The Armed Force are a reflection of the Society from which they come...
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Originally Posted by
AmericanPride
Americans were quite content with friendly relationships with illiberal and non-democratic regimes for the sixty years prior and to this day. So I very much doubt the assertion that "American politics" somehow requires any new government to be "recognizable" as democratic.
Not totally correct. There have always been objections that 'friendliness,' they've just grown more voluble, strident and prevalent in the last decade or two to the point where the government of the day now has to pay more attention to those objections. The Mom-ization of America continues...:wry:
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That certainly smacks of Orientalism. What features of North African, Arab, and Central Asian societies make them "not amenable to centralized control by anything but main force"?
As one who has spent almost an equal amount of time in the near east and the far east -- the Orient -- the features that most impact are the Tribal nature of most ME populations and, even more so, the deeply embedded habit of Taarof in the region. :eek:
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...I'm not concerned with their necessity; though once committed to action, achieving a favorable outcome regardless of the original cause(s) becomes a necessity.
Perhaps. However if the action to which the force is committed is based on unattainable goals due to the ignorance of the civilian policy makers who ordered that commitment success is improbable, necessary or not...
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...The political leadership made such preparations, including the establishment of the Coalition Provisional Authority and the facilitation of Iraqi government working groups. But the military did not provide the necessary security measures to assist the political process. Why?
Why? Inadequate troop strength due to decisions by the political leadership (not to mention really serious infighting among said 'leaders'); inadequate training of the force for the mission assigned. There's more but there's plenty of egg for a whole lot of faces and as many or more were senior civilian AND military leaders over several administrations.
Recall that the CPA was an afterthought, an Ad-hoc thing conjured up in May 2003 (LINK) (when, I believe, George W. Bush realized he'd been sold a bill of goods and had an attack of Christian conscience...) and that replaced the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), itself almost an afterthought as it was born in January of 2003. The civilian policy establishment was guilty of as many or more errors than the Army.:rolleyes:
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And this in turn pressures cuts in personnel and training, reducing combat power all around. Not to mention competition with other domestic agendas and social programs.
Not necessarily so on what those pressures dictate. You may be correct on what happens and likely are but it does not have to be that way, we have choices...
As for competition with domestic agendas and social programs, your are correct and that's reality -- but that also does not have to be that way. We have choices...
We continue to make bad choices -- and that is Political, period.
Misdirection may be an explanation but it is not an excuse
It is depressing to read posts on this thread that seem resigned to the inevitability of more small wars destined to end in failure. Why not only small wars that can be structured and resourced to succeed ?
The US military is known to generally stress a need for obedience, and also subordination of the armed forces to the political administration of the day. Both those may be all well and good but an essential role for senior military officers is to provide pertinent and objective advice without fear or favour. If unable to do that or if such advice is routinely rejected or ignored, then one alternative is to resign. That course of action is rarely followed even though every senior officer knows that another responsibility is to develop able subordinates and hence potential successors as opposed to fairly competent or even incompetent placeholders.
An alternative but less acceptable action is to go public. The last US senior officer to semi-effectively condemn and repudiate political direction as impractical and mis-directed was General Stanley McChrystal. But his reaction lacked impact because it was informal and could be depreciated because it was fuelled in part by alcohol. It would have been more effective to have resigned and later when out of uniform to announce and elaborate on the reasons for resignation at a public forum such as a press conference.
So repeating the initial question: Why not only small wars that can be structured and resourced to succeed (with an all-volunteer force) ?
And secondly: At what level are US officers required to provide forthright confidential advice direct to the political administration?
And thirdly: What is the tipping point for resignation as opposed to acquiescence or possibly brown nosing ?
Compost, Good commentary, but
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Originally Posted by
Compost
So repeating the initial question: Why not only small wars that can be structured and resourced to succeed (with an all-volunteer force) ?
Why are you limiting your question to pre-determine a U.S. military solution to solving other states problems?
What evidence do you have to suggest that a better war theory or better resourced military could in fact provide the solution that you are seeking?
In my mind, the question itself is inherently lacking sophistication or any sense of creativity.
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An alternative but less acceptable action is to go public. The last US senior officer to semi-effectively condemn and repudiate political direction as impractical and mis-directed was General Stanley McChrystal. But his reaction lacked impact because it was informal and could be depreciated because it was fuelled in part by alcohol. It would have been more effective to have resigned and later when out of uniform to announce and elaborate on the reasons for resignation at a public forum such as a press conference.
Really? Is this an early attempt at historical revisionism? McChrystal is currently on speaking tours getting paid handsomely for his thoughts.
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And thirdly: What is the tipping point for resignation as opposed to acquiescence or possibly brown nosing ?
General Officers have a duty to tell the truth.
Obedience and then resignation
Ken as always comments wisely and whilst noting there are differences between the European and US approach to WM's question:
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And thirdly: What is the tipping point for resignation as opposed to acquiescence or possibly brown nosing ?
It is quite clear, even for someone not within, that a good number of British Army officers have taken another way out - resignation, often after a tour in operational command. A good number have commented in public, usually in carefully phrased media interviews.
Some I expect have other reasons than the political directions given and the military command's response.
Excellent point, David and noticed even on this side of the pond...
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Originally Posted by
davidbfpo
It is quite clear, even for someone not within, that a good number of British Army officers have taken another way out - resignation, often after a tour in operational command. A good number have commented in public, usually in carefully phrased media interviews
It will be interesting in the next few years to see how much the monolithic entity that is Defence / Defense changes in response to such resignations. Or to the current US grumbling within the ranks
I think we can all agree that turning Elephants is hard work. Rewarding, perhaps but difficult... :wry:
Military or Political "Failure"
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from Compost
It is depressing to read posts on this thread that seem resigned to the inevitability of more small wars destined to end in failure. Why not only small wars that can be structured and resourced to succeed ?
First off (to Compost), I can suggest "small wars that can be structured and resourced to succeed." So also can a whole bunch of other people here ! As an example, I'd say "regime removal" - you want him taken out, the US "can do". The totally different "small war" of "regime change" is another story.
One material question in this thread is what constraints should be applied to a given state (not the USA, necessarily). Everything I post about "COIN" should have the disclaimer "try this at home first". ;)
Another question (which is wholly individual) is what restraints should be applied to foreign interventions.
You use the word "failure". That is obviously different from "victory" (or is it ? - a good case can be made for a USAian "failure" at San Juan Hill, etc.)
But, is "failure" different from "defeat" and "disaster" ? Well, "yes" and "no" - and consider the following resources (I have read them):
British Military Defeats
The French Military as Contrasted with the English since 1500: Proud Traditions or a Badge of Shame?
Wiki - List of military disasters
Regan, Great Military Disasters: A Historical Survey of Military Incompetence
Lind on U.S. Military Failures during the Cold War
Lind on Nixon’s Strategic and Tactical Failures
Michael Lind, Vietnam, the Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America’s Most Disastrous Military Conflict (Simon & Schuster, 1999)
William R. Corson, Consequences of Failure (W W Norton , 1973)
David MacIsaac, Of Victories, Defeats, and Failures (Air University Review, 1974)
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Bill Corson’s Consequences of Failure bears little resemblance to the Loory or Chodes books. Where Loory speaks of defeat, Corson treats of what he prefers to call failure; where Chodes uses history he tends to invent it whereas Corson’s grasp of historical perspective is what lends to his analysis its particular cogency. Corson, a retired Marine colonel, is well known to readers of military literature, particularly for his scathing indictment of search-and-destroy tactics in The Betrayal, which appeared in 1968. In the more recent book Corson ranges well beyond I Corps in an attempt to “evaluate the consequences of America’s failure in Vietnam in terms of its observable effects upon the United States and its institutions.” (p. 17)
Corson begins by reminding us to understand that we have not experienced a defeat in Vietnam but a “military failure” - defined as the nonperformance of something required or expected - a phenomenon with distinct characteristics and by no means an uncommon experience in the life of a nation. Such failures have been less studied than victories and successes, even though “failure is as much a determinant of future political behavior as is success.” Corson fervently believes that we will repeat our failure in Vietnam elsewhere unless we as a nation immediately acknowledge the fact of failure and undertake a rigid examination of our collective conscience. (pp. 15-18)
By means of a series of historical case studies, Corson sets out to illustrate how the violating or ignoring of certain principles of “limited war” strategy contributes to the failure of a great power in any conflict that does not affect its national existence. Starting with the Dacian and Parthian campaigns of the Emperor Trajan (A.D. 98-117), he moves through the catastrophic involvement of Spain in its war in the Netherlands during the sixteenth century to the British problems on this continent during the eighteenth century. Then, in somewhat more detail, he treats Britain’s military failure in Ireland between 1916 and 1922. From these examples Corson derives a number of general principles that need be applied (and others that need be omitted) if a great power is to avoid encountering military failure. (pp. 28-30, 72-73)
In essence, these boil down to abandoning—for limited wars not affecting national survival—MacArthur’s definition of victory in favor of Clausewitz’s rather more complex idea that winning means either to achieve one’s objectives by offensive action or, defensively, to thwart the enemy’s intentions; that losing is defined simply as the failure to achieve one’s objectives even though one’s forces are undefeated and still able to engage the enemy. Or, to quote Secretary of State Kissinger on Vietnam, “In the process we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla war: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win."
Bill Corson started out with a huge concept - to distinguish "failure" from "defeat" and "disaster"; but then got lost in the immediate situation - the close of the Vietnam War. As Ken says: Wait for 40 years. In any case, we should be looking not only to "victory" and "defeat"; but also to "failure" and (I'd say) "success" (a state less than "victory").
OK, SMG White, Can we now start ? Like, who really "won" (or "succeeded in") the SE Asian War (and Non-War) Games ? And, where did Indochina fit into that picture (if at all) - yes, I know Dayuhan has a possible oar in that boat.
BLUF at end: There is a long history to "Small Wars"; but it has to be explored very carefully with discernment as to "constraints" (which are set by the environment) and "restraints" (which are set by each of us).
For my large rugby-playing friend from That Place on the Hudson, I'd suggest your pick of eras is appropriate to understand the "beginnings". Owen Fiss called 1888-1910 the "Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State" (Holmes Devise History of SCOTUS; too expensive unless you are a Con Law scholar - find a library copy - or come up to Northern Michigan and read it - that's a real invite, BTW :)).
I've been in the same era for the last year or so - re: the most important issue - what are the reasonable limits of USAian force projection ??
Regards
Mike
Structure Issue not Leadership
Flawed by Design:The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC
by Amy Zegart
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In this provocative and thoughtful book, Amy Zegart challenges the conventional belief that national security agencies work reasonably well to serve the national interest as they were designed to do. Using a new institutionalist approach, Zegart asks what forces shaped the initial design of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council in ways that meant they were handicapped from birth.
Ironically, she finds that much of the blame can be ascribed to cherished features of American democracy—frequent elections, the separation of powers, majority rule, political compromise—all of which constrain presidential power and give Congress little incentive to create an effective foreign policy system. At the same time, bureaucrats in rival departments had the expertise, the staying power, and the incentives to sabotage the creation of effective competitors, and this is exactly what they did.
Historical evidence suggests that most political players did not consider broad national concerns when they forged the CIA, JCS, and NSC in the late 1940s. Although President Truman aimed to establish a functional foreign policy system, he was stymied by self-interested bureaucrats, legislators, and military leaders. The NSC was established by accident, as a byproduct of political compromise; Navy opposition crippled the JCS from the outset; and the CIA emerged without the statutory authority to fulfill its assigned role thanks to the Navy, War, State, and Justice departments, which fought to protect their own intelligence apparatus.
Not surprisingly, the new security agencies performed poorly as they struggled to overcome their crippled evolution. Only the NSC overcame its initial handicaps as several presidents exploited loopholes in the National Security Act of 1947 to reinvent the NSC staff. The JCS, by contrast, remained mired in its ineffective design for nearly forty years—i.e., throughout the Cold War—and the CIA’s pivotal analysis branch has never recovered from its origins. In sum, the author paints an astonishing picture: the agencies Americans count on most to protect them from enemies abroad are, by design, largely incapable of doing so.
Heh. In other words, the system is the problem...
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Originally Posted by
MikeF
Interesting. I'll have to get that one, she says what I've believed and said for years. The governmental process which I would not wish changed is the culprit. The domestic politics which dictate our foreign policy also have hobbled our efforts to create organs of government. This quote from the excerpt:
"The JCS, by contrast, remained mired in its ineffective design for nearly forty years—i.e., throughout the Cold War—and the CIA’s pivotal analysis branch has never recovered from its origins. In sum, the author paints an astonishing picture: the agencies Americans count on most to protect them from enemies abroad are, by design, largely incapable of doing so."(emphasis added /kw)
Is IMO correct with the exception of the fact that the JCS is still ineffective and Goldwater-Nichols is / was no help. The designed inefficiency of the US governmental processes should never have been transferred to agency design, the CIA should have been structured and required to be apolitical an operate without Congressional control (but with oversight, not the same thing) as should the Defense establishment -- I've never been convinced DoD was a good idea, the separate Departments worked well enough. The NSC probably doesn't need to exist at all...