Last job I had a LTC working for me who was that, a good Staff guy, however, he was ADA and an Aviator and thus was er, conflicted??? :D
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It may have more infantry, but there are some very flawed assumptions underpinning the idea.
I am sure it was done by good and patriotic men, but it seems to reflect a world and style of operations they would would like to believe in, rather than one, that empirical observation shows to us.
Here is one little gem of "illogic"
So "high intensity" is defined as something that is 3:7 versus medium of low. - and that is for ammunition rates, as batteries, water and rations, all have to resupplied regardless. I am assuming fuel/POL is also in there somewhere.Quote:
Operates for three days at high operational intensity and up to seven days in a medium to low operational environment before it must be resupplied
Someone may want to read Julian Thompson's assessment of logistics operations in the Falklands, before assuming those ratios
I think that the deletion of ADA is also very, very short-sighted.
Sure, the US hasn't had to face a real air threat in... many decades, but ADA has, since WWII, provided excellent service protecting convoys, "rear" areas (meaning anything behind the front line trace) and generally serving as additional combat power in an Army that, paradoxically, seems to be throwing more and more personnel into HQ, staff, and intel functions. Those Linebackers had 25mm cannon, M240's, armor, and mobility that would have been valuable additions to the anemic HBCT - sure, the above sounds more like the mission of the MPs, but the M1117 is not as well armed or protected...
I think that the combat power ADA units provided was overlooked.
I can see quite a bit of farce in that document, and I am of the "high intesity" warfare mindset.
My favorite:
In the "backup" section, under RSTA squadron, the first mission includes the words "find/fix threat". A unit with handful of JLTV's, some Scout helos and UAV's can hardly "fix" any threat larger than a squad...
...and I can never figure out why people are so in love with "organizing by threes", you could save a surprisingly large number of headquarters staffers across the Army simply by adding one more subordinate unit at each level. From what I have seen, a good commander can handle four, five, six or more units just as well as three, and a bad one will screw it up, even if there are only two subordinate units. Heck, more subordinates almost forces a commander to, well, "command", instead of being the "platoon leader for each platoon". At anything at battalion level and above, I really don't want to hear about "span of control" - that is why BC's and up have a staff with a couple of other field-grade officers to ride herd on everything.
This vexes me some as well. What I do know, with some certainty, is that spans of control shrink under stress. Spans of command are less prone to stress, so can be handed off, and then returned later, but I am not sure that that theory fits with how field formations actually work, at least in my limited experience. - which is why I am far more interested in basic principles of organisation, than I am in TOEs.
I am fascinated that anyone outside the branch noticed much difference in the 21B world.
One of the largest setbacks I have seen since the transformation is the total loss of skill level 2 knowledge. Sappers know almost nothing about their job now (this intuition was recently confirmed by a sapper instructor who has witnessed a steady decline in the past two years) and there does not seem to be an easy fix for this.
I think the recent push to build the JSS's and COP's in Baghdad speaks for 21B applicability in the COE.