If I were Secretary of Defense for a Decade
Bob's World,
I agree. That was the exact response I was going to write. Plus, it lets me take the idea a little further into detail. I would make the assertion that the Iron Triangle of politics which governs our Active and Reserve components, along with their composition, can only truly be influenced by the President, Secretary of Defense (advised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff), and acts of Congress. Economic downturns have the nice effect of forcing consolidation (for better or for worse) but otherwise Congress is useless.
If I were the Secretary of Defense during a decade of stagnant or declining economic prospects, I would do the following:
- Apply the High-Low capability mix to the Navy and Air Force:
- Navy: 6 Large Carriers, 6 “Jeep” Carriers, 12 Boomers, 12 “Blue Water” attack subs, 12 “Brown Water” attack subs, 1 cruiser and 2 destroyers per Carrier, 24 Frigates, start producing as many cheap “Corvette” class patrol ships as all other combat ships combined (6+6+12+12+12+12+24+24=108,) and all necessary support ships...Reserve would have all ships leftover from reorganization (nuclear reactors powered down and under guard).
- Air Force: As many ICBMs as the Navy. Same amount of money spent on UAVs/missles, as piloted combat aircraft. Plenty of aerial support (airlift included) capability. Reserves have 50-50 mix of piloted combat aircraft and aerial support aircraft. No AFNG, only Reserves.
- Special Operations Command (Direct Action): Consists only of a small mission tasking office run from directly under the Joint Chiefs. Personnel and equipment still comes out of each branch.
- Synch the Marine Corps with the Navy: 3 extra-strength MEFs (4 MEU each), and necessary additional personnel (training, embassy guards etc.) Reserves have another extra-strength MEF.
- Army focuses on 1) maintaining a large, well-equipped, well-trained NG, 2) performing on call joint operations with Marines, 3) and on call joint ops with Allies...in that order.
- Army undergoes massive consolidation with all surviving brigades adding personnel and necessary equipment until roughly between 4500-5000 soldiers strong. All companies are between 150-200 strong. Officer and NCO corps purged, increased use of Warrant Officers (Generals retired first, redundant field grades pushed into the IRR or National Guard). Reclass/Rebranch as necessary. Integrate National Guard Installations with AC Div. HQ's for joint training.
- AC: 40 Division HQ's, 8 Training & Support Brigades, 4 Sustainment BDEs, 3 Combat Aviation BDEs, 4 Maneuver Enhancement BDEs, 3 Special Forces BDEs, 3 IBCTs (Airborne), 3 IBCTs, 3 SBCTs, 3 ABCTs, 3 Fires BDEs, 3 Battlefield Surveillance BDEs. 40 Brigades and 40 Div HQ's on 40 Bases= ~200,000 (including Pentagon and civilian staff).
- Reserves: Only maintains IRR, 1 Div HQ, 2 Training & Support Brigade, 1 Maneuver Enhancement Brigade, 1 Sustainment Brigade...all other TPU units transferred to National Guard based on geography. 4 Brigades= ~20,000
- National Guard: 30 Sustainment BDEs, 22 Combat Aviation BDEs, 30 Maneuver Enhancement BDEs, 22 IBCTs, 22 ABCTs, 15 Fires BDEs, 15 Battlefield Surveillance BDEs. 156 Brigades= ~780,000...No overseas deployments without State approval. Check on Executive Power. Capabilities distributed evenly by region.
- All companies are deployable as modular units under different battalions on an ad hoc basis. (MAGTF concept)
- Set Army recruit intake goals at twice the replacement level for enlisted and officers. Ensure that each rank requires half as many soldiers to staff as the next lower rank. Emplace an aggressive up or out policy for Active component with skills testing before every promotion (you must be proficient in the skills of the rank you will be promoted into...team leaders can run squads, lieutenants can run companies.) Soldiers who don't get promoted quickly enough are forced into the Reserves or National Guard (contingent on MOS shortages.) The end result is a Reserve force with a large supply of junior enlisted ready to become an NCO, and many excellent platoon leaders, ready to become Captain.
It saves money (assuming NG costs 1/4th active), reduces the President's capacity for unlimited warfare, and makes the AC more proficient. It is also career suicide, but I wouldn't care.
A More Flexibile Army and A More Stable World
I typed a big long post about a recent article in Military Rview with the same above title, but it went poof in the cyber universe. What the author proposes is interesting and I recommend reading it: http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Military...831_art012.pdf
I have a question for the more knowledgeable posters at SWJ - could the HBCT (now ABCT) and IBCT brigades serve in both heavy and light assignments? I believe some HBCTs did shed the heavy equipment and serve as light forces in both Afghanistan and Iraq, but is it possible to train all armor, mechanized infantry and light infantry as just armor and infantry?
The HBCT combined arms battalion has 2xM1 and 2xM2. The IBCT maneuver battalion consists of 3xinfantry and 1xweapons. I propose changing the IBCT maneuver battalion design to 2 by 2. Armor companies when not assigned the heavy mission would serve as motorized weapons companies and the Bradley infantry would be light infantry. Should the Bradley crews be separate from the rifle platoon or utilize the weapons squad as crew members?
For example in the recent announcement from the Army the force structure will be cut by nine brigades - 4xHBCT, 1xSBCT and 4xIBCT. The 25ID will keep all four brigades. 4ID will have 2xHBCT and 1xIBCT. With my proposal, which I'm sure has been brought up before, all three brigades of the 4D would be capable of either the heavy or light mission. The Army would have combat arms troops trained primarily as M1 crew members, Bradleys and infantry. The 4D brigade assigned the light mission would still be able to train on heavy equipment at station to maintain a level of profficiency.
I would also propose keeping all the teeth in the AC and increasing the numbers of CS and sustainment in the RC. The RC combat brigades would consist of cadre forces that could be brought to full strength in a time of major war. Would this work or would it be detrimental to the RC?