Iran: Consequences of a War
13 Feb Reuters - Study: Thousands would die if U.S. attacked Iran
Quote:
Thousands of military personnel and hundreds of civilians would be killed if the United States launched an air strike on Iran to prevent it developing nuclear arms, a British think tank said in a report released on Monday.
The report by the independent Oxford Research Group said any bombing of Iran by U.S. forces, or by their Israeli allies, would have to be part of a surprise attack on a range of facilities including urban areas that would catch many Iranians unprotected.
The report by Oxford Research Group - Iran: Consequences of a War
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This briefing paper, written by our Global Security Consultant, Professor Paul Rogers, provides a comprehensive analysis of the likely nature of US or Israeli military action that would be intended to disable Iran's nuclear capabilities. It outlines both the immediate consequences in terms of loss of human life, facilities and infrastructure, and also the likely Iranian responses, which would be extensive.
An attack on Iranian nuclear infrastructure would signal the start of a protracted military confrontation that would probably grow to involve Iraq, Israel and Lebanon, as well as the USA and Iran. The report concludes that a military response to the current crisis in relations with Iran is a particularly dangerous option and should not be considered further.
Alternative approaches must be sought, however difficult these may be.
Contents:
1. Executive Summary
2. Introduction
3. The US Context
4. The Israeli Factor
5. The Iranian Context
6. Current Circumstances in Iran
7. The Nature of US Military Action
8. Pre-empting Iranian Responses
9. Casualties
10. Iranian Responses
11. Wider Responses
12. Israeli Military Action
13. Conclusion
The Threat from Iran's WMD and Missile Programs
A detailed (223 pages) backgrounder and assessment from CSIS: A Nuclear Iran? The Threat from Iran's WMD and Missile Programs
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There is a long chain of indicators that Iran is proliferating. Iran’s missile development problems only make sense if they are equipped with CBRN warheads. There have been numerous confirmed disclosures of suspect Iranian activity. Iranian nuclear program has been under intense scrutiny by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in recent years, and the IAEA reports disclose a pattern of activity that makes little sense unless it is tied to a nuclear weapons program.
Yet, the data on Iranian nuclear weapons efforts remain uncertain. The summary reporting by the IAEA has not stated that there is decisive evidence that Iran is seeking such weapons, although the detailed disclosures made in IAEA reporting since 2002, do strongly indicate that it is likely that Iran is continuing to covertly seek nuclear technology. Neither the US nor its European allies have as yet released detailed white papers on their intelligence analysis of Iranian efforts, and there have been several press reports that US intelligence feels that its knowledge of the Iranian nuclear program is less than adequate to make the case for where, when, and how the Iranians will acquire a nuclear weapon.
Iran does have the right to acquire a full nuclear fuel cycle for peaceful purposes under the terms of the Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty (NPT), and the Iranian government has been able to find ways to justify all of its activities to date as research, related to nuclear power, minor mistakes, or the result of importing contaminated equipment. It has claimed that its concealed and secret efforts are the result of its fears that the US or Israel might attack what it claims are legitimate activities.
In fact, Iran may have advanced to the point where it can covertly develop nuclear weapons even if it agrees to the terms proposed by the EU3 and Russia, and appears to comply with IAEA inspection. As the UN’s experience in Iraq has shown all too clearly, there are severe limits to even the most advanced inspection regime. Iran might well be able to carry out a covert research and development effort, make major advances in weapons development, and improve its ability to produce fissile material. Iran might well acquire a “break out” capability to suddenly make weapons or be able to produce small numbers of weapons without detection.
At the same time, it is hard to discuss the case against Iran without raising questions about the mistakes the US and the UK made in characterizing Iraq’s efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. The US in particular, has problems in convincing the international community that Iran is a grave threat to global security. Credibility is a precious commodity, and one that can sometimes be worth more than gold.
The problems in addressing Iran’s capabilities go beyond the ability to determine the facts. Since 2002, the Bush Administration and EU3 have consistently argued that the Iranian efforts to acquire nuclear weapons are real and that they must be stopped. The ability of the US, the IAEA, and the EU3 to halt the Iranian nuclear program is complicated, however, by the mistakes that the US and Britain made in dealing with Iraq
It is also impossible to deny the fact that Iran is being judged by a different standard because its regime is associated with terrorism, efforts to export its Shi’ite revolution, and reckless political rhetoric. There is nothing wrong with a “dual standard.” Nations that present exceptional risks require exceptional treatment. The fact remains, however, that Iran was under missile and chemical attack from Iraq, and seems to have revived its nuclear programs at a time that Iraq was already involved in a major effort to acquire biological and nuclear weapons. Iran has major neighbors -- India, Israel, and Pakistan -- that have already proliferated. It must deal with the presence of two outside nuclear powers: Russia near its northern border and the US in the Gulf.
The situation is further confused by the fact there is an increasingly thin line between the technology needed to create a comprehensive nuclear fuel cycle for nuclear power generation and dual use technology that can be used to covertly develop nuclear weapons. A nation can be both excused and accused for the same actions. This can make it almost as difficult, if not impossible, to conclusively prove Iran’s guilt as its innocence, particularly if its programs consist of a large number of small, dispersed efforts, and larger “dual-use” facilities.
Some efforts at proliferation have been called a “bomb in the basement” – programs to create a convincing picture that a nation has a weapon without any open testing or formal declaration. Iran seems to be trying to develop a “bomb in a fog;” to keep its efforts both covert and confusing enough so that there will be no conclusive evidence that will catalyze the UN into cohesive and meaningful action or justify a US response. Such a strategy must be made more overt in the long-run if it is to make Iran a credible nuclear power, but the long-run can easily stretch out for years; Iran can break up its efforts into smaller, research oriented programs or pause them; focus on dual-use nuclear efforts with a plausible rational; permit even intrusive inspection; and still move forward.
Iran: Is There a Way Out of the Nuclear Impasse?
From ICG, 23 Feb 06: Iran: Is There a Way Out of the Nuclear Impasse?
Here's the ExecSum:
Quote:
There is no easy way out of the Iranian nuclear dilemma. Iran, emboldened by the situation in Iraq and soaring oil prices, and animated by a combination of insecurity and assertive nationalism, insists on its right to develop full nuclear fuel cycle capability, including the ability to enrich uranium. Most other countries, while acknowledging to varying extents Iran’s right under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to acquire that capability for peaceful energy purposes, have a concern – reinforced by Iran’s lack of transparency in the past, continuing support for militant Middle East groups and incendiary presidential rhetoric – that once able to highly enrich uranium, it will be both able and tempted to build nuclear weapons.
But EU-led diplomacy so far has failed to persuade Iran to forego its fuel cycle ambitions; the UN Security Council seems unlikely to agree on sanctions strong enough to force it to do so; and preventive military force is both a dangerous and unproductive option.
Two possible scenarios remain, however, for a negotiated compromise. The first, and unquestionably more attractive for the international community, is a “zero enrichment” option: for Iran to agree to indefinitely relinquish its right to enrich uranium in return for guaranteed supply from an offshore source, along the lines proposed by Russia. Tehran, while not wholly rejecting offshore supply, has made clear its reluctance to embrace such a limitation as a long-term solution: for it to have any chance of acceptance, more incentives from the U.S. need to be on the table than at present.
If this option proves unachievable – as seems, regrettably, more likely than not – the only realistic remaining diplomatic option appears to be the “delayed limited enrichment” plan spelt out in this report. The wider international community, and the West in particular, would explicitly accept that Iran can not only produce peaceful nuclear energy but has the “right to enrich” domestically; in return, Iran would agree to a several-year delay in the commencement of its enrichment program, major limitations on its initial size and scope, and a highly intrusive inspections regime.
Both sides inevitably will protest that this plan goes too far – the West because it permits Tehran to eventually achieve full nuclear fuel cycle capability, with the risk in turn of breakout from the NPT and weapons acquisition, and Iran because it significantly delays and limits the development of that fuel cycle capability. But with significant carrots (particularly from the U.S.) and sticks (particularly from the EU) on the table – involving the appropriate application of sequenced incentives, backed by the prospect of strong and intelligently targeted sanctions – it is not impossible to envisage such a negotiation succeeding.
This proposed compromise should be compared neither to the fragile and unsustainable status quo, nor to some idealised end-state with which all sides might be totally comfortable. The more likely scenarios, if diplomacy fails, are for a rapid descent into an extremely unhealthy North Korea-like situation, with a wholly unsupervised nuclear program leading to the production of nuclear weapons and all the dangerously unpredictable regional consequences that might flow from that; or a perilous move to an Iraq-like preventive military strike, with even more far-reaching and alarming consequences both regionally and world-wide.
Vote-how will Iran respond if attacked?
Most analysts consider only the small question about such an attack:
Example: Rick Francona, former DIA analyst, describes 2 scenarios by which Israel can attack Iran's nuke facilities (hat tip to John Robb):
http://francona.blogspot.com/2006/03...e-options.html
The big question: what will Iran do in response to an attack by Israel or America -- perhaps helped passively or actively by Turkey or Saudi Arabia? Such an attack is, after all, an act of war against Iran. International Law allows Iran to reply against everyone who assisted.
As so often the case with war, the opening salvo is the most predictable. What comes afterwards is more interesting (survival is always interesting).
Vote, and post a note explaining your view!
Iran is already in a covert war with the US
Since at least 1979 Iran has been in a state of covert war with the US, primarily through its proxies like Hezballah. It has sponsored many deadly terrorist attacks against the US and Israel. Whether or not its nuke facilities are attacked, it will continue to do so. There is a reason why it has been designated as the chief state sponsor of terrorism for several years. That is why any attack on those facilities should also include attacks on all instruments of Iran's ability to make war. It should be a sustained attack over months, not days.
The idea of attacking just the nuclear facilities and then standing back for Iran's next move, is an invitation to more Iranian terrorism. When we attack we should make it more difficult for Iran to continue making war against us. We should not limit ourseves to air attacks. We should use special forces working with dissident groups in Iran to fix and target the enemy forces. We should target, for example, the facilities where Iran makes the IED's used in Iraq. We should target her missiles and missile production facilities, which threaten Israel and Western Europe. It should be a campaign like that used against Saddam in 1991 and also like the one against Belgrade later in the 90's.
We should also make clear to Iran's proxy warriors that they will be the subject of sustained attacks if they act to aid their sponsors in Iran.