Anyone who worked for Ken Houghton ought
to be welcomed here.
And anyone who's almost as old as I am certainly is... :D
Welcome aboard.
I thought I would add this here
“Moreover, in a day of rapid technical change, when British soldiers were apt to be employed anywhere in the world under conditions that varied widely and could not be anticipated because the tactics, equipment, and transport requirements differed with the circumstances of each campaign, the British Army could not preserve one uniform pattern…About all that could be done to prepare the army to fight was to retain an elasticity in outlook, simplicity in drill, and adopt a common, simplified…training manuals. When the next war came, the British would feel their way amidst the new conditions, but at least their feet would not be chained to a rigid system of tactics long since outmoded”.
Maj Gen Sir John Maurice. The Advantages of Simple Drill 1888
The Origins of Attrition Warfare in U.S. Doctrine
Fred's comments about the origins of attrition warfare are a bit at odds with the facts. When he writes that "(I)t started with U. S. Grant when Lincoln tapped him for command", he does Grant a considerable injustice. Grant's strategy was to prevent the Army of Northern Virginia from being allowed to disengage. If Lee was unable to reinforce the other Southern armies, then Sherman and Thomas would be free to maneuver, outflank and defeat their opponents in the field. (Grant's frustration with Thomas before the Battle of Franklin was based on his fear that Thomas would have the same "slows" that McClellan and too many others had shown.) Whenever Grant had the option, he chose maneuver warfare (Donelson, the entire Vicksburg campaign, the relief of Chattanooga). When, as it did against Lee, the situation required steady pressure, he made that choice but only as a necessary sacrifice, not as the preferred way of doing things. Even as he was dying, Grant felt it necessary to express public regret in his Memoirs over the third and final attack at Cold Harbor. He hated attrition warfare and thought it was complete folly.
Battle Drill and how it is taught
From the U.S. Army perspective, at least pre-OEF/OIF, battle drill was something to do again and again, until it was ground into the membrane. Very little variation was accepted or allowed.
COL MacFarland, of 1/1AD and Ramadi fame, went so far as to say in a CALL interview that Battle Drill, or the rote execution of a formatted response, needed to go away. We needed Soldiers thinking, deciding, executing - not executing a set course of action. I think the enemy, after watching us enough times, gets a feel for our Battle Drill and can template our reactions into their scheme of maneuver, thus creating a more dangerous situation for us. This definitely is an issue in an urban environment, where the enemy has the ability to watch us very closely. One thing I took away from Ramadi was how incredibly good the enemy recce was.
The problem, and I think it is going away, was the attempt to make the squad or platoon's execution of battle drill open to subjective analysis and grading. The U.S. Army still loves Task, Condition, Standard. That is how we train. Stealing this from someone else, but we need to be more focused on results or outcomes. I can honestly say that I have seen OCs at the NTC give very little thought to battle drill and are much more focused on what the end result is. Of course, in a COIN environment, there are very few battle drill opportunities to execute against the incredible set of variables, especially in more complex, urban environments.
Perhaps we still have a conscript-focused training system for a supposedly-professional Army. We do tend to focus on bulk number of iterations vice quality training. We still tend to be obsessed with keeping our numbers looking good. It is also a mixing of Armor mentality (gunnery being easy to grade/quantify) into infanty training.
Tankersteve
The fatal flaw of Task, Condition and Standard based training is
Quote:
Originally Posted by
tankersteve
From the U.S. Army perspective, at least pre-OEF/OIF, battle drill was something to do again and again, until it was ground into the membrane. Very little variation was accepted or allowed.
That it encourages -- almost demands -- exactly that.
Quote:
COL MacFarland, of 1/1AD and Ramadi fame, went so far as to say in a CALL interview that Battle Drill, or the rote execution of a formatted response, needed to go away. We needed Soldiers thinking, deciding, executing - not executing a set course of action. I think the enemy, after watching us enough times, gets a feel for our Battle Drill and can template our reactions into their scheme of maneuver, thus creating a more dangerous situation for us. This definitely is an issue in an urban environment, where the enemy has the ability to watch us very closely. One thing I took away from Ramadi was how incredibly good the enemy recce was.
All totally valid observations based on the way 'Battle Drill' changed after 1975 and the introduction of the very flawed TCS training process. The process effectively decrees that no one should think, just play automaton -- it has totally screwed up Army training at all levels.
Their recon is good because they're patient --patience can be taught (I spent many an hour under watchful eyes without moving...) and we used to do that but the TCS process eliminated that. Know why? It couldn't be defined as a 'task'...
Think about that.
Our Recon is generally poor because we lack patience and our training tries to break the complex process of stealthy reconnaissance into discrete little blocks that don't seem to make sense. Plus, to 'enable' training, a lot of tasks are not taught but are tabbed to the gaining unit to train -- where many of those tasks are usually not trained. The tasks that are taught are all taught pretty much the same way to 'standardize' the performance of the tasks -- that is a guarantee of uniformity.
It also guarantees predictability -- and tactical defeat.
If COL MacFarland said that, and I have no doubt he did and also suggest that many others believe that as well, my question is why have they tolerated such a flawed process??????????
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The problem, and I think it is going away, was the attempt to make the squad or platoon's execution of battle drill open to subjective analysis and grading.
Did you mean to say objective grading? I hope so because one of the reasons for the introduction of the TCS process was to remove subjectivity from grading and replace it with objective grading. Since the assessment of training for war without being at war HAS to be subjective; it was a terribly flawed premise. The only way they could make it look like it worked and introduce an appearance of 'objective grading' was to move to a 'Go - No Go' standard and define the 'tasks' down to bare essentials. That does not allow for combining tasks which is a combat essential.
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The U.S. Army still loves Task, Condition, Standard. That is how we train.
No they don't -- love it, I mean. they accept it but most people instinctively know there is something wrong with it. It's accepted because it treats Soldiers like stupid and ignorant beings. It's a pathetic way to 'train.' The fact that the US Army is as well trained as it is (which is far from great...) is due to the fact that a lot of good Officers and NCOs go beyond the training process and the Troops are about five times as smart as that process assumes.
Quote:
I can honestly say that I have seen OCs at the NTC give very little thought to battle drill and are much more focused on what the end result is. Of course, in a COIN environment, there are very few battle drill opportunities to execute against the incredible set of variables, especially in more complex, urban environments.
Great for the first, true for the second sentence.