symbols in targetland (or through the lava lamp)
This has doubtless been proposed more cogently elsewhere, but would it add needless complexity to suggest that insurgencies in particular may be operating in a culture-specific, symbolic realm that subsumes the political? The symbolic field may be opaque, inaccessible or even inimical to manipulation by outsiders, as much of its cultural resonance may occur offstage from the theatre of operations. Local insurgent leaders may have varying degrees of symbolic coup d'oeil, but even then struggle to maintain control over a feedback loop which operates largely within a cultural unconscious approaching the mythical.:confused:
We talked about two yesterday...
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Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
... but that is not the point. Tactical failure, can still have enough effect to break enemy will (Pyrrihic victory). That is completely different from trying to suggest that actual tactical success can be counter-productive.
OK, so show me one successful insurgency that did not grow from tactical success, eroding or corrupting the Goverments will to fight.
I can only think of one, (Rhodesia/Zimbabwe) - and that was an externally force treaty because the Rhodesian's realised they couldn't win, and faced a serious threat of a conventional invasion.
Again this was because the strategy was flawed. At no point was German tactical success "counter-productive."
Dr. King and Mr. Ghandi. But these were leader's so savvy that they realized that all operations needed to remain non-violent and focus on the strategic end.
I guess we can go with the US phase of the Vietnamese insurgency as one that has that classic line of "you know, we never lost a battle..." as an example of a kinetic insurgency that succeeded in defeating the most powerful nation in the world without tactical success. The US was able to keep them in the Phase 2 "strategic stalemate" stage, but it wore us down. After we left they were able to surge up to a successful Phase 3 "strategic offense" stage and finish off the S. Vietnamese government as well. But the main victory was achieved thru tactical defeats and strategic victories. Rope a dope.
Reminds me of a story within a Louis L'amour Sackett novel. A determined young man goes to the saturday night dance where the biggest, toughest man in the area takes him outside and publicly and decisively beats him to a pulp. The beaten man goes home, and is told to never return if he knows what's good for him and the large man returns to the dance.
The next Saturday the young man returns and is severly beaten again.
The next Saturday the young man returns and is severly beaten again, but puts up a better fight, and the county tough is less enthusiastic about the fight.
This continues, defeat after defeat, Saturday after Saturday, until finally, the tough man grows so weary of having to fight this persistent little man every single Saturday that he stops coming to the dance himself, leaving the other victorious.
Just a story, but for one who is so determined to achieve their goal that they will keep coming back no matter what, the tale of the tape in the end will be who has the most will, not who has the most might.
Think about the maoist insurgency model target list..
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Originally Posted by
Eden
The idea that insurgents can win without tactical victories is wrong. In Afghanistan, Vietnam, Algeria, etc., the insurgents enjoyed (or are enjoying) considerable tactical success. Every government offical assassinated, every schoolteacher intimidated, every bomb that wrecks a market, is a tactical success. Every police post overrun, every rocket that hits its target, every helicopter shot down, is a tactical success.
In Vietnam, the VC and NVA quite often scored victories over conventional SVN forces, sometimes quite considerable, and instances of successful ambushes or skirmishes with US forces were numerous. It is hard for me to understand how anyone who has read any history about Vietnam would buy into the tired old saw the 'we never lost a battle'.
In Afghanistan, hardly a day went by without some form of insurgent tactical success - mostly against civilians, often against Afghan security forces, but sometimes against allied forces, and every now and then against US.
An insurgency cannot sustain itself without tactical successes. True, these do not have to come in the form of stand up fights against conventional firepower, but they have to come in some form. Neither insurgent foot soldiers nor their leaders are superhuman - like all men, they have to see some point to their sacrifices to carry on.
Every operation is "tactical" if assessed by the nature of the task. A B-29 togglling off a nuclear bomb over hiroshima is a "tactical task" But the over all nature of the operation was pure strategic. A savvy insurgent does not go out and seek targets that only offer tactical effect unless he has to inorder to get to those targets with much larger operational/strategic effect. That is why they target school teachers and other low-level government officials over shop keepers and farmers.
I have covered this before, but whether or not something is "tactical" or "strategic" is not determined by the nature of the task, the platform/weapon used, or the number of stars on the commander's collar. It is determined by the purpose for the action.
But you're right, I should slow down. I often forget that others need to catch up ;)
The insurgent/guerrilla often wins merely by not losing
As Eden points out, the old saw about Vietnam is used too often and ignores much of the reality. “Victory in battle” during an insurgency must be viewed very carefully.
A good example: Ap Bac, January 2 and 3, 1963. While Sheehan, Vann, Halberstam, and others cast aspersions upon the performance of the ARVN, the GVN and Harkins declared Ap Bac to be a “victory.” Technically, using the traditional military definition, since the ARVN initiated the attack on the hamlet and the following day were in possession of it, they get handed the “victory.” But the real win belongs to the VC. In a day of hard fighting against 4 to 1 odds they shot down or disabled five US H-21s and a UH-1B and repulsed a full on attack by an ARVN M113 company. They then successfully broke contact on their own initiative and exfiltrated the scene prior to the ARVN occupying the hamlet. The moral boost and lessons learned by the VC in that fight far out weighed the fact that the ARVN were granted the “victory.”
Even Khe Sanh has been re-evaluated. Was Giap looking for a victory, or was he engaged in a diversionary battle to pin Marine forces in northern I Corps in order to prevent them from being employed elsewhere during the Tet Offensive? If the former is true, he lost,; if the latter, he won.
The military is one small aspect of warfare
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Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
Utterly, utterly irrelevant! It has no bearing on the military instrument. You could say L. Ron Hubbard, has managed to creates and convert folks to new religion without resorting to violence - unlike Christianity and Islam. If they don't "do violence" they don't register on the meter.
To paraphrase Eden, constant tactical failures eroded the US will to fight? Constantly wining caused the US to believe they could never force the NVA to quit?
The US had a Strategy in Vietnam and that protecting the territorial integrity of the RSVN. Unfortunately the US forces lacked the tactical and operational skill, or choose not to perform those actions that would break the will of the NVA.
The idea that tactical action is somehow irrelevant or that tactical success can be counter-productive or less relevant than the other three levels is a post modern myth! Military history simply does not support that contention.
If you can't consistently gain tactical success, you can do nothing.
Wilf, for a man as smart and grounded in CvC as you are, I have to admit I find it very interesting your total fixation on the military aspect of warfare. The military aspect is important, certainly, and can either create or lose conditions required for the larger victory, the grander competition; but it is just one aspect of a much larger whole that has no end and no beginning and is woven into that whole in such a manner that it cannot be considered in isolation without drawing flawed conclusions, or attributing undue importance to things that may have been very important to the military aspect, but perhaps merely a supporting effect to the larger political competition.
But I place far more value on the opinions of those who I know know what they are talking about and see things differently than I do, than I do on those who lack such credentials and merely agree. So I am listening. Don't agree, of course, but I am listening. :)
One of my standard positions is that "the military neither starts wars nor ends them, it is just our lot to fight them." We focus on the fight as it is so dramatic, so horrible, so visible; but it is just one aspect of the much larger competition.
As early as Sun Tzu it was recognized that a commander who had resort to combat to accomplish his ends had largely failed to begin with. The wise State Leader, the wise insurgent leader, the wise general all seek to win through superior thinking and non-violent positioning if possible. This does not make them irrelevant, just perhaps less interesting.
I love the smell of conceptual models in the morning...
...and this is a good one. Note the three-tier vs two-tier triangles.
Without definition from the source, one can assume
a. "insurgents" are local/regional therefore their strategic level is the theater/operational
b. "insurgents" are part of a larger network (al Qaeda) with a theater/operational "command level" that is inconsequential to the discussion
c. both
I say "c". Regardless, the "insurgents" benefit from a more efficient model. If that isn't a "problem" from our POV it should be. The solution (I don't mean to imply that it's simple) is to increase efficiency within ours.
(I'm also operating from the assumption we're talking more Information Operations and less COIN vs conventional here.)
I understand that and applaud you for doing what
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Originally Posted by
Bob's World
So here sits COL Jones crafting strategy to try to bring up that marginal grade, because young men and women are out there giving it their all everyday with SPC Jones holding up that excellent grade.
you can to fix it. However,
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This is why what I write here isn't about ... the nature of populace-based conflicts, etc.
it does seem as though that gets mentioned... ;)
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I am on a different road. Sometimes it is a bit lonely out here, but while I am quite sure I am not 100% right about anything; I am equally confident that I am on a path that will preserve our national interests in a manner consistent with our principles as a nation and offer us a chance at a long, bright, and relatively peaceful future.
Possibly true -- equally possibly untrue. You may be on that path but many others will have to join you to make that happen. I'm an optimist, big time -- but my concern is that you attract enough folks in the 'right' places to achieve your goal.
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...it won't unless we can get our senior leaders to understand that the old models they grew up with are obsolete and that they must approach similar problems in new ways, but that even those new ways must be solidly rooted in sound, enduring principles of conflict.
No one can argue with that -- but I will point out that old models are discarded by senior military leaders only if the new model can be proven better. Military folks are risk averse. Just saying you have the golden solution won't usually sway many -- until you convince them it's their idea... :D
Old senior leaders (Mil) are a problem but they rotate out and new ones have learned some lessons. :cool:
However, they are not the big problem. The big problem is the civilian leadership -- or lack of it -- and their too near total disinterest in any effort that "will preserve our national interests in a manner consistent with our principles as a nation and offer us a chance at a long, bright, and relatively peaceful future." They like that last part but want it at no cost to themselves or their party. IOW, here you're preaching to the choir; you're proselyting in the wrong place...
Unfortunately, those young and middle aged senior leaders (Gov, civilian type) are a far greater obstacle to your goal . If your road to a better national strategy (or policy set) fails to remove that road block and gain their support, then you may be indeed be wandering alone in the wilderness.