But the Taliban are a subset of the populace...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
I'm not arguing anything on behalf of POP-COIN. I am arguing that you need to go an hunt, harass, make life miserable for the bad guys, and only the bad guys Bad guys are only those trying to kill you or kill civilians.
Concur. Lots of Ambushes, lots of OPs. Lots of informer networks within the population. Find any excuse to visit villages and chat a bit to the locals. All good stuff.
The paradigm I'd want to establish is that ISAF never do any harm, to good people. The only people harming the good people are the Taliban. The people harming the Taliban are ISAF.
I don't want to promise the People I'll protect them from the Taliban (because I cannot). I will promise to avenge any deaths the Taliban cause (because I can) - and the Pashtun understand vengeance.
... and this, of course is why strategy applied the past several years has produced strategic damage out of tactical success.
As I understand the Taliban (and I am no expert, so this is intended to be a very general assessment) they are essentially a Pashto nationalist movement that is made up largely of members of the the Pashto populace living on both sides of the Afg/Pak border; that employ a fundamentalist Islamic ideology to provide the motivation for their movement.
I really see no way one can attack members of the Pashto populace that associate with the Taliban without having extremely negative effects with the larger Pashto populace from which these men originate. The tribe may well agree with the cause the Americans are supporting, yet as we have killed their kin, and likely non-Taliban members of the tribe as well in collateral damage, we have alienated the tribe as a whole. The more we engage, the stronger the Taliban become, not because more buy into their ideology, but because more are either sucked into the blood feud, or simply agree that the outsiders must be driven out.
This leads me to say that we do not simply need new ISAF COIN tactics; but rather we need a new overall strategic approach.
Most are coming on line to agree that the Westphalian construct of what a state is, or is not, is evolving. Yet few are willing to adjust how they think about dealing with such challenges to the old view of sovereignty. To this I simply suggest: "Free your mind, and your ass will follow."
How about this: We all recognize how important the Pashto populace is to both Afghanistan and Pakistan; and all should recognize by now that targeting the insurgent segment of that Pashto populace is destabilizing to BOTH of those countries; and also to the Western countries involved in the effort. Why not simply seek a new form of lesser included sovereignty that recognizes new rights for the Pashto populace without ripping apart the two states in which they reside? A form of dual-citizenship coupled with unique rights and governmental organizations that give the tribes a voice in both states.
How would this work exactly? I have no idea, this is evolving strategy in an evolving environment. Free your mind. Trust your damn parachute and go out the door.
All I know for sure is that what we are currently doing is not working, and the slight tweak of tactics proposed by ISAF is too little too late. But it is not too late to make a major change of strategy. One of my leadership sayings probably applies here:
"While it is sometimes right to do the wrong thing, it is never wrong to do the right thing."
Semper Fi...but a Grunt nonetheless...
Sir, greatly appreciate your willingness to engage the issues. For whatever its worth, I don't post rank as I hope that any ideas which I may or may not advocate/discuss/examine will stand or fall based solely upon their merits/lack thereof.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
PhilR
I believe this gets at the heart of the matter with FM 3-24, or "pop-centric" COIN, as its being described. I think that FM 3-24 describes a very specific COIN operational design to result in a specific political outcome. As Ken White and Col. Maxwell have described, we ARE NOT (or should not) be doing COIN in Afghanistan, but are supporting another government's COIN effort.
My take: technically it's FID or advising, but COIN works from a marketing standpoint...coins generally have value, etc. FM 3-24, FM 3-24-2, some of the CA FM's (CAG? ones) are important steps along the journey...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
PhilR
The ISAF guidance, however, clouds that fundamental fact by describing ISAF's direct responsibility to the Afghan people to both develop/influence a legitimate Afghan government for them, and to protect them from Taliban insurgents. It is emphasized to more work with the Afghan government, than through them. To do this assumes that we are developing an Afghan government that will eventually govern within the ethical framework of how we are conducting this campaign--that it will be "legitimate" in how we define legitimacy. I'm not sure we can dictate/influence this with any meaningful success. (The competing model currently seems to be how the Sri Lanakan government conducted its latest phase against the LTTE--an operational design that is not in keeping with FM 3-24 appraoch, but may better fit the ultimate political solution there).
OIF1 vet, Michael Yon reader...no Afghanistan experience, non-Dari/Pashto speaker which admittedly hobbles any insights...however...given the history of Afghanistan the possibility of a spontaneous leap into 'functional nation state status' appears to be remote from this armchair without the 'benefit' of some sort of catalytic event...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
PhilR
In the end, we may establish a more secure environment and better trust between ISAF and the Afghan populace, but we might do it in such a way as to develop an Afghan government that is fundamentally unsustainable over the long run and will not survive once we draw down. We will have conducted a tactically successful campaign that ultimately does not, and cannot achieve its strategic objectives.
Concur...
Clausewitz, Sun Tzu and COIN guidance
While it’s always a possibility, I’d offer that Clausewitz’s writings were more drawn from his interpretation of his experiences and history as he understood it. Peter Paret’s Clausewitz and the State (1976) is a useful biography that highlights this point. This is only foremost in my mind, because I only recently read the book. In looking not only at On War, but many of his other writings, Paret really reveals how Clausewitz zero’d in on the political underpinnings of every war. This is not simply in terms of policy, but that how any entity (usually as state, but not necessarily) goes to war and conducts war is a fundamental reflection of how their society is politically and culturally organized. Clausewitz’s thoughts and experiences are broader than just the phrase “Napoleonic Wars.” He realized that the true power of the French at that time was not in tactics or organization, but in how the fundamental changing of France to a nation that could tap the energies of the whole populace enabled it to wage total war against other European monarchies who still thought in terms of the limited wars.
Clausewitz could very well recognize the wisdom of Sun Tzu, but in all likelihood (and I can’t really speak for him), he’d assert that Sun Tzu’s tenets were applicable to the social and political makeup of China at the time he wrote it. Sun Tzu’s idea of avoiding bloody war, to win without fighting, reflected the tenuous hold Chinese kings/emperors had on their kingdoms. They could not bleed their kingdom dry, nor risk all on a long war. In this way, they were similar to the European wars of the 18th century before the French Revolution came on the scene.
Clausewitz actually focused much of his writings on politics. He understood that the concept of a nation in arms could express itself through a government and army, or through guerilla war without much account to an effective government or army (like Spain). In fact, as he became frustrated with the lack of reform in Prussia, he advocated the idea of the nation resisting through guerilla warfare.
All of this comes back around to the current discussion, because I believe it highlights how our own doctrine and “way of war” must be a reflection of our own political constitution and beliefs. In this light, population-centric COIN ala FM 3-24 is appropriate. However, FM 3-24 may not be the appropriate COIN strategy for the “host” governments and societies that we are aiding. By implementing 3-24 in a FID or SFA manner, its required that we and the host government have the same concept of what a legitimate and effective government is and that it will be the ultimate goal of the conflict.
s/f
Phil Ridderhof USMC