Why should I look at Google Images?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Valin
Google Images Pashtunistan...H/T David Kilcullen for introducing to the word.
Your link doesn't work (when you do one, if it isn't automatically underlined, it isn't a link) but I've been there before. One of the Pashtun problems is that I'm not at all sure the Baluchis will go along with some of the depicted versions... :wry:
I was probably aware of Pashtunistan about two years after D. Kilcullen was born. That name was around long before he was, many thing were around long before he was. In any event, I'm still aware of it. My question was "...does this "Pashto zone" have a border?"
A line on a map is not necessarily a border in the sense of a legal, internationally recognized border or even one accepted by many. See 'Kurdistan' (or Baluchistan) for an example of the problems with the construct of Bob's World's 'Pashto Zone' or your (and many others) 'Pushtunistan.' ;)
So my question stands, all alone and broken hearted...
A small tale that spells defeat
On the ground with the Australian / Dutch presence in Oruzgan Province, Afghanistan, this tale of treachery and confusion rightly illustrates the problem with the campaign, entitled 'Zoom in to this small tale that spells defeat': http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/com...cle6684516.ece
davidbfpo
Good link, thanks. The FSB and its predecessors,
the KGB / MVD / NKVD / Agitprop, diligently exploited that line and many others the British and French drew on the map...:(
We're still paying the price for those strokes of a pen but at least we're giving all the KGB retirees a chuckle. :wry:
Or social science ignored and
arms doing as more harm than good...
Lessons from the First Afghan War
Needless to say the First Afghan War was between Imperial India and Afghanistan, wayback in 1842 and with a disasterous retreat from Kabul. Taken from: http://www.britishbattles.com/first-...l-gandamak.htm
The First Afghan War provided the clear lesson to the British authorities that while it may be relatively straightforward to invade Afghanistan it is wholly impracticable to occupy the country or attempt to impose a government not welcomed by the inhabitants. The only result will be
failure and great expense in treasure and lives.
The British Army learnt a number of lessons from this sorry episode. One was that the political officers must not be permitted to predominate over military judgments.
To read more on this war use the link; Imperial India took revenge the next year!
davidbfpo
Maybe history in current Afghan War won't repeat?
David:
Your history is quite good, having served over there in the mid-1960s (Pakistan and side trips to Kabul from our base at Peshawar/Badabur).
It is too early to evaluate the latest strategy and accompanying tactics now being employed in Afghanistan, but I can say from this side of the Pond that use of "pincer" movements in Helmud Province in Afghan while Pak military operates to bottle up fleeing Taliban on their side of the border is current paying great benefits or dividends in enemy KIA.
We are now getting full statistics but my off line info feed from native e-mail correspoondents over there is that we are taking out Taliban, and al Qaida, in the thousands, not the few here and there being reported in the media.
Several thousand more Taliban still over there, much lesser number of al Qaida, but hammering them daily is helping.
The follow on strategy and tactics are being already premature attacked in the Pak media, and by closet Taliban on sites like GLOBAL HUJRA ONLINE whose nasty, convoluted, and lying comments reveal how well the war is now going.
I can assure you that some Taliban and Taliban sympathesizers over there, in Europe, Canada and in the US will read this posting, and one or two may even attempt to comment on SWJ. One of two are likely now Registered Users of SWJ.
Been that way since a year or two after World War II.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
gute
Many who view America in the way you suggest should take a second and reflect on their countries deeds. Quite blaming us for their failures and take responsibility.
Not likely to change. As a columnist in the London times said about a year ago:
""What makes America the indispensable power (and even more indispensable in the era of the new China), is precisely what makes anti-Americanism inevitable."" LINK.
Get used to it. I did, long time ago. A number of guys from various countries who were also on R&R from fighting in Korea alongside the US all telling me how evil America was. Recall, they were 'Allies.' I've heard and read it ever since and we keep plugging along, doing our thing. some bad stuff, mostly good stuff. The carping can be mildly annoying, no sense letting it be more than that -- like the man said, it isn't going away soon...
The Taliban's Winning Strategy
CEIP: The Taliban's Winning Strategy by Gilles Dorronsoro. H/T to the invaluable Registan.
Quote:
The Taliban’s clear strategy and increasingly coherent organization have put the International Coalition on the defensive, marginalized the local Afghan government, and given the Taliban control of southern and eastern Afghanistan. Rather than concentrating limited troops in the South and East where the Taliban are firmly entrenched, the International Coalition should prioritize regions where the Taliban are still weak but making alarming progress: in the North and around Kabul.
Far from a loose assortment of local groups, the Taliban are nationally organized, with coherent leadership and a sophisticated propaganda operation. The Coalition, on the other hand, lacks clear direction, largely due to its underestimation of the Taliban. Following a month-long trip through Afghanistan, Gilles Dorronsoro assesses the insurgency and proposes a strategy for the coalition based on a comprehensive understanding of the Taliban’s capabilities and goals.
Key points:
The Taliban have built a parallel government in areas they control to fulfill two basic needs: justice and security. An almost nonexistent local government and the population’s distrust of the international coalition allowed the Taliban to expand their influence.
Focusing resources in the South and East, where the insurgency is strongest, is risky, especially since the Afghan army is not ready to replace U.S. forces there.
The Taliban have opened a front in the northern provinces, having consolidated their grip on the South and East. If the International Coalition does not counter this thrust, the insurgency will spread throughout Afghanistan within two to three years and the coalition will not be able to bear the financial and human costs of fighting.
The insurgency cannot be defeated while the Taliban retain a safe haven in Pakistan. The Taliban can conduct hit-and-run attacks from their refuge in Pakistan, and the North remains open to infiltration.
The United States must pressure Pakistan to take action against the Taliban’s central command in Quetta. The current offensive in Pakistan is aimed at Pakistani Taliban and does not indicate a major shift in Pakistani policy toward Afghanistan.
Dorronsoro's book is required reading for Afghanistan. An excellent primer.
urban and rural populations
Conventional Wisdom Won't Work in Afghanistan
JOSHUA FOUST | 17 JUL 2009
WORLD POLITICS REVIEW
Quote:
The cliché that you must "protect the population" in order to win a counterinsurgency has now become entrenched in conventional wisdom. This is especially so of the war in Afghanistan, where civilian casualties have become a deeply polarizing issue. It has become so important that, during a recent trip to Helmand Province, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the new commander of U.S. and NATO-led troops in Afghanistan, declared that Coalition forces must make a "cultural shift" in Afghanistan, away from their normal combat orientation and toward protecting civilians.
But protecting the population requires knowing where it lives. Here, the Army's conventional wisdom fails.
In Iraq, the population was heavily urbanized, so spreading out into the cities made sense. The Surge, for example, was almost entirely focused on Baghdad. Now the consensus seems to be that the Army should focus on securing Afghanistan's major cities as well.
Pretending that Afghanistan is an urban culture clashes with reality. According to the Central Statistics Office, around 10 percent of Afghanistan's population is still nomadic. Afghanistan's 10 largest cities hold less than 20 percent of its people, and the rest of Afghanistan lives in small rural communities.
Interesting. Could mean he agrees with those of us here who
tried to point out that Afghanistan was not Iraq; that the far more rural Afghans were not Arabs; that the terrain in Afghanistan made it a totally different game; that MRAPS were not a good buy and a few other things. We may have been on to something.
Still, not necessarily a doomed operation. All those items are easily addressed. We'll see how smart and adaptable the the new Command crowd is...