I interviewed Reuters' Stephen Kalin on what he's seen while covering the Battle for Mosul. Here's a link.
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I interviewed Reuters' Stephen Kalin on what he's seen while covering the Battle for Mosul. Here's a link.
2. In just a few days the battle for Mosul has been transformed from a slow slog to a quick advance across most of the eastern section of the city. Why do you think the fight changed so dramatically?
Certainly good news at the tactical level, the Iraqi forces, with coalition assistance, appear to be adapting effectively and increasingly demonstrating the ability to defeat Da'esh despite their advantage of prepared defenses. One can only hope, that the Iraqi government has also adapting during this time, and is prepared to govern effectively once Mosul is liberated to consolidate this victory.Quote:
Apart from the reasons given by the coalition - better coordination, more US SF assistance and better tactics - you now have considerably more capable forces in eastern Mosul after the arrival of the Rapid Response Forces and some able police units. And while sending in the GD ahead of everyone else was strategic nonsense, it did soften up ISIS defenses prior to the renewed push early in the new year. The Iraqis where able to replace their destroyed material and beef up their forces. ISIS on the other hand cannot resupply the east bank from the west any more, and has limited manpower in Mosul anyway.
I saw a lot more air support the last couple of times I went into Mosul, which might be a consequence of US special forces getting closer to the action. At the same time, the Iraqi forces are coming up with better ways to deal with suicide car bombers, which have been a real hazard during the past three months. The Rapid Response Forces for instance tell the inhabitants to park their cars across the road as soon as they enter an area, so blocking off avenues of attack. Those two things combined shifts the advantage back to the military in terms of guided ordinance.
Day 97 Mosul campaign.
Day 98 of Mosul campaign.
The Rapid Response Division (Federal Police) did better than expected in Fallujah, but the Coalition footprint with it is limited and with that there is a lack of understanding of its capabilities. So far the only force with the ability to take, clear and hold complex terrain against a determined enemy has been the CTS. The CTS were always going to be the breach force for Mosul, the issue was more where the 'Hold" forces would come from and whether the Iraqis would be able to overmatch ISIS at the tactical and operational levels through multiple threats on multiple axis/fronts, something that to date they have struggled to do.
Iraqi operational reach is also something that has bedevilled offensive efforts. It is often not the case that the Iraqis do not have the materiel, but that they cannot manage it effectively. It is extremely difficult to cross-resource across Iraqi Army formations, and even more so across services (Iraqi Army to CTS, or Police), significantly exacerbating logistic coordination of operational efforts.
Day 99 Mosul campaign.
Iraqi forces are horrible at logistics. The whole system for Mosul is being run by the Americans.
Day 100 of Mosul campaign. All of east Mosul liberated.
Day 101 of Mosul campaign.
Day 102 of Mosul campaign.
Wrote two articles last night. Stats and analysis of security in Iraq first three weeks of January.
Day 102 of Mosul campaign.
Day 103 of Mosul campaign. Iraqi forces worked with ex-Ninewa governor Nujafi's Hashd al-Watani forces and now issued an arrest warrant for him.
Short piece on effect of Iranian propaganda on Iraq. Iraqis feel Iran trying to save them more than Iranians do. Here's a link.
Day 104 of Mosul campaign.
Day 105 of Mosul campaign.
Day 106 of Mosul campaign.
Day 107 of Mosul campaign.
Day 108 of Mosul campaign.
I interviewed Niqash's Mustafa Habib about the job of securing east Mosul while attacking the west. Here's a link.