Fighting AQAP in coalition
Crowbat,
Thanks for the pointer to the WoTR article on UAE's COIN approach; which make very interesting reading. I note the importance of having historical "kith & kin" between southern Yemen and the UAE.
The article ends with an optimistic slant:
Quote:
AQAP is used to being the smartest player around with the deepest local ties, but a partnership between the Gulf coalition, Yemen, and the United States could present Al-Qaeda and the emergent Islamic State in Yemen with a much tougher set of opponents.
So I note today in Foreign Policy's e-briefing this:
Quote:
American special operators are back in Yemen, and it doesn’t look like they’re going to leave any time soon. A group of about a dozen U.S. commandos sent to the country in April are going to stick around, U.S. defense officials say, and will help troops from the United Arab Emirates hunt down fighters from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
That sounds like a priority shift for Emirati troops, who have been fighting Houthi rebels for the past year. But Yousef al-Otaiba, the U.A.E.’s ambassador in Washington, told the Washington Post that said his country’s fight against AQAP “will go on for a long period of time...the military priorities have shifted from fighting the Iranian-backed Houthis to being more focused on AQAP".
One must wonder will the UAE have learnt enough to avoid the mistakes the USA and on a smaller scale others encountered in their Yemeni dealings.
Crisis in Yemen: The Forgotten War
Last week London's Fontline Club held a meeting on the Yemen, as the war entered a second year; with Iona Craig (who still visits), a yemeni expat who works for Oxfam (one of the sharper UK charities), a regional HRW speaker and an independent UK reporter in the chair (who has reported from the Yemen):http://www.frontlineclub.com/crisis-...forgotten-war/
There is a 90 min podcast, which I expect includes the Q&A. Yet to be listened to.
Defeating AQAP: some context and options
At a recent conference @ Oxford University, hosted by Pembroke College, entitled 'The Lure of Jihad: Propaganda & the Construction of Jihadist Identities' amidst the presentations was one talk that fits here: Keeping the Lure Alive: The evolution of AQAP's Propaganda Strategy & What we can Learn from it' by Dr Elisabeth Kendall. Her research has taken to the eastern provinces, most recently in November 2015.
- Due to the Saudi-led blockade AQAP is making US$2m per day taxing imports, especially of fuel;
- There is no appetite in the eastern provinces for the Caliphate;
- Polling using locally recruited staff to conduct interviews found that 21% state an Iman's role is to advise on all matters; 10% want a 'single, strong leader' definitely not a distant man;
- Each family can have up to twenty children and child mortality is high and death is accepted. Alongside having more guns than books in each home - makes them a hardened audience and it is hard to terrorise people like that;
- The ability of AQAP to get local "buy in" depends on local, tribal factors and it is clear there is mutual toleration of each other as business is pursued;
- When shown an IS 2015 video, showing a local Yemeni IS group, it was widely ridiculed and caused bewilderment;
- AQAP have adapted their approach, it is now more nuanced, but there is a contradiction between business and war. No longer are the punishments and stoning seen in 2011-2012 used. They now aim to get popular support by proving they can govern and so help the people. Then they radicalise;
- AQAP does not portray graphic violence against non-Muslims;
- It is almost a "Robin Hood" method, fighting for justice and righting wrongs. The jihad today is a continuation of the fight against the British (who left in 1967) and AQAP have used stills of British soldiers being buried in Aden in that conflict;
- AQAP's tweets (I do wonder how many locals use Twitter) when examined are by issue: 57% development, 18% law, 13% celebrations & parties and 3% Sharia;
- There has been considerable population movement to the eastern provinces, notably Al-Mukalla, from the north following the damage caused by the war.
Dr Kendall has written widely, her last article readily found was in WaPo in May 2016:https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/...a-be-defeated/
Assessing U.S. Special Operations in Yemen
Assessing U.S. Special Operations in Yemen
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Drones in South Arabia and Yemen
In June 2016 Professor Clive Jones, Durham University, gave a seminar paper which combines history, the wider aspects of drones and contemporary events in the Yemen; the full title being 'Drones as Air Proscription? The case of South Arabia and Yemen in comparative perspective'.
There is a summary and a podcast (90 minutes) of the seminar, plus the Q&A:http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/schools/...scription.aspx
On the ground, Saudis in the air
Peter Oborne, a UK journalist, has been to Houthi & others controlled Yemen, with two short film clips - with the caveat Houthi minders were with them. He denounces the UK stance on supporting the Saudi role, principally aerial bombing of civilian targets.
Link:http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns...orne-855615638
Ouch! UAE ship hit & burns in Red Sea
Via twitter by Alex Mello just:
Quote:
1) UAE HSV-2 Swift making runs between Assab and Aden hit with Houthi anti-ship missile off Mokha; 2) And looks like Houthi dudes in a dhow or speedboat tracked the Swift and filmed the missile strike. Big fail for UAE opsec...; 3) Keep in mind Before UAE HSV was hit by Houthi missile Unconfirmed news about an attack on Assab base
YouTube film clip (3.35mins):https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XaMSb_7_3cM&app=desktop
The vessel is a former USN vessel, Swift by class and disposed of to the private sector in 2013 and now operated UAE company. IRRC it was used earlier in the Yemen conflict to move UAE heavy kit to Aden and presumably was ferrying supplies from Assab, Eritrea to the Yemen.
Wiki has:
Quote:
The UAE leased
Swift was reportedly sunk off the Yemeni coast on the 1st of October, 2016 by an anti-ship missile from the brigade 17 tunnel-bunker network in
Dhubab [8], the UAE officials reported that the ship was carrying aid when targeted by the anti-ship missile
[9]
Link:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HSV-2_Swift