Trust the guy on your left and right and give it what you got...
Bill,
I am glad to see that you let your inner bean-counter off of the leash now and then :wry:. These financial metrics that might be of interest to you as well.
Of late I have been spending some time considering America’s strengths: My thesis is that we are an idea, one which speaks to all of the inhabitants of the world, funded by the world’s strongest business community (13 trillion dollar USD at our peak), and protected by the best trained (real world ops baby) military in the world. Heady stuff to be a member of that team, but as we all know pride goeth before a fall.
We certainly have lost our way when it comes to humility however, and as a result of this our idea has been carelessly dropped in the mud, much of our business community is busy getting kicked in the head, and parts of our military are way overstretched. Fortunately, collectively, we are one tough sob and there is no doubt in my military mind that we will get back up and prevail. In the meantime it’s time to fight and we need to focus on the 25- meter target with everything (DIME) that we have.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
When we went into Afghanistan in 2001 we had a clear enough objective to neutralize AQ, but somehow that seems to have become a distant priority. Now it seems we're expermenting with various COIN TTPs and calling that a strategy, but to accomplish what? Deny safehaven to AQ? They already have safehaven in Pakistan and Somalia and I'm confident in other locations. Are we going to apply this strategy (surging more troops and building capable governments) worldwide? I'm finding myself leaning more and more towards some of Gian's opinions. It seems we're becoming a missionary Army of sorts, but we're not bringing Christianity, instead we're bringing dreams of (and in some cases hope) capitialism, free markets, and democracy, which will supposedly equate to security and prosperity for all.
Your military questions, if I may paraphrase, are: Is Afghanistan part of that 25-meter target and is COIN the method?
Short answer: I don’t know and yes.
Focusing exclusively upon Afghanistan, it has a high cost and in all of my reading I have yet to come across a compelling argument as to the benefit(s) that will offset this cost. Being a brother soldier however, I will salute the flag and move out smartly because America has never let me down.
When it comes to the TTP’s of accomplishing the Afghanistan mission, COIN is certainly raw and ugly (and some GPF’s would say it’s new and its not cricket baby) but it works most of the time. MDMP and EBO are planning/management answers born of the direct/indirect environment that we have/currently face and they will continue to evolve as our enemy evolves. On the flip side this endorsement of COIN does not mean that MCO TTP’s are dead. Like it or not we have to be prepared to win using more than one method.
GPF are the high dollar/high visibility military answer and SOF are the low dollar/low visibility military answer to different problem sets. When GPF are covering down on SOF mission sets and vice versa we need to take a hard look at what it is that we want, how we have resourced and allocated things, what our timelines are, and how applicable our solutions are to the problems we are facing.
Regards,
Steve
That was quite a ride....
Quote:
Originally Posted by
reed11b
Infrastructure does not in itself have much to do with insurgency other then how it is fought. What we saw in Iraq (I get to say we, I was there as well) was the lack of a previously existing infrastructure. That infrastructure has never existed in Afghanistan. Working on creating it is good because it is the right thing to do, not because it will win the "heart and minds". Defeating an insurgency is like defeating any enemy, restrict there freedom of movement, find there lines of communication and destroy them. This is why I prefer Wilf's principles of warfare to the Army ones, they apply across warfare spectrums. I hope my ramble makes sense.
Reed
Reed,
Iraq was like nothing that I have ever experienced and I am glad that you made it through as well. Some of my family raves about Alaska and one of these days I hope to make the trip. In the meantime I suspect that Wilf has some historical recommendations on Afghanistan that we can all learn and benefit from and hopefully he will share some.
With respect to Afghanistan I hope that our collective aim is true. A focus upon Population Security, Good Governance, and Government Services seems to be the West's answer in this fight. Iraq and Afghanistan are very different however, as you correctly note.
It seemed to me that a non-lethal infrastructure focus upon Electricity in Iraq would have paid dividends for a population centric strategy. A non-lethal infrastructure focus upon Water may be worth considering for a population centric strategy in Afghanistan. I'd like to throw out three brief late night thoughts and references:
In Rome (and Iraq from my observations) people were motivated to support the State by clean water and agricultural water connections (Renaissance Quarterly, LXI, 4, Winter 2008 - Hydraulic Engineering and the Study of Antiquity: Rome 1557-70, by Pamela O. Long). I suspect that this will apply in Afghanistan.
Effective use of Hydrology and Hydraulics Teams can help Commanders in accessing Water for their AO's (Hydrological Sciences Journal, Volume 53, Issue 6, December 2008 - Performance of MARS in Predicting Runoff in Mid-Himalayan Micro-Watersheds with Limited Data, by V.N. Sharda, et. al) This could be a tool used to influence the populace.
A USAID case study speaks to this idea.
Regards,
Steve
Infrastructure matters, because
Quote:
Infrastructure does not in itself have much to do with insurgency other then how it is fought.
posted by Reed
Infrastruture is a vague term, but assuming you're talking about economic infrastructure, it sure as heck matters, because perceptions matter. Iraq was a basket case in 2003, much worse than many of us thought. We allegedly promised to make it better, but failed to do for many years, thus we lost credibility with the populace we were trying to influence. It matters because expectation management matters. We're promising a better standard of living, but we're not delivering. People get angry, then they are more susceptable to insurgent propaganda.
Going back to Iraqi infrastructure, the educated Iraqis blamed their infrastructure problems on the sanctions the UN applied. One of the doctors I frequently spoke with said the sanctions had severe effects on the populace, but they impact Saddam at all (his opinion, but opinions matter). This doctor and his friends were hoping we would invade sooner, so we could fix the problems (expectations). The insurgents knew we were promising various carrots, one of which was fixing the electric grid, but that is a hard target set to defend and an easy one to attack. We think the Iraqis should get mad at the insurgents for the set backs, but instead they get angry at us, does it matter? Darn right it does.
Thinking out loud about Problem sets and solutions….
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
Yes it was... ;)
However, I'm not at all sure I understand what this means: ??? :confused: ???
Ken,
Over a cup of coffee in a place far from the sound of any battle let’s see if we can make a small collaborative dent into TTP’s, Troops to Task, & GWOT which was the point of my paragraph that you cite.
My assumptions:
1) Afghanistan/Pakistan is the next 25-meter target. (a)
2) Limited US resources require a favorable cost/benefit solution to our problems. (b)
3) National & International will to apply the necessary resources to the problem is in short supply. (c)
The problem defined:
There are continuing strikes against US Interests led by adequately trained, resourced, and decentralized movements which are currently massed in and around Afghanistan and amenable to a multifaceted/multiagency response (DIME).
A proposed solution:
Precisely apply a long duration, small footprint, and highly trained and motivated DIME force in order to develop a solution amenable to US Interests.
Historical Precedents’:
SOF in El Salvador
Jesuits in India, Asia, etc.
Ottoman Janissaries
(a) WSJ
Quote:
Senior U.S. military and civilian officials have grown increasingly pessimistic about Afghanistan and Pakistan. Last month, Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, told lawmakers he was planning to develop a new strategy for the war in Afghanistan that would for the first time focus on both countries, which he said were "inextricably linked in a common insurgency that crosses the border between them."
(b) Wikipedia
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As of November 19, 2008, the total U.S. federal debt was $10.6 trillion.[2], with about $37,316 per capita (that is, per U.S. resident). The October 3rd, 2008 bailout bill (H.R.1424), section 122, raised the U.S. debt ceiling from $10 trillion to $11.3 trillion. Of this amount, debt held by the public was roughly $6.3 trillion.[3] In 2007, the public debt was 36.9 percent of GDP [4], with a total debt of 65.5 percent of GDP.[5] The CIA ranked the total percentage as 27th in the world.[6]
(c) Zogby
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Do you believe the country is heading in the right direction or are things off on the wrong track?
Regards,
Steve