Well, I didn't see anyone that radically disagreed with what you just wrote.
Except perhaps that last item and that's mostly an opinion so there will always be variances on that -- though I'm inclined to agree with the caveat that I believe the operational bit to be a European construct, with some applicability in a tight, densely populated European setting and not much in other locales. North America for example, like Asia, is way too large and underpopulated for a great deal of applicability. Island territories or nations do not lend themselves to it nor really does warfare in a jungle setting. Not that any of that changes current US doctrine...:wry:
Hope the meal turns out better than you expect...
Wilf, exactly what is wrong ...
and why ?
I'm positing that we are discussing the manual cited by Slap, which would be USMC MCDP 1-1, Strategy. Three relevant (and seemingly to me, material) quotes from that publication, dealing with "Ends" and "Means", are these ....
p.40 pdf:
Quote:
Strategy, broadly defined, is the process of interrelating ends and means. When we apply this process to a particular set of ends and means, the product — that is, the strategy — is a specific way of using specified means to achieve distinct ends. Strategy is thus both a process and a product. Any discussion of ends and means in war must begin with two basic points. First, as we have observed, war is an expression of politics. The ends or goals of any party waging war — even though those goals may be social, economic, religious, or ideological in nature — are by definition political goals. Second, wars are fought by political entities that have unique characteristics and often very dissimilar goals and resources. In order to understand any conflict, we must appreciate the ways in which the means and ends of the participants may vary.
and p.46-47 pdf:
Quote:
MEANS IN NATIONAL STRATEGY
In the purest sense, the means in war is combat — physically attacking the enemy or defending against his attacks upon us. However, war is not limited to purely military means. In fact, military means are only one element used to implement a national strategy. The relative importance placed on the military element of the national strategy varies greatly depending on the nature and the particular circumstances of the struggle. All of the instruments of power — diplomatic, economic, military, and informational — must be brought to bear and exploited to the fullest in war.
and p.54 pdf
Quote:
ADAPTING ENDS TO MEANS, AND VICE VERSA
When discussing strategy in the abstract, we often treat means and ends as fixed. In practice, however, we frequently adjust both. The occurrences of war — successes and failures, lessons learned, new ideas, the entry of new combatants — may cause us to shift both our means and our goals. As our resources increase, as we gain confidence in our abilities, and as we find
our enemy more vulnerable than we had imagined, we tend to expand our goals.
Where are the grave[*] errors and heresies in the above ? Please enlighten, so I can get back to my hamster joust. :)
[*] One can quibble about whether there are three DIE (diplomatic, informational, economic) elements or more - all of these (3 or more) non-military elements being part of the "politiical struggle" in my eyes.
Regards
Mike
No real need for implied terms,
and definitely no legalisms. :D
From MCDP 1-1, Strategy (pp.9-10 pdf):
Quote:
Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1, Warfighting, stresses that war is fundamentally political in character and that war must serve policy. What matters ultimately in war is strategic success: attainment of our political aims and the protection of our national interests. History shows that national leaders, both political and military, who fail to understand this relationship sow the seeds for ultimate failure — even when their armed forces achieve initial battlefield success. Battlefield brilliance seldom rescues a bad strategy.
.....
MCDP 1-1 focuses on military strategy in its most fundamental sense, exploring the question “How do military means relate to political ends?” It provides a conceptual basis to help us to understand both our own and our enemies’ political and military objectives, the relationships among them, and the nature of any particular situation in which military means might be used. It explores how political entities integrate military means with the other elements of their power in order to attain their political ends. A common conceptual understanding of these matters helps Marines develop the adaptability that our warfighting philosophy demands.
and the first quote from MCDP 1, Warfighting ("primacy" as we say in the trade) (p.9 pdf):
Quote:
“Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war.” [1] — Carl von Clausewitz
1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984) p. 119. This unfinished classic is arguably the definitive treatment of the nature and theory of war. All Marine officers should consider this book essential reading.
Regards
Mike