Wow, thank you so much for that tutorial
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Originally Posted by
Bob's World
"unconventional warfare" does not mean you dress like rambo and conduct raids from some camp deep in the swamp or jungle. It may mean you wear a $2000 suit, work in a highrise, and pick up the phone and call Fort Bragg and say : "Go see if you can get the populace of country x to make life difficult for their government."
Boy, I sure wish I'd learned all that stuff somewhere...:rolleyes:
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The "unconventional" part is getting the other guy to do your dirty work for you. When we say that SF conducts UW, it means that we are the middlemen between that guy in the suit and that foreign populace facilitating the transaction.
Given the fact that I did the SF thing probably about the time you were born, good to know things haven't changed in that sphere. :D
I'll yet again point out that the issue to me is who got who to do what dirty work. As Tom says, I was painting that stuff on cave walls long ago -- and I distinctly recall that we in the form of Silas Deane and Ben Franklin conned -er, persuaded, Vergennes to convince a reluctant Louis and even more reluctant French Navy that even though there was a massive risk to France due to an already overburdened treasury the potential of an alliance of France, Spain and the new nation could offset British Naval superiority. An idea we had absolutely no intention of honoring.
So. Using your elastic definition was the UW practitioner France -- or the nascent US??? ;)
I don't know - I think we're mixing missions and concepts of employment
Bob's World wrote:
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Our problem is we're like a mechanic who fixed an engine using three particular wrenches, they aren't doing the job on a couple of cars that just came into the lot. Someone said "have you tried this new SFA wrench? It looks just like the FID wrench your holding there, but its very different and sure to work." So you get all excited and go back to wrenching away at the engine now with this new tool worked into the mix.
If it comes down to confusing FID with SFA ala wrenches, then I think we're missing the point. Recently some folks came up to participate in a BCBL experiment with the guidance " when someone says SFA you say FID", after we were done they understood that when FID is called for as a mission based on its definition - then call it FID. FID is still a very useful construct.
If we are going to use this analogy, then SFA might better be described as the range of sockets for building sustainable security forces capability and capacities with the missions and authorities as the wrench - and at least with respect to our policy objectives - the USG as the head mechanic. In this analogy - you may or may not own the garage, but you are sure to have to work on many types and makes of vehicles, and under a variety of conditions - as such SFA is about having the right tool(s) available at the right time. FID is still very relevant as a policy tool when the objectives and conditions require it as a mission - as such it might be considered in this analogy as the way the mechanic works on the car, or the end his work supports .
We may just have to agree to disagree - which is OK - ultimately the distinction matters far less then being able to fully meet the operational requirements in this area, and there is more preventing us from doing that then just terminology.
Best, Rob
PS- JMM - good stuff on Laura Secord - I got interested in her after I heard her story. The Canadian perspective on North American military history is one we don't get much of down here.
We agree - sort of - strat4egic and operational context matters
Bob's World wrote:
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My opinion? No. Because it is just one more approach designed to address the symptoms of insurgency.
Here we do agree. Building sustainable capabilities and capacities of foreign security forces that do not represent a legitimate authority by may buy you some time, but probably will not in itself resolve internal political problems.
Context Matters -
Although that may not have been your objective - I say may not because your objective may have nothing to do with defeating an insurgency - but may be in fact to offset a regional actor, disrupt transnational LOCs, create additional capacity in a partner. Once you increase sustainable capability and capacity it may get used in a number of ways, some you probably did not anticipate -here again design may help you look at the range of possible outcomes and even if the policy course is set, at least you will have a better idea of what might be on the horizon.
WRT to the design guide here - this case this was mostly a functional design, meaning that while it did lay out some elements of an operational approach, the details of what to do and why have to come from the hard work of doing a full blown operational design (this is where you inject context) complete with all the relevant LOEs.
Part of the reason I thought a focus on identifying the functional requirements was useful is because it helps you consider the organizational, environmental, and institutional requirements of the FSF to generate, employ and sustain. It seems we often get caught up in a "generate enough for us to employ" loop since it suits our immediate objectives while not looking at the long term requirements.
One of the things that does come to light using operational design for any LOE is the issue of contingent objectives - e.g. you get to points where its unlikely the next thing you want to accomplish in one LOE can occur until there is progress in another LOE -could be economics, could be politics or governance. Doing this ahead of time in an operational design would seem to support unity of effort across the USG and multinational partners.
This may be one of the reasons (there are others) we seem to be having a hard time meeting operational requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan where we are doing this on a large scale and by extension one where our internal political clock has such an impact. I'm not sure we fully understand this issue of contingent development in its operational context. In smaller operations where the footprint is small and largely flys under the domestic political radar (meaning its not threatening anyone's re-election), and where normal USG support has not been subject to the type of contingency where it is truncated or diminished to the point where we now feel compelled to act immediately - the issue of contingent development has more time to surface and be addressed. When it is a matter of the converse, such a misstep can result in a major set back that makes further development more difficult as both internal pressures compounded by enemy activity, and regional politics as well as our own domestic politics compound the issues.
Best, Rob
You're riding the wrong pinto, Tonto ...
The Indians were:
1. not the largest system - lots of land over the mountains; but not that many Indians, and those divided into many bands - not even Pontiac and Tecumseh could put Humpty together for long.
2. not numerous at all east of the mountains, since the Chimoukimaanig ("long knives") had pretty much killed or driven most of them out.
3. mercurial as all get out - the French-Canadian Marines found them inconsistent allies, even if led by the officiers and sous-officiers who were part Indian.
Since the RW became widespread, I suppose you could consider large parts of the Earth as the larger surrounding circle.
But, I don't see where that addresses BW's comments:
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So, how could this tool of SFA helped England in successfully resolving the Separatist Movement in the American Colonies?? Would building the capacity and capability of the loyalist security forces have made a significant difference in the outcome of this whole affair?
My opinion? No. Because it is just one more approach designed to address the symptoms of insurgency.
And, my gosh (and I'm sober) - I agree with COL Jones:
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A successful approach would have had to address the express concerns of the Colonists; granting them not only full rights of citizenship, but also recognizing that due to their distance from the throne that they would not only require representation in Parliment from each colony; but that they having tasted freedom would require some degree of governmental autonomy separate from the King and parliment to decide over a body of laws that covered their day to day lives.
But, if that happened (and merging the commerces on an equal basis), what would have happened once the colonies developed as they did (plus having Canada) ? Move the capital to New York, I suppose.
There is a alternative history on the RW, except its foundation is a Burgoyne victory at Saratoga. Robert Sobel, For Want of a Nail - complete with extensive footnotes (as fictional as the story). Very imaginative.
Sgt. York is on - guess I'll watch it for the umpteenth time.