What are we selling here...
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Originally Posted by
Surferbeetle
This is where theory and reality clash. Of course it's military business...If we must intervene, it is to our economic benefit (and I would say that more than economics is involved) to leave behind stable countries which can contribute to the stability of the global system... Part of this fight included 'nation building' operations which brings us back to Uboat509's wisdom.(emphasis added / kw)
Note the words I placed in bold -- that's the issue, the worth of Civil Affairs is not being attacked.
There's no question that Civil Affairs as a branch and discipline is necessary nor is there any doubt about the good things they've done. The question is who can best provide the sustained efforts to other nations to preclude the commitment of US Armed Forces in large quantities. If such a commitment is necessary, then Civil Affairs will of course be critically important until some stability is obtained and the civil side which is capable of long term effort is able to initially augment and then eventually supplant the CA effort so that CA can reset for the next effort.
Military force should be a last resort when all other options fail. If, however, it's committed, then of course CA is necessary. The goal should be to avoid commitments of the Armed Forces, it's hard on the bods...
No one is arguing that nation building has not been or is not necessary nor does anyone dispute how we we've done it in the past or that CA has done great work -- but we also used to ride to work on elephants...
And some of us like to roller skate in buffalo herds...
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
... the worth of Civil Affairs is not being attacked.
Ken, no beef with you on this, you are consistent on this and other points in your postings.
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
The question is who can best provide the sustained efforts to other nations to preclude the commitment of US Armed Forces in large quantities.
Effective Interagency efforts can preclude wars and can help to end wars on more favorable terms. If a frog had wings...as of today our Interagency efforts are still not where they need to be, nor have they ever been in our past. This was why I posted the CA history; despite our best efforts wars will always occur and in every US war to date the Army screams 'Nation building is not my job' and then ends up having to do the bulk of it by default...I say again, the US Army has consistently repeated this same behavior since 1776.
Since repeating the same behavior and expecting different results is nonsensical, we need to permanently build in effective (staffing levels and range of skill sets) nation building capability into the Army. Call them CA (defined here as part of the SOF team AC & RC), call them Advisers, call them what you will, we need to admit we have a problem in this area of full spectrum operations and get 'Army Strong' in this area. Hindsight being 20/20, early Interagency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan might have been more successful in preventing/deflecting/reducing our troubles with additional SOF/Adviser assistance. Effective Interagency and SOF/Adviser efforts will almost certainly ease our passage from Iraq and Afghanistan.
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
Military force should be a last resort when all other options fail.
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
The goal should be to avoid commitments of the Armed Forces, it's hard on the bods...
Truly wise words here and you have argued elsewhere that if we build effective nation building capability (staffing levels and range of skill sets) into the US Military it will be used, which may lead to additional problems down the road. It's a good and wise analysis my friend, however the requirement still remains, and our history since 1776 reflects that we do not avoid these types of commitments. Accordingly, it is way, way past time for the Army to stand up and say 'Hi, my name is the US Army and I have a serious problem with nation building...'
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
-- but we also used to ride to work on elephants...
:wry:
And poor Roger Miller died. Young...
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Originally Posted by
Surferbeetle
If a frog had wings...as of today Interagency efforts are still not where they need to be, nor have they ever been in our past.
True on both counts. Just because the US government has always been shortsighted is indicative of the possibility that it will remain so. However, there is a slight if not an equal chance that can be changed.
Those who fight for the Status Quo are likely to get it.
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This was why I posted the CA history: in every US war the Army screams 'Nation building is not my job' and then ends up having to do it by default...I say again, the US Army has consistently repeated this same behavior since 1776.
I don't think that is correct. As your own examples show, that was not true in and after WW II. It was not true in Korea or Viet Nam to my recollection. There was indeed an early burble in Viet Nam but that was because the Army deliberately pushed State and USAid out of the picture -- so whose fault was that...:rolleyes:
Now we want to do that again?
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We need to permanently build in effective (staffing levels and range of skill sets) nation building capability into the Army. Call them CA, call them Advisors, call them what you will we need to admit we have a problem in this area of full spectrum operations and get strong in this area.
Not going to happen. Not affordable or sustainable. We can add some and will; we can better train everyone to do this better and we seem to be doing so. We can take SF / SOCOM / CA elements and apply them in the pre-emptive mode (which is what Bob's World and I are essentially saying) and we can apply others as adjuncts or augmentation to better trained GPF units 'enhanced' to provide advisory and nation building support where necessary -- as is being done.
You know as well as I do that the capability to get all the required skills aboard and keep them current only exists in the RC and those units have to compete with others for spaces, further, that the turnover and mobility in many of those skills mitigates against any significant expansion.
If the Army were to take your unaffordable advice and significantly enhance the internal 'nation building' capability and that cape were not used for, say five to ten years -- do you really think either the Army or Congress would allow those mostly unused space and units to remain in the structure? They never have in the past and that's what caused your cited problem in prior wars. The bulk of the CA effort was where it should have been, in the Reserve (I'd add some in the Guard, as well for several reasons). An AC buildup to augment BCTs is underway and that's all you're likely to get.
As for the RC guys, I've got more than a little familiarity with a number of nominally Civic Action / Training projects here and there including these LINK. Read the practical stuff, pgs 5-7 of the .pdf. GAO is not that swift but other assessments broadly agreed on the training and diplomatic benefits. That is not a knock, merely to point out that you have to grope and spend big bucks for small return to find productive training.
Thus it is in everyone's interest to push the USG to develop the Civil and State / USAid capability because if you don't:
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if we build the capability it will be used, which may lead to additional problems down the road.
Just so. Inviting problems to solve is the preferred course of action?
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...but once again we have had to do this type of work since 1776...
I say again: "but we also used to ride to work on elephants."
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The requirement will never go away. It is way, way past time for the Army to stand up and say 'Hi, my name is the US Army and I have a serious problem with nation building...'
I totally agree! you're absolutely correct. Good point.
It will never go away and the Army needs to be prepared for probable employment and possible expansion as required of both civil affairs and general nation building efforts. We can agree on that. Where we disagree I think is on the extent or limits of sensible expansion in view the world situation today. My sensing is that you wish a significant expansion and my sensing is that the requisite skills are not going to flock to the Army -- especially if we avoid interventions for a while and they are in uniform but way underemployed. IOW, be careful what you ask for , you may get it
We also, it appears, differ in that you seem to be of the opinion the Army should want the mission and stand up to say we can do it and we can do it better. I strongly disagree. It is not a core task and while it was absorbed by a large conscripted Army of 12M bodies in WW II, it is undesirable in a small professional force -- underline 'small' -- that cannot afford too many off core missions or to devote to may resources to missions that are inherent (like CA etc.). It is one thing to be prepared for full spectrum contingencies and for nation building as many of us advocate. It is quite another to develop excess capability for one spectrum that will adversely impact others and which is unlikely to ever be large or robust enough to operate at needed capacity lacking another major existential war. IOW, if it is almost certainly going to need augmentation, better that augmentation be available.
Going a step further, it is not desirable in my view for the Armed Forces to be the only elements of the USG to have to "embrace the suck" as they say. That needs for many reasons to be shared for the sake of all the nation. So given that, the 'augmentation' problem plus staffing and recruiting realities it seems to me the best course of action is for the Army to stand up and say 'Hi, my name is the US Army and I have a serious problem with nation building -- I can and will provide entry and non-secure environment capability but it is our considered professional opinion and advice that it would be better for the nation to avoid such cases if at all possible through better intelligence assessments followed by diplomatic, aid and development assistance. However, in the event all that fails and if a military commitment is unavoidable, the nation should be prepared at the earliest possible time to augment then replace the Army's capability." We've about worn out the "Yessir, yessir, three bags full... " option. History also shows where that has gotten us... :wry:
Lastly and most importantly and back to the real point -- the USG should expend more effort to AVOID wars instead of trying to get into them and then screwing the pooch. If you do not force the Diplomats and Policy Makers to send civilians and guardsmen and reservists off to wars, they will have no reason to avoid them. Again, build a capability that aches to be used and it will be.
Not really on the big. Not even too many on the quantity.
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Originally Posted by
Kiwigrunt
I fear that that someone, or a large number of someones, are the ones holding the biggest ricebowls. And they would need to break a lot of ricebowls.
DoD is made of thousands of small ones; like any operation, you just have to attack the nodes. As Slapout will tell you, in SBW, you have to identify those with motive, means and opportunity. That changes from time to time but one can generally track the power centers. For example, Project Manager FCS is no longer one though I'm sure they're fighting for another name and a transfusion.
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Appears to me that said bureaucracy has grown into such a large beast, with so many self lickers and self fuelers...
True, like I said, many, many -- just hit the right ones, perhaps a couple of dozen. Most of 'em are alright and need little modification, just change the few that one believes need to be modified -- or killed.
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Wonder where hearts and minds at home would fit into all that:confused:
Nowhere. Bureaucracies are heartless and mindless. This is a good thing, don't need to be sympathetic when attacking them and you can outsmart them. Plus they all have blind spots. However, some do have Scouts and early warning systems and some are devious -- just have to be a little smarter, a bit stealthy and flank 'em on the blind side... :D
Well, okay, I can think (sort of...) - but could we clarify a definition?
Define intervention, please. With respect to Iran during the dates you mention I'm confused. To me, the word intervention used with respect to the affairs of nations implies this:
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a. To involve oneself in a situation so as to alter or hinder an action or development
b. To interfere, usually through force or threat of force, in the affairs of another nation.
Full Spectrum Stone Soup vs. Hearts and Minds
Americans live the Stone Soup parable every day. We have all been that traveler living on his wits who walks into a town with a stone and walks out with a meal. Part of the reason we do it so well is that our collective family histories pull from every nation on earth where everybody makes soup differently. DOD took a page from this type of thinking when it configured our military forces. Unfortunately things within DOD having gotten out of balance and our problems are compounded by a general systemic failure to practice making stone soup with other government agencies. Fortunately there are still localized exceptions within DOD that believe in and practice the parable.
We are all thinking about what Full Spectrum Warfare/Unrestricted Warfare is.
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The multiplication of the means of waging war has expanded the scope of military activities, amended the idea that "war is bloody politics" and of "war as the final means for settling disputes." The object of war is no longer just to "use military force to force the enemy to accept one’s will" but now is "use any method, including military and non-military means, lethal and non-lethal means to force the enemy to satisfy one’s own interest". [p. 55]
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
Just because the US government has always been shortsighted is indicative of the possibility that it will remain so. However, there is a slight if not an equal chance that can be changed.
Those who fight for the Status Quo are likely to get it
My point exactly; it is my argument that we are consistently weak in integrating the non-lethal/non-kinetic means portion into the warfare spectrum and that we have the ability to transform that weakness into a strength in a fiscally conservative manner. The reflexive counter argument that is often heard is that things are just fine the way they are.
Unlike the reflexive counter argument your well thought out and nuanced counter argument provides some opportunities to examine how we can cost effectively integrate the non-kinetic portion into the warfare spectrum ;)
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
If the Army were to take your unaffordable advice and significantly enhance the internal 'nation building' capability and that cape were not used for, say five to ten years -- do you really think either the Army or Congress would allow those mostly unused space and units to remain in the structure? They never have in the past and that's what caused your cited problem in prior wars.
This is the crux of things right here Ken. It is my contention that if you take Uncle Sugar’s Nickel, irrespective of what your civilian attire/uniform color is, you have to ride on the merry-go-round.
Consider the headcount that exists solely in USG personnel who are presently resident in funded positions in USAID, DOS, USPHS, DOJ, USACE, Marine CAG/ENG/MC/NC (AC & RC), Army SF/CA/PSYOP/JAG/MP/ENG/MC/NC/MSC (AC, RC, & ARNG), USN Seals/JAG/ENG/MC/NC/MSC (AC & RC), and USAF JAG/ENG/MC/NC/MSC (AC, RC, AFNG).
Let’s sum that headcount number and assign it the variable X. Let's then assign the ideal number of people needed to accomplish our overseas non-kinetic mission the variable Y (and yes I am very aware that some of these folks are already multiskilled and can also do kinetic work).
It is my opinion that the ratio of X/Y multiplied by 100 is much greater than 100%. After designating nondeployables my contention remains that our existing personnel ratio is still much greater than 100%.
Tying nonkinetic USG civilian slots to an equivalent number of nonkinetic reserve/national guard slots (this force needs to be rebalanced -Advisors~SF/CA/PSYOP/ENG/JAG/MP/MC/NC/MSC) stretches our scarce taxpayer dollars, brings in valuable insights & methodologies not common to the US Military, and as a method of ‘Democracy in Action’ it keeps us out of unnecessary wars…
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
You know as well as I do that the capability to get all the required skills aboard and keep them current only exists in the RC and those units have to compete with others for spaces, further, that the turnover and mobility in many of those skills mitigates against any significant expansion.
Again my point exactly; non-kinetic skills are practiced daily in the civilian world and are best fielded by reserve/national guard types who have and practice the needed skill sets. Serving in the guard and reserve will expand your experience base, to include that of the concept of turnover as taught in the active component. Due to pesky fiscal (and other) constraints it is not uncommon to find people who will serve 20 or 30 years in their state or even a unit. Unit cohesiveness benefits as a result.
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
We also, it appears, differ in that you seem to be of the opinion the Army should want the mission and stand up to say we can do it and we can do it better. I strongly disagree.
Again it is my contention that if you take Uncle Sugar’s Nickel, irrespective of what your civilian attire/uniform color is, you have to ride on the merry-go-round. USG is USG…kind of like War is War. ;)
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
Lastly and most importantly and back to the real point -- the USG should expend more effort to AVOID wars instead of trying to get into them and then screwing the pooch. If you do not force the Diplomats and Policy Makers to send civilians and guardsmen and reservists off to wars, they will have no reason to avoid them. Again, build a capability that aches to be used and it will be.
We are in violent agreement here….
I don't really disagree with any of that but I do think that realistically, there are
some minor obstacles...
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Originally Posted by
Surferbeetle
...it is my argument that we are consistently weak in integrating the non-lethal/non-kinetic means portion into the warfare spectrum and that we have the ability to transform that weakness into a strength in a fiscally conservative manner.
That is true and is unlikely to change; we have the ability but Congressional desire is required. They may do the right thing. That would be different...
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It is my opinion that the ratio of X/Y multiplied by 100 is much greater than 100%. After designating nondeployables my contention remains that our existing personnel ratio is still much greater than 100%.
Possibly true but don't forget to decrement those doing other things that cannot be deployed because they're deployed elsewhere -- also, do not forget a rotation stack, ideally that means four of everything; three could work, so could two in a pinch but not for long.
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Again it is my contention that if you take Uncle Sugar’s Nickel, irrespective of what your civilian attire/uniform color is, you have to ride on the merry-go-round. USG is USG…kind of like War is War. ;)
True dat...
Answer to who was the Navy Air Commander Philippines
I had hoped someone would have answered the question I asked over a week ago about who was the Navy Air Commander in, bases, in the Philippines from end of WW II to 1947.
So, I will attempt to guess at the answer myself, since no one else has.
I think the overall 45-47 Naval Air Commander was Admiral Spruance, while the Navy on the ground air bases throughout the Philippines was commanded by Commodore Arthur Gavin, USN.
Now, can anyone else elaborate or correct me on the Navy air structure, who was in command, etc. at end of WW II in and on the Philippines. I may be either wrong or incomplete in these guessed at answers. Thanks.
Mostly myth - but they believed it which was his point.
Here are two big defeats, there are others.
LINK.
LINK.
And here's how it wrapped up: LINK .