war (from both sides) and where torture was the order of the day does that necessarily detract from other measures adopted such as the quadrillage system?
Why does it have to come down to selecting one person's idea and trying to force fit it into every insurgency situation you experience? The strategy options should be like a set of golf clubs. Pick what club you need for the shot you face.
I really don't understand the US military. They had McCuen and it seems he was as good as you get and he was a product of the US system speaking the same language and sharing the common culture but he was all but ignored. Then in US history there was a guy called John Mosby with his Virginia Cavalry who gave the Union army the run around - much like the Taliban are doing in Afghanistan. Does anyone out there know of Mosby? Has anyone studied him and what he did?
LINK.
There's more. Here, 'Search' is ready when you are (LINK) and Google is available for the wider world...
Can't speak for now but some years ago he was studied at both the combat arms advanced courses and at the CGSC. He's accorded space in the history of US special operations. We also study Geronimo and Chief Joseph and John Hunt Morgan, all of whom gave the US Army far more pernicious and wider ranging runarounds than did John Singleton Mosby... :D
was and is the US Army. Unfortunately, it is a big Army, not everyone studies the same things. Due to that size and 'democratic ideal' and 'fairness' driven personnel policies, those who did study the right things are not always in the right jobs. Thus we're confronted with some really good, well trained and educated people in command occasionally and more often, some less qualified folks whose turn it was to be in charge...
Penalty of a large force and political correctness. :wry:
to an extent but most certainly in the US, that very prevalent syndrome gets fixed only when absolutely necessary.
You've served in two Armies. Each was, man for man, among the world's best at that time. They were that because they had to be. When one has to do something, one puts a lot more effort into it...
Regardless of their worth and merit, those two very young Armies as they then existed are gone, never to return. The US Army has been around for over 200 years, it is an old comfortable Dude of an institution that is concerned with staying alive in a strange and wonderful political arena where there are a lot of other Gladiators questing for survival -- and glory. It plans on being around for another couple of Centuries. The Army thus is cautious and more concerned with survival of the institution than with its competence at this time. That is true in most democratic nations. Goes with the territory and, IMO, that's okay -- the overall life of most citizens is worth the sacrifices in capability those armies have to make.
For us, 'desirable' -- even highly desirable -- or increased effectiveness are not impetus enough to overcome the domestic political aspects. We'll muddle along as we always have, always do, until we have to fix it. Then we will do that temporarily. We will then quickly go back to our navel gazing after the crisis passes. So far, our overall record of doing it in that really inefficient manner is fairly good, surprisingly so. Though the trend is downward -- as should be expected...
The US Army today is mediocre because it doesn't need to be any better. I have seen it -- served in it -- when it was both better and when it was worse. It gets better in wartime and the tougher the war, the better it gets. Easy wars (as today) provide no incentive to get much better. There is no Citizen or Congressional pressure to be incredibly effective (actually, quite the reverse, the bulk of Americans including many in Congress are anti-military to at least some extent). Capability is present to rise to that peak when necessary and most people realize that, so they're content to allow the Army to bumble along. The Army, for its part, truly tries to do better -- but it is captive to political pressures that drive personnel, training and operational policies and to a bureaucracy that is politically derived and supported. There are over 600K DoD Civilian employees, all adults, mostly voters -- so Congress insures they are coddled and catered to. There or over 2M active and reserve service members, add their families and you get almost 4M voters. Congress is more concerned with their votes than with their competence. It's that simple.
Given a need for the hard work and sacrifice of all concerned to get better, quickly, a proven capability to do that has been shown so in the absence of need, no one is terribly interested in an excessive amount of hard work. There are many dedicated people in US uniforms who try to circumvent all that and truly aid in many units doing a good job -- but they move around every three or four years so the overall effect is one of some inconsistency. In terms of US Army units, as Bertrand Russell said of people in general, 20% do 80% of the work... :mad:
The good news is that, aside from that hard working 20%, the Army, too, knows that it can do better when required to do so and it puts a large amount of effort into insuring that remains the case. Too large IMO but they didn't ask me... :wry:
That ability to patch something together in times of real need may or may not remain true. It will for the near term, say 20 to 40 years; after that, hard to say.
JMA, being the shameless self-promoter that I am :o , click here to read the thread I started on John S. Mosby. A collateral relative of mine (mother's maiden name) rode with him in the very last days of the war.
Thanks for that Pete.
Mosby understood how to give a conventional army the run around. As apparently did (according to uncle Ken) Geronimo, Chief Joseph and John Hunt Morgan. So the lesson I suppose is that if you can get inside the head of such men you will understand how to fight them. This will help in the fight against the Taliban.
Joseph actually fought the Army in more of a stand-up fashion, although his leadership was somewhat mitigated or modified by that of Looking Glass. Geronimo was little more than a bandit (even in the opinion of the Apache at the time). That was one of the things that led to his downfall, as Crook and later Miles never lacked for scouts to lead against him.
However, I can tell you that you will not ever get "inside the head of such men." All those people named as well as Nathan Bedford Forrest and a few others -- including some RSA types -- and my pet, Subotai, had little to no formal military training or education.
"Inside the head" of such people is not reproducible or replicable. One either has it or one does not. Few do. We are capable of selecting those few and placing them in positions of influence. We deliberately choose not to do so.
You still broadly misunderstand the fight in Afghanistan. It is not that there aren't people who know what to do and how to do it -- it is simply that they are generally not allowed to do those things. There is no pressing need to do much better pushed by the Politicians and those are the people that have forced their services to tread softly and not use a stick. They know they're guilty of that and thus their lack of any real pressure to do better. In short, the problem is not direct incompetence, though that exists in some cases and is due to various factors not least people not suited for the jobs they have due to the inadvertent and unintended inequities of assignments due to the politics of a democratic society...
The real problem there is simply malfeasance induced ineffectiveness due to flawed policies and failed theories.
more bureaucratic opponent a "run around" for much longer than said opponent wished.
That was then and is now the case. Only when confronted with really incompetent enemies did the US Army 'win' quickly in the west. The 'insurgent' generally has an advantage in nimbleness and flexibility -- unless they're flaky... :D
Fortunately, most of our enemies have generally been even more screwed up than were we...:wry:
One has to wonder whether current military personnel policies filter out some promising talent. Before the Civil War while a student at the University of Virginia Mosby, a little skinny guy, shot the town bully in Charlottesville. While in jail he clerked for the prosecutor who sent him there and thereby became a lawyer. Grant had his well-publicized problems with the bottle and Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson had such strange interpersonal skills that today people would probably think he was autistic.
I'm pretty well convinced. I was fortunate in having had two really great Battalion Commanders in Viet Nam. I know the first would not have and I strongly doubt the second would have made it to LTC any time after the late 1980s. DOPMA and its followers have not done us any favors. Not at all...
By the way, Jackson and Jonathan Letterman, the Medical Department guy who developed modern casualty evacuation, served together in Florida at the tail-end of the Seminole problems and were close friends. Letterman tried to talk Jackson out of his dispute with his commanding officer there which led to Jackson's resignation from the Army. Jackson later met that old CO on the battlefield and sent him a-runnin'.
Although during the Civil War a guy with my Mother's maiden name, Utterback, served with Mosby, by that time my branch of the family, Utterback, had moved from Virginia and was then living in Anderson County, Kentucky, and in the vicinity of Franklin, Indiana. The deed for the family farm on the outskirts of Franklin where my Grandfather was born had been signed by Andrew Jackson, "Old Hickory," presumably for our military service during the Affair of 1812.
Well, they ran through the briars and they ran through the brambles
And they ran through the bushes where a rabbit couldn't go.
They ran so fast the hounds couldn't catch 'em
Down the Mississippi to the Gulf of Mexico.