ECO a parallel course not replacement to DO
From Vol. 21, No. 27, July 7, 2008 of www.InsideDefense.com’s: Inside the Navy.
"The Marine Corps calls the idea of dispersing Marine companies throughout a battlefield and equipping them to maneuver independently “enhanced company operations” (ECO). The concept was approved by senior service officials in April. It is the next iteration of the distributed operations concept, which called for breaking up units into much smaller groups for the same type of decentralized warfighting. “Our enemies will use large forces if it’s to their benefit in a certain area, but for the most part it’s going to be irregular warfare. And our companies, through enhanced company operations, will be trained and equipped better to fight both,” Murray said. “They can be distributed -- fight in a small, distributed unit -- or they can come together and fight in a more traditional manner.”
I would argue with around $630 million dollars of congressional funds allocated to DO as a concept and its related equipment and training, it is not dead. I doubt the Marine Corps wants to give all that money back.
What has DO influence so far?
1) ALL 36 Battalion T/E's have had a DO/IBEPP increase.
2) There has been an increased throughput at SOI(W), SOI(E) and 3d Marine Regimental Schools for Infantry Squad Leaders Course (ISLC).
3) MTT’s are traveling around the Corps teaching the Bn's leadership T3 so they can run their own Tactical Small Unit Leaders (TSULC) course [read fire team leaders course at Bn level].
4) Combat Hunter is being implemented from all entry level training (TBS, MCRD) to career level Schools in a building block approach.
5) Increase funding for new optics, OTH amphib vehicles, and tilt rotor planes has be allocated.
6) Enhanced Company Operations has been developed as a parallel course for the Marine Corps to get to DO, once technology, training and manpower can catch up.
7) DO is not a unit, it is a capability. This is not the Army's 10th Mountain that doesn't train in the mountains. It is a type of operation, a distributed one.
8) This evolution from the Sea Dragon experiments in the 90’s that have continued to be improved and transformed into DO, to the platoon that tested out some of the capabilities in Afghanistan, to ECO is a natural evolution to a level of proficiency we want our forces to get to in the near term.
So gents, I would argue it is not dead, we are still working on it. However, as administrations, change and CMC change the troughs and peaks of interest for DO vary, but the DO wave is still moving along
Its all to do with definitions...
...my battalion ran Distributed Ops in the Defence against a superior armoured force on a TESEX last year, which worked very well. Distributed, highly dispersed light role infantry operating as small groups of determined men, with cached CSS, autonamous aufragstaktik guidance, clearly delineated & simple battlespace management and C2 redundancy. It was a great success. By the same token, 'multiples' or 3 x fire teams of 4 men (about the same size as an ODA...) can routinely conduct all sorts of useful activity on operations if connected to the right ISTAR enablers. As ever, it all needs to be J2 led, and this pushed down to Company level. Inefficient? Nonsense. What's inefficient is taking a high school graduate, spending hundreds of thousands of dollars training and equipping him, and then employing him like a WW1 doughboy as part of a swarm, or on a front gate doing fatigues when PMCs could stag on and guard the camp for a fraction of the price. With embedded specialists at the right level, you can get a far greater return on your investment by making your operations meaningful (and I don't just mean CT Strike - J2 led ops apply to EVERYTHING).
Tiger and King Tiger analogies are all great sport, but inappropriate for this. J2 specialists are 'inefficient' if you're trying to resource a clanking great industrial age nation-state army. But we're in a different game today, and we need to be able to do it all.
What's REALLY inefficient is when deterrence fails because assymetric actors feel invulnerable to clumsy retaliation. If we (the West) had grasped this and adapted to the emerging AQ/non state threat in the 90s (numerous clarion Agency warnings, all unheeded), rather than configuring for Desert Storm Ultra, perhaps we'd be a few pages ahead in history than we are today.
Price of preparing for what you want to, rather than what you need to. Perhaps I should write a book....