A tremendous number of insurgencies have occurred and likely
will in future occur not due to poor governance but simply to replace whatever governance exists -- good, bad or as most are, indifferent -- with 'OUR governance.'
Government is not a terribly natural thing. It is needed but it is rarely truly good -- people intrude and screw it up -- I can think of no nation that has a truly 'totally satisfied with the government' population. I can think of a great many that have political parties or grouping that do not like the current milieu and wish to change it. The drive to do that violently often comes from the "poor governane" aspect -- it also comes from the 'we want OUR governance' crowd.
As Steve Metz said:
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The unspoken assumption is that insurgencies occur because states don't adequately follow the Western-defined path, and will be defeated if states do.
That's true and the western construct can lead one down a primrose path...
Seems to me that Insurgency thus can be -- most often is -- a strategy. If adopted as a strategy by the Insurgents, their issue then becomes the degree or intensity for the insurgency, i.e, what techniques or methods will be used to implement the strategy.
Or, to quote Slapout9:
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Insurgency is a Method....used by a Motivated individual(s).....to exploit any available Opportunity.
Yep and IMO, that makes it a Strategery to use that method to exploit sumpn... ;)
Common sense versus American Liberalism
Ken, as you well know I strongly agree with your view,
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will in future occur not due to poor governance but simply to replace whatever governance exists -- good, bad or as most are, indifferent -- with 'OUR governance.'
Legitimacy is concept that we in the West approach with great bias based on American liberalism (and usually promoted by our lawyers), yet it has little to do with real reasons people fight. In the simpliest and truest terms insurgency is a violent struggle for power. The victor whether insurgent or the current regime will never be viewed as legitimate by all in the vast majority of countries. America and some nations are unique in that we established a functional melting pot, but that is not a model we can impose on other nations. Of course that didn't happen overnight, and it can be argued we didn't achieve internal stability until 100 years after the Civil War.
Posted by John T.
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Sir Robert Thompson said, in his book Defeating Communist Insurgency, "If the [revolutionary] organization is already established, well-trained, and disciplined., it will not be defeated by reforms designed to eliminate the cause. It will only be defeated by establishing a superior organization and applying measures to break the revolutionary organization." (For revolutionary organization we can substitute the insurgents or insurgent organization.)
This is a fact that has been demonstrated again and again throughout history. At this point it is no longer really about politics, but more about basic pychology and sociology principles that influence people's behavior. Too many people confuse the underlying causes that led insurgencies to oust the illegitimate colonialists after WWII with all cases of insurgency. Insurgency in 2010 is not about throwing out colonial governments and replacing them with even worse governments, but a struggle for power that has little to do with legitimacy and much more to do with greed and hatred.
Finally injecting UW into the insurgency debate simply muddies the waters. UW is an American definition for a means that other nations and non-state organizations have used for centuries. For the regime still being challenged it is a State sponsored insurgency. It is still an insurgency. Iran may use the strategy of insurgency to pursue its goals in Lebanon for example. This is the risk of falling in love with our definitions, we'll end up describing and responding to the conflict in a way that conforms to our pre-determined definitions and doctrine.
Bill, the insurgent clearly has a choice of ways and means
as well as ends. Unsually, the ends are the overthrow of the recognized (or at least constituted) government. But, if he has control of such means as key parts of the military he can choose a coup d'etat has his method (way). If, on the other hand, he has half the army (means), he can fight a conventional war (way). If he has neither and limited political organization, he can use his few resources to conduct terrorist attacks in the hope of using that to gain the resources (militias, more terrorists, front groups) to mount a classic revolutionary campaign.
Anyway, that's what I mean.
Cheers
JohnT
Steve, you are asking the wrong question
It is not whether El Sal (to keep my typing down) was less corrupt at the end of the war but whether it was perceived by Salvadorans as less corrupt. But even that is the wrong approach. Perceived corruption is one of a number of variables that we argue make up the Factor we called Legitimacy. So, the real question was whether Salvadorans perceived their government as more legitimate than it was when the insurgency began. The evidence certainly supports that case. One of the reasons that can be adduced is that in the 1988 and 89 elections the Salvadoran voters threw the Christain Democrats out - largely over perceived corruption. The fact that another party could take over the government peacefully was a factor in bringing the FMLN to an agreement. They, of course, won the most recent elections and now govern the country.
Cheers
JohnT
It is somewhat more complex...
Bob, for a long time I thought as you do about the Strategic Hamlet Program in Vietnam. But then I read Rufus Phillips' memoir/analysis, Why Vietnam Matters, and greatly revised my thinking. I recommend it highly to one and all.
Cheers
JohnT
Steve, I'm witht Max on that
but then, you knew I would be.:wry:
Serously, take a look at the anthropological literature - which of course is clear as mud - but may provide some different ways of looking at the problem,
Marct, where are you when we need your input????
Cheers
JohnT