Or the penalties of that arrogance.Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
Either way, I don't see how that particular set of imperial methods is really applicable to today's non-imperial small wars.
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Or the penalties of that arrogance.Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
Either way, I don't see how that particular set of imperial methods is really applicable to today's non-imperial small wars.
The days of an urban cadre in the Guatemalan civil war with which I am familiar were numbered indeed (and s/he knew it). On the other hand, I suspect that during the darkest days of the conflict guerrillas in the hills slept more soundly than did civilians in the cities and pueblos. Something like a third of the Guatemalan population was urban at that time, as compared to about two-thirds of the contemporary Iraqi population. And in Iraq, outside of the north there isn’t much in the way of highlands to abscond to. And of course the stability of governance in Iraq in 2007 didn’t approach that in Guatemala in 1983. So, as you say, lots of reasons.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bob's World
Posted by Dayuhan
Re-read my comments, I said as much and agree, but these are not strong holds where they live in the open and control the area. The urban area is generally hostile territory to overt (even clandestine) terrorists.Quote:
I personally suspect that AQ and similar groups maintain a quite substantial urban apparatus... of course they would be trying very hard not to draw attention to themselves, and you'd expect them to have little or no contact with local militant groups other than with a few trusted individuals.
That comment was not intended to mean AQ is not active in the urban area, heck the urban areas are their targets. I suspect there are tens of AQ cells in London, New York, Paris, and elsewhere throughout the world, and they are very dangerous. However, this doesn't require the deployment of general purpose forces (like it did in Iraq, Algeria, etc.).Quote:
I suspect part of the reason their activity is limited in the larger urban areas is due to security concerns.
Which is why I wrote:
In sum I agree with you. What I am not getting is why it would be that much tougher for us to assist a partner with an Urban insurgency versus rural insurgencies (though in reality most are blended)? Urban areas are a tough battlefield, but so are the mountains and jungles, so regardless you have to adapt.Quote:
and if the scale of the AQ presence and activity in an urban areas is (dropped my thought, so completing it here in bold) relatively small and clandestine, then the appropriate response is generally small scale security assistance composed mainly of personnel from intelligence, special operations, and contractors with speciality skills. This is often enough to enable the affected state to defeat/suppress this threat.
If we occupy (not do FID) a country and try to control the populace ourselves then I agree that "may" (still situationally dependent, wasn't exceptionally tough in Germany or Japan) be brutal.
My fault for failing to better clarify my intent.
Regret (1) I stumbled onto this belatedly and (2) the sidetrack
Nevertheless, Fuchs, to clarify: Both sides made ample use of Montagnards. We even had a name for the ones on the other side: "VCM." Their collaboration and guidance (literally) were essential to allowing NVA units to pop up "out of nowhere," as it were--on the coastal plain in northen Binh Dinh....
A couple of the main ethnic groups from which US recruited, the Rhade and Jarai, were easy to attract because they feared and hated lowland Vietnamese---whether communist or GVN....and had formed FULRO, their own independence "Front." They saw an association with the US as a counterbalance to the hated ARVN. Their anti-Vietnamese sentiment did not play entirely into US hands, as they also sought strength from a noted, local, anti-Viet force--namely, the Khmer Rouge.....An interesting side note is the fact that Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot's personal guard unit was, from the '60's until his end, composed solely of Jarai.
Cheers,
Mike.
I know a fellow in my hometown who worked with Montagnards during the war and he told me one of his best guys had been with the ARVN until an in broad daylight incidence in which he turned his rifle on fellow ARVN—ethnic Kinh who wouldn’t leave off yelling various takes on “####ing Montagnard!” at him from across the street. Possibly a stolen and/or invented story, but indicative of a more general truth, I’m sure…Quote:
Originally Posted by Mike in Hilo
Posted by Mike in Hilo
Interesting comments on the Montagnards. I'm currently reading Black Ops by Tony Geraghty "The Rise of SF in the CIA, the SAS, and Mossad" (jury is still out on the book).Quote:
Both sides made ample use of Montagnards. We even had a name for the ones on the other side: "VCM."
Mike if you have any insights on the following please share.
In the Vietnam chapter he explains the ARVN disarmed the Montagnards in the late 50s and were not too happy we armed them again. He described a couple of situations where the program was transfered over to ARVN and it rapidly broke down because the Vietnamese didn't trust them; a pattern that widely repeated itself. The Vietnamese tried to reclaim their weapons, refused to go on patrol with savages, etc. All this I was aware of, but one bit of history I wasn't (or I forgot about) is that in September 1964 there was a Montagnard armed uprising. At one site they disarmed and detained their SF advisors and declared a rebellion against Saigon. At another site they killed 15 Vietnamese team leaders, at another site 11 Vietnamese SF soldiers were killed.
These surrogate operations are generally dicey, but especially so when those we are arming and training are opposed to the government we're trying to keep in power. The expedient choice is not always the right choice.
I realize that we mostly agree; I was mostly trying to underscore the differences between dealing with an "AQ-type" group and with an insurgency... two quite different things. If the local security services have any level of competence, they shouldn't need much help beyond intel to roll up a network of terrorist cells. An actual insurgency would be a quite different proposition, and the need for outside help, the desirability to an outside power of moving against the insurgency and the type of help that might be useful would depend entirely on the specific characteristics of the insurgency and the situation.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bill Moore
Urban areas are of course highly visible to the media and offer abundant potential for collateral damage, factors that have to be considered.
I'm guilty of conflating AQ terrorist cells and insurgencies, that wasn't my intent, but felt the need to address both. Of course it isn't unheard of for AQ to co-opt an insurgency (Iraq) and to a lesser extent Afghanistan. By the way we also dealt with an urban insurgency that utlized terrorist cells in Vietnam.
As challenging as this may be, I still don't think it compares to the true hybrid challenges our forces faced in Vietnam (fighting NV regulars, insurgents, suicide bombers "the sappers", electronic warfare, high end anti-aircraft weapons, major state actor support from Russia and China, etc.).
Our biggest challenge today isn't the enemy, it is ourselves. We went into this fight with unrealistic goals, adapted a doctrine that is deeply flawed, etc. This is a scenario where we actually could do more with less.
A statement that should draw loud "Amen, brother!" from the chorus AND the congregation.Quote:
Our biggest challenge today isn't the enemy, it is ourselves. We went into this fight with unrealistic goals, adapted a doctrine that is deeply flawed, etc. This is a scenario where we actually could do more with less.
Challenge is getting to some degree of agreement on what less looks like. We are much better at making things bigger in ways that don't make much sense or work that well, but when things go south when one does less people feel like you just aren't trying hard enough.
You'll get one from me, especially on the "unrealistic goals"...Quote:
Originally Posted by Bob's World
Before we even think about how to do more with less, we have to think about what we want or need to do. That seems to get overlooked a lot...Quote:
Originally Posted by Bob's World
My reply to Bill Moore's question (Post 37):I was not thinking of just the USA intervening and my SWC reading does not make me familiar with US FID doctrine. Caveats aside here goes.Quote:
what significant change and challenges do you think we would face with our FID doctrine if the focus shifted from the rural to the urban?
An urban setting for an insurgency / terrorist campaign absorbs manpower like a sponge, so using and adapting a local security element to the 'sepoy model' makes a lot of sense. You referred to 'The Troubles' in Northern Ireland (1969-1998), at one stage the UK had 30k soldiers there - Operation Motorman, when police primacy had not been reached. Nearly all of them in two cities, Belfast & Londonderry.
Secondly by time FID is deployed the host nation will have lost considerable control and governance will be weakened. Think of the favelas in Rio and some "no go" areas elsewhere. Citizen involvement in providing information to the state will be low, especially if intimidation is prevalent - not necessarily violent nor observable. In one period in 'The Troubles' Loyalists used cameras without film to intimidate; imagine the impact today of mobile-phones.
F3EA will be problematic until many other factors act as enablers: informants, intelligence, surveillance etc. Enough time may not be given.
Pinpoint accuracy of weapons systems, especially the use of explosives, will be limited in densely occupied spaces. They might not even be allowed by the host.
Finally image is important, even crucial. Not for the 'armchair" observers, but the people affected by the presence of FID-users. It simply is a very different image if the security forces appear similar, even if with a few expatriate officers & NCOs.
Abu M has a comment on urban operations today, prompted by a David Kilcullen article and the footnotes point to a SWJ article.
So first the link to AbuM:http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawam....html#comments
Then the Kilcullen piece:http://gt2030.com/2012/07/18/the-cit...an-resilience/
The SWJ article 'Command of the Cities: Towards a Theory of Urban Strategy':http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art...urban-strategy
A number of posts, including my own, have been on a related topic of future 'Small Wars' moving from the rural to the urban setting and may sit better in their own thread. Later I will try to identify previous threads on the theme.
I agree with this, the urban environment definitely presents its unique challenges. When I refer to foreign internal defense (FID), I'm generally refering to a few (maybe a couple hundred) advisors and trainers, so in theory it wouldn't be our guys dealing "directly" with these challenges. That is why I said it wouldn't be that much harder for "us".Quote:
Originally Posted by davidbfpo
As for future wars moving ever more into the urban domain it definitely seems probable.
1) The 1964 episode received wide publicity through National Geographic Mag, which featured it in the January 1965 issue of the magazine. The story focused on successful US Army SF efforts to defuse the situation, without which events would likely have spun out of control.
2) Re: those we're arming and training being opposed to the government we're trying to keep in power: Sounds like Sunni Sons of Iraq and their relationship with the Maliki government....
Cheers,
Mike.
The following article challenges our baseless assumption that through, by, and with others is always the best approach. History indicates otherwise, and recent history simply reinforces that this approach has its limitations and only works in select situations. Where it does work, the results are fantastic. I suspect it is our desire to replicate those fantastic results in situations where the conditions don't exist for it to work that compel us to generally view this as the approach of choice. That is wrong headed, proven to be wrong headed, and this blind assumption causes Congressional leadership to threaten to pull money from all UW/FID programs. Not all are wrong headed, but since we fail to honestly assess what works and what doesn't we are simply going kill the approach across the board.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opini...eac_story.html
Why foreign troops can’t fight our fights
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The programs rest on a theory embraced across the U.S. government: Sometimes direct military interventions do more harm than good, and indirect approaches get us further. The theory briefs well as a way to achieve U.S. goals without great expenditure of U.S. blood and treasure. Unfortunately, decades of experience (including the current messes in Iraq and Syria) suggest that the theory works only in incredibly narrow situations in which states need just a little assistance. In the most unstable places and in the largest conflagrations, where we tend to feel the greatest urge to do something, the strategy crumbles.
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It fails first and most basically because it hinges upon an alignment of interests that rarely exists between Washington and its proxies.
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Second, the security-assistance strategy gives too much weight to the efficacy of U.S. war-fighting systems and capabilities, assuming that they alone are enough to produce desired outcomes for both our foreign proxies and ourselves.
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The third problem with security assistance is that it risks further destabilizing already unstable situations and actually countering U.S. interests.
This author's critique is valid, yet it doesn't invalidate FID and UW, it simply points to the fact, that for it to work, it is bigger than train and equip. Train and equip is a small subset of a greater whole that must be congruent. For example, diplomats must set realistic goals/expectations agreed upon by our partner. These goals need to focus it on mutually agreed ends. Once this hard task is out of the way, the assistance should be tailored to support those ends. It is worth revisiting the IDAD concept, and ensure our efforts are properly aligned and sustainable by the partner. More and more, both FID and UW is getting dumbed down to train and equip programs with no associated strategy on our end, and all to often no strategy mutually agreed upon with our partner.Quote:
A more humble approach is needed. We must think about security assistance the same way we think about long-term alliances, looking for alignments of interests, not convenience.
This quote is from an academic conference on 'War and Peace' @ Leeds University recently and one paper appears very relevant:Link:https://defenceindepth.co/2017/07/12...ds-15-16-june/Quote:
Nir Arielli (Leeds) gave a fascinating paper on the role played by Italian colonial troops in the suppression of anti-Italian colonial revolt. The key forces in the brutal repression of the revolt against Italian rule in Libya were in fact Eritrean (and Somali) Ascari. The question of the part which colonial forces have played in small wars and counter-insurgency operations is one which has been little studied and which offers the potential for new insights into social and political dynamics of empire as well as military structures...
The author is a Professor @ Leeds University and his bio indicates this article contains more:Link:https://www.leeds.ac.uk/arts/profile...43/nir_arielliQuote:
'Colonial soldiers in Italian counter-insurgency operations in Libya, 1922-32', British Journal for Military History, 1, no. 2 (2015), pp. 47-66.
The BJMH paper is available free via and will be read soon:http://bjmh.org.uk/index.php/bjmh/article/view/29/21
Note Italian recruited Ascari (Askari) also featured in the 1936 invasion of Abysinia and the opposition to the 1941 Allied invasion of Abysina (Ethiopia), Eritrea and Italian Somailand; as covered in the book reviewed in:An obscure 'small war' in WW2
There is a reverse aspect, the violent suppression in Abyssinia of opposition to Italian occupation and a new book covers that. From the publisher's summary:Link:http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/...baba-massacre/Quote:
In February 1937, following an abortive attack by a handful of insurgents on Mussolini’s High Command in Italian-occupied Ethiopia, ‘repression squads’ of armed Blackshirts and Fascist civilians were unleashed on the defenceless residents of Addis Ababa. In three terror-filled days and nights of arson, murder and looting, thousands of innocent and unsuspecting men, women and children were roasted alive, shot, bludgeoned, stabbed to death, or blown to pieces with hand-grenades (est. 19k died). Meanwhile the notorious Viceroy Rodolfo Graziani, infamous for his atrocities in Libya, took the opportunity to add to the carnage by eliminating the intelligentsia and nobility of the ancient Ethiopian empire in a pogrom that swept across the land.
Spotted via Twitter a contribution from an Australian soldier, an infantry captain, who explains near the start:Quote:
The following tips are based on my experiences working with security forces in the South Pacific, as well as with other nations during exercises in Australia throughout my career. I can’t claim to be a skilled advisor, but I have been privileged to work with many skilled advisors and this article aims to accumulate my observations and lessons, reinforced during a recent two-year posting to the Defence Cooperation Program in Papua New Guinea, in an accessible aide-memoire. These tips should not be considered a template solution for every situation. They do however contain themes and skill sets which are universal and should be applied when working alongside foreign security forces, both within the region and globally.
The list concludes:Link:http://groundedcuriosity.com/aide-me...gn-militaries/Quote:
Advising is a difficult business; every advisor is placed in a position of trying to influence people they have no authority over, perhaps to do things that may not be in their nature, all whilst trying to implement Australian policy and answer for Australian government decisions over which they have no control. This is all conducted in a culturally diverse, developing and potentially troubled nation. If you can adopt the skills of rapport development, build your cultural confidence and competence, communicate clearly and understand your part in the big-picture you will find success as an advisor. Embrace the opportunity that an advisor posting or deployment presents; it will be one of the most challenging, interesting, memorable and enriching missions you will complete.
Nice find David.
Hat tip to WoTR for this commentary cum book review of Walter C. Ladwig III, The Forgotten Front: Patron Client Relations in Counterinsurgency (Cambridge University Press, 2017):Link:https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/ho...ency-campaign/Quote:
The King’s College London professor takes direct aim at FM 3-24, and the West’s thinking on counterinsurgency, specifically its naiveté that the patron and client will share common political goals if the patron is doling out large sums of cash to the client.
(Later) Ladwig shines a bright light on some of the deficiencies in counterinsurgency literature and the United States’ naiveté about its relationship with its clients. His goal is to improve the West’s performance in future counterinsurgency battles.