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In the latest British Journal of Military History Geraint Hughes (a familiar name on this thread) has a new article Amateurs Who Play in League Division One’? Anglo- Iranian Military Relations During the Dhofar War in Oman
It is 21 pgs. and has numerous references to pursue.
Are there lessons to be learnt, the author argues there are.
An overview of this war by a Malaysian author. It is quite interesting as a commentary on fighting similar wars today.
What was a surprise was this passage, which I have never seen referenced before:The author cites as his source Marc DeVore, The United Kingdom’s Last Hot War, 455-456, in the journal Small Wars & Insurgencies , which I read and posted a summary in Post 24, in 2015 and missed this.Quote:
The SAF also sought to subvert PDRY support for the rebels by sponsoring proxy guerillas in the desert region on the Yemeni-Omani border. In early 1969, Britain’s MI6 intelligence service managed to persuade the nomadic Mahra tribe, which inhabited the region, to launch an anti-communist revolt to disrupt PFLOAG supply lines. The Mahra, combining nomadic raiding skills with British supplied modern arms and Land Rovers, attacked the forts that the PFLOAG depended on for their supply lines. The Mahra did extensive damage in the enemy’s rear and relieved pressure on the SAF. By 1972 the Mahra were being led by SAS personnel, and kept an estimated four PDRY battalions occupied by the end of the war.
Link:https://thestrategybridge.org/the-br...ized-conflicts
Update: DeVore was referring to two sets of sets of private papers in the footnotes, which have now been id'd.
I’ve long considered this rebellion most relevant to courses of action to defeat the TB in AFG. Alas, Pakistan’s proximity and degree of support tilts the situation.
Jon,Quote:
Originally Posted by jcustis
There is now ample writing that the Omani Sultan remained in charge, with initially UK support and then a wider coalition. One must wonder is the GIRoA in the same position today. Or is there an Afghan consensus to cease the war, which IMHO is no longer going to include defeating the Taliban?
The realist in me says that “defeat” is no longer in the cards.
In an old Post No.28 in 2015 I referred to a new documentary being made available for payment. I missed looking at their website till today (due to a post in another, new thread).
Link:http://mysecretwardhofar.blogspot.com/
The website has five short clips and their YouTube arena has more.
Link:https://www.youtube.com/user/OperationOman
Note YouTube has nine hundred hits on Dhofar War!
Finally cross-border raiding is mentioned in part of the website; it involves Nick Downie, who was ex-SAS and on contract to Oman. Here is a quote:Link:http://mysecretwardhofar.blogspot.co...-for-nick.htmlQuote:
By that time I was a contract officer in SAF, charged with fomenting insurrection among the tribes of S Yemen. I commanded a unit of Yemeni exiles (bedouin) and we lived on the edge of the Empty Quarter. On one raid, we captured a substantial fort, 80 miles across the border. After the garrison surrendered, I filmed a bit of the action, before blowing it up with 1,100 lb of gelignite. This was three times more than was necessary. The fort literally vanished.
Id'd today whilst looking for very old Rhodesian personalities; the author is Professor Clive Jones, of Durham University and was published originally in the journal 'Small Wars & Insurgencies' and available via a link to the university library. As yet not fully read.
The Abstract:Link:http://dro.dur.ac.uk/17178/1/17178.pdfQuote:
This article examines the role military intelligence played in the Dhofar campaign between 1970-1976. Drawing on an array of sources, it examines not only the crucial role played by military intelligence in prosecuting a successful operational campaign against a Marxist inspired insurgency, but equally, the importance that intelligence played in consolidating the Al-Bu-Said dynasty when across Oman and Dhofar itself, the material benefits to be had from the discovery and production of oil had yet to be realised.
His other article still has no web link alas: Jones, Clive. (2011). Military intelligence, tribes, and Britain’s war in Dhofar, 1970-1976. Middle East Journal. Vol, 65, No.4, p.557-574. A quick search cannot find an open access edition.
A US Army officer whilst @ Kings College London submitted his Ph.D. thesis 'Combined Omani-British strategy during the Dhofar rebellion (1963-1982)' and the Abstract states:Link:https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/...bb970e60).htmlQuote:
The Omani government defeated the communist-aligned Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) during the Dhofar Rebellion (1963-1982) by implementing a national policy to pursue a military strategy, supported by information, economic, and diplomatic efforts. The Sultan’s government, aided significantly by the British and other Gulf states, set the conditions for military victory by integrating all aspects of national power to support a singular, local strategy. Most accounts of the conflict limit their analysis to the military aspects of the campaign, although in recent years a small body of work emerged on the diplomatic aspects of the war. However, to understand the complexity of the strategy required to win in Dhofar, all of its aspects must be examined before and after the coup that deposed Sultan Said bin Taimur in favour of his moderate son, Qaboos, in July 1970. The combined Omani-British strategy during the Dhofar Rebellion was an example of how to fight a war by integrating aspects of national power. Both states balanced national and regional interests to fight the insurgents. A strategic analysis of the war allows historians, strategists, and policymakers to reassess the narrative that Qaboos radically changed the direction of the war by embracing a ‘hearts and minds’ approach, the importance of Qaboos’s diplomatic efforts during and after the 1972 Sarfait campaign, Said’s efforts to plan and implement a modernisation plan following commercial oil production, the British contribution to the failure to develop a holistic strategy during Said’s reign, and the actions required to secure Dhofar after the termination of major military operations in 1975. A comprehensive examination of the conduct of the war places it within its historical and cultural context and allows government leaders and historians to better understand the limitations of applying its lessons within the context of modern conflicts.
Sometimes Kings thesis appear online, I have not readily found it.
Spotted two articles on RAF officers serving in Oman, on 'Loan Service' for two year unaccompanied tours and one covers the Dhofar War, in particular the famous attack on Mirbat Fort - which the SAS got plaudits for, with RAF-piloted Strikemasters delivering air support. Link pg. 125 onwards:
There is another article, which details the scene, role and aircraft over a longer period. Pg.117-124
Link to both: https://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/documents/research/RAF-Historical-Society-Journals/Journal-49.pdf
A new Journal article that has many web links and so could be useful. It ends with:Link: https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/ar...isors-securityQuote:
If the United States intends to assist its allies and partners by building military capacity, a blend of conventional and special operations support is ideal. The combined British-Omani counterinsurgency campaign in Dhofar provides an outstanding template for a balanced security force assistance strategy.
Post 24 refers to an article 'The United Kingdom's last hot war of the Cold War: Oman, 1963-75' by De Vore and has been made available by the author. Contact davidbfpo for a copy via PM. Alas too large to upload.
Last week the ‘Daily Telegraph’ published an obituary for Nick Downie, who had fought in Dhofar, first with the SAS, then for Oman. It is alas behind a pay wall, so I cite just a few passages:From: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/obituari...flict-western/Quote:
Nick Downie, who has died of Covid-19 in South Africa aged 74, was a former SAS soldier widely regarded as one of the world’s best combat cameramen.
Downie had been a professional soldier for six years, three-and-a-half of them in the SAS, and also fought as an irregular alongside Bedouins in the Sultanate of Oman against Marxist-led insurgents from 1972 to 1974, and with Kurdish Peshmerga guerrillas in Iraqi Kurdistan during the Second Iraqi – Kurdish War (1974-75).
From 1971 the SAS were involved in suppressing the Dhofar Rebellion, a clandestine war in Oman against communist-backed insurgents from South Yemen. Downie was sent to Oman as a trooper, but after a while decided to buy himself out to join the Sultan of Oman’s Yemeni exile Bedouin irregulars as a contract mercenary.
Promoted to sergeant, he was put in charge of a unit with orders to penetrate deep into South Yemen to carry out acts of sabotage and foment insurrection among the tribes. On one raid from their base on the edge of the Empty Quarter they captured a large fort, 80 miles across the border. After the garrison surrendered, Downie decided to blow it up “as a demonstration that we had arrived”. His calculations showed the need for 300 lb of gelignite, so he laid 1,000 lb. The fort, he recalled, “literally vanished”.
The demolition of the fort and the subsequent success of “Nick’s Guides”, a camel unit he founded, so impressed the Sultan that he wrote out a cheque for £500,000. However, disillusioned by what he saw as obstructionism by the British officer corps, Downie returned to London, though he felt vindicated when his irregulars mutinied with the aim of having him brought back as their leader.’
A new book includes Dhofar as an example of how COIN works; I listened to an online talk last week:The publisher's website is: https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu...ts/#bookTabs=1Quote:
In Bullets Not Ballots, Jacqueline L. Hazelton challenges the claim that winning "hearts and minds" is critical to successful counterinsurgency campaigns. Good governance, this conventional wisdom holds, gains the besieged government popular support, denies support to the insurgency, and enables military and political victory. Hazelton argues that major counterinsurgent successes since World War II have resulted not through democratic reforms but rather through the use of military force against civilians and the co-optation of rival elites. Hazelton offers new analyses of five historical cases frequently held up as examples of the effectiveness of good governance in ending rebellions—the Malayan Emergency, the Greek Civil War, the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines, the Dhofar rebellion in Oman, and the Salvadoran Civil War—to show that, although unpalatable, it was really brutal repression and bribery that brought each conflict to an end. By showing how compellence works in intrastate conflicts, Bullets Not Ballots makes clear that whether or not the international community decides these human, moral, and material costs are acceptable, responsible policymaking requires recognizing the actual components of counterinsurgent success—and the limited influence that external powers have over the tactics of counterinsurgent elites.
A 30% discount is available, for details see: https://fsi.stanford.edu/events/bull...rgency-warfare
It took a long time to completely read Jacqueline Hazelton's book; the chapter on Oman, Dhofar is pgs. 81-105, with 220 footnotes, so is probably the most comprehensive account of the campaign.
This thread still attracts attention and yesterday on another website for WW2 history a veteran of the conflict was the topic, Arthur Robert BROCKLEHURST, a UK contract officer who served in Oman for ten years. I don't think the references found have appeared here before.
The London Gazette on 29/9/1959 refers to:From: https://www.thegazette.co.uk/London/.../6127/data.pdfQuote:
Short Serv. Commit. 2nd Lt. Arthur Robert BROCKLEHURST (458614) from Reg. Army, Nat. Serv. List, to be 2nd Lt., 29th Aug. 1959
He was a company commander (with Red Company, NFR) in 1966, when there was an attempt to assassinate the (old) Sultan. See: http://www.jepeterson.net/sitebuild...1966_Assassination_Attempt_on_Sultan_S aid.pdf
He did adapt well when in Oman:From a 2009 US Army Masters thesis: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA513085.pdfQuote:
British officers were primary targets to the enemy insurgents, but despite their height and pale skin, some would blend in quite well. Many of the officers within the Sultan’s army, after a deepening tan and a closely cropped beard, became unrecognizable to the foreigner’s eye. On one occurrence when a senior British officer attempted to talk to one of the Sultan’s soldiers in his practiced Arabic, the soldier responded in Arabic to his questions. It was not until later that the visiting dignitary realized that he was talking to Arthur Brocklehurst, the British Regimental second in command.
There are eight references to him being interviewed in 1981, in Oman, when he commanded the Northern Frontier Regiment (NFR) by a British Army officer for a Cambridge Masters thesis. See: http://www.55fstramc.com/wp-content..._War_McKeown/Dhofar-War-John-McKeown-Full.pdf
There is a photo of him alongside his C.O. in Oman, Bryan Ray, in the later's book on his time in Somalia and Oman. See: https://www.amazon.co.uk/Dangerous-F.../dp/B00911RU1Q and parts are available on: https://www.google.co.uk/books/edit...ehurst"+++"oman"&pg=PT119&printsec=frontcov er
Some context is available in this document: https://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/sites/defa...collection.pdf
The opening post refers to:One book author, Ian Gardiner, 'In The Service of the Sultan' refers in the acknowledgements to:Quote:
Apart from this I have found very little information though I was told he committed suicide not long after leaving the army.
From: https://www.google.co.uk/books/edit...lehurst"+++"oman"&pg=PP13&printsec=frontcov erQuote:
owes much to my recollection of long conversations with the late Arthur Brocklehurst who had a deep and abiding interest in Oman
A new article on the early years of the insurgency by Dr. Simon Anglin, KIngs College London War Studies: https://www.militarystrategymagazine...ies-1970-1976/
I found some of the information on foreign (non-British) support remarkable, for their scale. That does not mean others have not written such before.