"North Vietnam" was not an outside power
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
And by that time well over 90 plus percent of the original insurgents were dead. I'm aware of Mao's Phases -- even more aware of Giap's (who was about twice as smart as Mao) plan.Probably true.Not really true with respect to Viet Nam -- most of the populace just wanted to be left alone. Some insurgencies are started and run by very dedicated folks who take the semblance of a problem, elevate it to a casus belli and go for broke.
I usually object to comparisons of Malaya and Viet Nam because the efforts were so very different -- but they do have one thing in common; in both cases an outside power (China in the first case, North Viet Nam in the second) took some social ills and raised them to start insurrections. Both were effectively stopped by a combination of good COIN tactics (very belatedly in VN) and political fixes. The big difference was that China was in no position to elevate to Phase III.
So yeah, it was a three phase effort -- but the insurgents didn't win they were mostly Southerners who did not necessarily want to hew to Ho. Another nation's fighters did win -- and the North had manipulated the VC almost as badly as they did the US.
The insurgency in VN, BTW, does not meet your definition of bad underlying conditions; the South was in better shape than the North on that score in the early 60s an people in both nations knew that.
Ok Ken, now I have to comment on your supporting argument that N.Vietnam was an outside power that instigated and manipulated and sustained a S. Vietnam insurgency. This is whole idea of a "North" and "South" Vietnam is just another aspect of the Western Colonial influence imposed on one populace. Vietnam had enjoyed some 900 years of independence from China prior to being subjected to about 100 years of French occupation and colonization. Upon successfully defeating that occupation the country was artificially divided into North and South states for purely Western political purposes. Did China and Russia support the Vietnamese movement to liberate themselves from this Western influence? Absolutely. Was North Vietnam somehow an "outside power" because a group of white men thousands of miles away drew a line on a map? Hardly.
This goes to a key aspect of my Populace-Centric theory. (Not controlling the populace, as in Kilcullen's population-centric tactics applied in Iraq; but in focusing on the needs, desires, perspectives and will of the populace as one engages through their government. To seek to meet our own interests in ways that are not counter to the interests of the populace; and to be, where necessary, an enabler of better relations between a populace and its governance and not a wedge to the same.)
We ignored the will of the Vietnamese populace writ-large by first reinstating the French occupation, and then by enforcing the artificial border through the heart of their homeland as part of our Cold War hedge against the Soviets.
I'd hate to see us make the same (similar) mistake in Afghanistan / Pakistan where a historic populace is also in revolt and we are preparing to commit tremendous energy once again to enforce a border created by white men thousands of miles away that cuts through the heart of the Pashtu homeland to reinforce states that reflect Western interests more than the interests of the Populaces they encompass.
When we learn from history, it is important that we take away the right lessons. Just me, but to me the main lesson is that the west can no longer simply expect eastern populaces to accept what we lay out for them, but that we can still achieve our vital interests in these areas by changing our approach to one of reinforcing the will of the populaces of these regions as prioritized over any vestiges of western governmental constructs imposed over the years, or ideas of how we currently want them to behave.
Surely we can be smart enough to find a way to support divided historic populaces around the world without having to destroy the states they reside within. Surely we can be smart enough to support troubled states without having to destroy the historic populaces that are divided by their borders.
My vote is for fighting smarter, not harder. We need a surge of strategic thinking, not a surge of hard young riflemen like my son. As long as we think we are there to "defeat" some threat as opposed to enable a stronger relationship between a populace and its governance we will fail. As long as people seriously think that a Clausewitzian model of warfare based on study of the Napoleonic wars between states applies directly to this type of conflict we will fail.
This is people business. Understand people first; second understand what actions over the years have manifested in the conditions of conflict that exist. Next, sit down and figure out new ways to meet your national interests in that region that are designed not to reinforce the failed system, but to enable a new system that has a chance to work.
(Ok, this is way longer, and went down a path I did not fully intend when I started typing 20 minutes ago, but sometimes you just have to go with the flow. Ken, clearly this is not all aimed at you. I just think you mischaracterize the true Vietnamese populace, but I also understand you have valid reasons for your positions. You earned them, and I have the highest respect for that.)
Perhaps I am not the one who is adrift...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
Clausewtiz did not base his understanding of war purely on his experiences of fighting against Napoleonic armies. Clausewitz observations on the nature of war is applicable to any form of armed conflict.
Well that's exactly what Clausewitz says, except he wrote On WAR, and you are drifting off into National Policy and Strategy, of which WAR is a subset of skills and capabilities.
Warfare is a tool, and a pretty dam good one, when applied to right problem.
Good points, but said another way, one might ask: "Is all violence "warfare"? or "If a state opts to respond to violence by waging warfare against the perpetrators of that violence does that make it warfare"?
Or, as WILF suggests, perhaps is it really a much larger issue that touches National Policy and Strategy?
I believe that many see this the way WILF does and I recognize that it is the majority position, so by a purely democratic or mathmatic analysis, it must be right.
I challenge that status quo thinking though, believing that an insurgency is most often better "neutralized" through addressing root causes than "defeated" by waging war against one's own populace as if it were a foreign state.
When a foreign country intervenes in such an internal conflict to protect interests they have there, they tend to want to keep the current government in place so work to not only do so, but also to help put down the rebellion. Right or Wrong is not the metric, preserving access to the national interest is.
When a foreign country intervenes in such an internal conflict to create interests they desire there, they tend to want to dispose of the government in place, so work to do so and to also lend aid to the rebellion in its efforts. Right or Wrong is not the metric here either, gaining access to the national interest is.
These actions of National Policy and Strategy revolving around these popular revolts make up the family of operations we call "Insurgency" and "Counterinsurgency" and "Foreign Internal Defense" and "Unconventional Warfare." But is it warfare in the true Clauswitzian sense? Perhaps. My point is that it is worth considering through both lights to have the best perspective. The concept of "Irregular Warfare" is based on the perspective that all of these activites are indeed war. But consider the source, IW came from the military, so naturally they see it that way.
Another way is to look at all of these violent internal struggles as all part of man's natural reaction to dealing with problems that can't be resolved peacefully, the appliation of violence. But that does not make it necessarily "war."
To avoid thread derailment, a brief response.
Bob's World said
Quote:
...now I have to comment on your supporting argument that N.Vietnam was an outside power that instigated and manipulated and sustained a S. Vietnam insurgency.
I do not agree with that statement, not what I said. However, that is closer to reality than the rest of your admittedly correct in idealistic terms argument. Reality differed. As you said:
Quote:
We ignored the will of the Vietnamese populace writ-large by first reinstating the French occupation, and then by enforcing the artificial border through the heart of their homeland as part of our Cold War hedge against the Soviets.
And the rest as they say is history -- in the Case of Viet Nam, history with many myths embedded and the normal case of people believing what they want to believe.
Steve Blair has it right IMO.
To get back on the thread, Bob's World later said:
Quote:
I challenge that status quo thinking though, believing that an insurgency is most often better "neutralized" through addressing root causes than "defeated" by waging war against one's own populace as if it were a foreign state.
When a foreign country intervenes in such an internal conflict to protect interests they have there, they tend to want to keep the current government in place so work to not only do so, but also to help put down the rebellion. Right or Wrong is not the metric, preserving access to the national interest is.
I agree and that tracks with what I believe CavGuy is trying to show. I'd only offer two cautions for him as to what happened in several of his examples and for the consideration of all as policy issues:
Be very sure you truly understand what are the root causes. As the digression on Viet Nam shows, opinions can vary and affect the outcome...
On the second quoted point, I believe such 'keeping' should be determined based on the host nation's national interest, not the intervenor's as generally occurs.
We'll just have to agree to stand 180 degrees out on this
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
I'm not sure you are actually challenging a position I in particular hold. Insurgency is the use of "military means" - organised violence for a "political purpose."
The problem is that the root cause is often impossible to address without defeating the insurgents first. What is more, as in Sierra Leone, the stated cause, (democracy) was not actually the source of the violence (resources).
Sure, addressing the roots of conflict, often avoid/delay conflict. One you are fighting though, it's best to win. Peace is nice. It's not a requirement.
I will have to join Mr. Webster (": a condition of revolt against a government that is less than an organized revolution and that is not recognized as belligerency"), the U.S. DOD and NATO("An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.), and a host of others in disagreeing with your definition of insurgency. In fact, an insurgent, not having a military, can not likely employ "military means." He employs violence. He employs terror, but only in phase III as in Vietnam or China (sorry Ken) does he employ "military means" Certainly the counterinsurgent, possessing a military is free to, and often does, "employ military means" in responding to such violent popular uprisings.
I also take the position that defeating a symptom, (the insurgent), is the delaying action, as new insurgents will always emerge so long as the underlying conditions exist. Addressing the concerns of the populace is the enduring solution. Again, we will remain 180 degrees out on this point, and I am comfortable with that.
Example: The defeat of the MNLF in the 70's is cited as a "victory," yet here they are still fighting the government of the Philippines as the underlying conditions were never addressed.
Any "victory" in an insurgency built primarily on the slain bodies of the rebelling populace has merely buried the coals to burst into flames again in due time. The history of man is replete with examples of this fact.
To this neutral observer,
the last few posts are not really off-topic. Although they deal more with the "How of Fighting" (rather than the "Who of Fighting"), that seems to be a fundamental dichotomy in how these armed conflicts are analysed - and what is considered more important, the "How" or the "Who".
The Lyall paper, "Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents? Reassessing Democracy’s Impact on War Outcomes and Duration", and a forthcoming Lyall and Wilson paper, "Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars", with supporting dataset, emphasize the "How" - seemingly, a counterpoint to Niel's tentative suggestion as to where his dataset is taking him.
That is an observation only - not a judgment.
Brief opinion piece (looking at Vietam from a different viewpoint):
Vietnam seems to me to be a tough nut to catagorize. From the French and US viewpoints, it was an insurgency by the Viet Minh and later Viet Cong with a heavy North Vietnamese overlay. Viewed from Giap's standpoint, it was an insurgency by Vietnamese (North and South) who cast their lot with the French and Americans. From his standpoint (he was a lawyer; then a general), his was the legally constituted government of Indochina from 1946. As such, he mounted counter-insurgency campaigns using different methods depending on the totality of circumstances he faced at the time. Some worked; some didn't. He adapted.
Major problems with that study
Quote:
Originally Posted by
jmm99
the last few posts are not really off-topic. Although they deal more with the "How of Fighting" (rather than the "Who of Fighting"), that seems to be a fundamental dichotomy in how these armed conflicts are analysed - and what is considered more important, the "How" or the "Who".
The Lyall
paper, "Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents? Reassessing Democracy’s Impact on War Outcomes and Duration", and a forthcoming Lyall and Wilson
paper, "Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars", with supporting
dataset, emphasize the "How" - seemingly, a counterpoint to Niel's tentative suggestion as to where his dataset is taking him.
That is an observation only - not a judgment.
A lot of the differences are explained in the dataset inclusion of (a) the 1800's, (b) a looser definition of insurgency, and (c) counting draws as insurgent victory.
Secondly, I have major, major issues with their "case study" of 4ID vs. 101st ABN (AA) in OIF 1 as the example of how mech hurts COIN forces Comparing the 82d ABN in Anbar 2003 and 1AD in Baghdad would yield a somewhat different result. That assertion is plain crap. My IR professor forwarded me that article, and I am working on a rebuttal piece for International Organizations. We hashed a SWC thread on it here - but bottom line if mech hurts COIN forces than how come 3ACR (has least number of dismounted troops of any BCT in the Army), and 1/1 AD (heavy legacy BCT) were hugely COIN successful?
Finally, I would submit the correlation of mechanization and decreasing counterinsurgent success is also clearly related to the information revolution - insurgencies need to spread their message.
Niel, Lyall-Wilson and you,
because of the differences you cite, seem to engage using the statistical approach (vs. the "matched" units approach) only in their Model 7, where their criteria do still differ from yours, as you point out:
Quote:
(Mech article, p.25 in .pdf)
Interestingly, REGIME only reaches statistical significance in the post-1945 era ~Model 7! and is negatively associated with incumbent victory, suggesting that as states become more democratic their vulnerability to defeat increases. This at once supports and qualifies existing arguments about presumed ineffectiveness of democratic states in COIN wars. To be sure, it suggests that as political systems become more open, the likelihood of defeat is also increased. Yet these shifts in regime type could occur at lower ends of the 21-point Polity2 values—that is, a shift from 5 to a 0—and therefore one should not conclude that stable democracies are especially vulnerable. [71] Moreover, the time-dependent nature of this effect is at least partially inconsistent with claims that audience costs or educated middle classes are hobbling democratic war efforts. Indeed, neither mechanism is exclusive to democracies, nor is it clear why their effects should only be observed after 1945.
[71] We re-estimated Model 7 with a dummy DEMOC variable that denoted whether a state’s regime score was .7, the conventional threshold for being coded a stable democracy, DEMOC was not significant.
This part of the discourse reminds me of many "battles of the experts" in which I've participated - not as an expert, but as the guy who had to translate the expert to the judge or jury. As you know, many of these battles degenerate (from the non-expert's standpoint) into inside baseball arguments between the experts.
What I've gleaned from my experience is that the practical examples weigh more with the non-expert than anything else. E.g.,
Quote:
from Cavguy
... but bottom line if mech hurts COIN forces than how come 3ACR (has least number of dismounted troops of any BCT in the Army), and 1/1 AD (heavy legacy BCT) were hugely COIN successful ?
because ... da, da, da - and you're off to the races. After reading through Lyall's articles, I can see why you are considering the topic. Bonne Chance. :)